Genetic information, life assurance, and the UK policy and regulatory framework by Mittra, James
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/106450  
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
THE BRITISH LIBRARY
BRITISH THESIS SERVICE
COPYRIGHT
Reproduction of this thesis, other than as permitted under 
the United Kingdom Copyright Designs and Patents Act 
1988, or under specific agreement with the copyright 
holder, is prohibited.
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it 
is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis 
may be published without proper acknowledgement.
REPRODUCTION QUALITY NOTICE
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the 
quality of the original thesis. Whilst every effort has been 
made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction, some 
pages which contain small or poor printing may not 
reproduce well.
Previously copyrighted material (journal articles, published 
texts etc.) is not reproduced.
THIS THESIS HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
27
GENETIC INFORMATION, LIFE ASSURANCE, AND THE UK 
POLICY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
By
JAMES MITTRA
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology
University of Warwick, Department of Sociology 
February 2004
i
Table of Contents
Title Page
Contents Page...............  ii
List of Abbreviations........ vi
Acknowledgements........vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND 
ESTABLISHING THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Introduction............................................................................................................  1
2. Social Science and the New Genetics...............................................................  2
3. Genetic Information, Life Assurance, and the Démocratisation........................  11
of Policymaking: Research Aims and Objectives
4. Methodology..............................................................................................................  14
4.1. Research Strategy....................................................................................................... 15
4.2. Qualitative Interviews..................................................................................................  16
4.2.1. Sampling...................................................................................................................... 17
4.2.2. Interview Structure......................................................................................................  23
4.2.3. Data Analysis..............................................................................................................  30
4.3. Document Analysis.....................................................................................................  31
4.4. Ethical Considerations................................................................................................  33
5. Brief Overview of Thesis Chapters...........................................................................  34
CHAPTER 2: GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE PRIVATE LIFE ASSURANCE BUSINESS IN 
THE UK: SOCIAL, COMMERCIAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 38
2. The Spectre o f Eugenics and Its Possible Impact on
Contemporary Genetics Debates........................................................................  42
3. Probability, Risk, and the Birth of UK Life Assurance.....................................  45
3.1. The Early Beginnings of Life Assurance.................................................................  45
3.2. From Divine Providence to Probable Futures.........................................................  46
3.3. Risk, Insurance, and the Growth of Capitalism......................................................  48
3.4. The Social Context of Insurance............................................................................. 55
4. The Underlying Financial and Ethical Principles o f Modem 
Private and Social Insuranca: Risk Analysis, Risk Pooling,
And the Business of Discrim ination..................................................................  61
4.1. Solidarity' and 'Mutuality' in Social and Private Insurance....................................  62
4.2. Life Assurance and the Social Good Argument.....................................................  65
4.3. Balancing Social and Commercial Interests: The Insurance
Industry's Double Truth Doctrine...........................................................................  67
4.4. Risk Analysis and Risk Pooling: The Business' of Discrimination........................  75
Ü
4.4.1. Adverse/Anti-Selection.................................................................................... 76
4.4.2. The Equity Principle and Discrimination .........................................................  81
5. Genetic Information and Life Assurance Underwriting: Likely
S ocia l, Commercial, Legal and Ethical Implications.................................. 86
5.1. The Special Nature of Genetic Information.....................................................  87
5.2. Interview Responses to the Status of Genetic Information: Equivalency
And Non-equivalency Arguments....................................................................  89
5.3. Genetic Discrimination and Insurance............................................................. 101
5.3.1. The Case of HIV and AIDS Discrimination in Private Insurance..................... 102
5.3.2. Genetic Discrimination and Social Exclusion.................................................. 105
6. The Medical Context: Privacy and Ownership............................................ 117
6.1. The Medical Profession and Confidentiality.................................................... 117
6.2. Privacy and Ownership of Genetic Information..............................................  119
7. Genetics and Life Assurance: Exploring Solutions .................................. 125
7.1. The Flexibility of a Commercial Market.........................................................  125
7.2. The Creative Capacity of the Insurance Industry to Create New Products .. 128
7.3. Implications of Genetic Information for the Privatisation of Welfare............ 131
8. Conclusion................................................................................................... 132
CHAPTER 3: STAKEHOLDER ACCOUNTS OF THEIR CONCERNS OVER GENETIC 
INFORMATION AND LIFE ASSURANCE IN THE UK
1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 137
2. Interest Groups and their Ideological Commitments.................................  138
3. Clinical/Scientific Interest groups ................................................................. 139
3.1. Interview Accounts of the Genetics and Life Assurance Problem..................  140
3.2. Clinical Organisations and Policy.....................................................................  153
4. Patient-Support G roups................................................................................  158
4.1. Interview Accounts of Patient-Support Group Concerns.................................  158
4.2. Patient-Support Groups and the Policy Process............................................. 175
5. Insurance Perspectives................................................................................  182
5.1. Interview Accounts of Industry Concerns...................................................... 183
6. C onclusion.....................................................................................................  191
CHAPTER 4: GENETIC INFORMATION AND LIFE ASSURANCE IN THE UK:
A CRITIQUE OF THE FORMAL POLICY AND REGULATORY PROCESS
1. Introduction......................................................................................................... 195
2. Politics W ithout Reason? A Critical Analysis o f the Formal
Policy P rocess..........................................................................
iii
197
2.1 A Short History of Regulation................................................................................197
2.2. The Central Regulatory Bodies...........................................................................  202
2.2.1. Association of British Insurers............................................................................. 202
2.2.2. Genetics and Insurance Committee ..................................................................  212
2.2.3. HGAC and HGC .................................................................................................  217
2.2.4. House of Commons Science and Technology Committee:
Politician's Differential Treatment of Stakeholder Evidence................................ 226
2.2.5. The Government’s Position .............................................................................. 240
3. Stakeholder Accounts o f the Policy Process............................................... 243
4. The Role o f Public Opinion and the Media in Shaping the Policy Process ... 254
4.1. The Problem of an Uninformed Public..................................................................  255
4.2. The Role of the Media ........................................................................................  260
5 Reflections on the Current Moratorium .........................................................  266
5.1. Towards More Effective Debate..........................................................................  267
5.2. Moratoriums, Regulation, and International Perspectives...................................  269
6 Conclusion.........................................................................................................273
CHAPTER 5: TOWARDS PUBLIC CENTRED DECISION-MAKING: THE 
CITIZENS' JURY AND THE VIRTUES OF DELIBERATION
1. In troduction...............................................................................................  276
2. Interests, Ideology and the Poverty of Representative Government... 279
2.1. Proceduralism Within Representative Institutions as a Means of
Protection Against Tyranny....................................................................  280
2.2. Ideology, Interests and Politicisation: The Poverty of Representative
Institutions .................................................................................................  282
3. The Deliberative Tum In Democratic Theory ........................................  287
3.1. Thin'and'Strong'Democracy....................................................................  287
3.2. The Nature of Deliberative Democracy......................................................  288
3.3. The Process of Deliberation: A Range of Approaches............................... 291
4. The Citizens' jury and Policymaking: Deliberative Democracy
in A c tio n .....................................................................................................  295
4.1. The Basic Structure o f the Citizens' Jury: A Critique o f the ABI J u ry .........  295
4.2. Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Rationality ................................ 301
4.2.1. Selection of Jurors and Witnesses, and the Roles they are Ascribed..... 302
4.2.2. Facilitators and the Management of the Deliberative Process................ 305
4.3. Flaws of the Citizens’ Jury Process...........................................................  314
4.3.1 The Problem of Proceduralism...............................................................  314
4.3.2 Difficulties Around Facilitation.................................................................. 317
4.3.3 Difficulties Around Juror Deliberation......................................................  322
4.3.4. Citizens' Juries and Democratic Legitimacy..............................................  324
5. Ths Public Understanding of Science as Central to  Citizen
Participation and the Démocratisation o f Decision-Making.................  326
IV
5.1. The ‘Public’ and their Attitudes towards Science........................................  326
5.2. Beyond a ‘Knowledge Deficit’ Model.........................................................  329
5.3. A New Relationship between Scientists and the Public............................  335
5.4. Citizen Jurors Cross-Examining ‘Expert’ Witnesses..................................  338
5.5. Criticism of Citizen Participation as Based on Lack of Faith in the Increased
Démocratisation of Policymaking.................................................................... 340
6. Conclusion.........................................................................................................  343
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND FURTHER ANALYSIS
1. Introduction .................................................................................................  346
2. Summary and Further Analysis .............................................................  346
2.1. The implications of Genetic Information for Life Assurance Provision......  347
2.2. Stakeholder Accounts of their Concerns about Genetic Information and
Life Assurance...........................................................................................  354
2.3. Genetic Information, Life Assurance and the Policy Process.................... 357
2.4. Evaluating the Citizens' Jury Approach to Policymaking........................... 361
3. Limitations o f the Research and Issues Requiring Further Investigation .. 366
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................  368
V
List of Abbreviations
ABI - Association of British Insurers
ACGT - Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing
BSHG - British Society for Human Genetics
CEST - Centre for the Exploitation of Science and Technology
COE - Council of Europe
ESHG - European Society for Human Genetics
GAIC - Genetics and Insurance Committee
GIG - Genetic Interest Group
HGAC- Human Genetics Advisory Committee
HGC- Human Genetics Commission
HUGO- Human Genome Organisation
IPPR- Institute for Public Policy Research
MORI- Market and Opinion Research International
NHGRI- National Human Genome Research Institute
OST- Office of Science and Technology
UKFGI- UK Forum for Genetics and Insurance
UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
WIHSC- Welsh Institute for Health and Social Care 
WHO- World Health Organisation
VI
Acknowledgements
I would like to give special thanks to my supervisor Prof. Steve Fuller, for the 
invaluable and intellectually stimulating direction he has provided me with 
throughout my period of doctoral research, and for his sustained help and 
positive encouragement in my endeavour to build an academic career. Thanks 
must also be given to my PhD colleagues in the department of Sociology at the 
University of Warwick, as well as the academic staff, for both the friendship and 
advice they have given me over the past 4 years. I would also like to thank the 
secretarial staff for the unwavering help they have given me.. Special thanks 
must also go to my parents, Carole and Braj, and my wife Tamara, for their 
emotional support during this period of doctoral research.
This PhD was funded through an ESRC research studentship, so final thanks 
must go to them for providing me with the finance without which this research 
may not have been possible.
v ii
Declaration
I confirm that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for 
a degree at any other university. The thesis has been prepared in accordance 
with the university of Warwick's guidelines on the presentation of a research 
thesis.
viii
Abstract
This thesis provides the first extensive sociological analysis of the genetics and 
life assurance debate in the UK. It uses data from original qualitative interviews, 
as well as various policy documents and reports, to investigate the likely 
implications of genetic information for life assurance provision, reveal the 
narrative strategies used by key stakeholders as they account for their concerns 
on the issue, and evaluate the efficacy of the policy and regulatory framework. It 
also attempts to evaluate the suitability of the citizens’ jury model as an 
alternative to existing decision-making procedures. The thesis begins by 
revealing the most likely social, commercial, legal, and ethical implications of 
allowing insurers to access new kinds of genetic information. A history of 
insurance, risk and probability is used as a starting point to challenge many of 
the pervasive fears and anxieties. This part of the thesis critically analyses the 
social and philosophical basis of such contested notions as ’discrimination’, 
'social exclusion’, 'genetic information', and ‘social justice’, and begins to reveal 
some of the key strategies of stakeholders in the debate. The thesis then 
analyses stakeholder accounts of their concerns, and begins to reveal the ways 
in which they draw on a broad narrative repertoire to give their beliefs a degree 
of moral legitimacy/coherency. The impact this may have on the quality of 
debate is also investigated. Following from the analysis of stakeholder 
accounts, the thesis proceeds to investigate the nature of the policymaking and 
regulatory framework. Through a sociological analysis of the work of various 
advisory committees, which led to the implementation of a moratorium on 
insurers' use of genetic information, the thesis investigates how fair and 
equitable the overall political process has been, particularly in terms of the 
treatment of stakeholder evidence. It also assesses the role of the public and 
media in shaping the political response to this issue.The thesis concludes by 
assessing the citizens’ jury as suitable procedures for resolving the conflicts 
around genetic information and life assurance. Both the potential advantages 
and persistent problems with the model are critically evaluated.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The social, political, and epistemological imbroglio that has enveloped 
contemporary debates on the implications of the ‘new genetics' is complex and 
multifaceted. A burgeoning volume of social research is investigating various 
aspects of this emerging technology. The purpose of this thesis will be to assess 
the impact new kinds of genetic information might have on access to private life 
assurance in the UK and critically evaluate the policy and regulatory framework. It 
will investigate the extent to which key stakeholders mobilise around a contentious 
policy issue, and use political rhetoric to shape the policymaking process. This 
introductory chapter will explain the underlying theoretical rationale of the thesis, 
highlight the ways in which it builds on previous work within the broader area of the 
sociology of science, and illustrate the specific aims and objectives of the research.
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A full description of the methodology used will also be provided. The introduction 
will conclude by providing a brief synopsis of each chapter.
2. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE NEW GENETICS’
Social scientists’ interest in the implications of the new genetics has grown 
significantly in recent years. Sociologists, in particular, have begun to apply their 
theories and methods to this intellectually fertile field of enquiry. Levitt (1999) 
argues that sociology is a discipline well suited for exploring substantive empirical 
issues constitutive of the new genetics, as well as its related ethical dilemmas. She 
writes:
The area of genetics seems particularly apt for a study of the broader 
sociological effects as well as individual psychological effects because genes 
are shared and the diagnosis of genetic disorders has implications for other 
family members.' (Levitt, 1999, 157)
Sociology can provide theoretically sophisticated and empirically diverse analyses 
of this new technology, which is not always possible through philosophical 
discussion alone. Levitt proceeds to argue that:
While it may be suggested by medical professionals that genetic screening 
techniques could remove some of the inequalities given by nature, a social 
perspective would lead to the (testable) expectation that the effects of 
screening procedures on individuals will mirror the inequalities in society: 
socio-economic class and racial inequalities as well as those of gender.' (Ibid, 
161)
Levitt argues that as genomic knowledge continues to advance, the social 
implications will become more palpable and relevant. A sociological approach may
2
enable us to question received wisdom and begin to explain what is happening 
from the standpoint of the diverse groups affected by particular applications of the 
technology. Levitt argues: 'Sociological perspectives look critically at the new 
technology and ask how it will be used, whom it will benefit and what the wider 
social consequences will be.’ (Ibid, 164)
It is important to recognise the impact historical trends in sociology have had on 
contemporary social science approaches to the new genetics. Work in the 
sociology of science and technology, coupled with the recent emergence of a 'risk 
society’ perspective, has had a strong influence on contemporary social research.
The first academic accounts of the nature of scientific knowledge and technology 
were rooted primarily within philosophical epistemology. This approach attempted 
to reveal and explicate the internal logic of a 'scientific method' abstracted from its 
social context. Luminaries such as Popper (1959) sought to protect a notion of 
'scientific truth', through a theory of 'falsification', in order to demarcate authentic 
scientific hypotheses from their pseudo-scientific aberrations. Lakatos (1984) also 
provided a rationalist account of science, but instead of focusing narrowly on 
scientific hypotheses, his work was concerned with the broader concept of a 
'scientific research programme’. According to Lakatos, a research programme 
could be either 'progressive' or 'degenerative' depending on the extent to which it 
could predict new facts (increase empirical content as it develops), explain the 
success of predecessors, and be legitimated through independent corroboration. 
Even those philosophers who were critical of the orthodox belief in a ‘rational’ and 
‘value free’ science, such as Feyerabend (1975), focused on the notion of method 
when challenging the dominant paradigm. It was not until Merton's (1973) account
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of the crucial role social factors play In determining the reward distributions 
bestowed by the scientific community, that a sociological account of the 
institutionalisation of science began to take shape. This work, coupled with Kuhn’s 
(1970) groundbreaking ideas on the paradigmatic nature of science', would lay the 
foundations for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), which came to 
dominate the 1970s sociology of science literature.
Bloor (1976) was one of the pioneers of the SSK approach. Although Merton had 
revealed the ways in which social factors could shape the career trajectories of 
scientists and destabilise particular scientific fields, as a ’functionalist' sociologist, 
he clung to the idea that there was a 'value-free' scientific method. However, Bloor 
wanted to demonstrate that scientific knowledge was not a pure and abstract mirror 
on nature, but was itself socially constructed. Work in the sociology of knowledge 
had already revealed that all forms of human knowledge were socially constituted. 
SSK adherents simply applied this logic to scientific knowledge and argued that 
science, as a social institution, did not deserve its exalted status as a form of 
disinterested inquiry.
Supporters of the SSK approach began to analyse a variety of ostensibly ’hard’
sciences and reveal the social and political interests shaping the very production of
scientific knowledge. Eventually, SSK came under criticism for its relativistic
implications. It was also challenged for failing to respond adequately to the
associated problem of ‘reflexivity’, which was illuminated by social theorists such as
' See Fuller. 2000a for an extensive critique of the philosophy of science offered by Kuhn. He argues 
that the inherent conservative slant of Kuhn has largely been ignored by the many 'radicals' who have 
discerned from his work profound political messages that he never really intended and often sought to 
distance himself from.
See also Fuller, 2003 for an erudite reconstruction of the Kuhn/Popper debate
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Woolgar (1988a, 1988b). While the philosophers of science had focused too 
heavily on the science pole of a manufactured science/society dichotomy, SSK 
supporters of Bloor’s 'Strong Programme’ appeared to grant social explanations 
privileged status by anchoring all scientific knowledge to the context-dependent 
social relations of a particular society or culture. Although they operated with a 
nominalist conception of science, they hypocritically embraced an essentialist view 
of social science. Furthermore, because they treated scientific knowledge as a 
macro phenomenon, they appeared to ignore scientific praxis at the micro level. 
Subsequently, they failed to recognise and understand the complex and nuanced 
internal power dynamics that often shape scientific knowledge and technological 
progress.
At the end of the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, a number of scholars began 
to recognise the limitations of the SSK approach and sought to develop 'post- 
relativist' theories. Latour and Woolgar (1979) began this trend with their 
groundbreaking anthropological study of laboratory life. Taking on the role of 
'anthropological outsider’, Latour and Woolgar tried to demonstrate that 
sociologists use of ‘science/society’, 'inside/outside', and 'nature/culture' 
dichotomies to describe the production of scientific knowledge could stymie our 
understanding of how science 'really' functions within society. According to the 
authors, sociologists attracted to such binary oppositions ultimately allow science to 
immunise itself from sociological investigation. Latour and Woolgar claimed that 
there were four inherent problems with prioritising the ’social’ in studies of scientific 
practice. Firstly, the range of phenomena open to sociological investigation 
becomes limited, as only those sciences clearly influenced by external social 
agencies can form a legitimate object of study. Secondly, a critical gaze can be
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cast only on 'bad' science, which contravenes Bloor’s appeal to treat 'bad' and 
good’ symmetrically. Thirdly, there is an inevitable tendency to provide a sociology 
of scientists rather than a sociology of the actual knowledge they produce. Finally, 
one can become drawn into questioning scientists' statements to outsiders rather 
than critically appraising the technical aspects of the science itself. This was a 
particular flaw In Mertonian sociology.
Knorr-Cetlna (1983) argued that the micro approach adopted by Latour and 
Woolgar opened the door for scholars to '... consider the objects of knowledge as 
the outcomes of processes which invariably involve more than one individual, and 
which normally involve individuals at variance with one another.’ (Knorr-Cetina, 
1983, 117) Such an approach was presented as being neither subjectivist nor 
relativist, because it conceptualised scientific practice as a complex and Intricate 
process encapsulating a variety of nuanced elements, not all of which could be 
defined crudely as social’. Because of this work, a completely new approach to 
investigating science and technology was born. Scholars began to apply the micro- 
oriented ‘science as practice' method to a diverse range of scientific disciplines. 
Furthermore, they moved beyond crude descriptive accounts of how science is and 
began to question how it ought to be. Nelson (1993) describes her work on 
'epistemological communities', for example, as one based on the idea that:
'... reconstructions appeal to and are recognised as Interdependent with a 
larger body of experience and knowledge (also historically relative and 
dynamic) rather than any alleged ahistorlc or extra theoretical foundations or 
standards.' (Nelson, 1993, 12$)
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For Nelson, 'evidence' is a communal activity that can be labelled reasonable 
only if it is coherent with a particular community’s experiential knowledge. However, 
in order to avoid the relativist trap of claiming all theories are equally valid, she 
argues that some theories will always have a more tenuous relationship to 
experienced reality than others.
Post-SSK sociology of science allowed for more diverse and extensive analyses 
of knowledge production as it was constructed by, and impacted upon, particular 
groups in society. Now it was possible to think in terms of a 'feminist' or disability’ 
discourse (Harding, 1991; Smith, 1987), which permitted the situated 
epistemological views of traditionally 'outside' groups to demand recognition and 
legitimacy. Science was recognised as a social construction, but now it was 
necessary to explore ways in which it could be reconfigured to empower social 
actors and work to the advantage of society as a whole. Fuller’s (2002a) Social 
Epistemology was firmly rooted in the idea that knowledge systems have a strong 
normative dimension. His work supported the practical ideal of reconstituting the 
science policy process so that it could begin to judge specific applications of 
science and technology by reference to their socially ameliorating potential. Fuller 
argued that a policymaker influenced by social epistemology would begin to 
consider explicitly the ways in which scientific knowledge ought to be distributed.
This concise, and admittedly oversimplified, account of the changing theoretical 
orientation of science studies reveals how a gate was eventually opened for a more 
nuanced critical evaluation of the social consequences of the new genetics. By 
moving beyond an abstract and descriptive account of scientific knowledge, and 
instead providing a normative analysis focused on the very subjects of knowledge
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production, a diverse range of issues associated with, and constitutive of, the new 
genetics could now be explored in more detail. However, one further theoretical 
development appealed to a number of scholars interested in the sociology of 
genetics. This was the emergence of Ulrich Beck's (1992, 1999) 'risk society’ 
theory. Beck’s central argument was that modernisation had induced acute feelings 
of insecurity amongst citizens, largely because of the ubiquitous 'hazards' that 
unconstrained scientific and industrial progress had precipitated. Consequently, 
people had begun to engage with science and technology by reference to its 
potentially adverse and unintended consequences rather than its social benefits.
Beck (1999) posited a supposedly unique relationship between a 'first' and 
‘second’ modernity. First modernity characterised the traditional nation state, in 
which social relations were understood in territorial terms. Five unique processes 
constitutive of a second modernity undermined the patterns of social life 
constitutive of this first modernity, which included full employment, social progress, 
and exploitation of nature. These five processes were ‘globalisation’, 
'individualisation', ‘gender revolution’, ‘underemployment’, and global risk’. (Beck, 
1999, 2) Beck writes: The real theoretical and political challenge of the second 
modernity is the fact that society must respond to all these challenges 
simultaneously. ' (Ibid, 2)
Giddens (2002) has also written extensively about risk. He contrasts two 
particular types of risk, which he argues are historically dependent. The first kind 
he refers to as ‘external’ risks, which emerge from the fixities of tradition or nature 
and characterised the pre-modern world. A second kind of risk, which he labels 
‘manufactured’, emerges from the impact of our developing knowledge upon the
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world. (Giddens, 2002, 26) This latter type of risk, analogous to Beck’s conception 
of global risk in advanced modernity, refers to situations we have supposedly no 
historical experience of confronting. Neither Beck nor Giddens suggest that there 
was no risk before modernity, although both imply that modern conceptions of risk 
are unique. Instead, they argue that individuals’ perception of risk fundamentally 
changed. Beck, for instance, argues that contemporary ‘techno-scientific’ risks are 
qualitatively different from those in the past, because they are global and 
imperceptible. Douglas (1994) argues that there has been a distinct conceptual 
change in language from ‘danger’ to ’risk’, and a new kind of blaming system, now 
applied to institutions, has slowly replaced the traditional moral condemnation that 
was often directed towards individuals for their personal culpability in failing to avert 
a particular danger. (Douglas, 1994, 16) She proceeds to claim that modern 
conceptions of risk are generally used to refer to negative outcomes, while ‘good’ 
things are couched politically In other terms. Douglas writes: ‘The language of risk 
is reserved as a specialized lexical register for political talk about the undesirable 
outcomes. Risk is invoked for a modern-style riposte against abuse of power.’ (Ibid, 
24) However, Beck employs the concept of 'reflexive modernisation’ to illustrate an 
immanent feature of second modernity. People came to recognise that they are not 
only negatively affected by social, political, and technological change, but 
simultaneously have the power to respond to them as independent and active 
citizens.
Both Beck and Giddens’ work on risk theory is now firmly entrenched in the 
sociological canon. However, one might legitimately criticise their theories on the 
grounds of over-generalisation and inconsistency with the empirical evidence. In 
particular, the argument that modern conceptions of risk are fundamentally different
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from those in the past is questionable. Beck's uncritical and ambiguous use of the 
term 'advanced' or 'late' modernity is deeply problematic when one begins to look 
at the empirical evidence. Dingwall (1999), in an extensive critique of Beck’s work, 
questions the central notion that contemporary risks are imperceptible. He argues 
th a t'... neither the nature of risk nor its association with the distribution of wealth is 
particularly new.’ (Dingwall, 1999, 481) Dingwall argues that the contemporary rich 
can often buy insulation from risk; a crucial point that explicitly challenges Beck’s 
argument that in late modernity risk is imperceptible and largely unavoidable. We 
will return to this issue in chapter 2, where an historical analysis of the birth of the 
life assurance industry and the probabilistic revolution will be provided. This 
chapter will reveal that the ubiquity of risk-averse individuals, particularly amongst 
the middle classes, is anything but a unique modern day phenomenon, and that the 
generalised risk theory perspective provides an inadequate theoretical tool for 
making sense of the genetics and insurance problem.
These developments in the sociology of science, as well as the pervasive 
influence of a ‘risk society’ literature, have enabled social scientists to engage 
critically with the nature of policymaking processes around controversial science 
and technologies. The notion of risk is central to genetics-based technologies and 
particularly pertinent to this research on genetics and insurance. However, while 
the sociology and philosophy of science has undergone profound change in recent 
years, and the emergence of the ‘risk society theory' has clearly influenced many 
social scientists, it would be counterproductive to apply one of the existing 
theoretical frameworks to the present research problem. The sheer complexity and 
multifaceted nature of the genetics and insurance issue can be more clearly 
illuminated by engaging with the existing literature more critically. This research will
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draw upon a number of sociological theories, as well as disciplinary fields, in order 
to provide an integrative analysis of the research problem that is not constrained by 
any attachment to a single theoretical framework.
3. GENETIC INFORMATION, LIFE ASSURANCE, AND THE 
DEMOCRATISATION OF POLICYMAKING: RESEARCH AIMS AND 
OBJECTIVES
The genetic information and life assurance problem provides an opportunity to 
explore a number of interrelated social, political, commercial, and scientific issues 
that have emerged contemporaneously with genetic progress. When contemplating 
the issue of commercial access to genetic information, it is important to recognise 
that we are dealing with a highly emotive public policy issue that has attracted the 
attention of a variety of interest groups. The principal objectives of this research will 
be to investigate the most likely implications of genetic information for life 
assurance provision, reveal the rhetorical complexity of ‘stakeholder’ accounts, and 
evaluate the efficacy of the policy/regulatory process.
The basic research questions may be stated as follows:
1. What are the most likely social, commercial, legal, and ethical implications 
of life assurance companies using genetic information for underwriting 
purposes, and might recognition of the history of insurance, risk, and 
probability enable us to better understand this contemporary problem? 
Furthermore, does the rhetoric expressed by key stakeholders advance or 
problématisé our understanding of the theoretical complexity underlying the
11
issue? The substantive issues to be investigated include the nature and role 
of modern commercial insurance, the business of discrimination, equity and 
social exclusion, and the ownership and management of genetic data. One 
preliminary hypothesis might be that the emergence of new kinds of genetic 
information does not fundamentally affect the nature of private life 
assurance provision, but that relevant stakeholders and academics have 
antagonised the debate through their strategic use of rhetoric.
2. Do relevant 'stakeholders’ operationalise a variety of definitional 
frameworks around ‘genetic information’, and might such definitions reveal 
underlying social, political, or professional agendas? More precisely, do 
particular stakeholders and interest groups, through their interview talk, 
render new kinds of genetic information 'special’, even if they do not believe 
in a fundamental technical difference between it and other forms of medical 
information. One hypothesis might be that stakeholders will constantly shift 
the definitional framework of the issue in order to defend a sectional 
interest.
3. What are the specific concerns of relevant stakeholders with regard to the 
use of genetic information by life assurance companies, and do they 
account for such concerns, judge the nature of the policy process, and 
articulate potential candidate solutions by reference to a broader set of 
social, clinical, or commercial values? One might expect to observe acute 
differences of opinion between insurers, clinicians, and patient or consumer 
support groups, each of whom may have an interest in framing the issue in 
a particular way, in certain social contexts. The extent to which interest
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groups draw upon a broad narrative repertoire (social, commercial, ethical 
and clinical), and use a variety of rhetorical strategies to express morally 
adequate accounts of their beliefs, will be investigated through semi- 
structured interviews.
4. How has policy developed on this issue, and how equitable has it proven? 
How effective have the various advisory/regulatory committees been in 
deliberating the broader nuances of the issue, and have stakeholder 
accounts been fairly evaluated by political decision-makers? One might 
expect political institutions to grant differential levels of legitimacy to the 
evidence provided by various stakeholders, depending on what they 
consider politically expedient. An extensive analysis of the policy debate will 
reveal the extent to which this is a valid statement.
5. In what ways has ‘perceived public opinion' affected both the strategies of 
stakeholders and the more general political framework of policymaking? In 
particular, has ‘uninformed’ public opinion polluted the policy and regulatory 
process and led to inequitable decision-making?
6. Considering the diversity of views, and the seemingly intractable nature of 
this politically sensitive problem, might a ‘citizens' jury' provide a more 
suitable means for arbitrating the competing interests? If so, how may we 
ensure that this new public-centred mechanism both significantly improves 
the quality of decision-making and enjoys greater democratic legitimacy?
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In contemplating these broad questions, this research will critically engage with a 
diverse range of substantive issues, which include 'definitions of genetic 
information’, ‘genetic risk and privacy’, ‘the public understanding of science’, ‘social 
discrimination and exclusion', ‘commercial rights, ethics and regulation’, 'sociology 
of science, technology and expertise’, and the démocratisation of science policy’. 
This thesis therefore establishes theoretical connections between a number of 
substantive issues that have so far only been analysed by sociologists in isolation. 
The paucity of any substantial sociological work on genetic information and the 
insurance industry is in many ways surprising. It appears to provide an excellent 
case study for exploring a number of interrelated social, political, commercial, and 
ethical exigencies. This thesis therefore provides the first extensive sociological 
investigation of an increasingly controversial and complex science and society 
issue. The research has both a theory and policy oriented slant. It draws upon a 
diverse range of academic and policy literature in order to make an original 
contribution to the sociological study of the new genetics.
3. METHODOLOGY
This research uses qualitative methods to investigate the stated research 
questions. A great deal of social research on the new genetics has used 
quantitative methods to unpack some of the diverse social issues surrounding this 
growing technology. Such work has proven invaluable in advancing our 
understanding of such things as the class, race, and gender variables that often 
determine attitudes towards specific areas of genetic progress and has revealed 
growing public fears around the commercial exploitation of genetic information. 
Such studies will be referred to throughout the thesis. However, in order to
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investigate the decision-making processes around the issue of genetics and 
insurance, a qualitative approach provides the most appropriate methodological 
strategy.
4.1. Research Strategy
There has been a lack of extensive sociological research into the nature of 
policymaking around the issue of genetics and insurance in the UK. In fact, 
throughout the 1990s there was not only a paucity of sociological literature on the 
potential social implications of allowing life assurance companies access to new 
kinds of genetic information2, but there was also a lack of political motivation to 
initiate a proper and informed policymaking and regulatory process. More recently, 
a number of governmental and non-governmental committees have been 
established to investigate this issue. Growing public and interest group concern 
provided much of the impetus for political action. This research is therefore timely, 
in that it provides a comprehensive analysis of an important social policy concern in 
which both technological progress and a politically contentious decision-making 
process are developing apace. This creates certain methodological difficulties, as 
the theoretical and empirical approach of the research must be flexible enough to 
react to changing social, political, and scientific circumstances. However, there are 
also advantages in that the research does not have to rely on retrospective
2 Although sociologists may have been slow to recognise the importance of the genetics and 
insurance issue, and recognise it as an area worthy of sociological attention, other social science 
disciplines have been engaged with some of the substantive issues. Economists, In particular, have 
looked extensively at some of the financial implications of denying or permitting insurance companies 
access to new kinds of genetic information. The Centre for Risk and Insurance Studies at the 
Nottingham University Business School, as well as the Genetics and Insurance Research Centre at 
Harlot-Watt University, have both researched these issues for a number of years now. But there is a 
need for a sociological investigation of the nature of the policymaking process and the political 
strategies of key stakeholders who have contributed to it.
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analysis but can, instead, provide an account of an active process as it is 
flourishing.
Scientific knowledge and technological innovation do not emerge and evolve 
within a social vacuum; rather both are constructed within a complex, multifaceted, 
and ever-changing social dynamic. Moreover, technology is not only constructed by 
society but may also fundamentally change its constitution. The use of genetic 
information in life assurance underwriting conforms to this conceptual 
understanding. This research used qualitative methods to describe and explain this 
fluctuating process. In particular, the thesis uses data from interviews with key 
stakeholders, as well as a number of public policy documents published in the past 
five years, in order to investigate the stated research questions and test the validity 
of preliminary hypotheses. These methods will now be described in detail.
4.2. Qualitative Interviews
Qualitative methods in social research are often portrayed as less ‘scientific’ than 
quantitative methods, because the data cannot easily be generalised. Qualitative 
data are in many ways open to subjective interpretation, so the method is usually 
practical only when applied to small samples. However, such methods do have a 
distinct advantage over their quantitative counterparts in that they enable the 
researcher to explore a particular topic in depth, and tease out the nuanced beliefs 
and attitudes that research subjects encapsulate. Qualitative interviewing, in 
particular, strives to uncover the reasons why individuals express certain beliefs, 
which is a goal that often remains elusive to adherents of quantitative methods. 
Silverman (1993) argues that a putative aim of qualitative interviewing is to gather
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an authentic’ understanding of individuals’ subjective experiences, and that the 
relationship between interviewer and subject is, in contrast to that found in 
quantitative studies, politically rather than scientifically grounded. However, 
authenticity is a problematic concept in the context of social research, as Silverman 
acknowledges, and this will be discussed in more detail later.
In conducting any kind of social research, it is essential to consider the 
methodological implications of the research strategy. As Mason (1996) argues:
‘This means being clear about how and why a particular method and data 
source are going to help you to address your research questions rather than 
assuming that, for example, a series of unstructured interviews, or some 
documentary analysis, will obviously and unproblematically tell you what you 
want to know.’ (Mason, 1996, 19)
This research used semi-structured interviews with a small sample of individuals, 
and analyses a diverse range of policy documents, in order to reveal the range of 
perspectives on the genetics and insurance issue, and test/develop the theory that 
key stakeholders will use a variety of rhetorical strategies when giving account of 
their beliefs, perhaps in order to further their broader interests or values.
4.2.1 Sampling
The original aim was to interview between ten and fourteen individuals, 
representing a variety of stakeholder/interest groups. Interview subjects were 
selected from three broad professional groups: insurance industry representatives, 
clinical geneticists/counsellors, and consumer/patient-support groups.
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Initially, letters were sent to various individuals and organisations falling under 
the broad categories defined above. Ten were addressed to insurance companies, 
twenty-two to patient/consumer support groups, thirteen to clinical genetics 
departments, and four to major research genetics units. Specific groups and 
individuals were randomly selected from lists provided on various internet websites, 
or cited in official policy documents. The letters described the central objectives of 
the research, accentuated the importance of gaining input from organisations that 
may be affected by policy in this area, and gave a brief description of how the 
interviews would be structured. When the letters were addressed to companies or 
organisations, rather than named individuals, it was requested they be forwarded to 
appropriate individuals who might be interested in participating in the research.
It is often difficult, particularly when establishing contact with insurance 
companies, to gain access to specific individuals in a position to make a positive 
contribution to the research. When the letters were addressed to the headquarters 
of insurance companies, there was either no reply or the responses were 
ambivalent. Overall, the general response rate was relatively low. There was no 
positive feedback from the insurance industry or organisations involved in genetics 
research, five responses from patient/consumer support groups, and four from 
clinical genetics units, which included a consultant clinical geneticist, two genetic 
counsellors, and a professor of clinical genetics. At this stage, it became clear that 
the recruitment of research geneticists into the project was going to prove difficult, 
so it was decided that only those working in a clinical setting would be interviewed. 
Furthermore, because the replies from clinical genetics units included both 
clinicians and counsellors, it was decided that this data would be categorised 
simply as ‘clinical perspectives.' However, it was still necessary to include
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insurance industry perspectives, so twelve letters were then sent to individual 
underwriters and directors within specific companies. The names of these 
individuals were drawn randomly from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
website, as well as from various official documents dealing with the genetics and 
insurance issue. There were seven positive replies, and four individuals working in 
the commercial insurance sector were interviewed.
The recruitment process for these interviews was always going to generate a 
relatively skewed sample. Most of the individuals recruited were either directly 
involved in debates around genetics and insurance or had, by the nature of their 
professional work, an interest in the outcome of the policy process. The most 
positive responses came from insurance representatives who had worked with the 
ABI on policy formation or who had an important role disseminating their 
company's position on the issue. Similarly, some of the respondents from the 
patient-support groups and clinical departments had an intimate knowledge of the 
policy process, by virtue of their role in articulating their organisation's concerns in 
discussion forums, media outlets, and journals. However, the aim was not to create 
a totally representative sample, so it was essential for the research to interview 
people who were 'engaged' with the issue. In one sense, the recruitment method 
could be regarded as a form of 'theoretical sampling’. Arber (1993) provides a 
succinct description of this method when she writes:
‘This approach eschews attempting to obtain a representative sample, arguing 
that sampling should be entirely governed by the selection of those 
respondents who will maximise theoretical development. The sampling should 
aim to locate strategic data which may refute emerging hypotheses. Sampling 
stops when “theoretical saturation" is reached, that is, when no new analytical 
insights are forthcoming from a given situation.' (Arber, 1993, 74)
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By selecting to interview individuals working within clinical, insurance, and 
interest group sectors, the research aimed to access a range of perspectives, and 
use the data pragmatically, in conjunction with an analysis of official policy 
documents, to answer the research questions and test/develop the preliminary 
theories and hypotheses. Although it may have proven instructive to interview a 
greater number of individuals with little knowledge of the underlying issue, and 
therefore no prior ideological attachment to any given solution, practical 
considerations dictated it would be better to interview the smaller number of 
knowledgeable’ research subjects, who generally demonstrated a greater 
willingness to participate. As it happened, one respondent from a patient-support 
group, and two genetic counsellors, had little knowledge of the legislative process. 
They therefore provided a counterbalance to the greater number of ’informed' and 
’engaged’ respondents. The analysis of various policy documents and public 
debates, as well as the use of secondary data sources, would complement the 
research by providing a more diverse range of data from which to investigate the 
research questions.
Some might ask why ‘victims’ of insurance practices were not interviewed. Why 
exclude from the sample individuals who have suffered 'unfair' discrimination at the 
hands of commercial insurers? The reason for this exclusion was that the evidence 
base for practices of unfair discrimination is extremely weak. Most studies have 
had to rely on Individuals' subjective reports of their treatment by insurers. 
However, there is no way of knowing ultimately whether such individuals were 
actually the victims of unfair discrimination. Applicants for insurance are rarely told 
the reasons why they have been denied a policy, or been charged a loaded
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premium. In chapter 4, interview and questionnaire based studies claiming to have 
uncovered practices of unfair genetic discrimination are critically evaluated.
The table below displays the names of the final eleven interviewees (three 
requested anonymity), and provides brief details of their professional position, 
organisation in which they were employed at the time, and the date the interview 
took place.
NAME POSITION ORGANISATION DATE OF 
INTERVIEW
Keith
Bedell-Pearce
Executive Director The Prudential Pic. 18/07/01
Graham Austin Director Munich RE. Life 
Branch
19/07/01
Tony O'Leary Deputy Managing 
Director
ERC Frankona RE. 21/05/01
Anonymous Chief Underwriter Insurance
company
12/06/01
Dr. Quarrel Consultant
Geneticist
North Trent Clinical 
Genetics Service
25/05/01
Anonymous 1 Genetic Nurse 
Counsellor
An NHS clinical 
genetics service
25/07/01
Anonymous 2 Genetic
Counsellor
An NHS clinical 
genetics service
25/07/01
Prof.
Sandy Raeburn
Professor of 
Clinical Genetics 
and ABI Genetics 
advisor
University of 
Nottingham Clinical 
Genetics Service
05/06/01
Alistair Kent Director Genetic Interest 
Group (GIG)
04/04/01
Dr.
Katherine Darton
Policy Officer MIND 08/06/01
Dr. Julia Cream Policy Officer Alzheimer's
Society
19/06/01
Dr. Darton was the respondent who did not have any significant prior knowledge of 
the genetics and insurance decision-making process, while the others had varying
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degrees of knowledge. Furthermore, because almost all of the respondents held 
relatively high positions within their organisations, this may have affected the data. 
In addition, it is important to note that specific organisations employ a variety of 
discrete professional groups. For example, the sample included one chief 
underwriter and three directors of insurance companies under the insurance 
industry category. It must be recognised that different types of professionals within 
the same organisation may have varying beliefs and attitudes to the issue because 
of their divergent professional roles, status, and experience.
It must also be recognised that the majority of employees in patient-support 
groups do not suffer the medical conditions that their organisations represent, so 
one should be careful not to uncritically accept their discourses as 'authentic' 
accounts of the concerns and experiences of the medically afflicted. This is a 
recurrent problem faced by social researchers aiming to tap into the subjective 
beliefs and experiences of ‘vulnerable’ groups. Often, access is granted only to 
‘representatives' or advocates’, who act paternalistically as gatekeepers to such 
knowledge. Of all the support groups contacted, only the larger organisations, 
which were politically and publicly engaged with the issue, replied positively. Many 
of the smaller groups have extremely limited resources, because they are often 
established by families of affected individuals and employ only a small number of 
part time volunteers. Such groups do not often have the time or inclination to 
participate in social research projects. Indeed, many question researchers' stated 
intentions.
Overall, the final sample did include a broad range of individuals with divergent 
opinions on the issue under investigation. The sample would contribute significantly
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to the intended research outputs. It is now necessary to explain the structure of the 
actual interviews in some detail, and clarify the status of the data generated.
4.2.2. Interview Structure
Semi-structured interviews were used for this research. Gilbert (1996) 
differentiates between three general types of interview, which he defines 
respectively as standardised or structured', 'semi-standardised', and ‘non- 
standardised or unstructured’. (Gilbert, 1996, 135,136) The choice of interview 
structure will always determine the type and quality of data generated. For 
example, standardised interviews provide data that can easily be coded and cross- 
referenced to provide a relatively ‘objective’ measure of variations in peoples’ 
attitude toward specific social phenomenon. However, because the questions are 
pre-defined, and the interview process is relatively inflexible, this method is 
unsuitable for research projects that aspire to understand more deeply the 
subjective opinions of individuals, and reveal the rhetorical strategies they use 
when accounting for their beliefs. On the other hand, an entirely unstructured 
interview can be time consuming and pose significant analytical difficulties. Here, 
the researcher has a far less active role in directing the interview process, so it 
becomes far more difficult to ensure the data remains pertinent to the specific 
research problem. May (2001) argues that:
‘ In moving from the structured to the unstructured interview, researchers shift 
from a situation in which they attempt to control the interview through 
predetermining questions and thus “teach” the respondent to reply in 
accordance with the interview schedule (standardization), to one in which the 
respondent is encouraged to answer a question in their own term s.’ (May,
2001, 121)
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According to May, in the semi-structured interview: Questions are normally 
specified, but the interviewer is freer to probe beyond the answers in a manner 
which would appear prejudicial to the aims of standardization and comparability.’ 
(Ibid, 123) The use of probing has a positive and edifying function. Rather than 
asking specifically what the respondent thinks about X, the interviewer can flexibly 
deploy specific arguments or hypothetical case studies as a heuristic device to aid 
the process of mining respondents’ subjective opinions. May writes:
' a change in the emphasis of a question, or a similar question posed in a 
different way, not only can provoke further thought on the subject, but also 
offers a catalyst enabling the interviewee to make links to other answers 
already given.' (Ibid, 129)
However, at this point it is necessary to clarify the status of the interview data 
and the use that is made of it in this research. One significant problem that can 
arise with qualitative interviewing is that the researcher can take for granted the 
validity of interview responses. There is significant debate in the field of qualitative 
research about the extent to which the interview process generates ‘accounts’ of 
respondents' beliefs/attitudes rather than literal reports of them. 
Ethnomethodologists have long maintained that interview data can only make 
legitimate claims about what occurs in the interview itself, but has no referential 
legitimacy to a world ‘out there'. This point is particularly significant in the context 
of the present research, because many of the interview subjects were part of a 
policy process in which they had to express different kinds of rhetoric in different 
contexts. For example, insurers often tell different ‘stories’, and may operationalise 
a complex variety of narrative strategies, depending on their audience (politicians,
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the public, shareholders, policy applicants etc). Similarly, clinicians and patient- 
support groups may have specific agendas that are best served by expressing their 
concerns in different ways depending on the particular social context they find 
themselves in. The way in which individuals or groups communicate their interests 
in one context provides no guarantee that they will do so the same way in a 
different context. The search for an individual’s 'true' belief/attitude, through their 
interview talk, will always remain an elusive ideal.
Silverman (1993) asks, ‘Must we choose between seeing interviews either as 
potentially “true" reports or as situated narratives?’ (Silverman, 1993, 108) One 
approach, according to Silverman, is to follow the work of Gilbert and Mulkay and 
treat interviews as giving us access to the repertoire of narratives’ that are used in 
producing accounts. Here, it is recognised that what respondents do through their 
interview talk is not generate a single, coherent narrative that reflects a ’true’ 
underlying belief or interest, but that a whole range of narrative strategies are both 
consciously and unconsciously deployed in order to express one or a number of 
'stories'. Silverman's 'twin track’ approach recognises that how respondents 
interpret their actions is as important as what they literally report. Redley (2003) 
used this approach in a recent sociological study of deliberate self-harm. He writes:
Rather than only trading on what respondents have to say about self-harm 
and life in an area of multiple deprivation, an exclusively externalist position 
towards interview data, the analysis presented here initially takes a 
constructivist position focusing on how  the respondents, in conjunction with the 
interviewer, produce accounts of their lives. Then and only then does the 
analysis turn to what is reported.' (Redley, 2003, 351)
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Miller and Glassner (1997) try to establish a position outside what they refer to as 
the objectivist-constructivist continuum; yet still take seriously the critiques of 
researchers at both these poles. They argue that; information about social 
worlds is achievable through in-depth interviewing.' (Miller & Glassner, 1997, 99) 
The authors go on to explain:
‘ ... interviewers need not resort to romanticism, or to identifying experience 
with authenticity, in order to call upon interviewees’ experiences and produce 
authentic accounts of social worlds ... All we sociologists have are stories. 
Some come from other people, some from us, some from out interactions with 
others. What matters is to understand how and where the stories are 
produced, which sort of stories they are, and how we can put them to honest 
and intelligent use in theorizing about social life.’
This research recognises the problem of trying to uncover ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ 
attitudes or beliefs. It therefore uses the interview data to reveal the various forms 
of rhetoric and narrative repertoires drawn upon by socially situated actors, as they 
attempt to further specific interests or give a morally adequate account of their 
beliefs. By critically analysing the interview transcripts, in conjunction with official 
policy documents and debates, this part of the research aims to improve our 
sociological understanding of the different ways in which stakeholders situate their 
accounts of the genetics and insurance issue, and perhaps prioritise or marginalise 
particular substantive issues, in order to further broader political or professional 
interests.
It was desirable that the actual interviews be based on a ‘reflexive’ and 
‘dialogical’ approach, in which the progress of the interview would be determined 
largely by the flow of communication between interviewer and respondent.
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However, before conducting each interview a basic schedule was drawn up, in 
order to ensure that all the relevant issues were discussed. Each interview covered 
two broad substantive areas. The first part focused on how the respondent 
conceptualised the general problem of genetics and insurance; that is what 
particular concerns did they express, and what kinds of solutions did they consider 
appropriate. This part of the interview was concerned with the underlying technical 
and theoretical issues, such as the definition of 'genetic information’ and the likely 
social and ethical implications of insurance companies using that data. The second 
part of the interview was centred on the decision-making process. The respondents 
were asked how engaged they were with the policy process, how effective they 
considered the regulatory approach to be, and what kinds of political intervention 
they considered appropriate or necessary. Their views on the role ‘public opinion’ 
has had on this process were also requested. Furthermore, at the end of the 
interview, respondents were asked briefly their opinion on the role of citizen 
participation.
The framing of the questions varied depending on the particular individuals being 
interviewed. Thus, interviews with insurance representatives covered technical 
commercial issues and concerns, while interest groups and clinicians were asked 
questions relevant to their own particular spheres of interest and expertise. 
Therefore, although all respondents were asked a broad range of questions around 
the basic themes of 'genetic information', ‘discrimination’, ‘commercial and 
individual rights', 'policymaking', and 'social exclusion’, the interview was flexible 
enough so that respondents were free to express, in their own terms and from their 
particular professional vantage point, some of the broader social, political, and 
technical issues. The interviews lasted, on average, one hour, and all were
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conducted at the respondent’s place of work. All interviews were tape recorded and 
later transcribed.
In conceptualising my role in the interview process, I attempted to maintain as 
impartial a stance as possible. I did not offer the interviewees my own personal 
opinions on the specific issue, even when asked on occasion to do so. Instead, I 
often played the role of devil’s advocate in order to draw out the variety of 
respondents’ opinions and beliefs. For example, if a member of an interest group 
expressed ambivalence about the insurance industry’s probity when articulating 
their commercial rights, I would explain the industry’s fear of adverse selection' 
and request a response. Similarly, when insurance representatives talked about the 
commercial problems of prohibiting access to all pertinent medical data, I would 
raise the public concerns of social exclusion and ‘unfair discrimination'. This 
approach of fostering two-way dialogue proved constructive. I was able to gain 
unexpected information and technical insights that I had not previously considered, 
and often the respondents claimed that the interview process had enabled them to 
contemplate issues they had previously not thought about in any great depth.
By not explicitly displaying a partisan attachment to any one belief or opinion, 
and therefore remaining relatively open-minded, an environment conducive to the 
free expression of ideas was created. Many researchers believe that an impartial 
approach to certain kinds of qualitative interviewing is impossible, and perhaps 
even undesirable. Finch (1986) notes some problems with adopting an impartial 
approach to research on policy issues. She writes:
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... policy-oriented research of a qualitative kind can realistically be carried out 
only on the  understanding that the knowledge created cannot be "objective" in 
the sense of being neutral in relation to the political process of policy-making.' 
(Finch, 1986, 209)
This statement suggests that the researcher is deeply embedded in a political 
process, particularly when the research has clear implications for public policy. She 
goes on to claim that:
'... there is a strong likelihood that the political stance adopted will be 
oppositional, perhaps subversive, in respect of the status quo, since the 
methods used get close up to the people studied, and are very likely to 
challenge the “official version” of their situation.' (Ibid, 210)
Disability researchers also suggest that the researcher ought not to conceal their 
personal political beliefs when researching ‘vulnerable’ groups. Oliver (1992), for 
example, claims that such research ought to be ‘emancipatory’ and explicitly 
confront pervasive social oppression’. (Oliver, 1992, 110) The problem of course is 
that if one automatically assumes that a particular policy is indeed oppressive to a 
certain group, then one has already limited the scope of the research and 
prejudged the nature of a process that is yet to be elucidated. The researcher 
ought to be open-minded, and allow for the possibility that the data may 
necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the underlying theory.
Although the partisan approach may appear, in some cases, appropriate and 
justified, for this research political neutrality brought clear advantages. Although 
neutrality may ultimately be only an expedient fagade, it is a role that ought to be 
adopted during the actual process of interviewing. For example, representatives of
29
the insurance industry are more likely to feel comfortable articulating their 
commercial concerns if they do not feel the researcher is an advocate for the 
'socially excluded’. Similarly, when interviewing interest groups, the dialogue is 
likely to be more open and constructive if the respondents do not feel the 
researcher is ideologically attached to a particular solution, particularly if it is one 
that legitimises commercial interests and values. Even if true objectivity can never 
be fully realised, it is still an ideal worth striving for.
4.2.3 Data Analysis
The process of data transcription and analysis began immediately after the first 
interview was conducted, rather than waiting until the entire fieldwork had been 
completed. Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend such early analysis because:
‘It helps the field-worker cycle back and forth between thinking about the 
existing data and generating strategies for collecting new, and often better, 
data ... It makes analysis an ongoing, lively enterprise that contributes to the 
energizing process of fieldwork.’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 50)
Each tape was listened to a number of times before transcription, and ‘relevant’ 
points then highlighted. Information emerging from each interview was then used to 
inform the structure of subsequent interviews. However, with semi-structured 
interviewing, a great deal of 'irrelevant' data is often generated. Therefore, it is 
important that the researcher select only those strands of narrative pertinent to the 
research questions. However, such a selective process is liable to suffer from 
researcher bias, as there is a natural tendency to transcribe only data that validates 
the underlying and prejudicial intuitions of the research. One therefore had to be
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constantly aware of this problem when analysing the tapes, and endeavour to be 
as impartial as possible when both transcribing and analysing the data. 
Furthermore, it was important not to become closed-minded to any emerging data 
that challenged some of the basic hypotheses. In fact, new and unpredictable 
insights that emerged through the interview process often led to a reconfiguration 
of the very framework of the research. Any possible bias was also mitigated by the 
fact that the interview data was being used in conjunction with an analysis of official 
policy documents and public debates. Empirical validation did not rest solely on the 
quality of this relatively small sample of interviews.
4.3. Document Analysis
Documents are an invaluable resource tool for most kinds of social research. 
This research required an extensive analysis of a variety of governmental and non­
governmental policy documents, political debates, and secondary research data. 
Throughout this research, a variety of publicly available documents circulated by 
genetic interest groups, medical organisations, insurance companies, and 
government committees were collated and analysed.
Analyses of policy documents and transcripts of public debates engender the 
same kind of methodological problems as the interpretation of data derived from 
qualitative interviews. One must be constantly attentive to the political context of 
such documents, and recognise that the rhetoric encapsulated within them may not 
provide an authentic guide as to how particular groups 'really' perceive an issue. 
This problem is particularly relevant to the interpretation of government reports, but 
also manifests itself in the narrative analysis of policy documents circulated by
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commercial organisations and interest groups. However, because the issue of 
genetics and insurance is so emotive and politically embedded, such documents 
provide an opportunity to study the various ways in which stakeholders may 
manipulate the political process in order to have their beliefs and concerns publicly 
recognised and legitimated. By utilising documentary evidence, in conjunction with 
the interview data, this research contributes to a more profound and nuanced 
sociological understanding of the ways in which interest groups mobilise around a 
contentious political issue in order to ensure their broader interests are realised.
Over the past five-years, there has been a proliferation in the number of reports 
and documents specifically concerned with the issue of genetics and insurance. As 
each new official report has been published, a number of organisations with vested 
interests have formally responded. Many have also disseminated their concerns 
through consultation mechanisms promoted by both the Government and the 
insurance industry. This research has attempted to use as much of this data as 
possible, but again a certain degree of selection has been required. Within this 
thesis, only the most important documents have been analysed extensively. The 
principal focus has been on governmental reports published in the UK, and a small 
selection of interest group and industry responses. Most of the insurance industry 
perspectives have been investigated by analysing documents released by the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI), which is the official representative of the 
industry in the UK. In providing an analysis of interest group concerns, the focus 
has mainly been on comparing the different approaches of the Alzheimer's Society 
and the Genetic Interest Group (GIG), which have been arguably the two patient 
organisations most engaged with this issue. A variety of other organisations are 
referred to, as well as media responses and social surveys, but those documents
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that have had the most profound and direct impact on shaping policy deserved 
greater attention.
4.5. Ethical Considerations
Because issues around the social implications of genetic knowledge and 
technology are highly emotive, it is important to recognise some of the ethical 
problems associated with research in this area. By interviewing insurance 
representatives, and members of patient-support groups, this research became 
situated in a politically sensitive area of public policy. There was therefore an 
ethical duty to document and interpret the data fairly, and provide confidentiality to 
any respondents who requested it. In this research, three respondents asked that 
they not be named in any written material. However, even those who displayed little 
objection to being named deserved an assurance that their views would not be 
misquoted or misrepresented. All researchers have an ethical obligation not only to 
their research subjects, but also to future social researchers who may be denied 
access to respondents who have had negative experiences participating in social 
research. All the people interviewed during this research were asked if they would 
like copies of the interview transcripts, and were told they could offer any further 
comments, not provided in the initial interview, at a later date if they so wished.
The ethical dimensions of social research may appear most acute when the 
research subject can be defined as a member of a 'vulnerable' group, historically 
excluded from the processes of decision-making. However, all the respondents 
who participated in this research held relatively high positions within their 
organisations, so could not be labelled vulnerable' in this limited sense. Often, they
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were representatives or advocates of traditionally excluded groups, but it was still 
important to be sensitive to the ways in which they perceived the equity of the 
research process. The interviews were conducted fairly and ethically, as was the 
analysis and interpretation of interview data. Some of the personal accounts 
expressed by the interview subjects do come under criticism at various points 
throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, the available evidence corroborated any 
criticism made.
5. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THESIS CHAPTERS
The rest of this thesis is split into four main chapters. A brief précis of each 
chapter will now be provided to conclude this general introduction.
Chapter 2 provides a background to the substantive issue of genetic information 
and its possible implications for access to life assurance in the UK. The theoretical 
complexity inherent to the controversy is elucidated, and a critique of abstract, and 
frequently taken-for-granted, concepts such as ownership', ‘privacy’, 
'discrimination', ‘fairness’, and ‘social exclusion' is provided. The chapter provides a 
social history of insurance, risk, and probability, explains the principles underlying 
modern insurance practices, and investigates the social, legal, commercial, and 
ethical implications new genetic information may have for commercial underwriting. 
Drawing upon a wide range of scholarly literature, as well as interviews with key 
stakeholders, this chapter provides an essential background to some of the 
substantive issues. It also begins to assess the role of stakeholder rhetoric in 
shaping the parameters of the debate, particularly with regard to definitions of 
genetic information and the social role of private insurance. The primary argument
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advanced is that the ethical boundaries imposed on commercial insurance 
practices ought to be dependent on the type of social good' individual insurance 
products are considered to exemplify, and that genetic information may in fact have 
only a marginal impact on the life assurance business as it currently exists. This 
chapter details the complex social, commercial, and philosophical issues 
underlining the problem of genetics and insurance, which should be used to inform 
any policymaking process that endeavours to provide pragmatic and fair resolve. 
This long chapter will provide answers to research questions one and two.
Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with the formal decision-making process on 
genetics and insurance, as well as stakeholder contributions to it. Chapter 3 
provides an extensive sociological analysis of the accounts given by relevant 
stakeholders, as they have tried to provide a morally justified framework for their 
policy positions. The focus will be on the ways in which stakeholders draw on a 
broad narrative repertoire, and marginalise or prioritise certain substantive issues, 
in order to give a morally adequate account of their opinions and beliefs. Chapter 4 
will, through an analysis of interview data and official governmental and non­
governmental policy documents and debates, investigate the political nature of a 
process that has appeared to prioritise ‘public opinion' as the guiding principle for 
action, and perhaps undermined reasoned, balanced, and unequivocal 
policymaking. The chapter will build on the one preceding it by investigating the 
treatment of stakeholder accounts by members of advisory committees, and the 
differential legitimacy interest groups appear to give to relevant regulatory and 
policy bodies. It will assess the extent to which they differentially situate their 
understandings of the issue, and judge the efficacy of the policy process, within a 
broader social, political, and scientific context. The focus of these chapters will be
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on the ideological and political beliefs that resonate within government advisory 
committees, genetic interest and patient-support groups, as well as commercial 
organisations. All these bodies, it will be demonstrated, have tended to react simply 
and uncritically to perceived public fears of a possible 'genetic underclass’. The 
argument Is made that a more rational and pragmatic decision-making process 
may be required; one that can balance the competing views more equitably, and 
not simply acquiesce to the emotive and uninformed views of both a credulous 
public, and interest groups with a clear stake In a particular policy outcome.
By analysing the formal policy process, and investigating the diverse range of 
opinion on the issue, these chapters evaluate the equity of the current policy 
process, the differential status granted to particular kinds of scientific evidence by 
interest groups and political institutions, and consider the extent to which perceived 
public opinion has shaped the strategies of principal stakeholders. By the end of 
these central chapters, research questions three, four and five will have been 
answered.
Chapter 5 assesses the suitability of the 'citizens' jury’ approach to policymaking 
as a potential alternative to the current decision-making framework. First, a 
critique of representative institutions is given. Next, the deliberative turn in 
democratic theory is discussed, and the possible virtues of public deliberation 
debated. The chapter then moves on to discuss the citizens’ jury as a practical 
application of abstract deliberative theory, and considers whether a particular 
formulation of this model might overcome some of the inherent flaws of 
policymaking revealed in previous chapters. Both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the model are presented so that a fair evaluation of its suitability
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can be made. This chapter is concerned primarily with providing an answer to the 
sixth research question.
The concluding chapter rehearses the research questions in light of the data 
provided within the thesis. It reviews the extent to which the thesis has succeeded 
in answering them and identifies appropriate directions for future work.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The controversy over commercial insurers’ access to the genetic test 
information of applicants proposing for life assurance Is complex and
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multifaceted. The question cannot be one simply of whether or not to allow 
commercial underwriters to consider new kinds of genetic test information when 
calculating premiums, because the underlying theoretical contingencies are far 
too complex for such a one-dimensional approach to be appropriate. This issue 
engenders broader philosophical, social, political, and ethical problems, which 
are best revealed by critically analysing the nature and role of private 
commercial insurance in the UK. The aim of this chapter will be to assess the 
most likely social, commercial, legal and ethical implications of introducing new 
kinds of scientific/technical knowledge to the domain of traditional insurance 
underwriting. This will require a critical assessment of the intellectual 
foundations of abstract concepts such as corporate responsibility', genetic 
information’, 'ownership', 'privacy', ‘discrimination’, 'fairness', and 'social 
exclusion', as they have been used by academics and stakeholders concerned 
about the impact genetic information may have on access to private life 
assurance.
The opening section of this chapter will briefly discuss the possible influence 
that the history of genetic testing, and its eugenic foundations, may be exerting 
on contemporary debates about third-party use of genetic information. Although 
there is little empirical evidence to suggest that individuals' views on the 
genetics and insurance issue have been directly influenced by the historic 
abuse of biological science, many of the contemporary terms and definitions 
used by both geneticists and insurers do carry significant historical baggage. 
Because genetics is not an abstract science insulated from the social world, it is 
important to acknowledge the possibility that history may be having an impact 
on the way people engage with these current controversies.
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Section 3 will provide a history of life assurance in the UK. It will situate the 
birth of this new form of prudent financial planning within the social and 
historical context of a time when developments in statistics, probability, and risk 
were beginning to subjugate the old, unpredictable world of divine providence. 
This section will illustrate the ways in which insurance evolved from relatively 
unsophisticated beginnings to the complex financial and socially embedded 
institution it is today, yet continued to retain many of its basic foundational 
principles. This history of probability, risk, and insurance will be presented as a 
sociological phenomenon. The analysis will pay particular attention to the class 
bias in insurance provision, which is a crucial issue that may undermine the 
social exclusion’ argument. The relationship between the growth of insurance 
and the development of modern capitalism will also be discussed through the 
work of Foucault and Weber. This analysis will also challenge some of the 
intuitive beliefs of contemporary sociologists of risk. The historical data will be 
crucial for understanding the birth of insurance and its accepted role within 
society.
Next, the underlying principles of contemporary insurance will be described 
and analysed. Data from interviews with insurance representatives will be used 
to assess the social legitimacy of the modern life business. The section will 
begin by contrasting the dual concepts of 'solidarity' and 'mutuality', as they 
pertain respectively to social and private forms of insurance. The question of 
whether or not private life assurance ought to be considered a 'primary social 
good' will be considered, and the perennial problem insurers face in trying to 
balance commercial and social interests will be evaluated. Interview data will be 
used to reveal the various ways in which representatives of the insurance 
industry manipulate the relationship between market and social values when 
giving account of the normative framework of commercial insurance provision.
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The section will then critically assess the ‘business of discrimination' that results 
from a risk pooling process and problématisé the abstract philosophical 
concepts of 'fair' and 'unfair' forms of discrimination. The contested notion of 
actuarial and statistical relevance will also be introduced within this context. By 
the end of this section, the role of insurance and its basic commercial principles 
will have been critically evaluated, and a foundation will have been built for 
assessing the most likely social, commercial, legal, and ethical implications of 
modern life assurance companies using genetic information to rate 
policyholders. The analysis of insurance representatives’ accounts of their 
social function will also begin to reveal the role stakeholders may have in 
shaping the framework of the debate. This section will contribute to answering 
the first research question.
The fifth section will focus on the issue of genetic information and its potential 
impact on both existing underwriting processes and access to specific 
insurance products. It will begin by looking critically at the way genetic 
information is often defined in the scholarly literature, as well as by relevant 
stakeholders in the debate, and illustrate the problems that can emerge when 
we attribute such an ambiguous concept privileged status in the context of 
private insurance contracts. This will provide a response to the second research 
question by increasing our understanding of the  ways in which stakeholders and 
interest groups may erect particular definitional frameworks, and use various 
narrative strategies, to express value judgements on this controversial issue. 
The extent to which the social, ethical, and commercial implications may be 
dependent on the type of ‘social good’ various insurance products are 
considered to exemplify, will also be discussed.
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Section 6 will look at the issue as it may affect general medical ethics. The 
ways in which the legal and ethical norms defining the doctor/patient 
relationship may be being reconfigured because of new developments in 
genetic testing will be highlighted and discussed. Various philosophical and 
legal issues regarding the ownership of medical information will also be critically 
evaluated.
The final section will look at various candidate solutions to the problem, in 
light of the theoretical issues discussed. In particular, it will assess whether the 
flexibility of a commercial market, and the creative capacity of the insurance 
industry to introduce novel products in response to changing market structures, 
might mitigate any negative social consequences engendered by the ‘new 
genetics'. This section will also flag one of the critical issues of genetic 
information; that is the implications it may have for the privatisation of welfare.
This chapter will provide a necessary theoretical background to the general 
problem of genetics and insurance, and provide an answer to the first research 
question by identifying the most likely social, commercial, legal, and ethical 
implications of permitting life insurers unconstrained access to new kinds of 
genetic test information. It will also make a contribution to the second research 
question by revealing the ways in which stakeholders' 
may manipulate the boundaries of the issue by operationalising particular 
definitional frameworks.
2. THE SPECTRE OF EUGENICS AND ITS POSSIBLE IMPACT ON 
CONTEMPORARY GENETICS DEBATES
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Before assessing the substantive issue of genetics and insurance, it is 
necessary to consider briefly the influence 'eugenic anxiety' may be exerting on 
peoples’ engagement with contemporary genetics-related controversies. It may 
be that such anxiety pre-configures their understanding of the likely social 
implications. When contemplating the diverse issues surrounding the 'new 
genetics’, we cannot entirely abstract contemporary debates from the history of 
the eugenic past. Public consternation over controversial issues such as human 
cloning, genetic testing, screening programmes, and third-party access to 
genetic information, may in part be the result of eugenic anxiety, aroused by an 
increasingly vocal opposition to genetic progress by groups such as the radical 
section of the disability movement.
It is almost impossible to engage with contemporary debates on the ‘new 
genetics’ without encountering the two extreme views of scepticism’ and 
uncritical acceptance'. These crude and opposing positions frequently find 
representation in what may be termed respectively the ‘disability’ and 
geneticist' discourses. The disability discourse often portrays current progress 
in genetics as an extension of the illiberal eugenic ideologies of the past. In 
contrast, the geneticist discourse tries to impose a line of demarcation between 
the historical abuse of biological science for ideological ends, and the ostensibly 
value-neutral genetic science that now promises to revolutionise medicine for 
the social good.
One problem with contemporary references to the past is that the antagonists 
tend to manipulate the historical framework so that it supports their own 
ideology. For example, if one takes Nazi eugenics as one’s point of reference, 
as do various disability activists, then one has a very different conception of 
contemporary genetic science than if the point of reference taken is post-war
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American geneticists trying to eradicate disease. Both the radical disability 
activists and those who uncritically embrace genetic progress often antagonise 
debates on the specific use of genetic technologies. Consequently, they may 
limit the potential for informed and balanced decision-making. The popularity of 
the determinist myth in many contemporary discourses on genetics, particularly 
in the fields of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, may further threaten 
informed public debate on the increasingly complex issues facing modern 
society.
The topic of this thesis is the issue of genetics and insurance. It may appear 
odd to suggest that the history of eugenics could have any bearing on a debate 
about how much of an individual’s medical information a commercial company 
should have access to. It would seem logical to consider eugenics only in terms 
of contemporary debates about pre-implantation genetic screening or genetic 
counselling. However, the term 'genetics’ elicits strong emotive responses, 
because it carries such a great deal of historical baggage. This may pré­
configuré peoples’ beliefs on the normative issues associated with various 
aspects of genetic science and its social utility. If we consider the lexicon of 
insurance, the prevalence of such terms as ’impaired lives’ and preferred lives’ 
should alert us to the ways in which what appear initially to be value-neutral 
concepts have a particularly chequered history. Life assurance companies 
essentially place a value on peoples' lives, and new developments in genetic 
testing might enable them to do this with far greater precision. The possibility of 
an emerging genetic underclass' resulting from the misuse of genetic 
information cannot be ignored. Overcoming a sense of historical myopia may be 
a prerequisite for fully understanding the social implications of contemporary 
genetic testing and screening.
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The genetics and insurance issue has become very public and controversial, 
as will be illuminated throughout this thesis. It is difficult to believe that the 
debate would have been so heated had genetics not been the focus of the 
issue. Indeed, the debate over HIV testing and insurance did not engender the 
same level of public or political opprobrium. We should not ignore the possibility 
that public understanding of the eugenic past, coupled with the recent popularity 
of determinist theories of social behaviour, has influenced all social policy 
debates centred on genetic science and its social applications. It is therefore 
necessary to be aware of the historical record, and individuals’ differential 
understanding of it, as foreshadowing the present dilemma over the use of 
genetic information in life assurance underwriting.
3. PROBABILITY, RISK, AND THE BIRTH OF UK LIFE ASSURANCE
3.1 The Early Beginnings o f Life Assurance
The birth of life assurance in the UK can be traced to the late sixteenth 
century, when the earliest registered contract was written in 1558 at the 
Chamber of Commerce on behalf of a William Gibbons, whose life was insured 
for £382 6s. 8d for a one-year period. (Cockerell and Green, 1976, 34, 35) 
However, life assurance had existed much earlier in the Mediterranean 
countries, where its practice can be charted as far back as 1400. Clark (1999) 
argues that in the early period, life assurance was often part of marine 
insurance policies rather than a discrete entity in its own right. For example, the 
insuring of slave cargoes was routine practice in the fifteenth century and, 
according to Clark, was ‘... indistinguishable from marine insurance since it 
simply indemnified slave-owners for the market price of their chattels lost at
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sea.’ (Ibid, 14 )1 Individuals travelling overseas could also enjoy some form of 
life cover as part of a broader marine policy, but these early contracts were 
often limited in scope and only covered the proposer for a single journey.
For those life assurance contracts that were not simply a constitutive part of 
marine insurance, the only condition of acceptance was that ‘ ...the  insured was 
in good health and was not travelling outside England within the term of the 
insurance.’ (Cockerell & Green, op cit, 35) Of course, in the late sixteenth 
century, the very concept of 'good health’ was rather ambiguous. Its definitional 
boundaries were determined both by the vagaries of a theocentric medicine and 
a public with little alternative than to place its faith in the transcendental world of 
religious mysticism. Nevertheless, this period would represent the prelude to a 
Copernican turn in history, when a new science of probability and risk would 
eventually seek to replace the chaotic and unpredictable world of chance that 
had for so long inhibited social progress. It would be within this new world of 
supposedly inexorable ’natural laws’ and the predictable regularity couched 
within them, where life assurance would become socially embedded.
3.2 From Divine Providence to Probable Futures
Bernstein (1998) argues that new advances in mathematics, particularly 
calculus and algebra, provided the foundation for what would become the social 
application of probability. The initial stage in the advance towards a world of risk
1 Clark points out that the terms of these policies usually only covered incidents of capture or 
shipwreck, and explicitly precluded disease and suicide. Clark recounts the disturbing case of 
Luke Collingwood, the captain of the Zong, who, in 1781, ordered 122 diseased slaves to be 
thrown overboard so that his company could maximise its claim against the insurers. Clark argues 
that this action implied ’... a thorough familiarity and long experience with the technicalities of 
marine insurance law.’ (Clark, 1999, 17)
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and probability was the establishment of scientific measurement, which began 
to take shape in the early seventeenth century and would later enable scientists 
to predict the order and regulatory of nature. (Bernstein, 1998, 55) Until this 
period, people had a relatively naive conception of natural order and regularity. 
When cataclysmic events occurred, people attributed their cause to the will of 
God, who was conceived as the ultimate, but largely unpredictable, harbinger of 
both life and death. Furthermore, medicine was inextricably linked to theology in 
this early period.2 It would have been impossible to develop life assurance, as it 
now exists, in such a world of perceived chaos and arbitrary death. Small-scale 
and short-term insurance products for seafarers could operate under these 
ostensibly chaotic conditions, but the statistical and probabilistic revolution was 
required before a broader conception of life assurance could become realised 
as an expedient and profitable social institution.
Bernstein acknowledges the work of Fermat and Pascal in laying the 
foundations for this probabilistic revolution. They began corresponding in 1654, 
and developed the first method for predii. ing the likelihood of future events 
when multiple possibilities existed. This method became known as Pascal's 
Triangle’. (Bernstein, op cit, 63) Bernstein writes: 'The inescapable uncertainty 
of the future will always prevent us from completely banishing the fates from our 
hopes and fears, but after 1654 mumbo jumbo would no longer be the 
forecasting method of choice.’ (Ibid, 72)
2 Female lay healers were at this time practicing a more evidence-based and empirical medicine 
in their communities, but they soon became marginalised as medicine began to acquire 
professional status through the establishment of formal training and accreditation. This new 
institutionalised medicine was essentially a male preserve. The universities that provided the 
training were still theological in their approach, and this was reflected in the formal text based 
medicine they taught. See Oakley, 1976 for a discussion of this male takeover as it applied to 
childbirth, and Witz, 1992 for a slightly different analysis of gender and the professionalisation of 
medicine. For an excellent general history of medicine, which includes an erudite analysis of 
these and many other important social issues related to medical practices, see Porter, 1999
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The next significant development emerged with John Graunt’s publication 
entitled ‘Natural and Political Observations made upon the Bills of Mortality.’ in 
this seminal text, Graunt compiled data on the births and deaths that occurred 
in London between 1604 and 1661. Bernstein describes this work as a 
breakthrough in the cultivation of sampling methods, which would become 
crucial for the calculation of probability. Furthermore, because many Dutch 
towns and principalities were financing themselves through the sale of 
annuities, an abundance of mortality data was also being collected and 
analysed there. However, some credit must be given to the English astronomer 
Edmund Halley (1656-1742), who in 1693 made the most significant theoretical 
advance towards the potential realisation of a marketable assurance industry. 
He developed the first life tables, based on population data gathered in the 
Prussian town of Breslau, which ‘... could be used to reckon the price of 
insuring lives at different ages.' (Ibid, 87) Abraham de Moivre (1667-1754) later 
perfected Halley’s methods and used them in his study of annuities.
The end of the seventeenth century was a period in which significant 
advances in knowledge and understanding of statistics and probability slowly 
began to change humanity's conception of itself and its place in the universe. 
The collection and dissemination of population mortality data provided an 
essential empirical foundation necessary for the creation of new and 
ameliorating social welfare institutions and a commercially expansive life 
assurance market.
3.3. Risk, Insurance, and the Growth o f Capitalism
These developments in probability and statistics facilitated not only the growth 
of the insurance industry but also contributed to the evolution of capitalism itself.
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In fact, one might even argue that the growth of insurance played an important 
role in the organic growth of capitalism. It would be useful to explore the deeper 
sociological insights that emerge from Bernstein's historical data. It may be 
particularly instructive to look at the broader social and economic context in 
which this mass of new and revolutionary data was being generated. As 
Hacking (1990) notes, the original impetus for collecting population data was for 
military purposes. Such data was an invaluable tool for the State, as it provided 
logistical information on such things as the number of able-bodied men 
available to fight in times of war. This data, which essentially allowed the State 
to measure its true power and strength, remained relatively clandestine 
because of its military implications. It was only when the amateurs began 
collating and analysing their own data that a broader probabilistic revolution 
ensued. Once this data entered the public realm, the very structure of society 
could potentially undergo profound social, political, and economic change.
However, not all of the changes engendered by the probabilistic revolution 
had an ameliorating impact. In particular, statistics became an enabling tool for 
the many enthusiasts of eugenic policies. Members of society did not enjoy the 
positive social impacts of applied probability theory equally. Foucault (1994a), 
for example, argues that the increasing obsession with the strength of 
populations, particularly in France, England, and Austria, was a precursor to the 
birth of social medicine and the dominance of a new 'medical gaze'. Individual 
bodies slowly became an object of state control and intervention. Foucault’s 
(1979) Discipline and Punish, provides an erudite analysis of the process by 
which the individual body eventually became a site for the exercise of discipline, 
through new technologies, which contrasted with the antecedent focus on 
punishment. At first, France, England, Austria, and Germany used the new 
science of statistics merely to record population strength. They had no explicit
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commitment to the improvement of public health. However, Germany eventually 
developed a new medical science focused on public health, and the other 
countries soon followed suit. The new obsession with public health, and an 
increasing desire to place the 'contagious’ under surveillance, perhaps 
inevitably resulted in the poorest and most vulnerable sections of society 
becoming the primary targets of state power.
In his essay, Governmentality, Foucault (1994b) cites again the importance of 
the statistical revolution. However, this time he looks at it more positively in the 
context of the emergence of modern political economy. He writes:
'... in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, the art of 
government finds its first form of crystallization, organized around the 
theme of reason of state, understood not in the negative and pejorative 
sense we give it today (as that which infringes on the principles of law, 
equity, and humanity in the sole interests of the state) but in a full and 
positive sense: the state is governed according to rational principles that 
are intrinsic to it and cannot be derived solely from natural or divine laws or 
the principles of wisdom and prudence.’ (Foucault, 1994b, 212,213)
For Foucault, the new science of political economy emerges from the '... 
perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between 
population, territory, and wealth; and this is accompanied by the formation of a 
type of intervention characteristic of government, namely, intervention in the 
field of economy and population.’ (Ibid, 217) Governmentality, for Foucault, 
means among other things the
’ ... ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, 
as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security.’ (Ibid., 219,220)
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Foucault reveals the impact that the statistical and probabilistic revolution had 
on both the development of political economy and the micro power relations 
between individuals and the State. Apparatuses of security were only possible 
in a rational state with access to the tools of statistical and probabilistic 
reasoning. As Bernstein remarks: The capacity to manage risk, and with it the 
appetite to take risk and make forward-looking choices, are key elements of the 
energy that drives the economic system forward.’ (Bernstein, op cit., 3) Without 
risk, and the means to tame it, there could be no profit and therefore no 
capitalism. Without the tool of probability theory, society could never have 
become ‘future-oriented’. Foucault’s most important theoretical contribution 
was his recognition that the fundamental social changes engendered by the 
new techno-rational approach to political economy had both positive and 
negative impacts. Rational probabilistic reasoning could enable society to 
manage risk, and therefore contributed to capitalist growth and the improvement 
of public health; yet simultaneously, state science could lead to new forms of 
subjugation and disempowerment.
Bernstein's rather sanguine celebration of the way society learned to master 
risk stands in contrast to Foucault’s more nuanced and critical perspective. 
However, a more acute contrast is revealed if we compare the work of 
Bernstein and Foucault with Beck's seemingly dystopian vision of uncontrollable 
risk. Bernstein’s data, and the general analysis so far provided, appears to 
challenge the basis of Beck’s pessimism. The risks circulating in modern society 
are arguably no more incorrigible than those in the past. Indeed, one could 
argue that they are now far better understood and manageable than ever 
before. Furthermore, as will be explained in more detail later, the wealthier 
sections of society can, just as they did in the past, buy a certain degree of 
immunity from the risks that routinely affect the poor. The rational state, and the
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various risks it has strived to master, has had differential impacts on individuals 
and groups. Foucault perhaps captures this more than most authors. Although 
the rational capitalist state may use science and technology to achieve greater 
control over its population, the emergence of free floating and discursive 
discourses, as well as more nuanced micro power relations between subjugated 
groups and the state, could also prove empowering. Bernstein’s optimistic 
vision perhaps fails to capture some of the negative consequences of this 
scientific revolution, while Beck's pessimism fails to recognise that many 
modern risks are manageable and may enable certain groups to avoid their 
devastating impact.
Weber (1927) also talks about the influence that rational, future-oriented 
statistical and probabilistic reasoning had on the development of capitalism and 
its underlying social relations. Both Foucault and Weber regard modern society 
as driven by rationalisation and discipline, which engenders norms of purposeful 
rational action in various aspects of social life and activity. Weber describes the 
rational capitalistic enterprise as one that employs, among other things, rational 
capital accounting according to the methods of modern double-entry 
bookkeeping, rational technology to permit calculability, and calculable law. All 
these necessary elements of the capitalist enterprise were made possible by 
the probabilistic revolution. Indeed, Weber argues that modern capitalism can 
only survive in the modern rational state. (Weber,1927, 276)
Although both Foucault and Weber do not talk about insurance as a rational 
mechanism for the protection of financial wealth, their arguments are still useful 
for understanding the fundamental changes that had a lasting impact on the 
structure and development of modern society. Their insights can build on 
Bernstein's data and provide a more general and critical social analysis of the
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influence these revolutionary ideas had on broader social and economic 
progress. From this kind of analysis, one can begin to assess the work of 
contemporary sociologists of risk far more critically and provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the historical role of insurance.
Although it is not possible to explore these issues in more detail, they are 
nevertheless crucial to our understanding of both the significance of insurance 
as a revolutionary mechanism for taming risk and its role in the evolution of 
modern capitalism. More precisely, the work of Foucault and Weber allows us to 
explore not only the positive impacts probability theory had on the growth of the 
rational capitalist state, but also the negative consequences that specific 
applications of statistical reasoning engendered for certain groups. For 
example, commercial insurance was an application of probability theory that 
was of direct benefit only to the few. Those able to use the new science to make 
investment decisions and protect their financial wealth were predominantly the 
middle classes. Although their actions enabled capitalist society to flourish, we 
cannot ignore the fact that there were also many losers. Even rationalised 
medicine through public health initiatives, made possible by the probabilistic 
revolution, was often perceived as a direct threat to the liberty of the poor and 
vulnerable.
However, it is important to realise that despite the abundance of mortality 
data at the end of the seventeenth century, the life assurance industry did not 
use them extensively for the underwriting of policies until much later. Cockerell 
and Green argue that the market in the early eighteenth century was relatively 
small. The Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance offered the only 
realistic alternatives to the mutual societies, who themselves only began 
underwriting life policies in 1721. At this time, the authors argue: ‘Assurance
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was provided for a maximum of one year, and the two companies refused sick 
or elderly lives and victims of smallpox.’ (Cockerell and Green, op cit, 35) 
Because no use was made of scientifically based underwriting, the market 
remained relatively bounded and marginal. This was to remain the case until 
1756, when James Dodson (1710-1757), a pupil of de Moivre, proposed that a 
life assurance society be established on the equitable principle: ‘"that the price 
of insurance on lives might be regulated by the age of the persons on whose life 
the insurance is made.’" (Quoted in Supple, 1970, 55) 3 This society was 
inaugurated in 1762, and became known as the Society for Equitable 
Assurances on Lives and Survivorships. Following this fundamental change in 
approach to insurance provision, numerous life assurance companies were 
born, and underwriting based on actuarially significant data soon became 
standard practice. As new policies were introduced, and underwriters became 
more adept at predicting mortality, the assurance companies began to 
obsessively demand increasing amounts of personal medical information. 
Cockerell and Green write:
'... from the 1830s onwards, offices recorded details of each proposer's 
family, and the incidence of gout, asthma, consumption and brain disease 
... Extra premiums for life assurance were also charged for corpulence, 
intemperance, and other health-affecting habits ... Suicide and duelling 
were exceptional risks ... Unusual personal habits such as opium-eating 
also affected the practice of the life assurance offices. After a test case 
involving a Scottish nobleman in the 1830s and the subsequent 
investigations of the Edinburgh societies, life offices refused to insure 
proven addicts.' (Cockerell & Green, op cit, 44,45)
Although the life assurance industry did eventually accept the commercial 
advantages of an underwritten insurance market, it is surprising that they
3 Dodson was enraged when he was denied a life assurance contract by the Amicable because of 
his age. believing he would have been eligible for a policy if underwriting based on sound 
actuarial data had been employed. He was rejected purely because the life business operated 
within such narrow margins.
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procrastinated for so long. This is perhaps illustrative of the time lag that often 
exists between an emerging science and its practical application. However, it 
must also be noted that some of the early statistical information was erroneous, 
largely because of inherent methodological flaws in the data collection process. 
The mortality data John Graunt collected in London was flawed, because he 
failed to factor Into his calculations the highly mobile and fluid nature of the 
population within the capital. The data was incomplete, and could have had 
serious financial implications if used to underwrite life policies. However, the 
insurance industry was still being economically Irrational in failing to adopt some 
of the more obvious and rudimentary principles of mortality. They preferred to 
rely instead, as Clark notes, on their parochial and imperfect 'rules of thumb'. 
(Clark, op cit, 117)
The historical data presented here suggests that in the embryonic stage of 
capitalism, insurance could only have had a marginal impact on its 
development, because the market remained relatively small and bounded. 
However, for late-stage capitalism, insurance would become crucial as a means 
of financial security for the middle classes and would make a greater 
contribution towards capitalist growth. It is now necessary to look at the social 
context of insurance in more detail, as this will become important when looking 
at the contemporary issue of genetics, insurance, and social exclusion.
3.4 The Social Context o f Insurance
Clark provides one of the most erudite social histories of insurance from its 
inception in the seventeenth century to the late eighteenth century. He makes 
the interesting point that in the early seventeenth century, England was one of
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the few countries in Europe to permit the assurance of lives. Those countries 
under the influence of the papacy, in contrast, eschewed life assurance for its 
impiety and imposed draconian restrictions on commercial practices. There was 
an unwavering belief that it was somehow immoral to estimate the value of a 
human life in monetary terms, because this was considered an ultimate 
transgression of the sacred boundary between God and his mortal subjects. 
However, in England there was little public objection, and the treasury remained 
quiescent because of the extra tax revenue it derived from insurance 
transactions. (Clark, op cit, 22) Furthermore, according to Clark, the Anglican 
Church was reluctant to denounce life assurance on theological grounds, 
because they recognised the sublime virtue of financial prudence constitutive of 
the life business.
However, regulation became an issue in England when the insurance market 
digressed from its putatively virtuous function as a means of prudential financial 
planning and oriented itself towards the promotion of risky speculative 
investments. The 1774 Gambling Act ‘... introduced the first appreciable 
regulation of life insurance by barring any insurance on a life or event except 
insofar as the policyholder had a financial interest (a so-called “Insurable 
interest") in that life or event.’ (Ibid, 22) It had reached the point where people 
were speculating on lives they had no legitimate interest in. Clark cites two 
macabre examples that occurred in 1765 and 1757. The first concerned the fate 
of eight hundred German refugees stranded for three days without food on 
London's eastern outskirts. Before charitable groups could be mobilised, ’... 
speculators and underwriters at Lloyd's had already begun placing bets on the 
number of Germans still alive by a given future date.’ (Ibid, 50) The second 
case occurred in 1757 and concerned an Admiral Byng, who was standing trial 
for dereliction of duty because of his abject failure to defend Minorca from the
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Spanish. Clark writes: premiums on his life varied with the strength of the
latest testimony offered against him in court.' (Ibid, 50)
These examples reveal the insurance industry’s dual nature. That is, 
insurance provides an avenue for exploring the theoretically nuanced domains 
of risk and security, which are essentially flip sides of the same coin that the 
probabilistic revolution allowed both insurers and consumers to balance more 
precisely. Insurance therefore encapsulates both a gambling and a prudential 
aspect. Both were necessary for the development of modern capitalism. 
Although there were many attempts to tame the excesses of the life business 
through regulation, the speculative aspect of life assurance has always been 
part of its nature.
It was not until the nineteenth century that the Insurance industry grew, and 
life assurance products began to catch the public imagination. However, 
insurance continued to be a middle class preserve, because members of the 
industrial classes were unable to afford the premiums. Supple draws attention 
to this class bias in the insurance market when he claims that:
'As early as the 1820s Charles Babbage made the significant point that the 
assured population had a lower than average mortality precisely because 
they were “selected from the middle and higher ranks of society, and are 
consequently exempt from many sources of unhealthiness to which the 
poor are liable.' (Supple, op cit, 113)
In the Victorian period, life assurance became recognised as conducive to, 
and indeed constitutive of, the general drive towards social progress. The new 
and revolutionary knowledge of statistics and probability provided the means for 
social amelioration through insurance, just as it offered the possibility of
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improving the body politic through eugenics-based social policy and increased 
medical surveillance. Supple describes insurance as:
a product which both reflected the importance of individualism and 
independence, and buttressed the institution of the family and the habit of 
prudence ... life insurance was bound to benefit from and exemplify the 
extension and strengthening of middle-class virtues in Victorian Britain.’
(Ibid, 116)
The insurance industry was keen to accentuate the social virtue role that that it 
was perceived to embody and sold itself as an institution compatible with the 
philanthropic ideals of the Victorian middle classes. The promotion of financial 
prudence that characterised the life assurance business also flattered the 
Victorians’ Calvinistic pretensions. This certainly contributed to the 
unprecedented growth of the life business throughout the nineteenth century. 
Weber’s, The Protestant Ethic and  the Spirit o f Capitalism, captured the 
relationship, or what he referred to as 'elective affinity’, between the religious 
virtues of Protestantism, such as prudence and worldly asceticism, and the 
progress of modern Western capitalism. Again, a rational future-oriented 
outlook was a prerequisite for capitalist growth, and the emergence of insurance 
products undoubtedly aided the Protestants in their quest for prudential living.
Weber does not refer to the role of products such as life assurance as a 
specific strategy of financial prudence and security at this time, yet its 
importance for the middle classes should not be underestimated. Insurance was 
a product that gave them a degree of security in a risky world. The inability of 
the aspirant working classes to access such products meant that their security 
from risk was far more limited. Therefore, although private insurance was an 
enabling product for the wealthy, and undoubtedly made a contribution to the 
growth of capitalism, its role as a socially ameliorating institution for wider
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society was at first limited. Of course, eventually social insurance systems 
would be established, and indeed many of the social engineering programmes 
aimed at helping the deserving' poor were dependent on the same kinds of 
scientific principles underlying private insurance. Nevertheless, life assurance 
itself only benefited a sub-section of the general population.
It is important to recognise that this social history of insurance, risk, and 
probability calls into question some of the basic assumptions made by risk 
society theorists such as Beck and Giddens. Beck, for instance, makes the 
claim that in modern society risk is pervasive and imperceptible by all. This is an 
extremely general and uncritical statement. In particular, it fails to recognise 
distributive issues around risk, which have remained relatively unchanged for 
centuries. Risks do not affect society as a whole’, implied by Beck's world risk 
society' theory. To aggregate risks, as both Beck and Giddens do, is to lose 
sight of the fact that the wealthy can avoid most of the risks that routinely affect 
the poor. Financial risks can be averted by purchasing life assurance, and 
health risks can be avoided by consuming the right products, purchasing health 
insurance, or living in areas with clean air and good medical services. Choices 
about consumption habits, social relations, and lifestyle significantly affect risk 
status, and the wealthy generally have fa r greater choice than the poor. This is 
as true today as it was in the past.
A s was argued in the previous chapter, both Beck and Giddens have a 
tendency to generalise various issues around risk. They frequently overlook 
empirical evidence that appears to contradict their intuitive beliefs on the 
changing nature of risk and its social impacts. The authors often move 
uncritically from the particular to the general, with the result that many of their 
theories can easily be challenged by the historical evidence. The risk society
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theory provides an inadequate tool for understanding the genetics and 
insurance problem, precisely because it does not adequately deal with the 
differential distribution of both risk and security in the modern world.
The following important insights emerge from the analysis provided in this 
section:
1) The birth of UK life assurance, and indeed the emergence of capitalism, 
was largely dependent on the statistical and probabilistic revolution. The 
ability to tame risk and promote financial prudence through insurance 
aided the capitalist enterprise.
2) However, the statistical revolution did not bring benefits to all in equal 
measure. The rational state’s obsession with the control of populations 
affected groups in a variety of different ways. Life assurance only really 
benefited the wealthy middle classes, because they were the only social 
group with the financial resources to be prudent and future-oriented. 
Foucault and Weber's writings are useful in that they alert us to the 
broader and more nuanced social context in which the statistical 
revolution was evolving, and reveal the differential impacts this revolution 
engendered.
3) Although life assurance contributed to the growth of late-stage 
capitalism, its role in the embryonic stage was probably limited. This was 
because the market remained relatively small and bounded, and the use 
of statistical data was not initially used In actuarial decision-making.
4) The history of risk, insurance, and modern capitalism challenges the 
generalised risk society theory of Beck and Giddens, because it 
demonstrates that, a) modern conceptions of risk are not qualitatively
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different from those in the past, and b) risk and security are not 
distributed equally amongst all groups in society.
The convergent histories of probability theory and life assurance represent 
both the triumph of science over superstition, and financial security and 
prudence over uncontrollable destiny. The insurance business, and the new 
science underpinning it, provided some individuals with a greater degree of 
control over their futures. The promise of security in an ostensibly risky world 
was always going to resonate within the Victorian middle class mindset, and this 
promise still holds indelible appeal to the contemporary insurance buying public. 
Insurance undoubtedly performed an important social function, and continues to 
do so, but the birth of actuarially determined underwriting also provided a 
means for discrimination and exclusion. This has become an important issue in 
the context of contemporary insurance provision. This chapter will now move on 
to discuss the principles of the modern life assurance business and the 
statistical discrimination on which it is based. The issues discussed in this 
section, particularly the class bias in insurance provision, will become of 
fundamental importance when exploring the contemporary problem of access to 
life assurance in the age of genetics.
4. THE UNDERLYING FINANCIAL AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF 
MODERN PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INSURANCE: RISK ANALYSIS, RISK 
POOLING, AND THE BUSINESS OF DISCRIMINATION
In the UK, commercial life assurance exists within a complex system of state 
funded welfare. Both social and private forms of insurance have an intricate and 
interdependent relationship, despite being underpinned by two contrasting
6 1
guiding principles. The level of state sponsored social insurance provision can 
have a direct impact on the commercial limits of the private sector. It may also 
shape society’s perception of the type of ‘social good' particular private 
insurance products are considered to exemplify. Private insurance often fills the 
residual spaces left by state funded welfare providers but may also replace 
social provision in part or in whole.4
Although this chapter is concerned with the principles and ethics of private life 
assurance, it is important to understand the ways in which these two 
complementary forms of indemnity interact, and appreciate that the level of 
provision available within the social realm can affect the financial and ethical 
framework of any private system incorporated into the social fabric. It is 
important to recognise this point, and look at it in the context of the historical 
issues so far discussed, if we are to make some progress on research question 
one, which is concerned with the likely social, legal, commercial, and ethical 
implications genetic information may have for life assurance provision.
4.1 ‘So lidarity ’ and ‘M utuality ’ in Social and Private insurance
‘Solidarity’ and ‘Mutuality’ are the two fundamental principles that guide social 
and private insurance respectively. Solidarity is constitutive of social forms of 
insurance in which coverage is universal and not dependent on the risk-status
4 See Ersklne, 1997 and his argument that social insurance is an anachronistic institution 
designed for a post-war era demographically very different from contemporary British society. He 
recognises a greater political momentum towards the private supply of insurance and 
countenances the argument that the private sector's interest in opening up new markets is 
influenced by the vacuum left after state cover has been exhausted. (Erskine, 1997, 143,144).
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of users.5 The finance required for this form of provision comes from general 
taxation and access is based purely on need. Mutuality, on the other hand, 
characterises those forms of private insurance where coverage is voluntary, and 
the financial contribution of the applicant is dependent on the risk he/she brings 
to the insurance pool. This is commonly referred to as the equity principle’, 
which underlies all risk-based private insurance models. In the absence of 
actuarial underwriting, and the equitable pooling of risks, commercial insurance 
is not a particularly profitable enterprise.
A solidarity based social insurance system is relatively straightforward to 
implement. It requires only the willingness of government to set aside a 
percentage of tax revenue for the supply of what is widely recognised as an 
indispensable 'social good', and an amenable public willing to support such a 
mechanism of provision. The rest is simply a matter of financial planning. 
However, a number of a priori conditions must be satisfied if a private system of 
insurance is to be socially and commercially viable. Nicholas Barr (1993), in his 
classic text, The Economics o f the Welfare State, proposes five crucial 
probability conditions that must be met if an efficient private insurance system is 
to be implemented. Firstly, the probability of an insurable event occurring for 
one individual must be independent from the probability of it occurring to 
another individual. Secondly, the probability must be less than one. If the 
probability were one, there would be no risk for the commercial insurer to pool. 
This is an important point when we consider the genetics issue. It is because 
genetic information is not absolutely deterministic that such knowledge
5 A narrow definition of solidarity has been proposed here mainly for pragmatic reasons, but it 
must be recognised that there are many varieties of solidarity. Husted, 1999 contrasts 
'constitutive'/alliance' solidarity with 'communal' solidarity. The latter represents people with 
'common interests' and is exemplified In social insurance systems oriented towards the protection 
of weak members of a group. The former, on the other hand, characterises people with an 
'interest in common' but acting essentially for self-interested reasons. This is exemplified in most 
private insurance contracts. (Husted, 1999, 3)
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becomes a valuable commodity in the hands of the insurance underwriter. 
Thirdly, the probability of the event must be known or estimable; otherwise, 
insurers cannot calculate with any precision the risk-based premiums 
fundamental to a private insurance market. Fourthly, there must be no 'adverse 
selection'. This will be discussed in more detail later. Finally, there must be no 
'moral hazard’. Moral hazard can occur, according to Barr, in one of two ways. 
The customer can either manipulate the probability of the event occurring or 
influence the size of the loss incurred. The latter, often referred to as the 'third 
party payment problem’, does not make the practice of commercial insurance 
impossible, but it does precipitate inefficiency by tolerating over-consumption. 
Moral hazard is a problem commonly experienced by private healthcare 
providers. Barr writes:
'If an individual's insurance pays all medical costs, then health care is 
'free'' to the patient. Similarly, on the supply side, the doctor knows that the 
insurance company will pay his charges; he is therefore not constrained by 
the patient's ability to pay. As a result, both doctor and patient can act as 
though the cost of health care were zero. This is inefficient: it causes over­
consumption and creates upward pressure on insurance companies.' (Barr,
1993, 130
In addition to these technical requirements, there must also be a positive 
demand for insurance (which requires plenty of risk-averse individuals), the 
administrative infrastructure to deliver insurance, and the ability to supply 
insurance products at a price that individuals are willing to pay. (Ibid, 123) 
These commercial necessities distinguish the private market from state funded 
provision. However, as has been mentioned, the two systems do mutually 
interact, as one constantly defines and configures the parameters of the other. 
This point becomes clearer when we consider the 'social good' aspect of private 
life assurance. However, it must be recognised that European systems of social
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insurance are often based on compulsory participation in schemes managed by 
private or mutual providers. Therefore, the polarisation of tax-funded and private 
provision may appear to be an artificial construct. Nevertheless, in the UK, 
private and social systems of insurance are institutionally autonomous, for the 
most part. In order to understand the social good' aspect of insurance, it is 
sometimes instructive to operate with ideal types’. Wiesing (1999c) provides an 
analysis of European styles of insurance provision and highlights the different 
ways that mixed systems may affect access to various kinds of insurance 
products. However, when looking at life assurance in the UK, it is legitimate to 
make a distinction between tax-funded and commercial insurance.
4.2 Life Assurance and the ‘Social Good’ Argum ent
When considering the ethical boundaries that envelop the commercial supply 
of any given insurance product, one is naturally drawn into considering the 
product's 'social good’ status. Sandberg (1995) posits the existence of three 
distinct types of social good. Firstly, there are ‘primary social goods’. These are 
goods that everybody has a ‘right’ to access, because they provide the 
minimum standards of welfare deemed necessary for the enjoyment of a 
decent’ life .6 Most people would consider the British National Health Service a 
primary social good on this definition. Secondly, there are commodities’. These 
are goods or services sold in an open market in which there is no moral 
imperative to distribute them according to egalitarian principles. They are, in this 
sense, non-essential luxuries. Thirdly, there are ‘non-primary social goods’.
6 Of course people will always disagree on what constitutes a decent life', so the very concept is 
in this sense relative, and may vary significantly between different kinds of society. However, 
within any single society, there will always be some objective criteria for measuring the general 
standards of living, and although the methods may be imperfect and disputable, they are still 
useful for providing a general baseline of what may be considered universal social essentials.
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These goods lie conceptually in-between the other two. Sandberg regards 
European life assurance as a 'non primary social good’. He writes: ‘It is an 
instrument for rational agents to secure a certain economic standard of living, 
above the publicly guaranteed minimum floor, for their dependants in the event 
they die.’ (Sandberg, 1995, 1554) However, it cannot justifiably be regarded as 
a primary social good, because dependants of those who cannot afford life 
assurance policies still have the social security system as a financial safety net. 
Nevertheless, it ought to be regarded as more than a mere commodity, 
according to Sandberg, because it does still distribute various social benefits.
The upshot of this conception of life assurance as a non-primary social good 
is that commercial providers have a legitimate right to employ risk-assessment 
as an underwriting tool. However, the social and ethical Impact of a commercial 
market can be mitigated or intensified by the level of state provision. The 
commercial and ethical parameters of private life assurance should not be 
regarded as static and immutable, but as constantly fluctuating In response to 
changes in the level of social welfare. In the United States, life assurance could 
be defined as a primary social good, because the general level of state funded 
welfare is woefully Inadequate by European standards. But even in the UK, 
where the provision of welfare is relatively comprehensive, life assurance may 
be shifting conceptually in the same direction. As a greater number of people 
begin to purchase their own homes, for example, society’s conception of the 
minimum economic standards of living may be modified. Since life assurance is 
often a prerequisite for obtaining a mortgage, its conception as a primary social 
good becomes more greatly justified. However, one must make a distinction 
between an endowment-linked mortgage and a simple repayment mortgage. It 
would be far more difficult to justify a fundamental right to the former.
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Nevertheless, if home ownership is considered a primary social good, basic 
insurance products necessary to access this good ought to be open to all.
The question that arises is: how can economic rationality, and the 
requirement to equitably distribute social goods, be squared within a private 
insurance market whose raison d ’etre is the search for ever-increasing profit.
4.3. Balancing Commercial and Social Interests: The Insurance Industry ’s 
Double Truth Doctrine
Private insurance is guided by the principle of economic rationality, yet it is 
simultaneously expected to fulfil certain social responsibilities and obligations. It 
is interesting to analyse the various ways in which representatives of insurance 
companies juxtapose market and social values in their interview accounts. On 
the one hand, insurers often accentuate the social benefits of a private 
insurance market. However, they are also quick to point out that insurance is a 
'business like any other’. The use of both a 'rhetoric of social altruism' and a 
rhetoric of market freedom' was a central feature in the interview accounts of 
insurance representatives. There was a sense that in order to defend 
commercial freedom, a narrative repertoire that included a strong social value 
dimension had to be expressed. One could refer to this strategy as an attempt 
to create a 'morally adequate' account of commercial norms and values.
Three of the insurance representatives made explicit reference to the idea of 
social values and responsibility. Keith Bedell-Pearce, a director at the 
Prudential, claimed when interviewed:
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. . . I  feel quite strongly that the insurance industry as a whole ... has this 
franchise to operate as commercial concerns in aggregate, through 
permissions granted by society, and therefore there has to be some 
reciprocal arrangement in terms of the way in which we behave. (Keith 
Bedell-Pearce, Director at Prudential Pic., interviewed by James Mittra, 18 
July 2001)
Later in the interview, when asked specifically about the moral dimension of 
corporate decision-making, he recapitulated by arguing:
With the growing emphasis on corporate social responsibility, which is very 
important and again sort of in the wider extension of the concept that you 
only engage in commercial activities with the consent of society; therefore 
there is some need to reciprocate that by exercising a degree of corporate 
social responsibility. Within that corporate social responsibility ... is the 
need to look at the implications of the decisions we make, and if we can 
mitigate that in human terms, then I think it’s the job of insurance 
companies to do that.
Within the insurance industry, there is a prevalent belief that the social 
implications of commercial practices matter. This is often expressed through the 
rather equivocal concept of ‘corporate responsibility’. It is necessary, however, 
to examine the way in which respondents articulate and use this rather vague 
concept. If one were to interpret the above extract as a literal and authentic 
statement, one would have to believe that insurance companies have a deep 
concern for the insurance needs of citizens. The above extract states that 
mitigating the negative consequences for individuals should, if possible, be a 
job of insurance companies’. However, the phrase 'if we can' might be read as 
'if commercially sound'. Although a social value narrative is revealed in the 
extract, a narrative of economic rationality appears to envelop it.
The anonymous insurance underwriter, lamenting the fact that the media only 
ever report negative stories about the industry, stated:
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There are positive stories coming out ... the monies paid out on death 
claims runs into hundreds of millions every year. But nobody looks at that. 
Nobody talks to these people and says well what did [a well known 
insurance company] do for you? (Anonymous underwriter, Interviewed by 
James Mittra, 12 June 2001)
Insurance companies undoubtedly distribute various social benefits. This 
particular insurance representative expresses clear concern that the benefits 
are often ignored. However, the following extract, from the same respondent, 
signals one of the reasons why insurers may have an interest in advertising the 
fact that they distribute social goods and are socially responsible agents.
We want to pay claims, we want to pay genuine claims because that's 
good news. It ups the standing of the company, it ups the standing of the 
industry. The client's family doesn’t benefit if they're expecting x tens of 
thousands of pounds and get nothing. (Ibid.)
This extract reveals how insurance companies see the distribution of insurance 
products primarily within a business framework, even though they may 
reference the benefits reaped by the family. It is interesting that the benefits to 
the family (a social value) are only expressed after the benefits to the industry 
(a market value) have been articulated. However, one may not wish to read too 
much into this, as lists are not necessarily indicative of respondents' priorities. 
Nevertheless, this extract illustrates the dual use that is often made of a market 
and social value narrative. Of course, in this case what benefits the client 
simultaneously benefits the industry. This same insurer accentuated this point 
when he stated:
‘At the end of the day the insurance companies are there to make a profit, 
but also to provide a service. But through that service they make a profit for 
their shareholders and for policyholders in mutual companies. So they are 
there for the greater benefit.'
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What is most striking in this extract is that the concept greater benefit' does not 
refer to 'protection of the vulnerable', but to the creation of a vibrant economy in 
which shareholders and policyholders can enjoy financial gains. Therefore, 
although insurers may invoke a social value narrative to legitimate their 
commercial interests, 'greater social benefit’ acquires a definition most people 
outside the industry would reject. However, whether or not the social value 
concept is used in an extended or restricted sense, it still appears to be used 
strategically to express a particular economic narrative.
However, what may be termed the ‘double truth doctrine’ (‘concern for access 
to insurance products’ and ‘concern for profit’) may sometimes run into 
contradiction. At some point, there must be a trade-off, and in such cases, it is 
the concern for wider social values that is often relegated in priority. The above 
extract, which stated that ‘at the end of the day insurance companies are there 
to make a profit’, is telling in this regard. Other insurers expressed similar 
statements. Keith Bedell-Pearce, after extolling the virtues of a socially 
responsible insurance market that distributes various social benefits, made the 
following statement when asked his opinion on those individuals who may have 
no access to life assurance because of a positive genetic test.
... there is no inalienable right to have insurance ... No one is forcing 
anyone to take out life or health insurance. Equally, no commercial 
organisation should be forced to provide insurance if it doesn’t want
to do so. It’s not as straightforward as that because there’s things like 
reputation, position, and the social responsibility aspect, but I don't think 
life assurance is a special case.
Although insurers express the need to be socially responsible, by enabling more 
people to enjoy access to various insurance products, in the final analysis it 
appears to be the economic ‘bottom line’ that takes priority. The rhetoric of
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social value is fine only if it is advantageous to the company. However, when 
social values may challenge commercial rights, the rhetoric of commercial 
freedom is used strategically to defend discriminatory practices. Insurers 
therefore appear to draw upon both an ‘altruistic’ and ‘market freedom’ value 
narrative, often blurring the boundaries between the two, in order to defend a 
particular business framework. Social values are referred to when they can be 
used to promote the normative framework of existing commercial practices. 
However, the focus quickly shifts to market values when pressure is exerted to 
provide products to all applicants regardless of their risk-status. When the two 
values appear to contradict each other, the commercial ones appear to  take 
precedence. Tony O’Leary revealed this in the following statement:
There are issues where the insurance industry has to be moral but 
obviously you've got to look at it as a business. (Tony O'Leary, interviewed 
by James Mittra, 21 May 2001)
This respondent states that there are shades of grey concerning the social and 
moral issues, and the industry has a responsibility to be practical and sensible. 
Nevertheless, he appears adamant that this responsibility does not extend to 
accepting the whole cost on behalf of society. Interestingly, the respondent also 
uses a social/moral value framework to defend the discriminatory nature of 
insurance. After citing a public document that had accused the insurance 
industry of being more concerned about its right to underwrite than the social 
implications of differentiating applicants, Tony O'Leary claimed:
To a degree that is an element. But I would find it very hard to stand up in 
front of the Diabetic Association and say “you guys are paying an extra 
premium whereas these guys aren’t.” Because I don't think that's fair.
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Again, the distinction between market and social values is made to look 
ambiguous. When representatives of the insurance industry are accused of 
being immoral, they may often draw upon an alternative narrative repertoire, 
where a different spin on social and moral values can be used to defend 
commercial freedom. Actions that others characterise as immoral are now 
inverted, through a rhetorical sleight of hand, and shown to be the most fair and 
equitable. The above extract is a perfect example of the way individuals strive to 
create a ‘morally adequate account’ of the ir actions. This insurer does not feel 
comfortable defending commercial interests purely on the basis of economic 
rationality, so instead he articulates the moral problem of breaking commercial 
norms in order to enable a sub-set of policy applicants to acquire insurance 
cover.
It is impossible to know for sure what the  ‘true’ motivations of the insurance 
industry are. However, these extracts reveal that insurers may tell different 
stories, and draw upon a broad narrative repertoire, in order to defend existing 
commercial norms and provide a morally adequate account of their beliefs. Two 
principal strategies for operationalising particular social and commercial value 
narratives are revealed in the preceding extracts. One strategy is to accentuate 
the fact that what benefits society also benefits the industry. Paying out on 
premiums increases the reputation of the  company and helps generate new 
business. Distributing social benefits, and being socially responsible, simply 
makes economic sense. Here, the social and market value appears 
synonymous, so a rhetoric that draws on both can be used to provide a morally 
adequate account of commercial freedom. A second strategy is to argue that 
because insurance is a business like any other, it should not be expected to 
take responsibility for the whole costs of society. In this case, a market value 
overrides any social values. However, the  market value is presented as being
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the best w ay to promote equity in the distribution of social benefits. Tony 
O'Leary used this strategy when he argued that it would be immoral to 
subsidise genetically at-risk applicants.
It appears unlikely that corporations honour their social and ethical obligations 
out of altruism and an authentic concern for wider societal values. Rather, the 
motive for their behaviour is more likely to be the desire for profit. Indeed, 
authentic altruistic behaviour, implicitly suggested in the concept of ‘corporate 
responsibility', is usually considered anathema to this fundamentally economic 
aspiration. However, we must concede that private insurance does perform an 
important social function by distributing social goods amongst policyholders. Of 
course, because life assurance only really benefited the wealthy, as revealed by 
the historical evidence, one must be cautious about talking in terms of general 
social benefits. Nevertheless, the socially desirable benefits of commercial 
insurance provision are likely to emanate from an economic rationalisation 
guided by corporate self-interest, rather than from the virtue of altruism and the 
social values assumed to be encapsulated within it. Although we may never be 
able to truly get behind’ insurers’ accounts and discover their ‘real’ motivations, 
the analysis of their accounts suggests the existence of an underlying economic 
story.
Insurers are able to blur the distinction between market and social values, 
because the  social benefits are not just a by-product of economically rational 
decisions but are simultaneously constitutive of that very same commercial 
process. W ithout the social benefits there could be no private insurance market, 
because individuals would not pay premiums for a product they did not believe 
would rescue them in time of financial need. Nevertheless, these social goods,
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from a corporate perspective, are best recognised as the consequence of 
rationalised economic decisions.
Insurers claim to be concerned about those individuals who find themselves 
‘socially excluded', and often declare that there is an affinity between their 
commercial practices and wider social and moral values. They may do this in 
order to express a morally adequate account of their commercial beliefs. 
Although many of their actions may be justified, one should not ignore the 
economic rationality that appears to envelop their seemingly altruistic 
behaviour. Such rationality is not necessarily a bad thing. Just because 
insurance companies make vast profits does not mean that wider social benefits 
do not exist. Furthermore, as Wiesing (1999a) points out, when insurers act on 
economically rational criteria, they should not be held responsible for the 
consequences of their actions. In addition, he argues that any external 
interference with such a rational process might undermine the very foundations 
of the commercial market. A frequent mistake made by many interest groups is 
to treat market and social values as mutually exclusive. Of course, such groups 
may have an incentive to tell this particular story in order to defend an anti­
commercial position. However, once we recognise that insurers, like all 
stakeholders, will express a variety of stories, and draw upon different kinds of 
values in order to defend existing practices, then we are in a better position to 
understand the role of rhetoric in the evolution of policy debates around 
genetics and insurance. Only then, can we stand back and look critically at the 
moral dimensions of the debate and the likely outcomes of particular policy 
decisions.
Society may desire selfiess corporations that act against their economic 
nature, but should not perhaps expect it. This might be regarded the first
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principle of private insurance. It is why the concept of 'social good' may become 
so instrumental to how society sets the social, economic, and ethical 
boundaries. If an insurance product is defined as a ‘non-primary social good’, 
society might find it difficult to justify legislative restrictions on commercial 
activities. If, however, the insurance product is defined as a ‘primary social 
good’, society may be justified in restricting commercial freedom by prescribing 
certain ethical boundaries. However, one must be aware that this may 
undermine the principle of equity that is fundamental to all private risk-based 
insurance. This will be discussed in more detail shortly, when the issue of 
genetic information is introduced. Now it is necessary to discuss in more detail 
the ‘business of discrimination' and the process of risk pooling that underlies the 
economically rational private insurance system.
4.4 Risk Analysis and Risk Pooling: The ‘Business of D iscrim ination’
The primary maxim underlying all private insurance contracts is uberrima 
tides (utmost good faith). Uberrima tides imposes a duty on the proposer for life 
assurance to disclose all relevant information necessary for accurate risk 
analysis and pooling, which leads inevitably to what is commonly referred to as 
‘discrimination'. Discrimination characterises the very business of private 
insurance, and is what distinguishes it most from social insurance systems. The 
following statement from Keith Bedell-Pearce is instructive in this regard:
The whole of insurance, whether it is life assurance, or property and 
casualty insurance, Is based upon discrimination. That is the art of the 
underwriter, and it is art and science for the underwriter, but a lot of it is art 
... In some types of insurance an underwriter for one company will, 
because its an art and not a science, take a different view as to the 
discrimination that is applied, than another insurance company ... And 
that’s what makes a market
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This portrayal of underwriting as both art and science is important in the context 
of risk pooling and discrimination. As well as providing the background 
conditions conducive to the practice of 'unfair' discrimination, it also creates the 
necessary commercial environment for underwriters to offer a diverse range of 
prices on risk. People do not have to be denied access to insurance, or pay 
exorbitant premiums, as long as they can find an underwriter willing to take a 
greater risk than his/her competitor at the same or lower price. Underwriting, in 
this context, is just as much art as science. However, in reality the market is not 
so fluid that there are rogue underwriters audaciously undercutting the 
premiums offered by competitors. Although it is possible to acquire better rates 
by ‘shopping around', the market remains relatively bounded. Underwriter 
freedom is generally restricted to the margins of risk. Nevertheless, the larger 
the market becomes, the greater the freedom individual underwriters enjoy in 
pricing risk. This results in a far more flexible market, which is obviously 
advantageous to the consumer. However, the industry as a whole may have an 
interest in sustaining a relatively bounded market through regulation, if this will 
allow them to limit the potential for rogue actions. Through mutual agreement, 
companies may submit themselves to internal or external regulators so that a 
viable market can remain both relatively stable and commercially reputable.
Couched within the rubric of the principle uberrima fides is essentially the 
'freedom to underwrite'. This is the freedom to classify risk and differentially 
categorise those individuals who embody it. In theory, this right ought to remain 
sacrosanct if the founding principles of private insurance are to be adhered to. 
Leigh (1998), an often outspoken defender of the traditional maxims underlying 
commercial insurance, exclaim s:'... only a fool or a rogue would disagree with 
this principle.' (Leigh, 1998, 11)
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4.4.1 Adverse/Anti Selection
One of the main functions of the principle uberrima tides is to prevent what in 
insurance terms is referred to as ‘adverse selection’ or ‘anti-selection’. The 
commercial fear is that in the absence of symmetry between applicant and 
insurer, regarding knowledge of the applicant’s risk-status, high-risk individuals 
will purchase excessive amounts of insurance at standard rates. This would 
lead to the insurer having to bear the added cost of the uncalculated risk. The 
insurance industry therefore demands equal access to all available and 
pertinent information regarding an applicant’s current state of health and 
susceptibility to future illness.
A related issue to adverse selection is 'moral hazard', which was mentioned 
briefly when describing Barr's prerequisites for a viable commercial insurance 
market. Moral hazard refers to situations in which the policyholder manipulates 
the size of the risk by virtue of having insurance cover. People with home 
contents insurance who neglect to secure their property, because they know 
they are covered in case of loss, provides a classic example of moral hazard’. 
In this case, the existence of coverage appears to reduce incentives to minimise 
the risk. In the 1980s, the emergence of HIV and Aids sensitised health 
insurance providers to the problem of moral hazard. However, because moral 
hazard is not a significant problem for life assurance providers, the current 
focus will be on adverse selection.
The cause of adverse selection is not always fraudulent non-disclosure on the 
part of the policy applicant. It can also emerge because of underwriter error or 
basic flaws in the design of application forms. A prime example of the latter
77
occurred in the early 1980s. Because of the unprecedented housing boom, life 
offices recognised that there would be an increased demand for mortgage- 
related life assurance. Since the excessive medical and lifestyle questions on 
existing proposal forms posed an administrative and financial burden, 
companies decided to minimise the underwriting process for mortgage-related 
life assurance. They did this by reducing the number of questions within the 
medical section of the application form.7 The industry figured that adverse 
selection would not pose a significant threat, because homebuyers were not 
presumed to be high-risk applicants. The industry assumed that the applicant’s 
primary motivation for accessing the product was the desire to purchase a 
home, rather than acquire a life assurance policy. Although the industry did 
impose age restrictions, all applicants effectively needed to obtain the life 
assurance was an offer of a mortgage. However, what the industry failed to 
realise was that the thousands of people who had been denied mortgage- 
related life assurance in the past, now found they were eligible and were taking 
advantage of the offer. To compound the problem, insurance agents working on 
commission were actively approaching those individuals they knew had been 
denied cover in the past, because they realised there were no longer any 
barriers. Many applicants purchased a mortgage just so that they could acquire 
the life assurance. Graham Austin, a chief underwriter, made the following 
comment during interview:
People on their deathbed were taking them. [The policies] Companies lost 
hundreds of millions of pounds. And people said we won’t be selected 
against. As soon as somebody realises they can get something that they 
couldn’t get before without having to lie ... they will do it. (Graham Austin, 
Director at Munich RE. Life Branch., Interviewed by James Mittra, 19 July 
2001)
7 From the 1980s, there has been a general trend towards reducing the number of questions on 
proposal forms As life assurance has became more popular, the transactional costs’ of excessive 
underwriting has become regarded as surplus to requirements.
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This statement offers an excellent insight into the way the insurance industry 
understands the internal psychology of its policy applicants. The prevailing 
wisdom appears to be that individuals will invariably take advantage of any 
loophole in the insurance contract, especially if doing so does not require them 
to break the law. It is interesting that this insurer makes a point of stating 
'people said we won’t be selected against'. Insurers frequently use this riposte 
against those who belittle their commercial fears.
This example of adverse selection is a ‘legal’ form resulting from commercial 
mismanagement. However, we should not ignore those applicants who do seek 
to defraud insurance companies. The salutary lesson for the insurance industry 
is that it must be sensitive to the psychology of policy applicants and be diligent 
when formulating proposal forms. Although one may want to make a moral' 
distinction between fraudulent and non-fraudulent non-disclosure, the 
consequences for the industry may be just as severe in both cases. Insurers 
therefore appear to create a decision-making framework guided by the principal 
’assume the worst of individuals’ in order to protect their commercial interests.
The insurance industry does find itself placed in a difficult position. It must 
protect itself against adverse selection, yet at the same time increase the pool 
of policy applicants in a socially responsible way. The various rhetorical 
strategies that representatives of the insurance industry use, and the diverse 
narrative repertoires they draw upon in order to express a morally adequate 
account of their actions, might in part be a consequence of having to respond to 
a number of different external pressures. This is a crucial point that will be made 
clearer in the following chapters.
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If we consider the implications of 'genetic testing’ for adverse selection, a 
number of diverse opinions emerge. Macdonald (1997) argues that genetic 
information might be more relevant than other criteria, such as gender, because 
a positive test creates an incentive to purchase insurance. Le Grys (1997) also 
raises the possibility of adverse selection resulting from genetic testing but 
argues that judgements can only be speculative at present, because there is a 
paucity of scientific evidence to validate any one argument. He does not believe 
that a positive test would cause somebody to buy life assurance, although he 
concedes that it may subconsciously influence their decision. Harper (1997a), a 
clinical geneticist, is more explicit when he argues that the new genetic tests are 
unlikely to have a significant impact on existing insurance industry norms. 
Harper provides an extensive analysis of the most common genetic disorders, 
and the current scientific wisdom on predictive testing, and claims that almost 
all have no discernible relevance to insurance underwriting. Of those that may 
be relevant, he predicts that their impact will be relatively innocuous.
Adverse selection is certainly a controversial issue, with many scholars and 
stakeholders seriously questioning its true significance for the insurance 
industry. However, documented cases do exist, so we should not discount it 
entirely as a legitimate commercial concern. Nevertheless, we must also 
recognise that the potential for adverse selection is often dependent on the 
particular insurance product being provided. For example, it is far more likely to 
occur in health, critical illness, and long-term care insurance, where there is a 
direct connection between the onset of illness and the salutary benefit of 
possessing the relevant insurance cover. However, in the case of a product like 
life assurance, it is not necessarily an individual’s primary concern, after 
discovering they are susceptible to some deleterious medical condition, to 
suddenly seek life cover. Of course, they may try to acquire as much health
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insurance as possible. In contemplating the complex issue of genetics, 
insurance, and adverse selection, it is important to recognise the differential 
consequences that particular insurance products may engender. Therefore, the 
level of freedom granted to underwriters ought, perhaps, to be dependent on 
these observable variations in impact.
4.4.2 The Equity Principle and ‘Discrimination’
Underlying the freedom to underwrite is the principle of 'equity', which dictates 
that individuals pay a 'fair premium’ commensurate with the risk they bring to 
the insurance pool. Individuals who bring a greater risk to the insurance pool 
pay higher insurance premiums than those who bring a lower risk. The risk 
status of some individuals is so high that they become in effect uninsurable. 
This notion of risk pooling, based on individual risk-status, is often defended on 
the grounds of 'actuarial fairness', which is a concept analogous to 'fair 
discrimination’. The underlying philosophy is that if an individual embodies an 
actuarially or statistically significant risk, it is ‘fair’ to charge them a higher 
premium or deny them an insurance contract. As Brokett and Tankersley (1997) 
write:
'Insurers generally hold that statistical justification is a sufficient defence for 
a classification scheme. That is, the use of a particular variable in a rate 
structure does not constitute “unfair" discrimination if individuals with 
differing levels of the variable have statistically and significantly different 
projected loss costs.' (Brokett and Tankersley, 1997, 1664)
The principle of actuarial fairness is not to the exclusive advantage of the 
insurer. It also benefits low-risk policyholders in the insurance pool. If 
commercial insurers lost the right to use a differential rate structure for high-risk
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and low-risk applicants, commercial norms would demand that the latter cross- 
subsidise the former by paying premiums incommensurate with the low-risk 
they bring to the insurance pool. For a social insurance system based on 
communal solidarity, this kind of redistribution may be both pragmatic and 
virtuous. However, such redistributive norms are anathema to a mutuality-based 
commercial system that embraces the principle of equity.
So long as the insurer Is using actuarially relevant information to differentiate 
applicants, it is considered fair and amoral. Wilkie (1997) points out that even 
the Disability Discrimination Act contains a clause that permits insurance 
companies to use discriminatory risk-assessment against the disabled, if the 
disability has actuarial relevance to the particular insurance product. Wilkie sees 
nothing iniquitous in the use of this principle. If everybody is categorised on the 
basis of scientifically valid and relevant information, it is claimed that there Is no 
moral ambiguity. Launis (1999) defines this kind of discrimination as 'value- 
neutral', non-arbitrary’, and ‘indirect’. In contrast, ‘arbitrary discrimination’, in 
which irrelevant, non-present, or statistically spurious characteristics are used 
as a basis for discriminatory practices, is generally considered unfair. O’Neill 
(1997b) posits an additional third category, which she refers to as ‘legally 
forbidden' discrimination. (O'Neill, 1997b, 9) For example, it is illegal to 
discriminate on the basis of racial characteristics even if doing so could be 
justified on the grounds of actuarial and statistical relevance. However, insurers 
are permitted to use gender as a discriminatory tool, which is why women 
generally pay less for life assurance than men. Nevertheless, it must be 
recognised that the proscription against insurers differentiating policy applicants 
on the grounds of ethnicity does contradict the principle of equity. This 
illustrates the fact that In practice actuarially fair information is not always 
treated as an amoral concept. In reality, ethical boundaries that undermine the
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equity principle are sometimes imposed on commercial insurers. However, at 
present we are focusing primarily on the ideal' and 'pure' principles of private 
insurance. The practical realities, and deviations from the ideal, will be 
discussed later.
There is another important dimension to this issue of discrimination. Many 
hold the intuitive belief that it is somehow more justifiable to discriminate on the 
basis of characteristics or traits that the applicant has control over, such as 
smoking or obesity, than on what are often referred to as 'no fault’ conditions; a 
term that encompasses most genetic disorders. People generally believe that 
those who find themselves in the latter category are morally entitled to special 
dispensation. However, within a private insurance system, the apportioning of 
blame is considered superfluous. Insurers care less about the cause of an 
applicant’s risk than they do the actuarial and statistical consequences of it. As 
Leigh states:
'If a proposer is more likely than the average person of the same sex and 
the same age to die prematurely, the premium should be higher: It is the 
increased probability of death that is important to the life office and not how 
it has arisen.' (Leigh, op cit, 24)
The insurance business is concerned ultimately with outcomes rather than 
causes. Abstract, normative arguments about the ethics of discrimination are 
sociologically and philosophically interesting, but one must question where they 
lead in practice. Although certain forms of discrimination are perhaps more 
morally suspect and unjustifiable than others, in the case of insurance it ought 
to be the outcome for the individual that we prioritise rather than the 
philosophical route by which that individual was excluded. Whether or not 
someone was discriminated in a 'fair' or ‘unfair’ way is immaterial when one
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begins to assess the impact on the individual who is denied access to an 
insurance product. There is, perhaps, a need to embrace this Kind of 
consequentialist ethical framework when contemplating the issue of 
discrimination. Such a framework should be linked to a social good criterion. 
When imposing ethical boundaries on the provision of private life assurance, we 
should perhaps do so based on the kind of social good it is perceived to be and 
experienced as. Sorell (1998) is one author who accepts that underwriting takes 
place within limits, but claims that the particular insurance product should 
determine where the parameters are fixed.8 He writes: 'How free insurers are to 
underwrite depends mainly on how morally bad it is for people to be denied the 
relevant form of insurance.’ (Sorell, 1998, 69)
If it is morally and ethically right that individuals should have access to a 
particular form of insurance, and if a significant number of people would be 
socially disadvantaged if denied such a product, then there may be justification 
for providing systems of protection. However, such protection must apply to 
everybody regardless of whether they were being denied insurance in a 
predefined fair or unfair way. Furthermore, one must realise, in these specific 
cases, that one is compromising the fundamental tenets of equity based private 
insurance. In fact, if one truly desires universal access to a particular insurance 
product, which has become defined as a ‘primary social good', then the system 
of provision itself should, in theory, be modified. Within a private life assurance 
contract, to be unfair in one’s discrimination is to either categorise individuals 
based on imperfect data, or allow value judgements to influence actuarial
8 Sorell provides an antithesis to Leigh's, 1998 contention that the freedom to underwrite should 
in principle be absolute'. Leigh decries the case of HIV and AIDS, which he believes set In motion 
the tide that would slowly attenuate this freedom. He goes as far as to argue that it such freedom 
is eroded any further, many life offices will be forced to withdraw from the market, as it will 
become commercially unviable to operate within its continually circumscribed boundaries.
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decision-making. All other discrimination is fair within this context and deserves 
a certain level of legitimacy.
This section has provided a lengthy analysis of the principles underlying 
private insurance provision and revealed the general ethical framework 
surrounding all private insurance contracts. A number of important insights 
relevant to the first research question emerge from the preceding analysis.
1) The relationship between solidarity and mutuality based insurance is 
symbiotic. The ethical parameters of the latter depend in part on the 
level of support provided by the former.
2) The concept of 'social good’ (non-primary or primary) can be used fairly 
and effectively to determine whether a given insurance product ought to 
be provided through a mutuality or solidarity based system.
3) If the product is considered a ‘non-primary social good', then the 
historical normative framework of commercial insurance provision 
(discrimination and risk pooling) perhaps ought to be respected. Fair 
discrimination is justified because in its absence, commercial insurance 
is unviable and insurers face the risk of adverse selection.
4) Commercial insurers may render the distinction between social and 
market values ambiguous. Through their interview talk, they may 
strategically draw upon both narratives in order to defend their 
commercial interests. This is interesting sociologically, and accentuates 
the point that commercial insurers exist ultimately to make a profit. 
Again, if they are offering a non-primary social good, there is no iniquity 
in this approach. However, the upshot of this is that society cannot 
expect insurers to prioritise social values/benefits.
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5) The preceding arguments are of fundamental importance to any fair 
assessment of the likely social, ethical, and commercial implications 
genetic information may have for the provision of private life assurance.
All of the issues so far discussed in this chapter become increasingly 
important when we begin to consider the likely impact of new kinds of genetic 
information on traditional life assurance underwriting. In order to make further 
progress on the first two research questions, it is necessary, in light of the ideas 
so far raised, to look at how genetic information may change the traditional 
practice of life assurance provision. In order to provide a response to the 
second research question, it will also be necessary to assess whether 
stakeholders' differential definitions of genetic information may play an 
important role in shaping the ethical parameters of the debate.
5. GENETIC INFORMATION AND LIFE ASSURANCE UNDERWRITING: 
LIKELY SOCIAL, LEGAL, COMMERCIAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
Because of the unprecedented progress made in predictive genetic testing, 
people have become increasingly concerned about the commercial practices of 
the insurance industry and its possible interest in using new kinds of genetic 
information to underwrite policies. Ewald (1999) argues that both genetics and 
insurance are epistemologically similar, as both evolved from the probabilistic 
revolution. Therefore, insurers might have a clear financial interest in 
harnessing the power of these emerging genetic technologies. (Ewald, 1999, 
27)
There is a now prevalent belief that the new information emerging from DNA 
and chromosome testing represents something qualitatively different from
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existing forms of medical information. The possibility of widespread genetic 
discrimination’, and the fear that a 'genetic underclass’ will emerge in society, 
has led various individuals and organisations to call for a legislative response. 
The regulatory framework, and the specific concerns expressed by 
stakeholders, will be explored in more detail in the following two chapters. This 
section will begin by critically evaluating academic and stakeholder accounts of 
the status of genetic information. Such accounts will reveal the extent to which 
individuals operationalise particular definitional frameworks around specific 
technical issues in a way that supports their broader social, political, or 
professional values. As before, emphasis will be placed on the forms of rhetoric 
and narrative repertoires identified in the interview transcripts. This section will 
provide answers to the second research question.
5.1 The ‘Special’ Nature of Genetic Inform ation
Those who believe there to be a qualitative difference between genetic 
information’ and other traditional forms of medical information tend to raise two 
particular arguments in support of their position. Firstly, they claim that the 
consequences of genetic knowledge are never restricted to individuals but have 
probabilistic implications for their entire biological kin. O'Neill (1997a) is 
sympathetic to this particular argument. A second argument emphasises the 
fact that individuals often acquire knowledge of their genetic abnormalities when 
they are pre-symptomatic, and at a time when there is little hope of cure or 
treatment. This, the argument goes, renders such knowledge ostensibly more 
serious and problematic than that derived from the more traditional methods of 
medical diagnosis. Carter (1995) points to the implications this new information 
may have for our notions of health and illness. He argues that: 'The application 
of expert probabilistic reasoning manages to make the categories of health and
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illness ambiguous.' (Carter, 1995, 140)9 The new genetic data, according to the 
sceptics, serves only to intensify this ambiguity.
These arguments give credibility to the idea that genetic information poses a 
significant and special social problem.10 Many claim that it is the greater 
predictive capacity that the new genetic tests promise to offer that has 
concretised social fears of discrimination. However, we must recognise the 
breadth and scope of the very term ‘genetic information', and recognise that a 
simple analysis of family history can provide useful and accurate predictive 
medical information. From this perspective, genetic information derived from 
DNA testing or chromosome analysis may not be fundamentally different in its 
social and commercial impact.
McLean (1998) argues that the social implications of genetic diagnoses 
perhaps appear more acute because they are less well understood and 
more intimate to how we perceive ourselves.' (McLean, 1998, 93) The logical 
corollary of this argument is that we ought as a society to mitigate the negative 
social consequences experienced by individuals with ‘faulty’ genes. Burley 
(1999) goes as far as to claim that society has a moral responsibility to share 
the costs of those who fare badly in the genetic lottery. She argues that society 
should act as a ‘People's Republic of Underwriters’ and compel the genetically 
advantaged to subsidise the disadvantaged. (Burley, 1999, 55) This argument is 
credible, so long as we do not expect private insurers to bear the ultimate 
responsibility for redistributing such benefits and losses. The principle of
9 Carter provides a general analysis of 'health risk appraisal', where both lifestyle traits and 
biological characteristics become factors in a danger/safety dualism. Again, the argument is that 
new genetic information has a profound impact on these kinds of measurements.
10 See Murray, 1997 for a critique of what he refers to as Genetic Exceptionalism'. He writes: 
Genetic information is special because we are inclined to treat it as mysterious, as having 
exceptional potency or significance, not because it differs in some fundamental way from all other 
sorts of information about us.' (Murray, 1997, 71)
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redistributive justice that perhaps ought to underlie the political actions of 
'society at large' is qualitatively different from redistribution within a private 
insurance market. Burley appears to concede this point when she argues for 
some form of mandatory state insurance scheme. Nevertheless, she does still 
exhibit 'genetic disadvantage’ as a discrete moral and social category.
Juengst (1996) is one dissenter who does not consider the social and ethical 
implications of genetic information to be conceptually distinct from other forms 
of medical data. In fact, he claims that as predictive testing advances, and 
begins to understand the pathology of multi-factorial based conditions, to 
differentiate between genetic and non-genetic components of disease will 
become indefensible. (Juengst, 1996, 71)
5.2. Interview  Responses to  the Status of G enetic Inform ation. 
Equivalency and Non-Equivalency Argum ents
The interview data reflected the difficulty of establishing a fixed definitional 
framework around genetic information. However, it is important to look critically 
at the various contexts in which stakeholder representatives express their views 
on this particular issue. The following statement from Graham Austin, an 
insurance representative, nicely captured the commercial angle.
As far as we are concerned it's not special ... it's another piece of medical 
information. If we said to somebody who's a diabetic you need not disclose 
you're a diabetic, people would probably find that odd. If we said to people 
you need not disclose information about genetic tests, they would think 
that’s tremendous. Neither of them is anyone's fault.
In this statement, the respondent does not use scientific arguments to defend 
an 'equivalency argument’. Instead, his response is framed by commercial
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norms and social values. The respondent invites us to consider the logic of 
disclosure and then tries to demonstrate that if genetic information were treated 
as a ‘special case’, this would appear odd in the context of existing commercial 
practices. Furthermore, It would prove inequitable for other high-risk 
policyholders. The final statement, which accentuates the fact that neither forms 
of diagnosis are anybody's fault, again reveals the strategic use of a social 
value narrative. The attempt to render genetic and non-genetic conditions 
equivalent, by claiming neither are anybody's fault, may be an Insurance 
industry strategy to demonstrate that their approach is consistent. Their goal 
may be to protect their right to  use both kinds of information in underwriting. 
Tony O'Leary used a similar strategy, which was revealed earlier, when he 
expressed the moral case for commercial underwriting.
Graham Austin also appeared to look at the issue from a business angle. The 
following statement is particularly interesting.
The business angle to me is quite clear-cut. If the boot were on the other 
foot would anyone say we were justified in withholding information? But 
because it's always the big insurer against the poor individual then people 
think there is an issue.
This statement reflects the tenuous position in which insurers often find 
themselves placed. Society appears to demand that they fulfil certain moral 
obligations, but often overlooks the responsibility of policy applicants. The final 
statement in this account, which refers to peoples’ perception of the big 
insurance company constantly working against the poor individual, is also 
interesting in light of the historical data provided at the beginning of this chapter. 
Life assurance is a means for the wealthy to protect themselves against
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financial risk. It is not, and never has been, about the poor and downtrodden. 
This issue will be raised again in the following chapter.
Insurers prefer to conceptualise new kinds of genetic information as 
commercially no different from existing medical information. They do this in 
order to protect their historical right to access all the medical data of an 
applicant. Occasionally, however, insurers do make statements that suggest 
they would like to treat the new kinds of genetic information differently. When it 
was put to Graham Austin that if existing family history data were treated as 
equivalent to the new genetic test information, a coherent argument could be 
made for prohibiting insurers from using both as an underwriting tool, he 
responded: Not asking for genetic tests is one issue, but not asking for family 
history is another issue.’ Insurers argue that the two kinds of information are 
conceptually analogous if it serves their commercial interests (allows them to 
use both to rate applicants). However, when the equivalency argument may 
challenge the legitimacy of the business narrative (by denying them the right to 
use traditional kinds of medical information), there is then a tendency to argue 
the opposite; to imply that the commercial implications of treating them as 
equivalent would be disastrous. The 'double truth doctrine’ reveals itself once 
again.
Other insurers were also keen to stress that from a business/scientific 
perspective the argument of non-equivalency does not stand. The anonymous 
insurance underwriter claimed, when asked if there were a difference between 
genetic information and other forms of medical information: ‘Well my personal 
view is no, from a risk-assessment perspective.' Tony O'Leary elaborated by 
stating: The answer is fundamentally no, but the perception is yes.’ The latter 
account really takes us to the crux of the issue. From a business and scientific
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perspective, there is no technical difference. However, the public believes new 
kinds of genetic tests to be special’. The rhetorical forms insurers' accounts 
often take seem to be influenced by the existence of this public attitude. This 
became evident when insurance representatives talked about the industry's 
position on requesting policy applicants to take a medical test, as opposed to 
just divulging information from tests already taken. Insurers do not currently ask 
people to take a genetic test as a prerequisite for acquiring a policy, and claim 
that they have no intention to do so in the future. However, the following 
dialogue from the interview with Tony O’Leary revealed an inherent 
contradiction in the industry's approach. In particular, the following account of 
Tony O'Leary explicitly contradicts his previous argument of equivalency:
J.M: Do you ever ask policy applicants to take non-genetic medical tests?
T.O: Yes
J.M: Isn't that actually treating genetic tests as something very different then?
T.O: Absolutely
In this case, it appears that public perception has forced the industry to 
compromise on its traditional practices. Tony O’Leary conceded this point when 
he stated:
I think in practice what the insurance industry has done is said that genetic 
information is slightly different in the way we treat it, because of the public 
perception and concerns, and what we felt was morally right. Technically 
speaking we should really send you for a battery of tests.
Whether or not what is 'morally right' factors heavily in the minds of insurers is 
debateable. However, to imply that it was considered morally wrong to request 
people take a genetic test before being given insurance cover, when companies 
routinely ask applicants to undergo other forms of medical testing, does appear
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inconsistent. The anonymous insurance underwriter tried to justify this special 
dispensation on the grounds that genetic tests are emotive, and that in many 
cases the individual has no control over the outcome. He also stated: ‘I know 
we do ask for HIV and AIDS tests, but we do pre and post test counselling for 
those.' He also revealed that applicants who have recently visited certain high- 
risk countries are often told they must take a Hepatitis B test. The above extract 
reveals a common strategy of insurers to try to justify actuarial decisions; to in a 
sense create a morally adequate account of their actions. One could argue, 
however, that knowledge of HIV infection is no less traumatic than knowledge of 
a genetic condition. Why pretend that there is a moral difference? In fact, since 
insurers claim that they only require the results of medical tests in order to 
protect themselves from adverse selection, one might rightly ask, what is the 
commercial justification for asking people to take HIV or Hepatitis tests before 
being granted a life assurance policy? If the individual is unaware of their 
medical status, there is no asymmetry in knowledge between insurer and 
applicant. Therefore, adverse selection should not be a concern.
The data from insurance representatives reveals a fundamental inconsistency 
in the treatment of new kinds of genetic test information. Insurers want to claim 
that there is no scientific/commercial justification for treating it as special’, most 
likely because they want the freedom to use it as an underwriting tool. Vet, in 
practice, they do treat the information differently, perhaps in order to placate 
wider social pressures. By drawing on a broad narrative repertoire, and 
constantly shifting the definitional framework of the problem, the practices of 
insurers actually begin to look questionable. Their arguments begin to contradict 
one another, and it becomes clear that commercial expediency takes 
precedence over any social values. Now it would be instructive to look at how 
those working in a clinical setting expressed their views on the status of genetic
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information. One needs to assess the extent to which their accounts are linked
to wider social, political, or professional values, as appeared to be the case with 
the insurers.
Those working in a clinical setting differed slightly in the way they expressed 
their views on the technical status of genetic information. Dr. Quarrel, a clinical 
geneticist, made the following statement:
Genetic testing is not unique. If you have information which is derived from 
family history it might not be as accurate as a genetic test, but if you have 
somebody with say a father with Familial Adenomatosis Polyposis then 
they are at 50% risk ... Now your DNA test might move them to 100% or 
0% but family history itself is a genetic test. If you come on to another 
issue, if you measure somebody's cholesterol levels then that can give you 
a handle on the fact that somebody's got familial Hypercholesterolaemia. 
Similarly, if you take adult polycystic kidney disease and you do an 
ultrasound scan, if the person has lots of cysts at a young age, then you've 
got a diagnosis of APKD; You do not need a DNA test. (Dr. Quarrel, 
Consultant clinical geneticist, interviewed by James Mittra, 25 May 2001)
From this account, one may discern that the only real technical difference 
between the new kinds of genetic tests and traditional family history/medical 
tests is their predictive potential. In all other regards, an argument of 
equivalency may be justified. However, Sandy Raeburn, a professor of clinical 
genetics, countenanced the argument that genetic tests may have to be 
conceptualised differently from most other kinds of medical tests. He stated:
A genetic test is unlike some medical tests In that it is not telling about the 
here and now ... One difference would be that most medical tests are 
measuring abnormal X-Rays or abnormal proteins, or abnormal 
substances in the blood which are actually quite a long way along the line 
towards disease. A genetic test is showing susceptibility to future 
problems. (Sandy Raeburn, Professor of clinical genetics, interviewed by 
James Mittra, 5lh June 2001)
He continued to state:
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If you ask in insurance terms is there a difference? Then I would say 
actually there isn't. It is a bit unfortunate that people see genetics as so 
very different from other tests.
This respondent does believe that there is a slight technical difference between 
genetic tests and some other medical tests. The former can predict 
susceptibility to future disease, while the latter generally detect current disease 
states. Of course, family history may also predict susceptibility to future disease, 
so the argument that it is concerned only with the ‘here and now’ may be 
flawed. The equivalency of family history information and genetic test data can 
still be justified on scientific grounds. In the context of insurance, Sandy 
Raeburn changes tactic and begins to defend the argument of equivalency. He 
states that for underwriting purposes, genetic and non-genetic tests should not 
be differentiated. It is important to note that Sandy Raeburn is an advisor to the 
insurance industry on the issue of genetic testing, so we should perhaps not be 
too surprised at this last statement. His strategy appears similar to those of the 
insurance representatives.
The above extracts suggest that we need to differentiate between genetic 
tests', ‘other non-genetic tests’, and 'family history'. The argument of 
equivalency is appropriate with regard to genetic tests and family history, 
although the former is more predictive, but the argument of non-equivalency 
may be valid when comparing genetic tests and certain other non-genetic tests 
(although as Dr. Quarrel pointed out, a blood test that reveals high cholesterol 
might indicate an hereditary condition). For the purposes of this section, 
however, we are concerned mainly with comparing family history and genetic
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test data and assessing the extent to which relevant stakeholders conceptualise 
genetic information in a restricted or extended sense.
One of the anonymous genetic counsellors did believe that there was a 
difference between family history information and new genetic test information. 
However, she expressed the difference by reference to how the information 
might be interpreted, rather than by reference to the scientific/technical status of 
the information. She made the following comment during interview:
Well one of the things about the new genetic tests is the fact that they're 
not all definitive. There's a lot of interpretation in there and we don’t fully 
understand all the factors that come into play. My worry is the insurance 
industry won’t understand that either, and will discriminate when it's 
perhaps not appropriate to do so. (Anonymous 1, interviewed by James 
Mittra, 25 July 2001)
This statement reveals a common fear amongst many clinicians that insurance 
companies may not have the scientific expertise to interpret the information 
correctly. Although this counsellor did concede that family history data is a form 
of genetic information, she claimed that because many new genetic tests are 
not well understood, it is perhaps best to treat the information differently.
So far, if we compare the clinical perspectives with the insurance 
perspectives, it is difficult to detect any fundamental professional disagreement 
with regards to the status of genetic information. Each representative had their 
own personal take on the issue, although two of those working in a clinical 
setting did, perhaps unsurprisingly, prioritise the scientific arguments. Insurers, 
like the clinicians, operationalised an extended definition of genetic information, 
but only in certain contexts. For actuarial decision-making, genetic test 
information was presented as simply an extension of traditional family history.
96
However, in practice, insurers were willing to operationalise a restricted sense 
of genetic information by singling out particular tests for special attention. There 
is an underlying logic to this strategy. Restricting the definition of genetic 
information’ to particular kinds of genetic tests not only allows insurers to 
portray themselves as socially responsible but also narrows the framework of 
the issue, which in certain circumstances may be advantageous. If public 
pressure eventually leads to regulatory restrictions on commercial practices, it 
would be better for the industry to lose only their right of access to specific pre­
defined genetic tests, rather than traditional family history information and non- 
genetic test results as well.
Certain members of patient-support groups also expressed the argument of 
equivalency regarding the status of genetic test information and family history. 
However, in the context of insurance, they too began to shift the definitional 
framework by articulating a non-equivalency argument. Extracts from the 
interview with Julia Cream, policy officer at the Alzheimer’s Society, provided 
useful data in this regard. In particular, her account illustrated the extent to 
which interest groups with particular agendas may re-configure the definitional 
framework, in specific contexts, in order to justify a broader political goal. In this 
regard, her strategy was analogous to that of the insurers. The following extract 
is her account of the non-equivalency argument.
J.M: Do you think there is a difference between genetic information derived 
from particular genetic tests and other forms of medical information, such 
as family history?
J.C: Yes. 1 think that actually what this debate has done in the last couple of 
years has really heightened that debate and we argue that genetic 
information should be treated differently at the moment because people 
understand it to be special; they treat it differently. And it also reveals 
information about people that might need to be treated differently. (Julia 
Cream, Alzheimer's Society, interviewed by James Mittra, 19 June, 2001)
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This account is analogous to the insurers' argument that genetic information is 
treated differently, because the public perceive it to be different. Of course, 
insurers do not regard this as a good thing. Julia Cream argues that there are 
some technical differences with regard to the social context of testing. 
Nevertheless, her stated belief that genetic information should be treated 
differently because people perceive it to be special suggests that she cannot 
think of any specific scientific argument to support a non-equivalency view. 
However, later in the interview, she offered a very different account. In the 
context of insurance, she began to imply the need for equivalency. That is, she 
argued that in certain circumstances new genetic test information should not be 
treated as a special' case. This alternative account was revealed after Julia 
Cream was asked to respond to the insurance industry's argument that if they 
make a special case for genetic test information, this would prove inequitable to 
people denied insurance on non-genetic based information. Her response was:
Well hopefully, I think it should open up the debate on family and medical 
history. We've got to a position where we re now looking to insurers to re­
examine how they use family history.
Before, Julia Cream operationalised a restricted definition of genetic test 
information in order to justify denying insurers access to it. However, now she 
broadens the definitional framework in order to challenge the insurance 
industry’s existing use of family history. This was a concern of the insurance 
industry representatives who, in their interview accounts, sought to 
operationalise a restricted definition of genetic information to defend their 
historic right to access family history data. These extracts from Julia Cream, as 
well as those from insurers and clinicians, illustrate the ways that stakeholders
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may reconfigure the definitional framework in order to push a particular social, 
political, or professional agenda.
However, not all members of interest groups were content with the special 
status accorded to new kinds of genetic test information. Alistair Kent, director 
of the Genetic Interest Group (GIG), called for scientific reality in the debate. He 
stated:
I think one of the important things that have been missing from the debate 
is scientific reality. If you listen to the conversations ... yes it would be 
terrible if we did those things [discriminated on the basis of genetic tests] 
based on the assumptions you're making about the predictive power of 
genetic information. But everything we know about genetic information tells 
us that it ain't likely to be so. (Alistair Kent, GIG, interviewed by James 
Mittra, 4 April, 2001)
Alistair Kent challenges the idea that the new genetic tests will be highly 
predictive and have a significant affect on the existing framework of insurance 
provision. Just as was revealed in the clinicians’ accounts, he expresses the 
view that there are many ways to acquire predictive diagnostic information. He 
stated:
What is the quality of the evidence that you have for somebody going to 
become ill in the future, or going to die prematurely? There are a number of 
different types of evidence that you can have. You can have the results of 
a DNA test, you have family history, you can make a biochemical 
diagnosis, you can diagnose on the basis of observed symptoms or clinical 
symptoms. You can make a predictive diagnosis based on thinks like 
ultrasound or MRI scanners under certain circumstances for different types 
of disease ... So our emphasis has been you look at the those who are 
pre-symptomatic, but predictably going to have a problem in the future, and 
ask what is the quality of the evidence, not what is the route by which you 
arrive at that evidence.
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This extract represents a defence of the equivalency argument. New kinds of 
genetic tests are different only at an instrumental level; that is at the level of 
initial methods of diagnosis. However, the information itself has substantial 
equivalence to various other medical tests, some of which have been used by 
insurance companies for centuries. Katherine Darton, a representative from the 
charity MIND, made a similar point when she said:
I personally come from a very cardiovascular family, so if somebody did a 
genetic test on me and said yes you've got genes for high blood pressure 
and heart attacks I'd say that's exactly what I’d expect to have, tell me 
something I couldn't have guessed. Just looking at a family tree has got 
just as much information in it. (Katherine Darton, MIND, interviewed by 
James Mittra 8 June, 2001)
Both these respondents could not see any technical justification for singling out 
particular genetic tests and defending a non-equivalency argument. However, 
respondents like Alistair Kent draw from this observation the logic that 
insurance companies should not be expected to provide special protection for 
those individuals denied insurance on the grounds of a positive genetic test. 
However, others, such as Katherine Darton and Julia Cream, take an opposite 
view, as will be explored in the next chapter.
Any single definitional framework may be used to justify a variety of normative 
arguments on the issue of genetics and insurance. Analysis of these interview 
accounts reveals that respondents will shift the definitional boundaries, in 
specific contexts, in order to justify normative beliefs about how insurers ought 
to treat the information. However, the data also revealed that we should not 
assume all interest groups, particularly patient-support groups, have a shared 
agenda. Once this is recognised, it is no surprise that Alistair Kent’s account of
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the scientific status of the issue is used to justify a very different approach to 
Julia Cream.
From a scientific and philosophical perspective, no clear and legitimate 
demarcation lines ought to be drawn between the new kinds of genetic test 
information and various other forms of medical data, but the perception 
continues to persist that new genetic tests are 'special'.11 In practice, all that the 
new DNA derived information is likely to deliver is a higher predictive value, yet 
the precise implications for insurance are unlikely to be significantly more 
serious. However, as revealed in the interview data, individuals may 
operationalise a restricted or expanded definitional framework in order to 
advance a personal agenda.
5.3 ‘Genetic D iscrim ination ' and Insurance
Although there appears to be no scientific justification for treating new kinds 
of genetic test information differently from various other forms of medical data, 
as most stakeholders concede, some people continue to regard genetic 
discrimination’ as a real danger and have petitioned for legislative redress to 
protect those they have come to label the 'genetically disadvantaged’. This 
section will critically analyse this specific issue, and argue that the debate might 
need to be hinged at a very different level; one that recognises and respects the 
foundational principles of private insurance and the limits to its social largesse. 
However, it would be instructive to first consider the historical case of HIV 1
11 Biesbecker, 1997 supports this view when she points to the fact that genetic counsellors often 
report that persons in families affected by genetic conditions perceive genetic information as 
more personal, revealing and stigmatising than other medical information.' (Biesbecker, 1997, 
109)
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discrimination within insurance, as this has had a profound influence on 
subsequent debates about genetic information and life assurance.
5.3.1 The Case of HIV and Aids Discrimination in Private Insurance
As was argued earlier in this chapter, discrimination' is fundamental to all 
equity-based private insurance models, and before public controversy over the 
use of genetic information began to emerge, most people were willing to accept, 
albeit reluctantly, the general legitimacy of this principle. It is worth recounting 
the case of HIV and AIDS as an exemplar of a significant social problem that 
had clear implications for insurance provision but did not engender the same 
level of public and political indignation, as does the current prospect of insurers 
accessing applicants’ genetic information.
As Draper (1998) notes, the ABI and the House of Commons have recently 
recognised the need to protect the personal genetic information of those 
applicants seeking mortgage-related life assurance. However, similar protection 
was never considered a matter of social and political urgency in the 1980s, 
when many HIV positive people found it difficult to acquire insurance. (Draper, 
1998, 105) In the absence of any legislative or regulatory constraints, insurers 
were permitted for years to transgress the ethical boundary by normalising 
‘unfair discrimination’. They often used information in a way that was actuarially 
unjustified, or allowed pervasive social prejudice to influence decision-making .
Schatz (1987) recounts a number of examples of unjustified commercial 
practices that occurred in the United States. One insurance company required 
its agents to segregate applications from single men with no dependants, and
102
employed in non-physically exerting professions, in order to isolate those who 
were presumed to be 'high risk’ homosexuals. Lifestyle information was used as 
a proxy to detect ostensibly related risk factors. When commercial organisations 
are prohibited from accessing information directly, they will often attempt to 
derive this information by more indirect and surreptitious means. Another 
company in the United States, required its agents to scrutinise applicants who 
were not married and named someone other than a spouse or child as the 
beneficiary of a life assurance policy or who exhibited traits that implied a 
■promiscuous lifestyle'. (Schatz, 1987,1787)
Roth (1995) claims that in the UK, insurers often requested that high-risk 
applicants seeking substantial life cover take an HIV antibody test. It is 
interesting to recount again the interview data, in which some insurers stated 
that they would never compel an individual to take a genetic test as a 
prerequisite for obtaining cover. It is generally accepted that such a practice is 
morally inappropriate because individuals are entitled to a ‘right of ignorance'. 
However, the insurance industry did not extend this right to those at-risk of HIV. 
If there is a fundamental ‘right of Ignorance’ regarding one’s health, it appears 
iniquitous to proclaim the existence of this right, and indeed positively embrace 
it, but apply it differentially depending on the nature of the medical condition and 
the amount of insurance cover being sought.
Legislation to minimise practices of unfair discrimination was eventually 
implemented in both the United States and the UK, but It is necessary to 
accentuate the point that it was considered more acceptable to discriminate
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against HIV positive applicants than those with genetic conditions. 12 The 'no 
fault’ condition status often assigned to diseases with a genetic origin13, coupled 
with a pervasive social prejudice against homosexuality, may partly explain the 
two very different responses. However, as McGleenan (1999) points out, both 
categories of medical information have many analogous features. Just like 
genetic tests: ‘HIV testing is predictive, it has a variable, but often lengthy, 
latency period, there is currently no available effective cure and in many 
instances the disease is fatal.’ (McGleenan, 1999, 60) This illustrates, once 
again, how a restricted definition of genetic information may fail to capture the 
similarities between genetic test information and various other forms of medical 
data. Reasons for restricting the definition may be associated with broader 
social, political, or economic interests/values.
It is important to recognise at this point that one of the reasons why the 
insurance industry might have became so concerned about the emergence of 
HIV was the potential problem of ‘moral hazard’, which was briefly referred to 
earlier. The fear was that by virtue of having health insurance cover, individuals 
at-risk of HIV infection might engage in risky sexual practices, safe in the 
knowledge that their medical expenses would be covered. Moral hazard is a 
significant concern for providers of health insurance, critical illness cover, and 
long-term care insurance. However, the problem is more difficult to extract in 
the case of life assurance, as there is no evidence to support the claim that 
individuals will change their behaviour by virtue of having a life assurance 
policy. Therefore, the differential treatment of HIV testing by life assurance 
companies was still largely unjustified.
12 Some people did, however, believe that AIDS was unjustifiably being granted special status 
through the prohibitory legislation in the United States. See Clifford and Luculano, 1987 for a 
critique of Schatz' view that legal protection was essential.
13 Frank. 1999 invokes this 'no fault' clause when he claims that differentiation based on genetics 
is a different form of discrimination because it is something the individual has no control over and 
cannot always change.
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5.3.2 Genetic Discrimination and Social Exclusion
When it comes to the potential discrimination that may transpire from the 
commercial use of genetic data, there is a prevalent belief amongst many 
scientists, policymakers, and the public that insurers, on principle, ought to treat 
such information differently. The reasoning used is that to use such knowledge 
in a way that denies people access to private life assurance falls unquestionably 
within the bounds of 'unfair discrimination’. Many people accept the 
philosophical argument that there is a categorical difference between 'fair' and 
‘unfair’ forms of discrimination. Furthermore, they have argued that this 
conceptual distinction should serve as the lynchpin for judging the legitimacy of 
corporate practices. In the context of genetics, insurers might engender unfair 
forms of discrimination by misinterpreting the genetic data or using the 
information duplicitously for financial gain. In both these cases, the use of such 
emotive terminology as ‘unfair discrimination’ might be justified. Both these 
practices are indeed iniquitous and run counter to the principle of uberrima 
tides. However, this relatively objective line of demarcation between ’fair' and 
’unfair’ discrimination is often contested. What one person considers ‘fair’ may 
be considered ‘unfair’ by another.
A growing body of anecdotal evidence suggests that insurance companies 
have unfairly discriminated against genetically at-risk policy applicants by simply 
misinterpreting the data. It has been alleged that certain companies have 
translated an increased risk into certainty or conflated recessive traits with 
actual presence of disease. Hudson et al (1995) describe the perverse case of 
insurers who misinterpreted sickle-cell trait throughout the 1970s, which
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resulted in many carriers of the disease being unfairly discriminated against.'4 
Without any scientific evidence to back their case, insurance companies 
operated on the assumption that carriers of sickle-cell trait embodied the same 
level of risk as those actually afflicted with the sickle-cell disease.
Low et al (1998) used a postal questionnaire to investigate possible 'genetic 
discrimination’ by insurance companies in the UK. 7000 respondents from 
various genetic support groups were asked to comment on how they had been 
treated by insurance companies. 33.4% claimed to have encountered various 
problems. The authors write: 'thirteen per cent of study respondents ... who 
represented no adverse actuarial risk on genetic grounds reported that their 
treatment by insurers seemed to represent unjustified discrimination.’ (Low et al, 
1998, 1632) Another study by Lapham et al (1996) investigated the same issue 
in the United States. From a sample of 332 members of genetic support groups, 
they discovered that 25% believed they had been denied life assurance, and 
22% health insurance, on the grounds of their genetic susceptibility. (Lapham et 
al, 1996, 621) Many of the respondents who were denied health insurance 
recalled being asked specific questions about their genetic status. 14 5 The 
Council for Responsible Genetics (2001), a national bioethics advocacy 
organisation based in the United States, also claim that a number of ‘healthy’ 
individuals have suffered genetics-based discrimination at the hands of various 
kinds of insurance providers.
14 See Macintyre, 1997, a sociologist who believes the case of sickle-cell should serve as a 
cautionary tale to those optimists who see in genetic screening only the great promise of an 
ultimate panacea for disease. (Macintyre, 1997, 1097)
15 See also Phillips et al, 2000, whose questionnaire-based study of 134 Jewish women in a 
research testing programme for Ashkenazi Jews, found that the main factors of concern regarding 
perceived risks: related to insurance discrimination, confidentiality, accuracy, and interpretability 
of results ...’ (Phillips et al, 2000, 376)
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It is important to recognise that many of these studies investigated only the 
subjective perceptions of individuals at-risk. Therefore, they do not provide us 
with an objective measure of the true extent of any actual discrimination that 
may have taken place. Such studies should be treated with a high degree of 
caution.
Many authors have challenged studies claiming to have revealed practices of 
unfair discrimination. Reilly (1999) argues that studies based on flawed 
methodologies have led to a great deal of spurious data. One consequence of 
this, according to Reilly, has been that people have become overly sensitive to 
perceived fears of mass discrimination. In reality, such discrimination is unlikely 
to become prevalent. Reilly writes: ‘Hundreds of popular articles warning of 
genetic discrimination rely at best on flimsy evidence.’ (Reilly, 1999, 127)
Bonn (2000) also believes the fears to be unfounded. She argues that 
genetic discrimination ‘... is unlikely to become the social evil of the new 
millennium.' (Bonn, 2000, 1526) Any ‘unfair discrimination’ will likely be limited 
and be the result of either commercial ignorance of genetic science or 
erroneous administrative practices. The most obvious solutions would be to 
improve managerial acumen, expand the provision of education and training for 
underwriters on the limits of genetic prediction, and take greater punitive action 
against insurers who continue to make fallacious actuarial decisions. As Ross 
(1997) argues: 'In my view it is not wise to restrict access to information just 
because people may misuse or misunderstand it. It is better to educate people 
in the proper use of the information.’ (Ross, 1997, 1106) 16
16 There are certain cases ot insurance companies breaking the law, or ignoring their own codes 
of practice. A report in the British Medical Journal, 2000 referred to a study in the Netherlands 
that found insurance companies circumventing the Dutch ban on genetics-based discrimination. 
Therefore, Ross' call for greater education may prove more salutary than continued legislation.
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Once again, it is important to stress that discrimination in life assurance, be it 
fair or unfair, is most unlikely to lead to the widespread social exclusion of 
vulnerable members of society. As the historical evidence presented at the 
beginning of this chapter demonstrated, life assurance has generally provided a 
means for the wealthy to protect their financial interests. Genetic discrimination 
would therefore only remove from the market a sub-section of the wealthy 
population. It is difficult to think of such people as part of a growing vulnerable 
underclass. Of course, social exclusion might be a problem for those genetically 
at-risk applicants who want to purchase life assurance attached to a mortgage. 
It is important to specify the context so that we do not make spurious 
generalisations. However, the claim that if insurance companies are permitted 
to use new kinds of genetic test information to rate policyholders large sections 
of the population might become socially excluded and form a growing 'genetic 
underclass' appears to  be deeply flawed.
It is also important to  point out that UK life assurance companies do not like to 
deny policies to too many individuals. Insurance companies are commercial 
entities with reputations to maintain, and rejecting too many applicants may 
have negative repercussions for their business interests.17 Furthermore, as life 
assurance companies increase their portfolios, their profits become far more 
stable. Common sense dictates that a large market is economically less risky 
than a restricted one. For this reason, there is considerably less rating involved 
in the provision of life assurance, as opposed to say long-term care insurance. 
With this knowledge in mind, companies do have an incentive to manage new
17 It must be noted that things are very different in the United States health insurance system, 
where there is an identifiable 'insurance underclass' that can only increase as genetic testing 
becomes more widely available. See Peters, 1998 for an ethical analysis of the underclass 
scenario as it applies to the United States.
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kinds of genetic information correctly, thus limiting the potential for unfair 
discrimination and widespread social exclusion.
In the case of life assurance provision in the UK, 95% of applicants pay 
standard rates, 4% pay a loaded premium, and only 1% are rejected outright. 
Furthermore, this latter group of ‘uninsurables’ are only denied access to a 
particular type of life assurance policy. They may be offered alternative forms 
of cover specifically designed for their high-risk status. It is important to 
accentuate this point in order to keep the issue in perspective. Genetic 
information is unlikely to have a considerable impact on these existing figures. 
In fact, most insurers in the UK have no intention of using the new genetic tests 
as a discriminatory tool. They claim only a right to defend themselves against 
adverse selection. Whether or not adverse selection is a justifiable concern may 
be debatable, but it is the primary reason used to justify commercial 
underwriting.
Bodmer (1997) dismisses the fear that as a greater number of multifactorial 
diseases become linked to specific gene sequences, insurers will demand to 
use them for underwriting purposes. He writes:
Since the insurance industry is often quoted as saying that even a two-fold 
increased risk is not enough for them to adjust their life insurance 
premiums, any genetically identified component of multifactorial disease 
susceptibility should, especially if targeted with prevention, be of no interest 
for life insurance.' (Bodmer, 1997, 1050)
When contemplating the possibility of genetic discrimination, it is important to 
recognise that only a small number of applicants are likely to be affected. Most 
of these individuals already have problems acquiring insurance, in the absence 
of new genetic tests. Indeed, some of these individuals may actually benefit
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from insurance companies' using new kinds of genetic test information. 
Somebody with a family history of Huntington's disease, for example, would in 
the past have been denied life assurance, or been charged a premium so high it 
would essentially be rendered unaffordable. However, if they now take a genetic 
test, and it proves negative, they can conceivably re-enter the market at a 
standard rate. From this perspective, we might look at the use of genetic test 
information as ruling people into the insurance market, rather than ruling them 
out of it.
This issue is extremely complex, and should not perhaps be framed simply In 
terms of people being illegitimately denied insurance. Of course, we must 
recognise the diverse ways in which particular types of insurance products are 
affected by the issue of genetic Information. The commercial and ethical 
boundaries of the insurance business should not be thought of as static. At 
present, long-term care insurance is generally considered a non-primary social 
good, but if the parameters of the welfare state continue to recede, it could in 
the future become a necessity for the majority of the population. O’Neill (1997a) 
supports the contention that legislation may be required if significant changes 
are made to the social landscape within which private insurance exists. 
However, at the present time, the problem does not appear so acute.
If we now return to ‘fair discrimination', the argument goes that individuals pay 
a premium for life assurance that is commensurate with the risk they bring to 
the insurance pool. If an individual embodies a gene that predisposes them to a 
particular disease, then the principle of equity dictates that they pay a higher 
price for insurance. Those who wish to privilege such individuals, and bestow 
upon them special legislative protection, may actually engender new forms of 
inequity. The logic of their argument leads to the rather dubious claim that those
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people whose condition is diagnosed through a specific and pre-defined genetic 
test are more worthy of protection, and have a greater moral claim to access a 
particular insurance product, than those who are denied insurance as a result of 
a positive non-genetic based test. This is a paradox caused by a restricted 
definition of genetic information, a desire to single it out for regulatory attention, 
and a growing belief that discrimination is fundamentally more insidious when it 
is of the genetic variety. Hamilton et al (1995) countenance this point when they 
write: 'The ability to obtain insurance should not depend merely on the 
mechanism of a diagnostic test.' (Hamilton et al, 1995), 1164)
It must be conceded, however, that there are some important issues raised 
by genetic testing and the information it generates, but the evidence seems to 
imply that it is only a matter of scale. The preceding theoretical arguments, as 
well as the critical sociological analysis of the interview data, suggest that 
genetic information is likely, at most, to simply refine existing underwriting risk- 
analysis. In the future, genetic tests may facilitate more precise predictive 
diagnoses, but access to life assurance is unlikely to be significantly affected. 
There are no fundamentally new social and ethical perplexities. Rather, historic 
problems and anxieties continue to persist, although they may have the 
potential to affect a slightly greater number of people. Many people believe that 
this issue of scale is sufficient to warrant extra legislative protection. For 
example, after admitting that there are only relative differences between genetic 
information and other forms of medical data, Gevers (1993) would still like to 
conceptually isolate and protect genetic information, because he believes ‘... 
the insurer's or employer's interest in requesting cooperation in a medical 
examination will be sooner disproportional to a person's privacy interests than in
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the other cases.' (Gevers, 1993, 128)16 Gevers wrongly assumes that medical 
examinations are routinely used to underwrite basic life assurance policies. 
However, even if it were true, one should perhaps still use a consequentialist 
ethical framework, and argue that the crucial issue is the impact on the 
individual who is denied a primary social good. Singling out the ‘genetically 
disadvantaged' may be socially inequitable, as well as commercially illogical, for 
non-primary social goods such as UK life assurance.
One could make the argument that all insurance products offered by the 
private sector should be recognised as non-primary social goods. The logic 
being that primary social goods ought to be distributed through non-risk based 
insurance systems. Subsequently, companies offering such non-primary social 
goods must be allowed to pool risks using actuarial underwriting methods, as 
this is the only way to guarantee that the principle of equity is sustained. The 
situation becomes a little more complicated when a non-primary social good 
slowly becomes a primary social good. When it has moved significantly enough 
in this direction, any individual previously denied a policy, regardless of whether 
their discrimination was labelled ‘fair' or 'unfair', may have a moral claim to 
some form of redress. One may ask if there are any historical examples of a 
private good slowly transforming into a public good. One may be healthcare in 
the UK. Before the creation of the welfare state, and nationalised healthcare, 
access to medical treatment was based on an ability to pay rather than need. 
Eventually, healthcare became recognised as a primary social good and the 
National Health Service was born. Other, perhaps more trivial, examples might 
be goods such as refrigerators, telephones, and electricity/gas supplies. Over 
time, these products have shifted from being regarded as mere commodities, to
' 8 Gevers, 1992 admits that asking for other medical tests is also an infringement on privacy but 
still seems to think that there is greater at stake with regard to genetic tests, and this alone 
justifies more extensive legal protection.
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non-primary social goods, and finally to primary social goods. The fact that 
individuals receiving state welfare benefits may receive extra money to buy 
such goods as refrigerators, or still be permitted to access gas and electricity if 
they fail to pay their bills, signals that society no longer considers these 
products mere luxuries or non-primary social goods.
This talk of social goods brings us back to the issue of balancing commercial 
and social Interests, which was discussed earlier in the chapter. In a country like 
the United States, where health insurance is entirely private, this is a far more 
pertinent issue. As Rizzo (1999) argues, the ethical minefield of the United 
States healthcare system will only be exacerbated by the genetics issue. He 
asks whether the insurance providers can 'be convinced that it is in their best 
interest, as well as in the interest of the public, to sacrifice economic prospects 
for the sake of preventing grave harm to individuals.’ (Rizzo, 1999, 127) Rizzo 
believes that because insurance companies enjoy advantages such as 
government tax breaks, they should as a matter of principle act with a social 
conscience. However, one should not expect the system to have a social 
conscience. Although the situation in the United States may be lamentable, it 
ought to be resolved through a fundamental change in the provision of 
healthcare, not through a false expectation that corporate entities should, or 
even could, have a social conscience. Either one changes the underlying 
structure of the system of provision, or one makes it profitable for corporate 
entities to act in a socially responsible manner. Morgan (1996) supports this 
view, in part, by arguing that: ‘Widespread genetic discrimination in the private 
insurance market would furnish a compelling argument for instituting a public 
insurance programme or instituting across the board regulation of the private 
insurance market’ (Morgan, 1996, 194)
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Peters (1998) conceptualises the conflict between insurers’ right to genetic 
information, and society’s interest in providing healthcare to all, as one between 
‘libertarian’ and ’egalitarian’ values. Constitutive of private insurers' appeal to 
libertarian values in risk-classification is an individual's right to benefit from 
■good’ genes, and thus in a private insurance market to pay lower premiums. 
Risk-classification is underpinned by libertarian ideals, which conflict with the 
social equality values of egalitarianism. The libertarian considers genes 'natural 
property’, and the advantages they bestow on the individual who ‘owns’ them 
ought to be protected on the grounds of individual liberty. However, Peters 
claims that one cannot appeal to personal liberty when proclaiming a right to 
benefit from ‘good’ genes, but must seek justification through other moral 
considerations. (Peters, 1998, 210) In considering the United States healthcare 
system, Peters writes:
Egalitarianism thrusts on libertarian-orientated commercial insurers a 
burden of proof to morally justify risk classification and the prorating of 
health insurance premiums to risk status -  if these risks are arguably not 
brought about by an individual's voluntary action.' (Ibid, 213)
There is an instructive lesson here for the UK. If we move towards a private 
form of healthcare provision, it perhaps ought to be made compulsory for 
everybody, remain free at the point of entry, and be based upon a hybrid 
system of social and private finance, rather than simply private provision alone. 
This contrast between libertarian and egalitarian values is also relevant to the 
life assurance context. Currently, because life assurance is generally regarded 
as a non-primary social good, the libertarian values of policyholders override 
egalitarian principles. Only when a product is conceptualised as a primary social 
good may egalitarian values subsume libertarian ones.
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This section has provided a largely theoretical account of the reasons why the 
use of genetic information is unlikely to have a significant social impact on 
access to life assurance. The social exclusion argument has been shown to be 
deeply flawed for two main reasons. Firstly, the 'vulnerable' individuals who are 
likely to be ruled out of life assurance because of a positive genetic test 
constitute only a sub-section of the wealthy middle class, rather than the 
reputedly ‘poor and downtrodden’. Secondly, very few people are denied life 
assurance to begin with, and it is unlikely that predictive genetic testing will 
have a serious impact on existing figures. Furthermore, as will be described in 
the final section, the insurance industry has a history of creating innovative new 
products to help those who represent too high a risk to be eligible for existing 
products.
Issues such as the social good aspect of insurance, fair and unfair 
discrimination, adverse selection, and the equity principle of private insurance, 
have been shown to be deeply complex, and often misunderstood by scholars. 
However, it has also been shown that we can understand the problem in terms 
of existing norms and principles. Genetic information does not have to be a 
problematic concept in the context of insurance, despite interview accounts to 
the contrary. Genetic information may simply lead to a refinement of existing 
underwriting practices, and will unlikely engender significant social, commercial, 
or ethical problems.
It is now possible to make a preliminary conclusion regarding research 
question one, and claim that the social, ethical, and commercial implications of
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using genetic information in life assurance underwriting are unlikely to be as 
significant as many scholars, and some stakeholders, have suggested. Many 
appear to have neglected the theoretical roots of the problem, as well as the 
practical realities of the contemporary insurance market, which suggest that 
genetic information is not really that ‘special' and is unlikely to fundamentally 
change the prevailing systems of insurance provision. Genetic information 
appears to be no different from existing forms of medical data, particularly 
family history. However, an argument could be made for restricting insurers’ 
access to these various other forms of medical information. Nevertheless, this 
would perhaps only be legitimate if the insurance product were considered a 
primary social good.
The interview data illuminated the various ways in which stakeholders and 
academics erect particular definitional frameworks around genetic information. 
The transcripts revealed how the use of both restricted and expanded 
definitions could affect the validity of claims about the impact of genetic testing 
on access to life assurance. In their interview talk, stakeholders frequently 
alternated particular definitional frameworks, which appeared in some cases to 
represent a rhetorical strategy for legitimating their broader social, political, 
ethical, or moral values. Such strategies may problématisé the issue, and lead 
to confusion as to how the potential impacts ought to be conceptualised. One 
consequence of stakeholders operationalising various narrative strategies is 
that attention may be diverted from the underlying theoretical roots of the 
problem. The issue becomes conceptualised as both significant and in need of 
urgent attention, when the reality might be that the issue is far simpler and 
easily resolved. With regard to the second research question, we may now 
conclude that stakeholders do strategically manipulate the definitional
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framework around genetic information in order to express value judgements on 
how the issue ought to be conceptualised. Their broader political goals and 
ideologies might also play a role in determining how their accounts are framed. 
This question will be explored further in the following chapter.
Although it has been argued that genetic information will unlikely have a 
significant impact on future access to life assurance, and will not fundamentally 
change the way insurers currently rate policy applicants, there is one area 
where genetic information may have an impact. This is in the context of the 
doctor/patient relationship, which raises questions about the way the genetic 
information and insurance debate may draw greater attention to issues around 
the ownership and control of medical data.
6. THE MEDICAL CONTEXT: PRIVACY AND OWNERSHIP
6.1 The Medical Profession and Confidentiality
Clinicians enjoy a rather precarious position in the genetics and insurance 
dilemma. They often find themselves as reluctant intermediaries who must 
carefully balance a moral duty to protect the interests of patients with a legal 
duty to provide clinical information to insurance companies.
Pergament (1997) raises the important question: what should a doctor do 
when presented with a patient who has a genetic disorder, but request that this 
information remain confidential so he/she can obtain life assurance? Should the
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clinician comply with the patient’s wish and become an accomplice to a 
fraudulent claim? Pergament believes that progress in genetic testing will 
increase the frequency of these ethical dilemmas.
When an individual applies for life assurance in the UK, they must sign a 
consent form granting access to their full medical history, as contained within 
the notes of their general practitioner. However, since large numbers of genetic 
tests are conducted within private clinics, the results can remain relatively 
clandestine. In fact, even if one consults a clinical geneticist as an NHS patient, 
one is entitled to request that the general practitioner not be informed of the 
result. Dr. Quarrel gave an account of this practice during interview.
. . . i f  somebody wants a predictive test and absolutely forbids me to write a 
letter to their GP, then I will report that in the notes and write them a letter 
saying these are the results, you have not asked me to disclose the same 
to your GP ... It's an NHS service, but I suppose it’s the equivalent of being 
in private practice ... I should emphasise, and perhaps we ought to record 
in the transcript, that in the case of insurance ... I routinely explain to 
patients that there is an issue and I advise them that they must answer 
questions honestly. So even if they said they didn't want their GP informed 
I would still give the advice that if they are filling out a new form it is a legal 
contract, and they must take it out in good faith and answer questions 
honestly ... that is so much a routine part of my practice.
One of the anonymous genetic counsellors confirmed this statement in her 
interview. She gave the following account when asked if the insurance problem 
was often raised in counselling sessions:
... what I tend to say to people is we re still a little bit unclear of where this 
is going to go, we would suggest if you are thinking of genetic testing 
conditions which could be significant in this way then look at your cover 
before going ahead.
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It is clear that those working within a clinical setting are primarily concerned with 
patient health and well-being. They clearly recognise the implications genetic 
testing may have for their patients’ future access to insurance. Clinicians 
routinely explain to patients that they are duty bound to inform insurance 
companies of their medical status. It is then left to the patient to decide whether 
to be truthful on the application form and enter the contract in good faith. 
However, the fact that this is becoming a frequent issue in genetic counselling 
sessions should sensitise us to the potential scale of the problem. 
Consequently, we should consider more carefully the whole issue of ownership, 
privacy, and consent regarding personal medical information.
Orentlicher (1997) believes that patients should have far greater control over 
their medical records, particularly those aspects relating to genetic information. 
He states: ‘Although insurers and employers may want genetic information, 
physicians need not and should not participate in efforts by insurers or 
employers to obtain genetic information.’ (Orentlicher, 1997, 88) It is important 
to recognise that granting consent is not a form of empowerment, and does not 
represent greater individual control over medical information, if to refuse access 
results in being denied an insurance policy. However, the social good aspect of 
insurance is crucial in this regard. Insurance companies providing non-primary 
social goods have a legitimate right to access applicants’ medical history. The 
problem lies in squaring this commercial right with an individual's right to 
privacy.
6.2 ‘P rivacy’ and ‘O w nership’ o f Genetic Information
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The very term 'genetic privacy’ encompasses a number of discrete concepts. 
Allen (1997), for instance, regards it as encapsulating concerns about access to 
information, physical privacy of personal space, third-party interests in individual 
choices, and propriety concerns and interests in human personality. (Allen, 
1997, 33) However, she argues that it tends to be the informational aspect that 
creates the greatest concern. Nevertheless, the concept of privacy is 
multidimensional, and a number of issues are at stake. For example, one may 
seek to protect an individual’s right to keep their medical information private, but 
there may be circumstances in which it is considered, in Kantian terms, a 
categorical moral imperative to reveal such information. This point is particularly 
pertinent to specific genetics-based information that reveals the risk status of 
not only a specific individual, but also his or her entire biological family.19 
Sandor (1999) recognises this point when he claims that data protection:
... does not provide sufficient guarantees for the protection of genetic data, 
since once genetic data has been obtained, the notification about the 
potential danger for children and relatives or disclosure for the partner is 
often regarded as a moral duty.’ (Sandor, 1999, 189)
However, this is not a problem exclusive to genetic information, but can apply to
a diverse range of medical and personal data. In the opening section of this
chapter, reference was made to Foucault's theory of the medical gaze and his
account of the various ways in which the rational state began to blur the
public/private divide in order to protect public health. The duty to disclose
medical Information for the benefit of others is not a unique modern day
19 Clarke, 1997a also raises the special issue of genetically testing children who, since they 
cannot give formal consent and make informed decisions as adults can, may suffer greater 
psychological and social disadvantage.
The Human Genome Organisation (HUGO), 1998 also recognises a difference between the moral 
obligations to disclose information to biological kin, and the requirement to grant access to 
institutional third parties such as insurance companies.
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phenomenon. The only difference here is that the duty is imposed not to benefit 
wider society, but to protect members of immediate family or the interests of 
private commercial enterprises. Many would perhaps consider the former a 
noble duty, but be far more critical about imposing a duty of disclosure to 
protect commercial interests.
It is also important to stress that the right to privacy is linked to the issue of 
discrimination because, as Rothenberg (1999) recognises:
‘ ... an individual who believes he has been discriminated against has the 
difficult task of proving it; a person might not even know that his information 
was actually used ... it becomes important to protect access to the 
information, not just erect safeguards against discrimination.' (Rothenberg, 
1999, 86)
Nevertheless, a single privacy policy would likely prove inadequate. As Powers 
(1997) argues:
'... the kinds of information that ought to be protected from access, the 
degree and nature of the  protection needed, and the institutional 
arrangements that determine the contingent importance of privacy will vary, 
depending on the kinds of harm s threatened by a loss of privacy and the 
vulnerabilities of persons under any given set of economic and social 
arrangements.' (Powers, 1997, 362)
This argument supports the central claim of this chapter; that the moral and 
ethical boundaries are relative to the social context within which private 
insurance exists. The upshot of Powers approach is that if an individual’s 
interest is threatened by another person gaining access to their genetic 
information, then the policymaker must either restrict access to the information
1 2 1
or modify the institutional arrangement within which that information exists. 
(Ibid, 363) In the case of insurance, one can either deny access to the genetic 
data or change the institutional arrangement of insurance provision so access is 
no longer required.
Lebacqz (1998) believes that protection of privacy rights will not in the end be 
of immediate benefit to the most vulnerable members of society, because such 
rights construct problems as personal rather than societal. (Lebacqz, 1998, 248) 
Social consequences come second to individual interests when we seek to 
protect privacy on the grounds of individual liberty. In the case of healthcare, 
she claims that privatising decision-making does not challenge the underlying 
values of health provision in the United States, which by its very nature 
discriminates against the poor. Lebacqz argues that the protection of privacy 
will not fundamentally change this institutionalised framework of discrimination.
However, legislation to protect particular privacy rights might in certain 
circumstances be essential. A moral case could be made for changing the 
present system of consent, in which people are forced to concede access to the 
totality of their medical record. Mandl et al (2001) argue that patients should be 
able to grant differential levels of access to various parts of their medical record, 
with each section requiring independent authorisation. (Mandl et al, 2001, 284) 
This would give patients far greater control over their personal medical data, 
and could reduce the potential for improper use of that information. However, 
within the insurance context, people may still be required to grant certain, albeit 
more limited and specific, access as a precondition of receiving insurance
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cover.20 Again, the moral and ethical status of this kind of request depends 
largely on the type of insurance product being provided.
There is a legitimate right to privacy, as well as a right to control sensitive 
personal information. As Moore (2000) points out in his Lockean analysis of 
intangible property rights, such control over personal data protects autonomy 
and can serve as a defence against possible totalitarian forms of government 
intervention. (Moore, 2000, 104) However, such rights are clearly not absolute. 
Others also have legitimate claims on certain rights, and their rights can 
sometimes impinge on others. Even private insurance companies have certain 
rights, but only if they are offering non-primary social goods.21
As far as genetic information is concerned, it is difficult to justify the creation 
of special systems of protection The ethical dilemmas that the genetics and 
insurance debate have illuminated, and brought to society’s immediate 
attention, should perhaps be used to question the entire system of access to the 
medical information of individuals.22
20 Laurie, 2000 points out that within The Data Protection Act 1998 personal health information, 
which includes genetic data, qualifies as "sensitive personal data" and is afforded greater 
protection in that it can only be processed under limited circumstances and with explicit consent. 
However, what good is consent if to deny access leads to ineligibility for an insurance contract? 
Laurie approaches this issue from a legal perspective, but questions whether legal redress always 
offers the best solution. He concedes that a more universal approach is required, one that does 
not single out genetic information for special protection, and he regards the data protection laws 
as a positive step forward in this direction, precisely because it refers to health information as a 
universal and inclusive category.
21 I do want to note that corporations should not be granted the same rights as individuals, 
because in a trade-off between the individual and the corporation the individual's rights ought to 
be stronger. Many global corporations have tried to use individual rights based legislation to grant 
themselves the most dubious property rights, which can be damaging to many developing 
countries, and I argue fervently against this particular trend.
22 The National Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), 1993 believe genetic privacy requires 
protection but concedes this important notion that various types of health related information are 
equally sensitive. They argue that such information should never be used to deny health care. 
However, this task force has a vested interest in framing the issue beyond merely 'genetic 
information' since they operate as part of the Human Genome Project, which is clearly interested 
in promoting genetic research.
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This section has illustrated the ways in which genetic information may affect 
the relationship between doctors, patients, and insurance companies, and 
perhaps render issues around consent, privacy, and control of medical 
information far more complex. The increasing knowledge of genetics, and 
advances made in screening technologies, will most likely heighten public 
sensitivity to these complex issues. However, such dilemmas are not new, but 
the risk is that genetic information once again is granted special status in this 
context. These issues certainly need to be resolved, but the debate should 
perhaps be extended to all medical information, not just the genetic aspects. 
Access to family history information is crucial in this regard. It is important to 
note that some European countries, such as Norway, have used formal 
legislation to prohibit insurers from requesting family history information. As 
such, they have at least demonstrated a consistent approach to the issue by not 
ring fencing new kinds of genetic test information for special attention. Whether 
or not this restriction on commercial freedom succeeds in the long-term remains 
to be seen, but there are some lessons for the UK. The logic of this debate does 
lead naturally to a more critical consideration of the use of all medical 
information by third parties.
Having looked in some detail at the various theoretical roots of the problem of 
genetics and life assurance, and certain groups' accounts of the definitional 
framework, it is now necessary to look at some of the practical realities of the 
insurance business. So far, it has been demonstrated that the likely social, 
legal, ethical, and commercial implications of genetic information for access to 
life assurance are not as great as perhaps the level of concern has implied. Of 
course, there will certainly be some social and commercial impact, but it seems 
wrong to single out new kinds of genetic test data for special regulatory
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attention. Even if new kinds of genetic test information were likely to prove 
significant in the context of access to private life assurance, the everyday 
practical realities of the life business would most likely mitigate any negative 
social consequences. These practical realities, combined with the creative 
capacity of the insurance industry to create novel products, will now be shown 
to offer possible candidate solutions to the problem of genetics and insurance.
7. COMMERCIAL REALITIES OF THE LIFE ASSURANCE INDUSTRY
Throughout this chapter, the issue of genetic information and its implications 
for life assurance provision has been presented mostly in abstract theoretical 
terms. Thus, the nature and role of actuarial underwriting was presented as an 
ideal’. However, practical reality often deviates from pure theory, so it is 
incumbent upon policymakers to recognise the commercial realities of the life 
assurance industry when evaluating candidate solutions to the problem.
7.1 The F lexib ility  of a Commercial Market
In the UK, life assurance companies do not conform rigidly to the theoretical 
principles of underwriting presented earlier in the chapter. They may often 
provide insurance with minimal underwriting, treat specific genetic test 
information as a special category, and accept restrictions on rating policies 
because of formal legislation (for example the Race Relations Act). 
Furthermore, they can often make allowances for individual policyholders 
because the market is so flexible. A good example of this is the case of risk re­
classification. This particular issue emerged during the interview with Tony
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O'Leary. He was asked whether it was possible for individuals to be re­
underwritten if their risk-status improved, and therefore pay a reduced premium. 
He responded:
The theory is no —  an insurance company offering life assurance is 
different from house insurance and car insurance where you renew it every 
year and if something changes the rates change. Life assurance is forever, 
for the term of the policy ... from a theoretical point of view I shouldn’t 
change the terms [because only those whose risk-status improved would 
ask to be re-classified. Those whose risk status did not improve would not 
ask to be rated higher.
This account expresses the pure theory that re-classification of risk is 
economically unsound. Graham Austin confirmed this theory in his interview. 
However, because the insurance market is so competitive, there is always the 
possibility that an individual will cancel their existing contract and take out a new 
policy with a competitor company in order to get better rates. This is known in 
the industry as ‘lapse and re-entry’. When Graham Austin was asked if this 
commercial reality might sometimes make re-classification necessary, he 
responded:
If your good lives walk away and your bad lives stay, and then the ones 
that you did charge an extra premium for you allow to come back and have 
ordinary rates, in actuarial terms you have a skewed group of people. But I 
accept that we do it sometimes.
The competitive nature of the insurance industry suggests that most people 
could find affordable insurance if they were both willing to take action to reduce 
their risk status and understood the commercial realities of the market. Even the 
genetically at-risk might be able to access affordable insurance this way. Of 
course, for many monogenetic conditions it is impossible to reduce risk-status 
through lifestyle changes. However, most people seem to be worried about a
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future in which genetic testing becomes routine for multi-factorial conditions. In 
these cases, some prophylactic action is likely to mitigate the severity of the 
condition, so the competitive nature of the market might advantage these at-risk 
individuals.
However, most evidence suggests that individuals are usually bad at 
modifying their lifestyle in order to reduce risk of illness. Clarke (1997c), 
commenting on the financial costs incurred by health promotion programmes, 
argues that lay understandings of risk often conflict with the scientific reality. 
Some people become fatalistic when they discover they are highly susceptible 
to some illness, while others who are told they have a low susceptibility begin to 
assess the extent to which they can abuse their bodies. Both reactions can 
have a negative impact on future health. This view is shared by Marteau and 
Lerman (2001), who claim that current evidence suggests that providing people 
with DNA related information does not increase their motivation to change 
behaviour any more than it does for non-genetic information. (Marteau & 
Lerman, 2001, 1058) Evans et al (2001) point additionally to the lack of any 
straightforward and effective measures to reduce the risk of many cancer 
predispositions, even if individuals are willing to comply with a strict medical 
regime, and Davison et al (1992) note the consistent failure of the general 
public to embrace medical lifestyle advice and acquiesce to received medical 
wisdom. Internal irrationality may be one of the reasons why people are largely 
unsuccessful at reducing their risk-status. We will return to this issue in the final 
chapter, as It has significant implications for the public understanding of 
science.
The fact that insurers are willing to compromise on their standard norms and 
practices, because the market is so fluid and competitive, demonstrates that
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bad genetic luck does not have to seriously affect access to insurance products. 
Of course, as Nikerson (1996) points out, most of the benefits of genetic testing 
will be monopolised by those individuals with negative results who will ultimately 
pay less for life assurance. Those with positive test results will generally pay 
more. The insurance industry is usually no better or worse off as a result. 
(Nikerson, 1996, 386)23 Nevertheless, insurers have demonstrated a willingness 
to provide alternative arrangements for high-risk individuals. For example, 
because onset of illness almost invariably starts in middle age, individuals with 
the gene for Huntington's disease can often acquire term life assurance 
because insurers recognise that the applicant will have a number of years 
where their risk-status is ‘normal’.
7.2. The Creative Capacity o f the Insurance Industry to Create Novel 
Products
Even if the nature of the life assurance market renders certain individuals 
ineligible for an insurance policy, there are insurance products available that are 
tailored to the specific needs of high-risk applicants. What is often neglected in 
debates about genetics and insurance is the 'creative capacity' of the industry to 
respond to 'deviant' cases in the market. This capacity to design novel products 
for individuals who cannot access existing ones is reflected in the growth of the 
annuities market. The emergence of such policies as ‘impaired life annuities’, or 
‘smokers' annuities', demonstrate that the industry can respond to a variety of 
emerging consumer needs.
23 It must be noted that offering lower premiums to the genetically 'fit', or what are known in the 
trade as preferred lives', is considered unethical and all insurance companies have promised 
they will not 'cherrypick' low risk applicants. However, they do cherrypick for other risks, so again 
a false demarcation line is often drawn between genetic and non-genetic factors.
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Annuities are extremely important to how we conceptualise the genetics and 
insurance debate, because they essentially represent an inversion of the life 
assurance dilemma. With life assurance, high-risk applicants pay greater 
premiums than low-risk ones. However, with ‘impaired life annuities', high-risk 
policyholders pay the lowest premiums. The basic principle of an 'impaired life’ 
annuity is that the applicant pays a one off premium, and the provider 
subsequently guarantees the policyholder a regular income until death. 
Therefore, from the insurers’ rational economic perspective the hope is that the 
applicant dies sooner rather than later. However, such a product also provides 
the opportunity for those high-risk individuals to gamble with the insurer on their 
own mortality. Many companies offer smokers annuities, and it is not 
inconceivable that a similar market could grow as genetic testing becomes more 
prevalent. This could offer some form of financial security to the so called 
genetically disadvantaged’.24 One of the advantages of this approach is that it 
avoids having to provide special protection to a sub-set of high-risk policy 
applicants in an equity based insurance pool. This would prove unfair to both 
low-risk policyholders who would be forced to pay higher premiums, as well as 
other high-risk policy applicants who might be charged a loaded premium 
because they suffer from conditions not pre-defined as deserving special 
protection.
It is surprising that various protagonists in the genetics and insurance debate 
have neglected the case of annuities as a potentially straightforward solution to 
the genetics and insurance dilemma. Instead, many scholars and interest 
groups have advocated legislative restrictions on the life assurance market. 
Baroness Warnock (1993) argues we should average out the increased costs
24 This does raise the interesting scenario of a new form of anti-selection whereby those people 
with low risks pretend to lead unhealthy lifestyles in order to get favourable annuity premiums.
129
amongst all policyholders, in order to protect the genetically disadvantaged’. 
She wrongly believes that this provides the most equitable solution. The 
insurance company would not suffer financially, but those people in the 
insurance pool only just able to afford their premiums could be disadvantaged 
and may even fall out of the market altogether. McGleenan and Wiesing (1999) 
offer another solution. They propose that we make it a pre-condition of taking a 
genetic test that the individual prove he or she has already taken out a life 
assurance policy. This would prevent anti-selection, so the insurance industry 
would be content, but there is a liberty issue here; should one be forced to 
obtain insurance, especially if it is not considered a primary social good?
There are other possible piecemeal solutions that do not necessarily 
challenge the principle of equity. One could be to offer people with genetic 
disorders the kind of state subsidisation that military personnel enjoy when they 
propose for life assurance policies. Basically, they apply for an insurance 
product and the government pays the loaded part of the premium. This does not 
challenge the principle of equity, because within the specific insurance pool, 
people are still paying premiums commensurate with their risk. However, some 
members are being state subsidised. This is something society may wish to 
implement, although it could prove unfair to those who are not eligible for the 
state subsidy but are still excluded from accessing life cover, or are forced to 
pay excessive premiums. Maybe this principle of state subsidisation could be 
extended to all those who are denied insurance? Whether people would be 
willing to support those whose risk is self-inflicted is another matter, but worth 
discussion.
Warren (2001) proposes another possible solution. Talking about long-term 
care insurance, she argues that the Government could give tax relief on
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premiums so companies could offer standard rates to all those wanting 
moderate cover, yet grant such companies the right to access all information for 
those seeking substantial amounts of cover. (Warren, 2001, 1060)
All these solutions provide some form of protection without undermining the 
principle of equity. However, each of them does require singling out particular 
groups of policy applicants for special legislative protection. The creation of 
novel products appears to be the fairest, and perhaps simplest, way to provide 
protection in the unlikely case that new kinds of genetic information leads to 
widespread social exclusion.
7.3. Im plications of Genetic Inform ation fo r the Privatisation of Welfare
Although the creation of novel products might prove useful in providing 
alternative coverage for high-risk applicants, for those products that are 
considered primary social goods, such an approach is likely to be inappropriate. 
The logic of insurance discrimination is that for certain products, such as 
healthcare, long-term care, and perhaps in the future life assurance attached to 
a mortgage, it is simply inappropriate to provide such products through a 
mutuality based model. The genetics issue has perhaps sensitised people to 
the mechanisms by which 'social goods’ are distributed. The Government's 
increasing obsession with privatised welfare may therefore have to be 
reconsidered in light of this evidence
Solutions may be needed that go further than the creation of novel insurance 
products or state subsidies, and lead essentially to the re-evaluation of the 
institutional structures of private and social insurance more generally. 
Something like European models of public finance and private provision could
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be implemented, at least for healthcare. The genetics issue, if anything, should 
perhaps lead to a major rethink of the fundamental place of insurance in 
modern society. At this moment in time, it would probably be unwise to 
significantly modify the institutional framework of private life assurance, as 
piecemeal solutions are likely to prove sufficient at present. However, a strong 
argument could be made for applying these solutions to the entire 1% of people 
who are denied access to such products, not just the genetically disadvantaged. 
However, if greater numbers of people do end up falling into this unfortunate 
category of ‘uninsurable’, then the equity principle may have to be challenged 
and some form of social insurance or solidarity based private insurance 
introduced.
A major problem for the policymaker is how to judge when a non-primary 
social good has shifted significantly enough towards conception as a primary 
social good to warrant a fundamental change in the institutional provision of 
insurance. It may be an incremental process, with even minor changes in the 
level of welfare payments shifting life assurance closer to consideration as a 
primary social good. It is really all a matter of degree. The solution required is 
dependent on where along a linear continuum an insurance product is 
considered to lie at any given time. The closer an insurance product moves 
towards conception as a primary social good, the greater the need to transfer 
provision from the private to the state sector; from risk-based mutuality to non­
risk based communal solidarity.
8. CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to provide some answers to research questions 
one and two. Research question one asked: what are the most likely social,
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legal, commercial, and ethical implications of life assurance companies using 
genetic information to rate policyholders, and might the history of insurance, risk 
and probability enable us to better understand this contemporary problem. It 
also asked whether the political rhetoric of stakeholders advances or 
problematises our evaluations. In order to Investigate this issue, the chapter 
began by looking at the history of probability, risk, and insurance. The first 
section discussed briefly the impact eugenic anxieties might be exerting on 
peoples' perception of the genetics and insurance issue; perhaps by sensitising 
them to the potential abuse of genetic science. Although there was no clear 
evidence to support the view that people were being directly influenced by the 
eugenic past, it was claimed that the historic abuse of genetics might need to be 
seen as foreshadowing contemporary debates.
The first main section of the chapter provided a short historical account of the 
issue at hand. The birth of life assurance was shown to be linked to the 
development of a new science of probability, both of which also had an impact 
on the growth of late-stage capitalism. This section challenged some of the 
basic assumptions held by contemporary sociologists of risk, particularly the 
idea that modern risks are qualitatively different from those in the past. Although 
the ‘risk society' theory presented by writers such as Beck and Giddens may 
have served an important purpose in sensitising sociologists and the public to 
issues around risk, their theories were shown to be inadequate for 
understanding the genetics and insurance issue. Analysis of the social context 
of insurance revealed the distributive issues around risk that have often been 
neglected by risk society theorists. Because insurance has always existed 
primarily as a means for the wealthy to protect their financial interests, talk of 
widespread social exclusion appears flawed. The statistical revolution and the 
birth of insurance did not benefit all equally.
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The next section proceeded to analyse the foundational principles of the 
modern Insurance system, both social and private, and argued that the ethical 
boundaries of the private market should be dependent on the type of social 
good particular products are perceived to exemplify. The logic of this section 
dictated that any insurance product that falls within the private sphere should be 
considered a non-primary social good, and In such cases, Insurers ought to be 
able to use risk-assessment as a discriminatory tool. Fair and unfair forms of 
discrimination were also contrasted. However, the argument was made that it is 
the impact on the individual denied insurance that is most important to consider, 
rather than the route by which that individual is excluded. Nevertheless, for 
private insurers distributing non-primary social goods, the distinction was shown 
to be valid. The main conclusion of this section was that private insurers were 
above all else a business. Although many may talk of social values/benefits, as 
revealed in the interview transcripts, there always appears to be a commercial 
narrative enveloping the social narrative. Insurers often render ambiguous the 
social/commercial value distinction, in particular contexts, in order to provide a 
morally adequate account of their commercial norms and practices.
The next section looked specifically at genetic Information in the context of 
insurance. In light of the previous arguments, it was shown that genetic 
information was unlikely to have a significant social, commercial, ethical or legal 
impact. Regarding social Implications, the fear that widespread social exclusion 
would be engendered if commercial Insurers were allowed to use new kinds of 
genetic information, was challenged. This riposte was based on the historical 
data that revealed the class bias in insurance provision. Furthermore, the 
commercial realities of the insurance business, discussed in the final section, 
demonstrated that the likelihood of an uninsured genetic underclass emerging
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was low. It was also pointed out that genetic information might rule people into 
insurance, as well as out of it, so talk of unfair discrimination leading to social 
exclusion appears deeply flawed. On the commercial implications, the potential 
impacts were also shown to be minor. The argument was made that genetic 
information is likely to simply refine existing underwriting practices. On the 
ethical side, it was argued that genetic information does not really engender 
new ethical complexities, but may compel us to reconsider the use of all 
medical information in private insurance underwriting, and indeed the very role 
of the private insurance sector. Any ethical boundaries imposed on commercial 
underwriters, it was argued, should be dependent on the type of social good the 
insurance product exemplifies.
The genetic information section also sought to provide an answer to the 
second research question. A great deal of the controversy over genetics and 
insurance was shown to be dependent on the definitional framework. Interview 
data from relevant stakeholders highlighted the ways in which people 
operationalise various definitional frameworks around the issue of genetic 
information, which may then be used to justify particular positions on the issue. 
Although there were no acute differences between the various representative 
groups, individual members did appear to alternate definitional frameworks, 
through their interview talk, which might have been influenced by their broader 
social, political, or professional values. One consequence of imposing different 
definitional frameworks may be that the issue appears more complex than they 
really are, and that some of the underlying roots of the problem may be 
neglected.
Section 6 looked at the legal implications, in terms of the doctor/patient 
relationship. It was shown that genetic information does illuminate certain
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ethical issues around ownership and control of medical data. However, again it 
was shown that many of the problems seemed to apply to various kinds of 
medical information, not just genetic ones. Therefore, the argument was made 
that the genetics and insurance controversy perhaps ought to be used to 
question insurance companies' access to all kinds of medical information.
The final section looked at the practical realities of the life assurance industry, 
and again demonstrated that the putative impacts of genetic information were 
likely to be innocuous. However, even if genetic information were special, and 
likely to engender a number of social and ethical problems, it was shown that 
the industry has a long history of creating novel insurance products. Indeed, it 
was argued that the growth of the annuities market might obviate the need for 
any serious debate over, or legislation on, genetics and life assurance. This 
section also raised the issue of the implications genetics might have for the 
privatisation for welfare. The logic of insurance discrimination is that primary 
social goods, such as healthcare and long-term care insurance, should only be 
provided through a solidarity based social insurance system.
Overall, this chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of the life 
business, and the likely impacts genetic information may have on traditional 
underwriting processes. It has tried to capture the complexity of the issue, and 
demonstrate the ways in which various individuals may bound the issue through 
their interview talk. The following chapters will critically analyse the formal policy 
process in the UK, and stakeholders’ engagement with it, in light of the insights 
that have emerged in this chapter.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter investigated the likely social, legal, commercial, and ethical 
implications of permitting life assurance companies access to new kinds of genetic 
information. It also began to reveal some of the narrative strategies used by 
stakeholders to establish certain definitional parameters to the issue. The analysis 
provided answers to the first and second research questions. This chapter will try to 
provide answers to the third research question by analysing stakeholder accounts 
of their concerns about genetics and insurance. If the evidence suggests that the 
likely implications of genetic information for life assurance are relatively innocuous, 
then one has to begin to look at stakeholder rhetoric as one possible explanation 
as to why the debate has become so controversial.
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This chapter will use data derived from the interviews, as well as a number of 
publicly available policy documents, to investigate the differential ways in which 
stakeholders and interest groups express concern about the use of genetic 
information by life assurance companies. In particular, it will look closely at the 
broad narrative repertoire drawn upon by insurers, clinicians, and patient-support 
groups, as they have given account of their beliefs on some of the substantive 
issues underlying the debate. It will assess whether the way stakeholders articulate 
and frame their beliefs is influenced by a broader set of social, political, or 
professional values/interests. The policy positions of various professional bodies 
will also be analysed, in conjunction with the interview data, to provide a broader 
sociological account.
One aim of this chapter will be to examine the extent to which individuals and 
groups engaged with the genetics and insurance problem marginalise or prioritise 
certain substantive issues in order to provide a coherent, and perhaps morally 
adequate, account of their beliefs. In the previous chapter, the use of both a social’ 
and ‘commercial’ value narrative was revealed in the accounts of insurance 
industry representatives. This chapter will build on this analysis and reveal further 
evidence that stakeholders will use a variety of rhetorical strategies to legitimise 
their ideologically dissonant positions. This chapter will build a solid foundation for 
an assessment of the formal policy process, which will be presented in the 
following chapter.
2. INTEREST GROUPS AND THEIR IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS
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A variety of stakeholders have made significant contributions to the genetics and 
life assurance debate in the UK. Indeed, one could argue that the political rhetoric 
of key stakeholders has played a fundamental role in shaping the policy process. 
The primary objective of the following sections will be to reveal, and critically 
analyse, the range of narrative repertoires drawn upon by specific stakeholders and 
interest groups, as they have attempted to provide coherent accounts of their 
beliefs and concerns. It will be argued that the various rhetorical strategies used by 
key stakeholders may have antagonised the debate, and negatively affected the 
quality of the policy process, by granting exclusivity to the perceived ideological 
beliefs and concerns of those individuals they claim to represent.
It may be of little surprise to discover that representatives of specific 
organisations are inclined to frame social problems, and offer candidate solutions 
to them, in a way that reinforces confidence amongst the sectional interests they 
represent. In one sense, this tendency ensures that all opinions in this complex 
debate can enjoy some form of public expression. However, it is necessary to 
analyse the strategies of such groups, and subject their statements to critical 
sociological analysis, precisely because they may have such a strong influence on 
the policymaking and regulatory process.
3. CLINICAL/SCIENTIFIC INTEREST GROUPS
Professionals involved in the scientific/clinical aspects of the new genetic 
technologies have raised a number of concerns regarding the use of genetic 
information by third parties such as insurers. The previous chapter discussed the 
ethical boundaries of the doctor/patient relationship, and revealed growing concern
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amongst clinical geneticists and counsellors that patient health might suffer if 
insurers are permitted unconstrained access to the genetic information of their 
policy applicants. One principal concern was that insurers might overestimate the 
predictive power of genetics and rate policy applicants on fallacious scientific 
evidence. Another interesting issue revealed in the clinicians’ interview accounts 
was the fact that the insurance problem was becoming a central feature of genetic 
counselling sessions. This section will build on the findings presented in the 
previous chapter and provide a broader sociological analysis of the clinicians’ 
interview accounts. The policy positions of various professional bodies representing 
the clinical community will also be critically evaluated.
3.1. Interview Accounts of the Genetics and Life Assurance Problem
The clinicians appeared to draw upon a broad narrative repertoire when 
articulating their concerns about the commercial use of genetic information. One 
could identify in their accounts a subtle interplay between social, clinical, and 
commercial values. However, the respondents frequently prioritised the clinical 
aspects of the issue. Dr. Quarrel, for instance, gave the following account when 
asked to articulate his primary concerns:
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Well I suppose the principal concern I have is that, because of the issue of 
insurance, people will not access genetic tests which may be of benefit to 
them, not because they don't want them or because they feel it's inappropriate 
for them, but because they will be financially disadvantaged. I suppose the 
other concern has to be that if the welfare state is rolled back and more of 
social provision has to be provided by the insurance industry ... then that will 
become more of an issue.
The respondent’s account incorporates a number of underlying values. However, 
some appear to be marginalised while others are prioritised. There is a central 
clinical value, expressed as a concern that patients’ health might be compromised 
if there is continued uncertainty about access to insurance products. There is an 
implicit assumption that a patient's propensity to undergo a medical examination is 
directly influenced by the status of the genetics and insurance problem. From this 
premise, the respondent infers that our priority must be given to the clinical 
interests of the patient rather than the commercial needs of the private sector. The 
respondent also draws upon a broader ‘social value' narrative when he expresses 
the concern that continued recession of state-funded welfare may exacerbate the 
clinical impacts and disadvantage certain social groups. This is an example of the 
classic ‘social exclusion' argument, which attempts to judge the moral legitimacy of 
commercial insurance by reference to its accessibility. Dr. Quarrel also intimates 
that particular types of insurance ought to be considered 'social goods', which 
should be made available to all individuals regardless of their risk-status. Again, his 
fear is that in a risk-based insurance system, patients may not come forward for 
treatment if they believe they will be denied insurance.
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It Is difficult to decouple clinical and social values in Dr. Quarrel's account, as he 
often appears to conflate the two. For example, the statement that patients are 
concerned that they will be financially disadvantaged if they seek medical care (a 
social value) also engenders the concern that patients will subsequently reject 
genetic testing (a clinical value). Because the clinical community has an interest in 
improving patient health through medical screening, they may draw on both a 
social and clinical value narrative to give their clinical concerns additional rhetorical 
power.
Anonymous genetic counsellor 2 expressed a similar clinical concern, but also 
brought into play the notion of unfair discrimination. She stated:
I think, myself, I would be concerned. Part of me is concerned because I 
always perceive insurance as spreading risk, and I can see potential there for 
people who are at genetic risk through no fault of their own being unfairly 
discriminated against and not being able to get cover which actually fo r them 
could be more important to have ... I also worry about the potential for 
insurance companies requiring people to have genetic tests. We spend a lot of 
time talking about the pros and cons of, you know, “is this the right thing for 
you" ... The last thing we want is for someone to feel pressurised to  have a 
test which might not be the best thing for them.
Again, one can identify in this account a broad narrative repertoire that incorporates 
clinical, social, and commercial values. It contains a personal opinion on the 
commercial norms of insurance, a social concern that individuals may be ‘unfairly 
discriminated’ against, and a clinical concern that patients may be forced to 
undergo medical procedures that ultimately disadvantage them. The respondent 
also refers to the 'no-fault' clause in order to try to realign the commercial norm of 
risk spreading with a putative right of at-risk patients to receive adequate cover.
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The concern that patients may be compelled to take a genetic test by insurance 
companies is a central feature in the respondent’s account. Whereas Dr. Quarrel 
expressed concern that people may refuse to take clinically necessary genetic tests 
because of fears about social exclusion, this respondent expresses the parallel 
concern that patients may be forced to take clinical tests that have no clinical value. 
When asked to respond to the insurance industry’s claim that it will not ask people 
to undergo genetic testing as a prerequisite for receiving insurance cover, genetic 
counsellor 2 responded by stating:
I know that is what they say, but I tend to say to people that we are still a little 
bit unclear of where this is going to go, and we would suggest that if you are 
thinking of taking a test which could be significant then look at your cover 
before going ahead.’
It is clear that clinicians take a very patient-centred approach to this issue, which 
may explain their ambivalence towards the insurance industry's promise that it will 
not ask people to take genetic tests. The interview accounts also reveal the 
frequent priority given to clinical and social values over commercial ones.
The scientific/clinical value narrative became more conspicuous in the interview 
accounts, when the competency of the insurance industry to use new kinds of 
genetic test information fairly and accurately came under question. Genetic 
counsellor 2 recounted the following case from personal experience:
We have had the odd situation where somebody has had the test, and tested 
negative, but has still had trouble getting the insurance company to take that 
on board, and it has required a letter from one of the consultants to say look 
they have been tested for the gene area which has caused this family history 
and they have not got it ... Obviously, whoever's dealing with it hasn't
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completely taken on board the tacts. Patients I have seen have become quite 
wary. We always ask If it is ok to write to their doctors, but soma of them ask 
us not to or think twice because they're worried about things getting into their 
medical records.
There is growing concern amongst clinicians that the insurance industry is 
incapable of using new kinds of genetic information fairly and accurately. The 
personal accounts of clinicians reveal that patients often have to deal with 
personnel in the commercial sector who are ignorant of the scientific facts. Genetic 
counsellor 2 argued that as genetic testing becomes more common, the insurance 
industry would find it increasingly difficult to make both scientifically informed and 
socially equitable decisions. When asked if the insurance industry would be more 
likely to misuse genetic information for multifactorial conditions, the respondent 
stated:
Yes, absolutely, because those are the conditions which are less 
straightforward. They're not like Huntington's with the 50-50 almost complete 
penetrance. And the worry would be that people could start feeling obliged to 
have tests for predispositions when it's not completely clear what that means.
Again, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the scientific complexity of genetics, 
and there is an explicit assumption that insurance companies are likely to misuse 
the data. The insurance industry is portrayed as an institution that problematises 
both the 'scientific value' of genetic testing and the 'social value' of economic 
inclusion. However, both genetic nurse counsellor 1 and Dr. Quarrel did concede 
that some insurance companies had made a tentative effort to become 'more 
informed' by engaging in dialogue with members of the clinical community. When 
asked whether the insurance industry was competent enough to use genetic 
information fairly and legitimately, genetic nurse counsellor 1 stated:
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It used to be that I would have said no, but I think they are asking more 
questions and there are a number of leading consultants on some of the 
insurance boards and they are getting direct information, so I think that their 
knowledge is getting better, particularly when they are consulting with us. It's 
whether they use it correctly.
Similarly, Dr. Quarrel stated:
Well it's becoming competent isn’t it? I mean the difficulty is, well I can't speak 
for individual companies, but the members of the insurance industry with whom 
I have had dealings are the ones that attend seminars and link with the 
genetics community and so they are very well informed. So the insurance 
industry has the ability, if it wants to, to become well informed.
Both these accounts attribute the primary cause of the insurance industry's misuse 
of genetic information to a knowledge deficit, which may require the commercial 
sector engaging more widely with the professional genetics community and 
recognising its specific expertise in this area. However, both respondents implicitly 
assume that geneticists are a homogenous professional group with a shared belief 
in the status of the science, and are in a position to educate the 'ignorant' insurers. 
The statement: 'I think that their knowledge is getting better, particularly when they 
are consulting with us' reveals the extent to which clinicians believe themselves to 
have an educative role to play.
The following account by Dr. Quarrel captured the tense relationship that often 
exists between the genetics and insurance communities. He stated:
It [the insurance industry] seems to me to be far too defensive about the good 
principles it has, and says look this is the way it is, “I'm sorry genetics 
community, you are seriously misguided, you don't really know insurance.
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We'll talk to you but in order to facilitate discussion you have to understand our 
principles". We now have the two groups understanding their professional 
language as it were, but they're still In parallel. You've got to have that 
understanding of the two group’s professional jargon, but then you've got to 
have some sort of meeting of minds. We haven't achieved that.
This account signals the respondent’s concern that although the insurance industry 
could, in principle, become competent enough to use the new kinds of genetic test 
information fairly and accurately, the reality is that they continue to be defensive 
about their actuarial principles, seem unwilling to concede ground, and appear to 
regard geneticists as ignorant of the underlying principles of insurance. Although 
the genetics community portrays insurers as ignorant of genetic science, they also 
assume that insurers consider the genetics community to be ignorant of actuarial 
expertise. This professional dissonance is crucial to understanding policy debates 
on genetics and insurance, as it may engender a great deal of conflict and 
confusion. Both professional communities concede that there is a great deal of 
professional discord, which may necessitate greater and equal professional 
engagement. This, it would seem, requires not only the insurance industry 
conceding ground to the geneticists, but also the geneticists recognising some of 
the concerns of the commercial sector.
The interview accounts appear to support Kerr et al's (1997) research on 
professionals' discursive boundaries. Both clinicians and insurers appear to be 
erecting such boundaries, through their interview talk, in order to protect their 
professional status and autonomy. While Kerr et al's analysis revealed the ways in 
which clinical geneticists use rhetoric in order to create a boundary between 
themselves and their patients; here they seem to be using a similar strategy to
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protect their expert status in the face of intrusion by another professional body, with 
its own interests, values, and professional agenda.
So far, the interview transcripts have revealed that clinicians tend to account for 
their beliefs on the genetics and insurance issue by drawing predominantly from 
their professional experience and expertise. Consequently, a clinical value 
narrative, which is sometimes conflated with a social value narrative, often appears 
to be prioritised in the interview talk. The clinicians appear to marginalise the 
potential impact of genetic information on existing insurance industry norms and 
commercial values. This was revealed further when the respondents were asked 
to express their opinions on how the problem might best be resolved. The 
social/clinical values dimension became even more conspicuous.
All but one of the four respondents expressed the belief that some form of 
legislative response was perhaps necessary to protect patients from unfair 
discrimination, and ensure that they take genetic tests that might be of clinical 
benefit to them (again, the social value is linked directly to the clinical value). 
However, there was a clear sense of unease when the respondents began to 
consider this issue. On the topic of legislation, the dialogue with genetic nurse 
counsellor 1 proceeded as follows:
JM: Do you think there needs to be some form of legislation (The current status 
of the moratorium is explained)? Do you think this moratorium is sufficient, or 
would you prefer some other form of regulation or legislation?
Respondent: I would have thought that we are moving to a time when there 
would need to be some legislation ... yeah I think there needs to be.
JM: What kind of legislation would you prefer?
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Respondent: Well, by definition, because of my professional role I have to 
think of the confidentiality of the client. If somebody turned around to me and 
said that I had to release information against a client’s wishes I wouldn’t want to 
do that.
JM: Would you prefer an outright blanket ban on insurers asking for new kinds 
of genetic information so that clients wouldn't even have to think about the 
implications for their insurance needs?
Respondent: Well in an ideal world that would be great, but I think I’m realistic 
enough to know that that isn’t going to happen and there’s going to be an 
increasing number of tests available and that means insurance companies are 
going to be increasingly interested in them. So that’s why I say there needs to 
be a balance, some legislation from people who aren't involved in the insurance 
companies.
This respondent’s account appears to be clouded by how she finds herself 
professionally situated. She expresses a story based on her everyday experience 
of working with genetically at-risk patients who, she tells us, worry a great deal 
about the confidentiality of their medical records. She also responds positively to 
the idea of an outright legislative ban, and implies that the protection of patients' 
interests should be our primary concern in an ideal world, even if this undermines 
commercial freedom. The clinical/social values are again given priority over 
commercial ones. The account also acquires a certain degree of moral adequacy 
by anchoring itself to a putative need to protect the medical interests of the at-risk 
client. However, the respondent also acknowledges that reality is far more 
complex, when she concedes that such ideal legislation is unlikely to be 
implemented. Subsequently, she calls for ‘balanced’ legislation. However, ’balance' 
for this respondent appears to entail taking insurance representatives out of the 
decision-making process and involving only those with no commercial stake in the 
outcome. The respondent does not appear to recognise representatives of the 
insurance industry as legitimate actors who might perform an important role in 
establishing fair and balanced legislation. Their professional and commercial
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interests are once again marginalised, while additional power is given to the 
rhetoric of other interest groups and stakeholders.
Genetic counsellor 2 shared the opinion that there had to be balanced and well- 
informed legislation, but admitted that this could be difficult as genetics is such a 
fast moving field. She also gave an account based on her experience working with 
at-risk clients, but did try to recognise the insurance industry’s position. The 
following statement was particularly interesting:
I'm not unsympathetic to the cause of the insurance industry. I've got relatives 
who work in the insurance industry and I can understand their concerns about 
people potentially abusing the system by having tests and taking out policies.
And I know they have to be stringent because I know people try and defraud 
them so I'm not unsympathetic ... but at the same time, because of the nature 
of my job, I'm sort of very conscious of the issue as it might affect my clients. I 
can understand the concerns of the insurance industry, but I think you know 
from the family and patient point of view, I'm just aware that people who are in 
a difficult situation anyway might have things complicated for them.
This respondent tries to conceptualise the issue from both the perspective of a 
citizen who knows people in the insurance industry, and is therefore sympathetic to 
their concerns, but also as a concerned clinician who must consider the problem in 
terms of how it may affect her clients. There appears to be an internal conflict, and 
perhaps even contradiction, between her conceptualisation of the issue as an 
'ordinary' citizen and as a situated professional in the genetics field. The difficulty 
she experiences in trying to resolve this conflict leads her to call for a balanced 
response from others. Although she appears to recognise that the issue is 
multifaceted, and that the account she is expressing from a clinical perspective is 
only one amongst many, it is implied that for the purpose of the interview, the 
clinical position will be expressed most strongly.
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Dr. Quarrel's opinion on the matter of legislation was that the insurance industry 
had to be willing to concede ground on its long established principles, and that in 
the absence of primary legislation there had to be at least enforceable regulation. 
He stated:
The insurance industry quote all sorts of principles ... I think we can move 
away from that by saying that we as a society recognise that there's going to 
be a small group of people who are going to be at a substantial disadvantage 
when it comes to obtaining insurance and, in a large insurance market like life 
assurance, it may be that the excess cost of that, which has to  be borne by 
somebody, can be accommodated by the insurance industry itself. You can 
regulate the market such that the degree of adverse selection is limited and 
that's society making a stand and saying yes we know all those principles, we 
accept all those principles, but there's a problem that this group are excluded, 
we don’t want that exclusion therefore we are regulating your market. I think 
what we need to do is come up with a regulation, an enforceable regulation on 
the insurance industry that enshrines these concessions.
This account opens with recognition that the insurance industry has established a 
number of principles that it considers crucial in order to remain commercially viable. 
For the first time, the respondent appears to understand the underlying logic of 
commercial values. However, once again a social value narrative framework 
appears to subsume and trivialise the commercial values. Dr. Quarrel now talks of 
we as a society’ recognising that some people may be significantly disadvantaged 
because of prevailing commercial norms and values. In previous accounts, the 
clinical values appeared to be given priority, but now it is a far broader set of social 
values that have become central to the account. The respondent recognises that 
somebody must bear the cost of protecting the 'disadvantaged', but argues that 
because the life assurance market is so large, it could be forced to bear this burden 
without its profit margins being affected. This is then described as 'society taking a 
stand’, as if the social values of wider society ought to take priority over any
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commercial concerns, which are themselves treated as being relatively trivial and 
marginal.
All three clinical accounts share a number of analogous features. All give account 
of specific clinical and social values, which are used to marginalise commercial 
interests and values. However, tensions persist as respondents try to give a 
morally adequate/coherent account of why they believe stronger regulation, or 
primary legislation, may be necessary to protect patients’ interests, while at the 
same time having to recognise that this is a complex policy area where commercial 
interests must also be considered. A broad narrative repertoire is therefore drawn 
upon in order to try and make sense of the complexity, and give account of 
professional concerns in a way that appears fair, coherent, and morally justified.
However, one of the clinicians interviewed expressed very different views on this 
issue. He was Prof. Sandy Raeburn, a clinical geneticist who is also an advisor to 
the ABI. He did not believe that the principles of insurance should be entirely 
ignored, and that genetically at-risk individuals should be given special legislative 
or regulatory protection. However, he still used a similar strategy to the other 
clinicians by drawing upon a strong clinical and social value narrative, in order to 
give his alternative account a degree of moral adequacy. His defence of 
commercial freedom was not framed by a desire to support the narrow commercial 
interests/values of the insurance sector, but was rooted in a belief that a flexible 
and viable commercial market would bring the most salutary benefits to both 
patients and society as a whole.
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The following account from Sandy Raeburn captured his very different approach
to the issue.
If you can identify the people who are having difficulties with insurance, rather 
than just let all the insurance premiums go up and everybody as it were paying 
the extra risk in a small group, why not look at that small group and find out 
what they really need, and see if you can actually design insurance policies 
which are going to be better for them. Now I’ve got strong suspicions that on 
the whole it would be cheaper to do that.
This statement reflects the respondent’s more nuanced understanding of the 
genetics and insurance problem. He appears to recognise that providing protection 
to a specific sub-class of at-risk policy applicants is inequitable to other high-risk 
policyholders not given special dispensation, and that this is perhaps not the best 
way to protect the genetically disadvantaged'. When asked whether actuarially 
relevant data should always be used by life assurance underwriters (a commercial 
value) the respondent continued by stating:
Well I think so. I'd like to  think that we are a civilised society; if a test is 
actuarially relevant, and if that means a proportion of people are at such a high 
risk they can’t easily get insurance of the type you or I could get, I think we 
should provide a way of handling their needs in a different way ... I think that if 
it is relevant it should be used in commercial insurance, and if you want to 
have this civilised socialistic bit that I like, then you would have some sort of 
tax advantage, or one of another models of provision.
As somebody who advises the ABI on genetics-related issues, and is therefore 
aware of the commercial perspective, this respondent appears far less critical of 
the 'business of discrimination’ narrative. However, his account also contains a 
strong social value dimension, expressed in terms of 'civilised' society and the 
need for ’socialistic’ principles to have their place. Nevertheless, commercial
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norms, values, and interests are not considered by the respondent to lie in 
contradiction to a social value narrative framework. Although he implies that at-risk 
patients should not be placed in a position in which they essentially become 
uninsurable (an argument against social exclusion), he also recognises that the 
commercial practice of risk-classification ought to be respected (an argument 
promoting the continued viability of the life business). In his account, commercial 
and social values are presented as being mutually reinforcing. Individuals who are 
genetically disadvantaged may not be able to access a particular form of life 
assurance, but the flexible nature of a competitive industry means that special 
products can be designed specifically for the unique needs of at-risk applicants.
Sandy Raeburn clearly has an interest in promoting genetic science, and he 
appears to be intimately concerned about the insurance needs of patients. 
However, unlike the other clinicians interviewed, he expresses the belief that we 
should look to the commercial sector itself as the primary mechanism through 
which to provide financial protection to at-risk individuals. Both a social and 
commercial value narrative repertoire is drawn upon, but they are not portrayed as 
mutually exclusive. The underlying logic appears to be that clinical and social 
Interests and values cannot be decoupled from commercial ones If we truly wish to 
reach an equitable solution to the problem of social exclusion in insurance.
3.2. Clinical Organisations and Policy
Organisations representing the clinical community have also focused their 
attention on the scientific/clinical aspects of the genetics and insurance problem, 
such as medical confidentiality and the validity of genetic tests. The World Health
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Organisation (WHO) gave a great deal of rhetorical space to the confidentiality 
issue when they published proposed ethical guidelines for medical genetics. (WHO, 
1997) They proposed that genetic data ought to be used only if it empowers 
individuals or families, has positive effects on their health, and should only be 
divulged to third parties with explicit and informed consent. (Ibid.) Earlier, in 1992, 
the WHO had raised concerns about genetic discrimination, and argued that it 
should be considered as morally equivalent to racial discrimination. (WHO, 1992) 
Just as was revealed in the interview accounts, this statement appears to attach 
clinical concerns to specific kinds of social values, such as discrimination’ and 
‘social exclusion’. Commercial values appear to be marginalised by the emphasis 
placed on individual patient rights. However, both statements expressed by the 
WHO appear to have been made without due consideration of the complex, and 
often paradoxical, problems that often emerge when dealing with such deeply 
contested social and philosophical concepts as discrimination and genetic 
information.
The British Society for Human Genetics (BSHG) also released a statement on 
genetics and life assurance in 1998. They argued that it would be inappropriate to 
compel applicants to grant insurers access to all their genetic test information. 
Instead, they argued that insurance companies should only be permitted access to 
those specific test results that they could prove are actuarially relevant. (BSHG, 
1998, Section 4) This statement assumed that insurance companies purposely use 
data that is scientifically unsound; a concern also expressed by most of the 
clinicians interviewed. The problem is framed not in terms of the existing structures 
and principles of the modern life business, but by reference to a belief that
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commercial organisations simply cannot be trusted to use new kinds of 
scientific/technological data appropriately.
Both the BSHG and WHO clearly wish to promote the new genetic technologies 
and patient-screening programmes as a progressive development in medical care. 
They therefore have a stake in promoting public confidence in genomics related 
research. In their statement on insurance, BSHG expressed concern that perceived 
fears of ‘unfair discrimination' might be affecting testing patterns by reducing 
individuals’ willingness to participate in genetic research programmes. The Royal 
College of Pathologists, in their memorandum to a House of Commons Select 
Committee, countenanced this fear when they claimed: ‘We feel very strongly that 
publicity surrounding use of genetic test results by insurers is likely to make some 
patients reluctant to participate in research, thus slowing down progress.' (House of 
Commons, 2001, appendix 17) Here, one can observe the centrality of a 
clinical/scientific value (patients may be reluctant to participate in important 
research), which is then shown to be compromised by increasing publicity on the 
potential negative social consequences of commercial norms and values. The 
result, from a clinical perspective, is that the very progress of the science may be 
stalled. Although this fear may have some validity, neither the BSHG nor the Royal 
College of Pathologists provide any reliable evidence to support their belief that 
people actually have been reluctant to participate in research for these stated 
reasons. Nevertheless, in order to defend the clinical narrative, such fears are 
expressed as though they are based on compelling evidence.
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Although the BSHG, and various other clinical organisations, are right to raise 
their particular concerns1, problems may occur when they proceed to make broad 
political claims, such as that the insurance industry ought to bear the burden of 
responsibility for countering public fears by: acknowledging that those facing
genetic risks need special consideration (and probably small concessions) that 
would prove of great emotional and practical help to the families and yet pose little 
if any threat to the life insurance industry.' (BSHG, op cit., Section 6) This broad 
statement is expressed without any explanation of why special consideration is 
justified for this one group of patients and not others, and in the absence of reliable 
accompanying evidence to support the belief that the consequences for the 
insurance industry would prove so innocuous. Furthermore, compelling the 
insurance industry to allay public fears of discrimination by providing protection to 
policy applicants who test positive within a genetic research environment, is 
qualitatively different in its commercial implications to obliging insurers to treat 
genetic information derived from a clinical examination as protected and privileged 
knowledge. Nevertheless, various clinical organisations and representatives of the 
medical profession often conflate the two contexts, believing that protection ought 
to apply equally in both cases. This is an example of a particular science-based 
interest group raising a legitimate clinical concern, but then overextending their 
logic by making general propositions based upon particular interpretations of 
specific social and commercial values. Such organisations appear to draw 
selectively from social, clinical, and commercial values, and often marginalise or 1
1 A joint statement by BSHG. UkFGI and the ABI on genetic research and insurance was announced 
at the Royal Society on 24 April 2001, and the ABI accentuated the point that insurers are only 
interested in genetic test results validated by the GAIC and that individuals receive as part of a clinical 
diagnostic process. They proceed to claim that research subjects rarely fall into this category and so 
will be protected in the context of insurance, thus rendering the clinical concerns mute.
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prioritise one or more value frameworks, in order to render their position the most 
coherent and justifiable.
For the clinician attempting to allay the fears of his/her patients, or the research 
geneticist trying to recruit viable research volunteers, the commercial norms and 
interests of private life insurers tend to be trivialised as a value worthy of 
consideration. Often, scientific organisations that seek to promote public 
confidence simply misrepresent the practical realities of the commercial insurance 
market. The Centre for the Exploitation of Science and Technology (CEST), for 
example, argued in a policy document that since the new genetic tests are not 
highly deterministic, they can have only marginal utility in the context of insurance. 
(CEST, 2001) The organisation simply failed to realise that it is precisely because 
genetic diseases involve complex interactions between the gene and its 
environment, and are therefore not highly deterministic in the biological sense, that 
insurance underwriters have an interest in them. The insurance industry does not 
want absolute biological certainty; rather it needs the element of risk constituted 
within uncertain futures, which an interactionist approach to genetics provides. This 
is another example of the disparity in knowledge that exists between genetics 
experts and insurance professionals, each of whom appear incapable of 
comprehending the other's standard theories and practices.
This section has revealed that clinicians and scientific organisations, like the 
various other interest groups contributing to this debate, have expressed their 
concerns, and offered potential candidate solutions, based largely on their 
professional clinical interests and values. The priority given to particular value 
narratives, combined with the tendency to marginalise or prioritise certain
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substantive issues, illustrates that specific stakeholders may manipulate, through 
their interview talk, the social, moral, and political boundaries of the debate in order 
to render their account the most coherent and morally adequate. The following 
section will try to discover if similar strategies are revealed in the accounts of 
patient-support group representatives.
4. PATIENT-SUPPORT GROUPS
4.1. Interview Accounts of Patient-Support Group Concerns
Three representatives from different patient-support groups were interviewed as 
part of this research. Interest groups working on behalf of those most likely to be 
affected by policies around genetic information and life assurance have, for the 
most part, been the most vociferous critics of the 'business of discrimination’ 
narrative that has come to define the role of the modern life assurance industry. 
Instead, they have anchored their accounts to a ‘politics of inclusion' narrative 
framework, in which commercial norms and interests are often marginalised. 
However, the interview data challenged the theory that interest groups are 
homogenous entities with shared agendas. Interview accounts of key 
representatives, and documentary evidence from policy papers, revealed acute 
differences in approach to the problem. Differences in the accounts given by 
representatives of the Alzheimer's Society and the Genetic Interest Group were 
particularly striking. However, despite believing in different policy approaches, both 
respondents did appear to share a belief in the normative social framework that 
envelops the issue of genetics and insurance. Also, both were keen to accentuate
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the importance of a social value narrative as a means to protect the ‘vulnerable’. 
This section will concentrate predominantly on these two accounts. A third 
representative, from the charity MIND, had a far more limited knowledge of the 
underlying issues and had not developed any fixed ideological position. Her 
account therefore provides a counterbalance to the more strongly opinionated and 
‘informed’ accounts provided by representatives of the Alzheimer's Society and the 
Genetic Interest Group.
The most conspicuous feature of the accounts given by both Julia Cream 
(Alzheimer's Society) and Alistair Kent (Genetic Interest Group) was the extent to 
which they drew on a strong social value narrative to defend very different opinions 
on the genetics and insurance issue. Both respondents opened their accounts by 
explaining their role as advocates for individuals and families affected by genetic 
conditions and Alzheimer's disease. Both were attempting to express a concern for 
the needs of the ‘vulnerable’. They were, in a sense, couching their principal role 
within a putative social value framework. Both stated explicitly their campaigning 
remit, which signalled again that they saw themselves as primarily representative 
organisations working on behalf of the interests of patients and their families. 
However, when it came to the substantive issues around genetics and insurance, 
the respondents diverged in what they considered appropriate solutions. The 
following dialogue from the interview with Julia Cream reveals a clear attempt to 
prioritise certain social values and marginalise commercial ones.
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JM: The insurance industry claims it needs to know all the Information the 
applicant has to prevent adverse selection. Do you think that this is a valid 
defence? Is it legitimate?
JC: I think it could be a legitimate argument, but for life assurance and genetic 
information I don't think that they have any defence. They've failed to provide 
any evidence that it represents any risk at all, the numbers are absolutely tiny. 
Several companies have emphasised the fact that they're willing and able to 
take anyone with a positive genetic test and withstand that risk. So if one 
company can do it the whole industry can.
JM: Do you believe the ethical issues change when we consider different forms 
of insurance? Some people suggest that access to life assurance is not a 
fundamental right and that the debate should be around other forms of 
insurance such as health and critical illness insurance.
JC: I think that most people probably accept that life assurance and long-term 
care insurance is something that people need to be able to access. I don’t think 
insurers have a legitimate argument at the moment.
The first statement explicitly challenges the insurance industry’s claim that access 
to genetic test information provides a necessary safeguard against adverse 
selection. The respondent draws on her knowledge of commercial norms and 
practices to challenge the 'business of discrimination’ narrative and marginalise the 
primary values and concerns of the industry. By representing the issue as it is 
today (few available genetic tests with any commercial value to current life 
assurance companies), the respondent claims that the argument of a ‘right to 
underwrite’ is in this case spurious. So far, the respondent has appeared to use a 
particular interpretation of commercial norms in order to marginalise and undermine 
the commercial narrative underpinning it. However, her second statement, which 
represents life assurance as a product people ought to have access to, is very 
much rooted in a social value narrative framework. Now it is implied that life 
assurance is a 'primary social good' that individuals should not be denied on the 
grounds of commercial freedom. 'Social exclusion' is flagged as a particular 
concern that ought to be prevented on principle. This statement acquires a degree
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of moral adequacy/coherency because it is preceded by an argument claiming that 
commercial values will not be compromised if at-risk individuals are permitted to 
acquire standard life assurance policies.
Julia Cream appeared to express thinly veiled contempt for the insurance 
industry's position when giving account of her concerns. She accused the industry 
of failing to understand the implications of genetics and establish transparent 
decision-making procedures. Informed consent' was a prominent issue in the 
interview. Julia Cream stated:
We have serious concerns about the level of informed consent an applicant 
gives about medical records. They just sign it without thinking because they 
feel they have no choice but to sign ... it's not informed consent if you don't 
know what you are signing, If you don't know what your GP will be asked, and 
we know GPs give too much information to insurance companies, which may 
lead to unfair discrimination.
In this account, the respondent appears to recognise the complexity of informed 
consent, but intimates that ambiguity and lack of transparency in the process may 
be leading to iniquitous practices by the commercial sector. However, it is difficult 
to know ultimately whether ‘unfair discrimination' engendered by this lack of 
transparency is the result of duplicity or simple incompetence. The respondent 
leaves this question open, perhaps implying that the underlying cause is irrelevant. 
The social consequences for vulnerable applicants is given priority over the exact 
cause of their exclusion. The account also implicitly suggests that applicants’ 
ignorance of how insurance works, and what exactly it is that they are signing as 
part of a contract, represents failure on the part of the insurance industry. Again,
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the onus is placed on the commercial sector to protect policyholders. Insurers are 
expected to both establish equitable policies and make such policies transparent 
and easy to understand. There is no suggestion that policy applicants perhaps 
ought to take some responsibility by making sure they are informed’ before they 
sign a policy contract.
Julia Cream's lack of sympathy for commercial concerns, her constant 
prioritisation of particular social/clinical values over commercial ones, and her lack 
of confidence in the probity of the commercial insurance sector in general, leads to 
a perhaps unsurprising policy position. The following extract highlights the 
respondent’s position and perhaps reveals an underlying political agenda.
JM: How do you feel about the role of government in all this? Do they need to do more? 
JC: It has to introduce legislation.
JM: So you would prefer this to the moratorium?
JC: Yes, the moratorium hasn’t worked.
JM: So you would simply ban access to genetic information, as have a number of other 
European countries?
JC: Unless it is in the applicant's favour.
This extract reveals the respondent’s desire for a legislative response to the issue. 
Julia Cream expresses the belief that the political response of a moratorium has 
proved inadequate, and that legislative action is urgently required. If we look at this 
account in light of Julia Cream’s other statements, the implicit assumption appears 
to be that the insurance industry's concerns over adverse selection are unfounded, 
and that the equity principle, which defines private insurance contracts, is 
illegitimate on the grounds that it economically excludes vulnerable groups. Of
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course, we must note again the conclusions of the previous chapter. The practical 
realities of the UK life assurance market suggest that vulnerable groups are 
unlikely to be affected by the genetics and insurance issue, and that the fear of 
widespread genetic discrimination is largely unfounded. However, the most striking 
statement in the above extract is the final comment that genetic information ought 
to be used if it is in the applicant’s favour. This reveals the extent to which some 
patient-support groups consider the needs of applicants to outweigh the needs of 
the commercial sector. As was explained in the previous chapter, the principle of 
uberimma tides dictates that there should be symmetry between insurer and 
applicant regarding knowledge of the risk. If insurers are only permitted to use 
genetic information that benefits the client, and not information that may 
disadvantage him/her, then this principle is being undermined by loading the dice in 
the applicant s favour. If it is wrong for insurers to use genetic information to protect 
their own financial interests, then it is perhaps similarly Iniquitous for applicants to 
profit from negative genetic tests. Asymmetry between insurer and policy applicant 
regarding knowledge of risk information is perhaps no more justifiable if it is loaded 
in the applicant's favour.
Julia Cream was also asked about the possible consequences of a legislative 
ban. The following dialogue reveals once again the priority given to a social value 
narrative framework.
JM: If a legislative ban was implemented, would you be satisfied with the 
insurance industry raising everybody's premium to cover the loss?
JC: I think the increases, from what I understand, would be negligible and that 
the public would be prepared to pay the tiny increase in cost. I kind of think
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people are willing to pay for that. There is evidence from social surveys to 
suggest the public would do this.
The respondent again assumes that the financial implications of limiting insurers' 
access to genetic information would be marginal. She therefore challenges the 
legitimacy of the commercial value narrative that insists the equity principle is 
crucial for sustaining a private insurance market.
However, the respondent also assumes that a particular social value is widely 
accepted. Julia Cream expresses the belief that the public are essentially altruistic 
and would be willing to subsidise the vulnerable, even in a commercial insurance 
pool. She cites evidence from social surveys to support her claim. However, one 
must recognise that what people say they are prepared to do when asked by 
survey researchers is not necessarily a good indicator of how they will 
subsequently behave in a particular situation. It Is not at all surprising that members 
of the public claim that they would be willing pay higher premiums for life assurance 
to enable more people to access the product. Social scientists have long 
recognised that individuals like to present themselves to others as caring and 
altruistic, even if they are motivated essentially by economic self-interest. 
However, purchasing patterns almost always reveal that individuals ultimately 
purchase the cheapest products available. The cheapest insurance products 
usually attract the highest number of applicants. Those companies that offer the 
most expensive products generally remain uncompetitive. However, it could well be 
that if an insurance company advertised more expensive products with the promise 
that they would commit to providing cover to all, regardless of risk-status, a market 
could emerge. Providers of free trade products, for example, have often discovered 
markets for ‘ethical products'. Nevertheless, such markets are rarely as large as
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those for standard products, and there is no evidence that ethical insurance 
products would attract the same interest. Julia Cream's statement simply assumes 
that the insurance buying public are essentially altruistic and will sacrifice economic 
self-interest for a greater good.
If we now compare Julia Cream’s interview transcript with that of Alistair Kent, a 
number of interesting contrasts are revealed. Alistair Kent’s account opened with 
the same expressed commitment to the needs of the genetically disadvantaged, 
thus emphasising the importance of a social value framework. He stated:
W e try to promote the climate such that changes in scientific understanding 
spin through quite quickly into things that benefit patients. But we also try to 
resist the inappropriate uses of genetic technology.
From this initial statement, it appears that the respondent conceives his role to be 
similar to representatives of various other clinical and patient-support groups. He 
wants his members to enjoy the medical benefits of the genetic revolution (clinical 
value) but also recognises that all technologies engender positive and negative 
consequences, hence the stated commitment to preventing the misuse of biology 
(social value).
However, when asked what concerns him most about the genetics and insurance 
problem, Alistair Kent did not, as Julia Cream did, express an explicit anti­
insurance stance and demand proscriptive forms of legislation. Rather, he stated:
The thing that concerns us most about this whole issue is the need to 
contextualise it. There are a number of important questions that have not been
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addressed. What do we mean by genetic information? Are we talking about 
diagnostic information, in which case you have somebody who is currently sick 
or has a chronic health problem, the nature of which may be confirmed by a 
genetic diagnosis, but the implications for that individual are already extant. 
Now the question is, if that is a rare event, we're talking about a rare single 
gene disorder, how good is the insurance industry at dealing with things that 
are rare and what is the issue for them? Is there any incentive for them to look 
seriously at this particular situation or is the economics of it simply that it’s 
easier to take a fairly broad brush and paint a fairly high risk scenario and judge 
accordingly? You get a lot of people who are saying "I've got a genetic 
condition and I can't get insurance, therefore it is genetic discrimination”. It may 
be discrimination, it may be unfair, but it is not genetic discrimination. It is 
discrimination against you because you have an extant medical condition that 
the industry hasn't evaluated properly.
This account appears to recognise the ambiguity surrounding issues such as 
genetic information and discrimination. It appears to be critical of the simplistic 
stance taken by many interest groups, that genetic discrimination in life assurance 
is widespread. Rather than adopt the same logic, this respondent draws from a 
commercial narrative framework, and asks whether the existing norms and 
practices of commercial insurance might give us a handle on how good private 
insurers generally are at dealing with rare events. The primary concern expressed 
by the respondent is the need to contextualise the debate, and base decision­
making on sound and realistic scientific evidence. Interestingly, for a representative 
of a patient-support group, he also appears to marginalise the social exclusion 
argument, as the following account reveals:
People do not seem to separate out the large number of people who are 
currently symptomatic and might want insurance but will probably have 
problems, and those people who are currently pre-symptomatic but who can 
reliably be predicted as going to be sick at some point in the future. Now the 
number of people who fall into that second category is very small, for two 
reasons. One, most of us are not riddled with highly penetrant genes in the 
absence of family history. Two, because those genes which are highly 
penetrant are so rare. Also, most penetrant genes manifest themselves in the 
individual prior to them reaching an age when insurance purchase is an issue'
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In this account, scientific reality’ is used to undermine the social exclusion 
argument, which claims new kinds of genetic test information will most likely rule 
out a large number of people from the insurance market and lead to them being 
socially and economically excluded. Rather than argue for the protection of at-risk 
patients through incumbent forms of commercial regulation, the respondent 
appears to believe that the social value of inclusion is best protected through good 
science. The following dialogue is particularly revealing.
AK: If the discussion was about the ability of the insurance industry to 
appreciate, to interpret, to use predictive medical information fairly, then we'd 
be having a very different debate now. The current emphasis on DNA analysis 
and whether the insurance industry should be allowed to have access to DNA 
test results, seems to us to be a distortion of the real Issue.
J.M: So your argument would be that there is no problem with them accessing 
this information as long as they interpret it correctly?
A.K: And fairly, and appropriately. I mean if they have the DNA test result and 
say we are going to use this simply as a way of saying under no circumstances 
will we insure you for anything, then that is clearly inappropriate. But that’s not 
the case. If you have an insurance industry selling products through a system 
of mutuality, then it is up to the industry to make a case for doing that, to show 
they are using the information in a logical and equitable way.
The respondent appears to draw from his knowledge of the insurance industry to 
demonstrate that the commercial practice of risk-assessment, if scientifically sound, 
negates the possibility of widespread genetic discrimination. The commercial value 
narrative is presented as justifiable if it is coherent. This represents the most crucial 
difference between the policy positions of GIG and the Alzheimer’s Society. The 
latter has no faith in the existing norms of insurance provision, and believes that the 
inevitable result will be further unfair discrimination against the vulnerable and
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excluded. GIG, on the other hand, recognise that If the industry abides by Its own 
actuarial principles, then such a dystopian future will unlikely materialise.
However, the respondent shares with other pressure groups a commitment to the 
social value narrative. He does not appear to be defending insurance practices in 
order to promote the commercial sector. Rather, he appears to recognise the social 
value of a competitive insurance industry and regards this as the most appropriate 
means by which to help those with genetic disorders. In fact, he proceeds to argue 
that those who lobby for restrictions on commercial practices (by allowing insurers 
access only to genetic test results favourable to the applicant) may in effect 
engender economic exclusion.
If you have got a risk pool that is based on family history and you can declare 
that you’re not going to get something, then you are out of that risk pool and 
into the population risk pool. This automatically increases the risk of the people 
remaining in the pool, and the assumption by the industry will be that those 
people who haven't come forward with tests favourable to them must have 
something wrong because if they didn't they would try to get cheaper rates. The 
question is over what population is the increased risk going to be shared. If it is 
only shared over remaining members of that pool then the price of the 
premiums will be disproportionately increased and you'll get economic 
exclusion; people kept out of insurance because they are poor rather than 
because they are genetically vulnerable. And given that caring for people with 
chronic health problems has a major impact on families' economies, that's likely 
to have a disproportionate affect on those people with genetic diseases. It's not 
at all simple, and it's bad to take a knee-jerk response and ban insurers 
accessing the information. You have to remember that insurance companies 
are private sector organisations with a profit-making motive, and whatever else 
happens they will guard that. If they don't they're out of business
This account is firmly rooted in a social value narrative framework, in which the 
needs of the genetically disadvantaged play a central role. However, unlike Julia 
Cream, the respondent sees economic exclusion as a possible consequence of 
over-regulating the insurance industry. The respondent also pays heed to the
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commercial value narrative by recognising that private insurers are for-profit 
organisations that have an interest in protecting their freedom to underwrite. 
Whether or not commercial norms are morally right is beside the point; it is the 
consequences for individuals that are presented as being of primary importance. 
The respondent is convinced that a robust commercial sector that abides by its 
principles will ultimately provide protection to policy applicants, including the 
genetically disadvantaged. If there comes a point when the private sector cannot 
offer such protection, the respondent claims a public debate may be needed to 
decide how best to provide for their needs. By narrowing the debate to specific 
genetic tests, and arguing over whether to limit insurers’ access to certain medical 
information, the respondent claims we 'might be eliminating one form of inequity 
but replace it with a much greater problem for a lot more people. ’
The respondent favoured balanced regulation, as opposed to restrictive 
legislation. The following account was interesting.
You can see that legislation ends up creating a nightmare that is more likely to 
end up with insurance companies saying we won’t sell the product because it 
is unprofitable. What happened in the States when there was a ban on medical 
insurers having genetic information was they withdrew from the market. Well, 
who benefits from that? You’re dealing with powerful private sector 
organisations whose primary motivation is to make a profit
Blanket legislation is presented as being counter-productive. Again, revealed in the 
account is recognition that the insurance industry’s raison d'etre is the search for 
profit. There is an implicit message, however, that we do not have to regard 
insurers as philanthropic in order to recognise that their commercial values may 
also be advantageous to policyholders.
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The accounts of Julia Cream and Alistair Kent appear at first highly polarised. 
However, what is perhaps more sociologically interesting is that there are many 
similarities in the way both respondents account for their beliefs. Both appear to 
prioritise a social value narrative framework, expressed as a commitment to 
protecting the needs and interests of the disadvantaged. The rhetoric in both 
accounts makes constant reference to those who may fare badly in the genetic 
lottery, and both representatives appear to value social and economic inclusion. 
Both also represent the insurance industry as motivated primarily by profit. 
However, one regards commercial values as anathema to the interests of those 
who are socially, economically, or medically at-risk, while the other regards 
commercial and social values as mutually reinforcing. Although both start with a 
similar commitment to social inclusion, each appears to frame the problem slightly 
differently. Subsequently, their strategies for resolution lie in discord.
Alistair Kent’s account is similar to that of Sandy Raeburn, the clinical geneticist. 
It is perhaps no surprise that both respondents have engaged extensively with the 
insurance industry. Both appear to value the needs of the medically afflicted, but 
both also have a degree of respect for the underlying principles of insurance. 
Those interest groups that have been most vociferous in their critiques of insurance 
practices have often tried to avoid dialogue with the commercial sector.
While the comparative analysis of Julia Cream’s and Alistair Kent’s interview 
accounts illustrate how very different policy strategies could emerge from two 
informed and politically engaged patient-support groups that share a strong belief 
in a social value narrative framework, the interview with Dr. Darton from the charity
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MIND gave us access to the views of a relatively uninformed and disengaged 
representative of an interest-based group. While organisations such as the 
Alzheimer's Society and GIG have spent a great deal of time and resources 
debating the issue and disseminating their policy positions, many smaller 
organisations do not have any official policy. The interview with Dr. Darton, policy 
officer with the charity MIND, appeared to mirror the public's ambivalence towards 
insurance companies.
Like the other patient-support group representatives, Dr. Darton began by 
explaining MIND'S public role. She stated:
Well national MIND is I suppose as much as anything a pressure group and the 
main things people here actually do in the organisation is campaigning, raising 
issues, and trying to get things better for people with mental health problems.
This statement reflects, perhaps unsurprisingly, the respondent’s commitment to 
representing the interests of those with mental health problems. Her partiality is 
therefore apparent from the outset. However, unlike the previous respondents, Dr. 
Darton admitted to knowing little about the genetics and insurance issue. Despite 
this, she expressed her views strongly. The marginalisation of commercial 
concerns, and the priority given to social/clinical ones, was again quite apparent in 
her narrative. Early in the interview, Darton expressed ambivalence about the 
power of genomics. She challenged genetic determinism, and criticised those who 
expound it. The respondent displayed some expert knowledge of the science of 
genetics, but her comments on the insurance industry were based on lay 
understandings, as the following dialogue revealed.
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K.D: Regarding mental health, there isn't anything for the insurance industry to 
get a hold of. It's kind of theoretical. Supposing anything is found; you know I’m 
actually sceptical about whether they'll pin down genes, certainly in the near 
future.
J. M: Some worry that some time in the future, if there is reliable evidence to 
suggest a link between genes and mental health, that the industry will take an 
interest.
K. D: But if they're only linked, that's not good enough is it? I mean with 
Huntington's it's not a predisposition, it's a dead certainty. But if you've just got 
something that is just linked with manic depression, where does that leave you?
The respondent tries to demonstrate that commercial interest in genetic links to 
depression simply reflects a lack of genetic knowledge. She does not recognise 
that a genetic link is potentially more useful to an insurance underwriter than 
absolute certainty. Commercial concerns are therefore marginalised by being 
associated with supposed genetic ignorance. Later in the interview, the respondent 
linked the commercial ignorance of science to the practice of unfair discrimination. 
Drawing on a social value narrative, she objected to insurance discrimination 
because it economically excludes certain vulnerable groups. However, rather than 
present genetic discrimination as a potential future concern, she claimed that 
insurance discrimination was a current reality.
The insurance industry already discriminates horribly against people with 
mental health problems. People get discriminated against if they’ve had an 
episode of depression and they write it down in their insurance form, just for 
going abroad on holiday. It happens such a lot. I mean there is already huge 
discrimination. I think the insurance industry really have to demonstrate an 
important need to know in order to have this genetic information.
In this extract, the respondent conflates a number of issues. She begins by 
representing insurance as inherently discriminatory, implying again that they often
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assess risk on the basis of fallacious science. People suffering from mental illness 
are presented as being particularly vulnerable. However, the respondent talks 
specifically about travel insurance, as if the type of insurance product under 
consideration is a trivial issue. Rather like the uninformed public, the respondent 
wants to express an opinion about unfair genetic discrimination in life assurance, 
but talks about a more general form of discrimination in the context of travel 
insurance. She proceeded to state:
And they are already prejudiced against people with mental health problems.
They already expect to pay high premiums, unreasonably. You know, we get 
loads of people ringing up about it.
In this statement, the commercial practice of risk-classification is translated by the 
respondent into endemic prejudice against the mentally ill. ‘Prejudice’ is a highly 
emotive term, and the respondent appears to suggest that the insurance industry 
makes normative, rather than science-based, judgements when calculating 
premiums. Their standard practice of charging high-risk applicants loaded 
premiums is assumed unreasonable because it unfairly discriminates. The 
respondent proceeds to claim that insurers need to be ‘educated’ about mental 
health so that they may stop 'stigmatising patients'. Again, the commercial norms 
and practices of insurers are presented as being based on ignorance and 
prejudice. The respondent appears to be drawing from her experience working 
with those who have been the victims of social discrimination to make value 
judgements about the commercial norms of insurance. Because she starts from 
this social value framework, it is unsurprising that she expresses a negative view of 
the commercial value narrative.
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The respondent’s anti-commercial rhetoric became more conspicuous when she
was asked her opinion on regulation.
JM: Do you think this is an issue that requires legislation?
KD: I think it probably needs legislating ... because there are always 
unscrupulous people ...
JM: Do you trust the insurance people? Are they competent enough to use the 
information correctly?
KD: uhm, no I don’t think I do actually. I suspect that they're as likely to be as 
misinformed by the media as the rest of the population and be prejudiced. 
Because I do think it does engender a lot of prejudice because people think 
genetics is so deterministic. I think it's quite likely that a substantial proportion 
of the insurance industry have those sorts of prejudices as everybody else.
JM: Do you think their being a profit-making organisation influences this?
KD: Yes, Yes, I mean some of them are going to think there Is money to be 
made out of this aren't they, and manipulate it for those reasons.
The respondent argues for legislation, because she assumes that insurers are 
unscrupulous and cannot be trusted to use new kinds of genetic information 
competently and fairly. She also assumes that insurers want to make a profit out of 
such information. There is currently no evidence to suggest that the insurance 
industry is consciously seeking to discriminate on the basis of new kinds of genetic 
information simply to augment its profit margins. Rather, it claims a right of access 
only so that it defend itself from adverse selection. Darton's antagonistic rhetoric 
appears to be symptomatic of broader media and interest group scaremongering, 
which feeds on extant public fear and scepticism.
It appears, from the interview data, that it is not only by virtue of being a member 
of a particular interest group that determines precisely how attitudes to this issue
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are shaped and presented. Dr. Darton’s account demonstrates that the level and 
quality of knowledge that particular individuals can draw upon in formulating their 
beliefs is of fundamental importance. Of course, once one has procured a certain 
amount of knowledge, one may use It strategically for particular social, political, or 
Ideological ends, as appeared to be the case in Julia Cream and Alistair Kent's 
accounts. But within the interview accounts, it was the observable disparities in 
how ‘informed’ particular respondents were, and the extent to which they had 
engaged with the theoretical and social exigencies of the problem at some 
substantial meta-level, which was more defining of how the viewed both the 
substantive issues and the decision-making framework around its possible 
resolution. However, despite the various respondents having slightly different 
opinions on how policy should develop, all shared a commitment to the needs of 
the at-risk and couched their rhetoric within a strong social value narrative 
framework.
4.2. Patient-Support Groups and the Policy Process
The Alzheimer's Society has been the patient-support group most critical of the 
insurance industry. They have argued for legislation to abrogate insurers’ right to 
genetic information. However, GIG has been far more pragmatic in developing their 
policy position. The policy statements disseminated by these organisations, and 
other consumer and patient-support groups, reveal the ways in which pressure 
groups with a particular social or political agenda can shape the policy framework.
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The Alzheimer’s Society released its first official policy statement in January 
1999. This was in response to the Government’s decision to allow the insurance 
industry to regulate itself rather than be subject to official legislation. The Society 
argued that this decision was iniquitous because it essentially legitimised 
discrimination. Furthermore, they protested that the inclusion of Alzheimer's 
disease on the ABI list of genetic diseases insurance companies have an interest in 
validating: reveals how flawed the thinking is around genetic disease.’
(Alzheimer's Disease Society, 1999, 1.4) In particular, the Society claimed that this 
inclusion was misleading because it did not distinguish between the common form 
of late-onset Alzheimer’s and the rarer gene-based familial form of early onset 
Alzheimer's. (Ibid, 1.6) According the Alzheimer’s Society, this oversight aroused a 
great deal of unnecessary fear and anxiety. However, it could be argued that the 
ABI had no duplicitous intent. They were not suggesting the existence of a genetic 
link to the more common late-onset form of the disease. However, they perhaps 
ought to have made this more explicit within their document. Nevertheless, the 
Alzheimer’s Society appeared to translate a simple oversight into endemic 
incompetence, or perhaps even duplicity.
The Alzheimer's Society also highlighted the 'public fear’ issue by claiming 
commercial incompetence and lack of transparency might adversely affect peoples’ 
willingness to participate in research trials. Here, their strategy mirrors that of those 
clinicians who sought to restrict commercial practices on the grounds that it may 
threaten genetic research. Both therefore appear to use a social and clinical value 
narrative to undermine a commercial one. The Alzheimer's Society argued that the 
voluntary nature of the ABI code of practice was simply ’insufficient to protect
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consumers.’ (Ibid, 3.1) Their rhetoric implied that industry self-regulation could not 
work because of insurers’ inherent ignorance and incompetence.
The Society's own research discovered what it believed to be serious breaches 
of the ABI code of practice by member companies. (Cream, 2001, 7) Ideally, the 
organisation desired effective and formal legislation to prohibit insurance 
companies accessing the genetic test results of proposers for life assurance, 
ostensibly to protect the 'poor and vulnerable’. Over the years, they have attempted 
to counter all the arguments that the insurance industry has expressed in its 
defence of the right to use actuarially relevant medical data. In their defence, 
however, the Alzheimer's Society appears to have been rather more consistent in 
its approach than many of the official advisory committees. For example, they have 
conceded that genetic test information is not qualitatively different from other forms 
of medical data, and have therefore extended their criticisms to the general use of 
family history in insurance underwriting. By seeking to restrict insurers' access to all 
forms of genetic information, regardless of the specific method of diagnosis, the 
Society has at least recognised that there is ’substantial equivalence’ between the 
various forms of diagnostic data. However, the interview data analysed in the 
previous chapter did reveal the ways in which particular interest groups may 
sometimes shift the definitional boundaries of the issue in order to render their 
position most coherent; the Alzheimer's society being no exception.
The principal flaw in the Society's approach does not appear to stem so much 
from the quality of the specific arguments they have put forward. Indeed, many 
have been quite valid, and the organisation has served an important role by
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uncovering breaches of the code of practice. Rather, it is the apparent political and 
ideological intransigence of their approach, where disparities between companies 
in how they have interpreted a code of practice have translated into endemic 
incompetence or duplicity, which perhaps ought to be called into question. It 
appears from the Society’s literature that they have set themselves up as the 
radical opponent of the insurance industry; an ideological position that seems to 
have influenced their entire approach over the past few years. Unlike many other 
interest groups, they have made a conscious decision not to enter into discourse 
with the insurance industry at any substantial level. The following dialogue from the 
interview with Julia Cream is interesting in this regard, as it appears to reveal the 
underlying logic of this approach.
JM: Does your society have much contact with the insurance industry?
JC: We have had numerous communications with the ABI and tend not to get a very 
satisfactory response.
JM: It seems that a lot of committees use GIG as the standard representative of the patient 
perspective, and there seems to be far less input from other organisations such as yourself.
JC: I guess we're involved differently. I mean the GIG is represented on the ABI genetics 
committee, and I guess even if we were asked we probably wouldn't accept an invitation to 
sit on that committee.
JM: Why not?
JC: I don't know why, I think we probably wouldn’t (Laughter). I think we've been extremely 
effective being outside, being able to criticise the committee.
JM: Do you feel organisations such as GIG, by being involved in actual decision-making 
and talking with industry representatives, are basically allying themselves ideologically with 
the commercial sector?
JC: They've taken a much less critical line
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It appears that the Society regards active dialogue with the insurance industry as 
counterproductive, and has instead chosen the strategy of political lobbying, which 
has been achieved largely through extensive dialogue with the HGC. On 23 
October 2001, the Society released a rather sanguine response to the five-year 
moratorium negotiated by the Government and the ABI. They welcomed many of 
the Select Committee s recommendations, which are discussed in the next chapter. 
Again, the Society argued that the voluntary code of practice was insufficient to 
protect consumers and claimed that there was no reliable scientific evidence to 
justify using genetic test results for risk-classification. (Alzheimer’s Disease Society, 
2001) Their response also stated that the moratorium should not extend to the use 
of negative test results, which implies that the Society regards asymmetry between 
insurer and insured as more palatable if it is to the advantage of the latter. Again, 
the concerns of insurers appear to be marginalised while those of the applicant are 
given priority.
The organisation GeneWatch UK, an interest group claiming to be concerned 
with the social, environmental, and welfare aspects of decision-making around 
genetics, were far more sceptical of the moratorium decision, and characterised it 
in a policy statement as ‘hopelessly inadequate'. (GeneWatch UK, 2001a) They 
argued that this system of regulation '... amounted to a step-by-step approach by 
the insurance industry to expanding its use of genetic tests in spite of public 
opposition.' (Ibid) Again, public opinion was cited as a justifiable and reliable 
guiding principle for policymaking. Dr. Helen Wallace, deputy director of 
GeneWatch UK, was quoted as saying 'This temporary agreement is a slippery
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slope to creating a genetic underclass’. (Ibid.) In a previous policy statement on 
the issue of genetics, GeneWatch had attempted, like the Alzheimer's Society, to 
discredit the primary arguments articulated by the insurance industry. However, 
they too provided counter arguments in the absence of debate, evidence, and 
consideration of the broader issues at stake. (GeneWatch, 2001b) For them, 
anything short of a permanent legislative ban was simply unacceptable. The use of 
the term ‘genetic underclass’ is also interesting in that it highlights once again the 
ways in which pejorative language, with no factual basis in reality, may often be 
used by pressure groups to render their policy position not only logical, but also 
perhaps morally imperative. As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, the 
possibility of a genetic underclass arising from unfair discriminatory practices in life 
assurance provision is minimal. The explicit suggestion that the insurance industry 
is consciously and pro-actively attempting to create such an underclass is perhaps 
illustrative of the emotive rhetoric that is often used strategically by interest groups 
to scare the public into accepting their own policy recommendations.
Both the Alzheimer’s Society and GeneWatch, as well as various other interest 
groups concerned with the ostensible prevalence of ‘unfair discrimination', tend to 
cite various international rights-based legislation as a guiding principle for how we 
ought to treat the genetics and insurance issue. UNESCO's Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights Article 6 (1997) is often quoted in 
defence of stringent legislation. The Article states that: 'No one shall be subjected 
to discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended to infringe or has 
the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity.' 
(UNESCO, 1997, Article 6) Similarly, Article 11 of the Council of Europe (COE)
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine states that: 'Any form of 
discrimination against a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is 
prohibited.' (COE, 1992, Article 11) The fundamental problem with these kinds of 
formal declarations is that they are often so all-encompassing that they inevitably 
conflict with practical realities. The COE Convention Article 26 does recognise this, 
to an extent, when it states that restrictions on this right may be permitted in the 
interests of public safety, prevention of crime, protection of public health, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This essentially creates a reservoir 
of rhetorical space for legalistic interpretation, and one can conceivably envisage it 
being used to articulate justification for all kinds of discrimination. This essentially 
renders Article 11 rather impotent as a vehicle for both social and individual justice. 
Such conventions tend to reduce solutions to complex and intricate problems to a 
series of simple legalistic propositions, which then masquerade as practical ethics. 
Interest groups concerned with preventing unfair discrimination might do better by 
engaging with the social, political, and philosophical foundations of such emotive 
and equivocal concepts as ‘discrimination’ and 'social exclusion’, rather than simply 
accept global conventions that appear to lose all power and meaning when they 
encounter the contradictions and nuances constitutive of social, political, and 
economic reality.
In contrast to both the Alzheimer's Society and GeneWatch UK, GIG has been 
far less adversarial in their approach to the genetics and insurance problem, and 
has tried to rationally debate the genuine relevance of genetic information for 
commercial insurance provision. Furthermore, GIG has both engaged the
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insurance industry in active dialogue and participated in various committees and 
policy forums. Consequently, they have tended to reject proposals for an all- 
encompassing restriction on insurers’ access to genetic information. Instead, they 
have sought to negotiate practical solutions that protect the genetically 
disadvantaged from ‘unfair’ treatment, but also sustain the commercial vibrancy of 
a private insurance market, which is recognised as an essential social institution 
that dispenses various social benefits.
Policy documents released by GIG have consistently expressed concerns about 
genetics and insurance, but the organisation has tried to avoid being ideological 
obstinate. For example, in their response to the GAIC consultation document, GIG 
concurred with the need for insurers to demonstrate actuarial relevance before 
requesting genetic test data from applicants. However, it also raised a variety of 
concerns about the technical aspects of the proposals without overtly demonising 
the commercial sector. For example, GIG was one of the first groups to criticise the 
lack of peer review in actuarial research, arguing that this was unacceptable if the 
validation system was to be both fair and transparent. (GIG, 2000) One reason 
why GIG has operationalised a very different policy approach to other interest- 
based groups is, perhaps, because they have actively engaged with the 
commercial sector and come to recognise the practical realities of insurance 
provision.
5. INSURANCE PERSPECTIVES
182
The previous chapter revealed that representatives of the insurance industry may 
often draw from a broad narrative repertoire in order to provide moral justification 
for their commercial practices. They appeared to draw from a complex rhetoric 
around commercial, social, and clinical values, often blurring the boundaries 
between them, in order to give a morally adequate account of their belief in 
commercial freedom. The accounts of clinical and patient-support group 
representatives, analysed in this chapter, have revealed the ways in which other 
stakeholders may also use rhetoric strategically in order to render their policy 
position the most coherent, acceptable, and indeed logical. This section will 
continue to investigate the third research question, by critically analysing the 
complex ways in which insurers account for their concerns on the genetics and 
insurance issue. This will be accomplished through a focused sociological analysis 
of the interview data. Documentary and policy data from insurance industry interest 
groups will not be assessed in this section, as the work of the ABI, which is the 
principal representative body of insurers in the UK, will be analysed in detail in the 
following chapter.
5.1. Interview Accounts o f Industry Concerns
The principal theme revealed in the interview accounts of insurance industry 
representatives was the concerted attempt by respondents to morally justify the 
underwriting process and present themselves as competent actors able to deal with 
the introduction of new kinds of genetic test information. This strategy of 
presenting an image of competency’, and accentuating the social value of private 
insurance, appeared to stem from the need to defend the commercial freedom of
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underwriting. Commercial freedom had to be protected in order to defend 
commercial providers of insurance products from potential adverse selection. The 
principal concern of insurers was that the restriction of commercial freedom, 
through incumbent forms of legislation, might precipitate adverse selection.
Tony O'Leary's account began by establishing and defending the fundamental 
principles of commercial insurance. He began by distinguishing ‘population 
mortality data’ and ‘insured lives mortality data'. The following account was 
particularly interesting.
Insured lives mortality is quite different from population mortality because a) 
people applying for insurance are creating a subset of the population anyway 
and b) people have different reasons why they apply; they could be in different 
groups, they could be people who are working and got money to spend on 
insurance, so if they are working they could be healthier because they are in 
jobs. There are a number of factors that come into account. Insured lives 
mortality is different and also better. It's better because there is an underwriting 
process. Why is there an underwriting process? Well, because what we have to 
do is take into account the reasons people might apply for insurance ... The 
role of the underwriter is two-fold. One is to protect against anti-selection. The 
other is to say if we do identify an extra risk in you then we charge you a 
premium that is fair. That premium has got to be fair to you, but also to other 
policyholders in the fund. If we don't charge you enough then your fellow 
policyholders end up paying more because you are getting a payout sooner 
than you should.
By citing the differences between insured lives and population mortality data, the 
respondent, perhaps unconsciously, negates the social exclusion argument. By 
demonstrating that the insured lives pool contains individuals who are generally 
wealthier and in better health than the general population, he is in effect saying that 
it is predominantly the middle classes who purchase life assurance. This statement 
supports the claim by Charles Babbage, referred to in the previous chapter, that 
class bias in insurance provision fundamentally affects the risk pool. To rehearse
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the argument, insurance is more an institutional mechanism through which the 
wealthy can protect their financial interests than a means of providing social 
welfare to the poor and vulnerable. The use of insured lives mortality data is 
better’, according to the respondent, because it offers a more precise guide for 
underwriting. Of course, it is worth mentioning that it is only 'better' for the 
commercial provider and that small subsection of the population who can afford 
insurance. It is of no benefit to the aspirant poor who may also desire a degree of 
financial security.
In stating the role of the underwriter, the respondent talked of a need to defend 
against adverse selection and create an equitable insurance pool in which 
policyholders are charged a ‘fair’ premium. Revealed in this account is a central 
‘commercial value' that only through the principal of actuarial fairness can 
insurance equitably distribute social goods. The implicit message is that there is 
moral justification in using commercial risk-assessment, because those individuals 
who are denied insurance are done so on the grounds of equity.
All the insurance representatives cited adverse selection as their primary 
concern, and each used the commercial principle of ‘equity’ to frame the problem. 
Keith Bedell-Peace stated:
If society is going to say you mustn't use any underwriting in life assurance, you 
mustn't have genetic testing or any medical history, then that is fine. It just 
changes the rules of the game and the cost of covering everyone will simply 
increase.
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In this account, the underwriting process is justified on the grounds that without it, 
there will be negative financial consequences for policyholders. The commercial 
freedom to underwrite, and therefore make a profit, is presented as ‘good’ 
(equitable) for the average policy applicant with no extant medical condition or at- 
risk of some future malady. However, the respondent also tries to defend the 
freedom to underwrite on the grounds of ‘societal good’, as the following account 
reveals:
If you're providing motor insurance and you're not allowed to ask medical 
questions, are you going to put society at risk by providing insurance for 
someone who has got a newly developed syndrome of epilepsy? There are no 
black and white answers.
Here, risk-assessment is presented as a moral imperative. Within this narrative 
framework, underwriting serves to protect society from individuals with dangerous 
medical conditions. Again, a social value narrative is presented in such a way as to  
defend the existence of particular commercial values. The respondent continued to 
talk about how the industry looks at the issue of genetic information from a 
technical angle. The following account reveals that insurers initially regarded the 
use of genetic test information as not only appropriate but indeed practical. Bedell- 
Pearce stated: I
I think actuaries and underwriters thought, actually this is a more precise tool 
than just going through the family history, and therefore it's a good thing. They 
had no difficulty convincing themselves that given a negative genetic test leads 
to a better underwriting decision than in the absence of one, by and large they 
were improving the lot of society rather than diminishing it.
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This statement offers an interesting insight into the actuarial profession. For them, 
the issue is conceived as purely technical. Genetic tests improve underwriting, thus 
life assurance provision inevitably becomes more equitable. The consequence is 
that genetic test information is inherently a ‘good thing’ for the industry, and 
subsequently for society as a whole, because it improves actuarial decision-making 
and renders the process of distributing social goods more efficient. Of course, it 
must again be recognised that because wealthy, low risk individuals are likely to 
benefit most, talk of 'good for society' is perhaps a little sanctimonious.
Having presented the principal concerns of the industry, and defended existing 
commercial norms, the insurance representatives then attempted to project an 
‘image of competency'. Because a number of interest groups have accused the 
industry of being incapable of using the new information fairly and accurately, the 
industry has tried to counteract these accusations and present at least a veneer of 
competency. Tony O'Leary stated that the insurance industry has always had to 
adapt as new scientific and technological developments emerge. He said:
If you look back twenty or thirty years ago, if you'd had a kidney transplant it 
was difficult to get insurance cover because the  risk was unknown. But the 
insurance industry followed the developments in medical science and now it is 
easy to get cover ... So the natural way the industry has gone is that if 
something new comes along initially it is difficult to provide cover, but as 
medical science learns and mortality improves, the  insurance industry watches 
that and then say look we have come up w ith  some terms for short-term 
policies and then gradually long-term policies. And I think the 5% figure of 
people who pay an extra premium and the 1% who can't get cover is a fair 
testament to this working. With genetic information we have to think about how 
we will handle it, and we apply the same principles.
In this account, the respondent concedes that it can take time for insurers to 
respond to new scientific and technological developments, because at first there is
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a great deal of unknown risk. However, it is also stated that the Industry is highly 
adaptive, and its standard norms and practices allow for technological progress. 
The sub-text appears very much to be ‘there is no problem with new kinds of 
genetic test information’ and ‘the industry's competence should be in no doubt’. In 
order to qualify this opinion, the respondent refers to the case of Huntington's 
disease. He uses this case as an exemplar of how the industry has learned to deal 
competently with novel genetic testing. It is perhaps convenient for members of the 
insurance industry to cite the case of Huntington's, because it is relatively simplistic 
in science and insurance terms. It also has the additional benefit of being a genetic 
test that can rule people into insurance as well as out of it. It is an example often 
referred to by insurers when they are trying to defend prevailing commercial values, 
as it can quite easily be used to marginalise fears of social and economic exclusion 
and give extra strength to the commercial value narrative framework.
All the insurance representatives shared a belief in the legitimacy of insurance 
underwriting. All similarly protested against what they considered the widespread 
ignorance of actuarial science and the norms of insurance provision. The 
anonymous insurance underwriter stated:
People ta lk about insurance too generally, and don’t distinguish between term 
assurance or whole life, or any of the other disability or illness related products 
set up beneath that banner. Life assurance is simplistic, it s easy to underwrite 
and the whole thing is simple. It's the next layer down that contains all the 
complexity.
This respondent appears to try and marginalise the fear that social and economic 
exclusion will inevitably occur if genetic test information is used to underwrite
188
insurance policies. The subtext of this account is that the focus of interest groups, 
the media, and politicians on the problem of life assurance and genetic information, 
reflects only their ignorance of commercial norms. Just as the clinicians sought to 
protect their autonomy and expert status by labelling insurers scientifically ignorant, 
the insurers similarly imply that those outside the industry are ignorant of actuarial 
science and the norms of the insurance business. Perhaps they too are trying to 
create a discursive boundary between themselves and those who want to abrogate 
their commercial freedom.
The anonymous insurer continued on the theme of public ignorance when he 
sought to challenge the legitimacy of public fears. He claimed that people generally 
have false expectations of what insurance companies can provide for them. He 
cited an example of a butcher who had a critical-illness policy. The man cut his 
finger, claimed under total and permanent disability, and expected to receive from 
the insurer about thirty thousand pounds because he had to take four weeks off 
work for a lacerated finger. The respondent stated:
If I was a man on the street, would I think that the insurance company would 
pay me thirty thousand pounds because I cut my finger? If that situation exists 
then it's a real perception that the insurance industry has to address. And its 
got to look at its product design and say God this is too complicated; how can 
the average person on the street understand that. Because there is emotion 
involved in giving insurance, but it's ten times worse when you claim and have 
the claim turned down.
The respondent expresses the belief that public ignorance is creating false 
expectations. There is also the implicit assumption that growing concerns over the 
commercial practices of insurers may be being fuelled by these false expectations. 
His candidate solution is to 'educate the public’ and simplify insurance policies so
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that people may develop a more balanced and informed view of the insurance 
industry. Tony O'Leary countenanced this view when he argued that the industry 
needs to get its message across to the public’ and explain to people the basic 
underwriting process. However, he also stated that the social and moral issues 
should not ultimately be the responsibility of the insurance industry, as the following 
account made clear.
What about the moral and social issues? What are the concerns for people 
with regard to healthcare and long-term care? I think these are tremendously 
important issues that should be addressed but they are not insurance issues. 
The political parties should put into their manifestos that we can't keep the 
health service going as it is, we can't cover everybody for long-term care and 
protect everybody’s financial security, this is how we will deal with it. Now they 
say we either do it through taxation or some other means, but that is a public 
sector debate. At the moment the debates over here in the private sector and 
people are saying we’re scared about the future; we have a right to insurance. 
But insurance is not set up on that basis, it is set up as a commercial situation. 
There’s no compulsion for people to take out Insurance. If there is compulsion It 
changes the game completely. But when there Is no compulsion the private 
sector cannot be expected to carry the extra costs of protecting everybody.
This account is very much rooted in the idea that insurance companies ultimately 
exist to make a profit, and therefore they should not have the responsibility for 
mitigating social and economic exclusion. The respondent appears to be trying to 
avoid responsibility when he claims the Government should be open and 
transparent about its long-term plans. A commercial value narrative framework is 
again central to the account. The complex and messy world of social values, ethics, 
and moral responsibility is presented as a problem for others to resolve.
The respondents' accounts of how best to tackle the issue of genetics and 
insurance again appeared to reflect their professional situatedness. All resisted the 
suggestion of a legislative response, claiming that fears of a genetic underclass
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emerging were unfounded, and that the principle of a 'right to underwrite’ should 
not be undermined. Bedell-Pearce claimed:
The thing that worries me most is that statutory interventions is that those that 
are made in haste in developing scientific and technological areas are very 
difficult to overturn and may actually work against the interests of society.
This account rejects legislation as a candidate solution, but rather than couch the 
argument within a commercial value framework, the respondent talks about a 
broader threat to society and its underling values of economic inclusion and access 
to social goods
Overall, the insurance industry representatives used similar strategies to other 
interest groups and stakeholders when accounting for their concerns. They 
prioritised one or another value narrative (predominantly a commercial one), and 
constantly tried to undermine the beliefs and opinions of other groups and 
professional bodies. However, just as was revealed in the previous chapter, they 
also drew on a broad narrative repertoire; shifting the boundaries and conceptual 
understandings of social, clinical, and market values. Various configurations of 
these values could be used strategically to marginalise the legitimacy of an anti­
commercial rhetoric and trivialise public fears of social and economic exclusion. In 
so doing, the interests of the commercial insurance industry could be implicitly 
prioritised and presented as socially, morally, and commercially legitimate.
6. CONCLUSION
191
This chapter has, through an extensive sociological analysis of the interview data 
and policy positions of specific stakeholders, sought to provide some answers to 
the third research question. It has been revealed that relevant stakeholders in the 
genetics and insurance debate employ a variety of rhetorical strategies, and draw 
on a broad narrative repertoire, when giving account of their beliefs and opinions 
on the genetics and insurance issue. The prioritisation or marginalisation of 
particular substantive issues or values also appeared to be dependent on 
respondents' broader political or professional values. It appears that key 
stakeholders have attempted to frame the issue, and disseminate their opinions on 
how best to resolve it, in a way consistent with where they find themselves 
professionally or ideologically situated. Clinicians tended to be ideologically 
wedded to the clinical value narrative; prioritising the needs of patients and 
marginalising the rhetoric of commercial freedom. Patient-support groups used a 
similar strategy by prioritising the social needs of the vulnerable and economically 
excluded. Insurers generally used a rhetoric of commercial freedom, although they 
did envelop this within a social value narrative framework in order to give their 
account a degree of moral legitimacy. Nevertheless, all respondents, regardless of 
where they were ideologically situated, at times drew on all three value narratives 
in order to justify their particular position. Clinicians and patient-support groups 
often conflated social and clinical values, while insurers frequently advocated 
commercial values on the grounds that they supported particular social and clinical 
ones.
It must be recognised, however, that not all representatives of the same 
professional constituencies expressed shared ideological beliefs and concerns.
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Neither did they use exactly the same narrative strategies to legitimise their 
candidate solutions. The contrasts between the GIG and the Alzheimer's Society 
were revealing in this regard. However, even in this case, both respondents 
appeared to prioritise the social value dimension by revealing their deep 
commitment to the interests of the at-risk. The contrast between Sandy Raeburn’s 
account, and other representatives of the clinical community, also revealed 
alternative strategies for resolving the genetics and life assurance dilemma. 
Raeburn appeared to recognise that the best way to protect patients was to sustain 
a competitive, evidence-based system of underwriting. The other clinicians 
intimated that it might be necessary to impose restrictions on the 'business of 
discrimination' narrative in order to ensure at-risk patients could enjoy the clinical 
benefits of the genomics revolution.
It appears, despite some anomalies in the accounts, that relevant stakeholders 
and professional groups have a relatively fixed idea of how the issue should be 
conceptualised and resolved. They then appear to use rhetoric strategically in order 
to make their position appear the more logical, balanced, and equitable. In so 
doing, the relevant protagonists may become more ideologically and professionally 
dissonant. One consequence of this may be that it becomes increasingly difficult for 
politicians, and the broader public, to fully understand the complex exigencies of 
the problem and reach fair, evidence-based policy solutions. If narrow interests and 
values constantly impinge on the policy process, it becomes far less likely that 
informed and pragmatic decision-making will materialise. The fact that certain 
interest groups appear to marginalise or prioritise certain substantive issues, and 
reduce a complex problem to interest-based conflict, may problématisé attempts to
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establish equitable and rational policy on this issue. By revealing some of the ways 
in which stakeholders and interest groups have tried to narrow the conceptual 
framework of the debate, and expressed a variety of stories based on their 
professional situatedness, this chapter has laid the groundwork for a critical 
assessment of the formal policy and regulatory process. This chapter has focused 
on the third research question. The following chapter will build on the analysis 
presented here and investigate the political process that has enveloped the 
genetics and insurance debate. It will provide answers to the fourth and fifth 
research questions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter critically analysed the accounts of key stakeholders as they 
expressed their concerns about the genetics and insurance issue. The various 
stories’ they told revealed a deep sociological complexity. The data appeared to 
confirm the hypothesis that interest groups will draw on a broad narrative 
repertoire, when accounting for their beliefs, in order to render their particular 
position morally adequate and consistent. This chapter will build on the previous 
analysis and evaluate the formal policy/regulatory process. It will provide answers
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to the fourth research question by assessing how equitable the policy process has 
been in the UK. This chapter will also provide a response to the fifth research 
question by assessing the impact public opinion, and media representation of the 
issue, may have had on the strategies of key stakeholders and the decision-making 
bodies.
Section 2 will offer an in-depth sociological analysis of the formal policy process. 
A critical examination of the work of various advisory and regulatory bodies, which 
culminated in the Government endorsing a five-year moratorium on the use of 
genetic tests by insurance companies, will reveal the extent to which the decision­
making process has privileged political expediency over rational, fair, and 
evidence-based policymaking. A brief history of the policy process will be provided, 
followed by an extensive critical examination of the central regulatory bodies. The 
focus will be on how robust and equitable this process has been. A lengthy analysis 
of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Report, for 
instance, will enable us to assess the extent to which political representatives 
differentially judge the legitimacy of stakeholder evidence. Might the politicisation of 
genetic technology and its social applications undermine effective deliberation on 
this issue? This section will provide answers pertinent to the fourth research 
question.
Section 3 will investigate how relevant stakeholders have judged the equity of the 
policy process. Interview accounts will reveal whether stakeholders confer greater 
legitimacy to those organisations that they perceive to support their 
ideological/political beliefs. Are stakeholders selective in which advisory 
committees and policy reports they are willing to endorse, and have insurers been
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forced to ‘play the game of politics' in order to ensure that their interests are 
recognised by the political community?
Section 4 will assess the influence public opinion and the media have had on the 
nature of the policy process and the strategies of key stakeholders. The various 
surveys and polls that have sought to reveal the ‘public attitude' will be challenged 
for their failure to recognise the crucial difference between an informed' and 
‘uninformed’ public. This point, it will be argued, may have serious implications for 
the equity of policymaking on this controversial issue. This section will provide an 
answer to the fifth research question.
The final section will consider the efficacy of the five-year moratorium decision, in 
light of the data provided. Does the moratorium provide the best opportunity to 
resolve this issue equitably, or might it have undermined the possibility of lasting 
consensus by failing to recognise the deeper underlying issues of the controversy?
2. POLITICS WITHOUT REASON? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FORMAL 
POLICY PROCESS
2.1. A Short H istory of Regulation
The present status of the genetics and life assurance issue in the UK is that a 
five-year moratorium is in place, which restricts commercial insurers' access to the 
genetic information of individuals applying for policies under £500,000. This 
moratorium is due to end in October 2006. The moratorium decision was reached
197
after eight years of governmental and non-governmental advisory committee 
investigations and industry self-regulation. The 1995 House of Commons Science 
and Technology Select Committee report, entitled Human Genetics: The Science 
and its Consequences, was the first official governmental report to highlight the 
potential significance of genetics for access to insurance. The report criticised the 
insurance industry for having failed to recognise the problem and develop an 
adequate policy position.1 It recommended that the insurance industry be given one 
year to propose an equitable solution. The report also suggested that a statutory 
Human Genetics Commission be established, with a dual remit to monitor 
developments in genetics and advise the Government on how it should deal with 
the emerging issues.
The Association of British Insurers (ABI), an umbrella organisation representing 
the majority of UK insurance companies, responded to the report by drafting a code 
of practice. The ABI instructed its members not to compel applicants to take a 
genetic test as a prerequisite for obtaining insurance. Members were also informed 
that they could use the results of genetic tests applicants had already taken, only if 
the newly appointed ABI genetics advisor had validated such tests as actuarially 
and scientifically relevant and if the applicant were seeking a policy over £100,000 
that was not attached to a mortgage. (ABI, 1997a) This code of practice was 
essentially a self-imposed moratorium on the use of genetic test results. The code *
' In 1993, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics released a report entitled "Genetic Screening: Ethical 
Issues'. Part of this report raised the issue of genetics and insurance. However, the report stated that 
because genetic testing was still in its infancy, it was unlikely to pose a significant and immediate 
problem in the context of insurance. It recommended that the insurance industry continue with their 
policy of not requesting people to take a genetic test as a prerequisite for acquiring life assurance, 
and hoped the commercial sector would maintain general standards of "good practice". The report did 
raise the possibility of future ethical dilemmas but was not too concerned with the insurance industry's 
policy position at that time. The insurance industry itself did not believe the issue required immediate 
attention, because they were not using new kinds of genetic tests at the time, and realised that 
greater scientific understanding was required before they could even consider it.
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was updated in 1999 (ABI, 1999), when another two-year non-statutory moratorium 
was put into effect.
The Government’s response to the Select Committee report was to establish the 
Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (ACGT) and the Human Genetics Advisory 
Committee (HGAC). Although the ACGT was inaugurated as a non-statutory body, 
its initial remit was to investigate a broad range of issues related to genetic testing 
and establish good practice' guidelines for providers of genetic testing services. 
The two official documents it released were only marginally relevant to the 
insurance issue. The first document was a code of practice for organisations that 
deliver genetic testing services direct to the public. The code dealt with issues such 
as confidentiality, informed consent, and genetic counselling (ACGT, 1997). The 
second document was a report on the use of genetic testing for late-onset 
disorders. This report discussed a variety of pertinent social, scientific, and ethical 
issues. (ACGT, 1998)
The HGAC also published two reports; one in 1997 on the implications of genetic 
testing for insurance (HGAC, 1997), and a second in 1999 on the potential 
implications for employment. (HGAC, 1999) The report on insurance recommended 
a two-year moratorium on the use of genetic information by life assurance 
companies until specific genetic tests could be validated. The HGAC developed a 
criterion for validation that included demonstration of actuarial relevance. Although 
the HGAC welcomed many of the ABI initiatives, they argued that the ABI's general 
policy position was insufficient to meet the wider concerns in the area. Although the 
HGAC did not consider it appropriate to entirely ban insurers from using new kinds
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of genetic information, they did not believe insurers should have unlimited and 
unquestioned access. The HGAC also recommended that an independent 
mechanism for genetic test validation should be negotiated between the 
Government, the insurance industry, and the HGAC.
In November 1998, the Government responded to the HGAC report (Office of 
Science and Technology, 1998). However, they did not accept the recommendation 
of a moratorium, because they believed the ABI code of practice at that time 
provided sufficient protection for consumers. Moreover, the Government felt that 
the insurance industry had made significant progress, through consultation with the 
genetics community, developing a robust validation system, which was overseen 
by Professor Sandy Raeburn. However, it did accept the need for an independent 
validation process, so the Genetics and Insurance Committee (GAIC) was 
established. In October 2000, the GAIC validated the Huntington's disease test, 
which heightened public fears and amplified the concerns of many interest groups. 
The Human Genetics Commission (HGC) was also established in May 1999, and 
the work of the ACGT and HGAC was transferred to this new advisory body. It is 
important to recognise the lack of continuity, both in organisational structure and 
membership, within many of these formal committees. Subsequently, there is 
always the possibility that such committees will establish a narrow and myopic 
decision-making framework and focus only on short-term goals. The following 
section will assess whether this was the case here.
The HGC released its interim recommendations in May 2001 (HGC, 2001a), 
based largely on data that emerged from its public consultation exercise. (HGC,
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2000) It recommended a three-year moratorium on the use of genetic tests for 
policies under £500,000. It argued that the current system was ineffective, drew 
attention to the public fear issue, and concluded that it was important to establish a 
clear' and ‘defensible’ regulatory system that can both balance the interests of 
stakeholders and promote public confidence. A House of Commons Science and 
Technology Select Committee fifth report (2001) also accused a number of 
insurance companies of breaking the ABI code of practice. Subsequently, it 
questioned the legitimacy of industry self-regulation and recommended a two-year 
moratorium on the use of genetic tests. The Select Committee threatened that if the 
insurance industry did not implement this new moratorium then Government 
intervention would be forthcoming. The ABI confirmed on 1s’ May 2001 that it would 
extend the moratorium for a further two years and would not request test results 
from applicants seeking policies up to a value of £300,000. (ABI, 2001a) In October 
2001, the Government responded to the various reports (Department of Health, 
2001a) and negotiated with the ABI a new moratorium that would last five years 
and provide protection for those seeking life assurance policies up to a value of 
£500,000. Furthermore, applicants for a variety of other insurance products, such 
as critical-illness, income-protection, and long-term care insurance, would be 
protected when applying for policies under £300,000.
This complex and multifaceted issue, as the number of official bodies considered 
necessary for overseeing its regulation testifies, appears to be both politically and 
ideologically embedded. One might ask if the political arena exists principally as a 
site for ideological and political conflict, where stakeholders and interest groups can 
frame the issue in their own terms and use ideological rhetoric to shape the policy
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process. Broader concerns and fears invoked by genetic technology’s unrelenting 
growth perhaps attune us to the capricious nature of the formal policy/regulatory 
framework, which often reveals itself more as a site for the expression of 
ideological rhetoric than a mechanism for fostering rational deliberation and 
consensus. The following section will now provide a more in-depth analysis of 
these relatively autonomous policy and regulatory authorities, so that we can begin 
to assess how progressive and equitable the general process has been.
2.2. The Central Regulatory Bodies
In their ideal formulation, the various advisory committees and regulatory bodies 
are supposed to impartially investigate the full complexities and subtleties of the 
issue, and impartially consider the diversity of conflicting perspectives expressed 
by key stakeholders. This section will provide a sociological analysis of the formal 
regulatory and policymaking bodies so that we can evaluate their effectiveness and 
provide some answers to the fourth research question.
2.2.1. A s s o c ia tio n  o f  B ritish  In s u re rs  (A B !)
The ABI is the only non-governmental organisation with direct regulatory 
authority over the insurance industry. It is also the primary representative of the 
insurance industry and its commercial interests. The organisation’s general 
approach to the genetics and insurance issue appears in many ways to have been 
reactive. It appears to have been placed in the unenviable position of having to 
constantly re-negotlate its policy position as unrepentant criticism from outside
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authorities and interest groups has been directed against it. Analysis of key ABI 
policy documents reveals the organisation's use of two very different strategic 
responses. One response has been to prioritise a commercial value narrative 
framework in order to defend insurers’ ‘freedom to underwrite'. A second response 
has been to acquiesce to the stringent demands of critics by recognising the 
importance of both social and economic inclusion, and public confidence. This 
strategy appeared to be the one most frequently deployed.
The publication of the ABI’s first code of practice2 was a strategic response to the 
severe criticisms that the insurance industry received from the 1995 House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee. This code established minimum 
standards of ‘good practice' for insurers dealing with new kinds of genetic 
information. The most important directives within the code were as follows:
1) Applicants must not be required to take a genetic test as a prerequisite for 
obtaining life assurance. (ABI, 1997a, Paragraph 2)
2) Until the GAIC is established, members may only factor in those tests already 
taken by an applicant if they have been deemed actuarially and scientifically 
relevant by Prof. Sandy Raeburn, the ABI genetics advisor. (Ibid, paragraph 4) 
Prof. Raeburn formulated the ABI’s criteria for genetic testing, which would later be 
used as the conceptual framework for genetic test applications to the GAIC. The 
ABI also established the Genetics and Insurance Forum as an online public
2 A revised code of practice was published in 1999, which took into account the transference of the 
role for evaluating genetic tests from the ABI genetics advisor to the GAIC. The confidentiality 
guidelines were also re-writtcn to take into account the Data Protection Act 1998. (ABI. 1999)
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resource providing important information on the industry's position. The testing 
criteria were published on this site. (Genetics and Insurance Forum, 1999)
3) Insurers must not offer lower than standard premiums to those applicants with 
negative genetic test results. (Ibid, Paragraph 38) The inclusion of this directive 
was rather surprising, since insurers have always sold 'preferred lives' policies. 
Nevertheless, the ABI might have considered this a pragmatic and commercially 
acceptable compromise. The lack of any reliable genetic tests would have made 
‘cherry picking', as it is known in the industry, at that time impractical. The ABI 
conceded that the philosophy underpinning this proscription deviated from standard 
commercial practice. However, they argued that 'insurers consider it necessary to 
allay public concern that an uninsurable underclass may develop.’ (Ibid)
4) No medical information may be obtained from an individual’s medical practitioner 
‘without the applicant's prior, explicit, informed consent.' (Ibid, Paragraph 14) This 
part of the code was rather ambiguous, because it did not specify whether consent 
would permit insurers access to the entire medical record or only certain sections of 
it. Furthermore, the power of informed consent may be rendered impotent if refusal 
of disclosure results in the applicant being denied insurance.
5) The code states that: 'Existing Genetic Test Results need not be disclosed in 
applications for life assurance up to a total of £100,000, which are directly linked to 
a new mortgage for the purchase of a house to be occupied by the applicant ... if 
an applicant chooses to disclose the result, it must be ignored unless it is in the 
applicant's favour.’ (Ibid, Paragraph 31) This restriction would protect the majority
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of applicants who require life cover in order to purchase a mortgage. By imposing 
this restriction, the ABI implicitly recognised mortgage-related insurance products 
as important social goods. The directive to use genetic test results only if it is to the 
applicant's advantage appeared to be another compromise on standard 
commercial practice. This perhaps illustrates the industry’s desire to present itself 
as socially responsible.
A number of interesting sociological insights emerge from the ABI code of 
practice document. The careful use of rhetoric suggests that the organisation was 
attempting to strike a balance between social and commercial values. In particular, 
the ABI appeared to recognise the need to create a code conducive to both social 
prosperity and commercial expediency. The most striking feature of the code was 
the extent to which the ABI seemed willing to compromise on the existing norms 
and standards of insurance provision. Why would an organisation that represents 
the interests of the insurance industry willingly undermine commercial values? The 
interview data presented in chapter 2 suggested that insurers ultimately prioritise a 
commercial value narrative framework. One needs to ask whether the ABI's motive 
for promoting a 'rhetoric of social Inclusion' was also perhaps economic in nature. 
The ABI knew that the science of genetic testing was still in its infancy and was 
therefore of little use to life assurance underwriters. Therefore, they could 
compromise on commercial norms and values without suffering financially. Indeed, 
by stating publicly that they would not use such tests as an underwriting tool, they 
may have been trying to reduce public fears and placate the sceptics who were 
questioning their ability to establish a fair and pragmatic process of self-regulation.
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A conspicuous feature of the code of practice was the absence of rhetorical 
space dedicated to promoting the insurance industry’s ‘right to underwrite'. There 
was also no defence of the argument that 'genetic information’ is substantially 
equivalent to other forms of medical data, and therefore may not deserve 'special' 
attention. Even in paragraph 24, where the code states that private insurance 
cannot meet the needs of everybody and some individuals will always find 
themselves uninsurable, this is qualified by the statement: 'The industry is willing to 
discuss with interested parties the public-private interface and the potential for 
extending cover in a way which is consistent with sound commercial practice.' (Ibid, 
Part 6, Paragraph 24) This statement attempts to square the commercial norms of 
risk-assessment (discrimination and exclusion) with the social value of economic 
inclusion. Although commercial values are promoted, they appear to co-exist with 
an explicit social value narrative.
However, in a policy statement also published in 1997, the ABI did express 
concern over the possibility of adverse selection. It stated: 'In the absence of full 
and accurate disclosure of information, proper evaluation of risk cannot take place. 
Insurance companies could be “selected against".’ (ABI, 1997b, 1) In this 
document, the ABI appeared to draw on a commercial value narrative framework in 
order to defend existing insurance practices. Nevertheless, the ABI were keen to 
point out that they did not wish scientific progress to be undermined by public fears 
that commercial insurers would misuse genetic information. They appeared to 
recognise the concerns of scientists and clinicians but claimed that because 
genetic testing is not yet prevalent, it is impossible to predict the precise impact of 
genetic information on the future provision of insurance. The ABI promised to
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collect data on the genetic tests received from applicants (but not use them as an 
underwriting tool) and therefore accumulate some evidence-based knowledge to 
inform future policy and debate. They also provided assurance that such data 
would remain confidential. (Ibid, 2)
Until 2001, when a variety of advisory committees and interest groups began to 
question the system of industry self-regulation, this code of practice, and its self- 
imposed moratorium, provided the only effective control over the use of genetic 
information by private insurers. However, in response to criticisms made by the 
House of Commons Select Committee, the ABI Director General, Mary Francis, 
claimed:
'The insurance industry will consider the Select Committee's report very 
carefully. We recognise how much public concern there is about the way 
genetic information is used -  whether by government, the police, employers, 
insurers or others.’ (ABI, 2001a)
Despite insisting that genetic information cannot simply be ignored by underwriters, 
the ABI did express the need to consider the status of the self-imposed 
moratorium, which was about to end. They intimated that conciliatory talks with the 
HGC, consumer groups, patient-support groups, and medical experts would be 
essential if any constructive progress were to be made. However, the ABI also 
accentuated the advantages a flexible, self-regulatory framework had over the 
permanence of formal political legislation. This latter point is perhaps fundamental 
to our understanding of the ABI’s general approach of compromise. The fear of 
government intervention may have compelled the ABI to act in a socially
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responsible way. By negating certain commercial values in the short-term, they 
may have been attempting to pre-empt future legislation. If the ABI appeared 
intransigent to certain regulatory restrictions, the Government might have 
considered it necessary to intervene with formal prohibitory legislation. From this 
perspective, it was perhaps in the industry’s interest to appear quiescent.
In May 2001, the ABI confirmed that the moratorium would be extended for a 
further two years. (ABI, 2001a) Again, Mary Francis accentuated the public 
concern issue and called for calm and rational discussion. She hoped that the 
moratorium would ‘provide a period of stability while new and more permanent 
arrangements can be put into place.' (Ibid) In October 2001, the Government 
published their response to the issue and a new 5-year moratorium was negotiated 
with the ABI. This moratorium did not significantly improve on the one preceding it, 
would in reality provide little extra protection to the genetically disadvantaged', and 
little closure had been made in trying to resolve the underlying issues. 
Nevertheless, there was optimism that lasting consensus could be achieved during 
the new moratorium.
A compliance report published by the ABI on 23 October 2001 reveals how 
insignificant genetic test information is likely to be in the context of insurance. This 
report listed all genetic test results received by insurance companies bound by the 
ABI code of practice. In 1999, the total number of tests disclosed to insurance 
companies was 239. In 2000 this rose to 328. Furthermore, 106 of those tests in 
1999, and 135 in 2000, were already prohibited by the ABI. Of those tests that 
insurers were entitled to use, few led to an adverse underwriting decision. The
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report concluded by affirming that all member companies were adhering to the 
code of practice, and that some were implementing policies that transcended the 
minimum requirements set by the ABI. (ABI, 2001 d) This report provides further 
evidence that the social and commercial implications of genetics for life assurance 
are likely to be minimal, which supports the conclusions of chapter 2.
Despite the fact that life assurance companies currently receive few genetic tests 
with applications, in January 2001 the ABI commissioned Dr. Tony Mcgleenan, a 
member of the Law school at Queens University in Belfast, to assess the general 
impact of genetic information on the insurance industry. In the subsequent report, 
the public concern issue was a central theme. After insisting that no valid 
conceptual distinction could be made between genetic information and other forms 
of medical data, the report stated:
'...the popular and political perception appears to be that there is an important 
difference. In the absence of change in these perceptions insurers ought to 
make plans to deal with public policy interventions based on the argument that 
molecular genetic information is categorically different.' (ABI, 2001e, 5.1.2)
Despite recognising that there was no scientific justification for asymmetrical 
treatment of various categories of medical data, the ABI decided to act as if certain 
kinds of genetic information were qualitatively different in order to inspire public 
confidence and escape criticism.
Part of the report did defend the industry against accusations of practising 'unfair 
discrimination' and endorsed the idea of a 'right to underwrite’ as a defensive shield
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against adverse selection. The report also advanced the rather spurious argument 
that a policy aimed at prohibiting actuarially relevant genetic test information, on 
discriminatory grounds, might end up encouraging the use of indirect rating by 
proxies. It stated:
Studies suggest that if restrictions on underwriting are introduced in an effort 
to prevent discrimination then the competitive pressures of the market may 
lead to the use of proxies which actually increase inequality through inaccurate 
classification.' (Ibid, 4.1.3)
This was a rather erroneous defence of the right to use genetic information, and 
one that could only have a negative impact on the socially responsible image that 
the industry has strived to foster. This statement mirrors the themes and strategies 
revealed in the interview accounts. The narrative framework is shifted in order to 
provide justification for protecting particular commercial values. The ABI, like the 
interview respondents, use a variety of rhetorical strategies, and draw upon a broad 
narrative repertoire, in order to provide moral justification for their commercial 
position.
The work and progress of the ABI appears to have been defined by political 
expediency; that is the need to balance commercial values with the putative 
economic needs of society. They were essentially forced to accept a regulatory 
system by increasing public fears of a genetic underclass. Although they have 
attempted to counter many of these fears, and justify commercial insurance on the 
grounds of the social benefits it distributes, they have also striven to be sensitive to 
public concerns. The ABI’s strategic approach reflects the fact that policymaking
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processes around controversial science and society issues tend to compel 
stakeholders to 'play the game of politics’ in order to have their interests 
recognised. Insurers, like all stakeholders, must shift the definitional and 
conceptual boundaries of the issue, in specific social contexts, in order to express a 
morally adequate account of their position. In doing so, the deeper and more 
nuanced roots of the problem may be neglected or marginalised, and policymaking 
might become defined not by the quality of evidence but by the persuasive force of 
rhetoric. The evidence so far seems to support this hypothesis.
Although the ABI may have been forced to marginalise their commercial interests 
on the grounds of political sensitivity, there have been other organisations and 
debate forums where the industry has been permitted to defend its commercial 
rights more openly. One such organisation has been the UK Forum for Genetics 
and Insurance (UKFGI). The organisation was established in 1999 to encourage 
discussion amongst various stakeholders (physicians, geneticists, social scientists, 
actuaries, underwriters, and insurers). In formulating a response to an FIGC 
consultation document, UKFGI criticised the way genetic information had been so 
narrowly defined and requested clarification on the nature of ‘unfair discrimination’ 
and its conceptual boundaries. It also questioned the distinction made between 
genetic test information and other forms of medical data. (UKFGI, 2001a) The 
actuarial profession also critiqued the FIGC's consultation document for its 
parochial approach. In their response to the FIGC, the profession called for a 
broader debate on the 'social good' aspect of insurance and defended the process 
of risk-classification. (Faculty and Institute of Actuaries, 2001) A one-day 
conference held at the Royal Society in 1999, organised by UKFGI, provided an
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opportunity for the actuarial and insurance profession to disseminate their concerns 
and offer their professional insights openly and constructively. (UKFGI, 1999)
Nevertheless, despite the existence of various committees and forums that have 
allowed insurers to express their concerns and defend their interests, the ABI has 
clearly had to play a political game in order to represent itself as socially and 
morally responsible, fair, and equitable in its commercial activities. It may have 
been rendered impotent as a forceful lobbying group by a policy/regulatory 
framework that has coerced it into defending specific kinds of social values, and 
forced it to establish policy positions that serve only to inspire public confidence. If 
the process had been truly open and equitable, perhaps the ABI would not have felt 
it so necessary to marginalise its concerns in public documents.
2.2.2 The Genetics and Insurance Committee (GAIC)
The primary role of the GAIC was to validate specific genetic tests for insurance 
purposes; thereby introducing a degree of 'scientific reality’ to the regulatory 
process. Because the ABI had a stake in the outcome of any validation process, 
policymakers decided to transfer responsibility from the ABI to an autonomous 
GAIC. There was an implicit assumption that insurers could not be trusted to make 
sound and equitable decisions, and that the maintenance of public trust ought to 
take precedence over the interests of industry.
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The GAIC tried to introduce a mechanism of validation based on sound scientific
and actuarial evidence. It proposed that insurance industry applications to use 
specific genetic tests satisfy minimal requirements in three substantive areas. The 
first area concerned ‘clinical impacts'. GAIC demanded that: 'A reasonable body of 
current medical literature should support the extent and variability of the clinical 
impact.’ (GAIC, 2000a, Note 1,10) Furthermore, the GAIC stated that applications 
must demonstrate understanding of the natural history of the condition for which 
the genetic test relates, such as. age-of-onset and variability of clinical effects, and 
provide any evidence of medical interventions that may mitigate the clinical effects, 
expected morbidity, and survival probabilities. (Ibid, Note 3, 12)
The second area referred to ‘scientific and technical test standards'. GAIC 
demanded all applications include any evidence relating to the types of identifiable 
mutations associated with the test and their proportions in affected individuals. 
Furthermore, any technical flaws found to be associated with the genetic test had 
to be referenced.
The final area was concerned with the 'actuarial relevance' of the genetic test. 
The insurance industry had to demonstrate the actuarial relevance for each 
insurance product that they wanted to apply the information to. The notes stated:
Evidence to support a case for actuarial relevance should normally take the 
form of an actuarial investigation of the additional mortality and/or morbidity 
risk (as appropriate) associated with the relevant genetic test results or 
combination of genetic test results with other factors.' (Note 8, 17)
213
It is important to note that although the insurance industry was not required to 
provide peer-reviewed evidence in support of their case for actuarial relevance, this 
was a strict requirement for the clinical impact and scientific test standards criteria. 
One reason for this asymmetry in the requirements may have been that very little 
actuarial data is peer-reviewed. However, if the intention was to have a fair and 
equitable validation process, the same procedural standards perhaps ought to have 
applied equally to each of the three requirements.
The above criticism notwithstanding, the GAIC had at least tried to implement a 
comprehensive set of evidence-based procedures to reduce the possibility of 
insurance companies misusing genetic information and engendering 'unfair' forms 
of discrimination. However, the GAIC defined genetic information narrowly and 
equivocally as ‘a test to detect the presence of or absence of, or change in, a 
particular gene or chromosome.’ (Ibid, Annex B, 1.1, 25) Although they did not, like 
the various stakeholders and interest groups, shift between an extended and 
restricted definitional framework, the GAIC did appear to exclude from their remit 
various other forms of clinical diagnosis and testing. A number of other tests do 
exist that could equally disadvantage proposers for life assurance. Furthermore, 
because the remit of the GAIC was limited to the ‘scientific’ aspects of genetic 
testing, the complex social implications were largely ignored. Although one might 
argue that it is essential to develop some kind of evidence-based process for 
certifying genetic tests as scientifically and actuarially valid, disassociating this 
entirely from the social and ethical issues may be problematic. Because the two 
issues of ‘scientific validity' and ‘social legitimacy' are in many respects linked, it
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might have been more appropriate to use a synergetic approach and unify the 
validation process with an assessment of the wider social and ethical impacts.
There were a number of problems with the GAIC's scientific approach. Since its 
inception, the GAIC has validated only the Huntington’s disease genetic test; an 
extremely rare single gene disorder that can already be predicted relatively 
accurately through family history analysis. (GAIC, 2000b) It would be extremely 
difficult, at present, to satisfy the GAIC requirements for more complex but common 
multifactorial conditions. This raises questions over the present need for such an 
extraneous process.
Another problem with the GAIC’s technical criteria has been revealed by Prof. 
Martin Bobrow, a clinical geneticist. He argues that the evidence base for 
determining population risk in clinical studies poses problems when applied 
uncritically to the context of insurance. In a paper delivered to a UKFGI (2001b) 
consultation meeting, he referred to certain biases within clinical studies that could 
have crucial implications for the use of such data in underwriting. Firstly, bias can 
occur when geneticists try to ascertain a gene's penetrance. Clinical researchers 
tend to  recruit research subjects from families with a large number of affected 
individuals in order to improve their chance of discovering a correlation. 
Consequently, the correlation may end up being over-exaggerated, while 
alternative non-gene specific factors that could be relevant, since they too will be 
over-represented in the sample, may be conflated with the genetic cause. 
Secondly, severity of the disease may be over-exaggerated, because clinical 
researchers tend to recruit only those individuals with acute manifestations of the
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disease. They do this in order to prevent contamination of the sample. Thirdly, the 
efficacy of treatment may take decades to establish, because early treatments 
generally prove less salutary than later ones. According to Bobrow, ‘treatment 
effects' are often underestimated. The crucial point in all this is that insurers who 
use clinical data uncritically may overestimate the clinical implications of particular 
genes and underestimate the efficacy of particular treatments. Bobrow's account 
raises serious questions about how effective a scientifically grounded process of 
validation can be when dealing with complex genetic information. It does not 
appear that the GAIC have considered the deeper implications of translating clinical 
data into actuarial data. If Bobrow is correct, the clinical and actuarial relevance 
criteria may be insufficient for validating genetic tests for insurance purposes.
In general, the GAIC might consider itself successful in terms of the limited remit 
it was given. It has also tried to be open and transparent in its decision-making. In 
its first annual report (GAIC, 2000c), GAIC proclaimed that it had drawn together in 
a single committee a broad range of expertise. It stated its intent to promote public 
confidence by establishing a rigorous complaints procedure, and provided an 
assurance that ABI compliance with its decisions would be carefully monitored. The 
GAIC openly invited interest groups to review its process and stated: 'GAIC sees it 
as an important safeguard for the views of those who may be affected by any 
decisions to have an input in the deciding process.' (GAIC, 2000c, Para 5.5) It is 
interesting that a committee very much focused on the scientific evidence base of 
the genetics and insurance issue would make such a strong statement about public 
confidence. This perhaps illustrates further the political nature of the policy 
framework. Although the GAIC tried to disassociate the scientific principles from the
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social ones, this proved impossible in the context of a controversial public issue. 
The rationale for the validation process had to be linked to a putative concern for 
the public. Although the establishment of an organisation committed to the scientific 
and actuarial principles underlying the debate was perhaps pragmatic, to initially 
disassociate these issues from the social and commercial ones was perhaps 
flawed. It essentially permitted subjective public concerns to enter 'through the 
back door’. If the GAIC had sought from the beginning to investigate the clinical, 
commercial, and social impacts, political rhetoric about the need to raise public 
confidence and calm their fears of social and economic exclusion may have 
perhaps been unnecessary.
This analysis of the GAIC’s work has revealed that even when official 
advisory/regulatory committees try to be rational, fair, and equitable, they often 
revert to political rhetoric and allow value judgements to pollute their work. With 
such a complex Issue as genetics and insurance, it is very difficult for a validation 
process to be entirely objective and scientifically sound.
2.2.3. The HGAC and HGC
The HGAC, and its successor the HGC, have been the two most influential 
government advisory committees on the 'new genetics'. Both were given an 
extensive remit to assess the broader social and ethical issues relating to genetic 
science. In trying to fulfil their role, both introduced a novel system of public 
consultation into their decision-making framework. The results of their consultation 
with various stakeholders were used to construct pragmatic policy
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recommendations for the Government. However, it is important to investigate how 
these important advisory committees have framed the issue of genetics and 
insurance, and critically analyse the process of public deliberation they have striven 
to initiate. It will then be possible to further assess the efficacy and equity of the 
general policy/regulatory framework and make some progress on the fourth 
research question.
The HGAC released their first report in December 1997, entitled The Implications 
of Genetic Testing tor Insurance. (HGAC, 1997) Although this report supported 
many of the ABI initiatives, it claimed that the industry’s general approach was 
insufficient to meet the wider concerns in the area. (HGAC, 1997, Paragraph 1.5) 
Although the HGAC acknowledged that the hereditary implications of new kinds of 
genetic tests might appear significant, they conceded that similar medical 
conclusions could be reasonably drawn from family history data. Here, we can 
observe once again the rhetoric of clinical equivalency. However, the HGAC also 
expressed concern that the insurance industry had not designed special insurance 
products tailored to the needs of the genetically disadvantaged'. These two 
statements appear to contradict one another. The HGAC appear to marginalise the 
issue of genetics by expressing a substantial equivalence argument, yet 
simultaneously criticise the insurance industry for failing to treat new kinds of 
genetic information as special. This criticism was unfair to the commercial sector. If 
the information emerging from new kinds of genetic tests was not radically different 
from existing family history information, and if the actuarial relevance of most 
genetic tests was unlikely to be known any time soon, as the report concedes in 
Paragraph 2.12, then the question arises; why should the industry have a duty to
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design theoretically novel and population-specific insurance products? The implicit 
assumption underlying the rhetoric of the HGAC was that insurers should be 
obliged to accept primary responsibility for protecting an imagined 'genetic 
underclass’. The onus was placed on insurers to prioritise specific social values 
and marginalise existing commercial ones. It appears evident from the HGAC’s 
inconsistent rhetoric that a fundamental social value rationale has enveloped their 
supposedly objective remit.
The report proceeded to claim that the industry could withstand limited levels of 
adverse selection, hence their recommendation of a moratorium. This 
recommendation appeared to be influenced by their finding that:
‘ ... there was a strong and persistent sense of unease among those who had 
provided genetic test results to insurers about the way this had been 
interpreted. Despite inadequate quantitative evidence, we therefore could not 
set aside perceptions of unacceptable discrimination as groundless.' (Ibid,
Para 3.14)
This statement is particularly interesting, because it is expressed by a 
governmental committee with a central role in directing policy on this emotive issue. 
Despite acknowledging that there is no empirical evidence to confirm whether an 
individual who perceives him/her self to have been discriminated against actually 
has been the victim of discrimination, the HGAC suggest that mere public 
perceptions provide sufficient grounds for strict regulation. Not only is the very 
nature of discrimination, as a complex and ambiguous philosophical concept, not 
considered in any detail, but neither are a whole range of other social and ethical 
contingencies of the genetics and insurance dilemma. The central policy and
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regulatory authorities appear, just like the interview respondents, to marginalise or 
prioritise certain substantive issues. In this case, the social value of preventing 
‘unfair’ discrimination appears to be a central feature in the account, yet there is no 
supporting evidence to suggest that discrimination, or the perception of it, really 
exists or is prevalent. This statement suggests that inspiring public confidence, 
through a ‘politics of inclusion’ rhetoric, is more important than supporting 
commercial interests and values.
Soon after this report was published, the HGAC was disbanded and its work 
transferred to the HGC. The HGC initiated a broad public consultation exercise to 
tap into the diverse views of stakeholders and the public. The data from this 
exercise would be used by the HGC to inform their recommendations to 
Government. In 2000, they released a document entitled Whose Hands on Your 
Genes? Within this document, the HGC set out what they considered the most 
important issues regarding the new genetics and requested responses from 
interest groups and the public.
The Whose hands on your genes? document expressed a number of important 
concerns about the issue of genetics and insurance. The HGC deserves 
recognition for being one of the few advisory committees to seriously Investigate 
some of the ‘big questions' germane to this issue. In many respects, their work has 
proven both bold and salutary. For example, the HGC did not fudge the issue of 
what exactly constitutes 'genetic information' and questioned whether it deserved 
special’ status. They appeared to recognise that personal genetic data is 
conceptually complex and equivocal. However, the HGC then argued that for the
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purposes of the document, the definition of genetic information would be restricted 
to information derived from DNA or associated biochemical tests. They claimed 
that:
it is these new sources of genetic information based on DNA technology 
that provide new possibilities and challenges. There is public concern about 
the extent to which existing safeguards and regulation of information may be 
effective in the face of what can be done with the new technologies.' (HGC, 
2000, Para 2.4, 3-4)
The principal problem with this statement was its presentation as fact. The HGC 
presented as incontrovertible what was in reality a deeply nuanced and contested 
issue. They appeared to recognise the equivalency argument as valid, but 
proceeded to adopt a narrow definitional framework of non-equivalency, implied by 
their vague reference to new possibilities and challenges'.
The document then stated a number of reasons why new kinds of genetic 
information may require special legislative attention. The HGC argued that such 
information could identify unique individuals from small amounts of their biological 
material, predict late-onset disorders, and be of commercial interest to third parties. 
(Ibid, Para 3.2, 7) Again, the pre-framing of the issues in such a way meant that the 
lay public were asked to consider the validity of a number of normative arguments, 
in the absence of an adequate explanatory/interpretive framework to render the 
underlying philosophy intelligible. The public were simply instructed to register 
either their agreement or disagreement with the HGC's interpretation of the 
problem, without being offered a range of competing knowledge claims to draw 
upon before formulating their responses. For example, the HGC did state the
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insurance industry’s argument that genetic test information is no different from 
other forms of medical data and should therefore be divulged to them. However, 
three arguments were then presented for why access may need to be restricted. 
Stakeholders and the public were asked if they believed this to be a fair 
representation of the issue. They were also asked if it was important to distinguish 
different types of insurance products, medical conditions, and value of policies. 
Again, an 'intelligent' and 'informed' response was expected, even though 
respondents were given little background on the social, ethical, and commercial 
complexities.
Some of the questions posed by the HGC were valid, and perhaps useful for 
initiating public debate. Nevertheless, a number of methodological flaws would 
mean that the public responses would have to be treated with caution. The HGC's 
goal of mining public attitudes and establishing rational, pragmatic, and evidence- 
based recommendations was compromised because they, like the various 
stakeholders and interest groups, drew selectively from a broad narrative repertoire 
so that certain substantive social, clinical, and commercial values appeared to be 
prioritised while others were marginalised.
The consultation period ended on 23 March 2001, and the data was collated and 
analysed. Overall, there were 250 responses. 181 were tick box, 32 included 
additional comments, and 87 provided detailed written commentary. (64 of these 
came from named organisations and 23 from members of the public). The number 
of responses was considerably low considering the amount of time dedicated to the 
consultation exercise. However, this may not be too surprising. One must question
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how many ordinary’ members of the public would be prepared to read a fifty-page 
document and present extensive written responses to it. Further methodological 
flaws of this exercise will be explored in more detail later.
Although the HGC’s initial goal was to  initiate public debate and set out some of 
the basic issues of principle, it would have perhaps been more constructive to have 
discussed the intellectual basis of these various principles at the beginning of the 
exercise. If they had illuminated the social, ethical, and scientific complexities, 
without appearing to prioritise one value narrative framework over another, the 
HGC may have been more successful at building a strong and critically-adept 
foundation to the policy debate. This would not necessarily have required that the 
consultation document be profoundly esoteric. An intellectually fertile range of 
perspectives could have been presented to the lay public without the document 
becoming inaccessible to the non-expert.
The recommendations the HGC presented in May 2001 reflected the flaws in 
their decision-making process. Although they had consulted extensively with 
stakeholders and the public, and tried to initiate open and transparent public 
debates, the final recommendations appeared biased. . The HGC concluded that it 
was '... important to establish a clear and defensible regulatory system which not 
only balances the interests of insurers, insured persons, and the broader 
community but also enjoys the confidence of the public.’ (HGC, 2001 b, 1) The HGC 
recommended a 3-year moratorium on the use of genetic tests by insurers, except 
in cases where applicants were applying for policies over £500,000, during which 
time a full review of the regulatory process should take place. Furthermore, they
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recommended that insurers should only be permitted to use genetic tests that have 
been approved by the GAIC. However, the HGC also argued that the current 
system of self-regulation was inherently flawed and suggested that an independent 
body enforce the moratorium. This recommendation was influenced by the rather 
austere comments of the Select Committee report.
The HGC also argued that a moratorium was necessary to prevent 'social 
exclusion.' They seemed to ignore the fact that few genetic tests are currently 
used by insurance underwriters This is a crucial point that undermines the ‘social 
exclusion' argument. The HGC also cited the clinical concern that individuals might 
be reluctant to use genetic testing services or participate in research if they believe 
they will be discriminated against. Of course, no empirical evidence was cited in 
support of this concern. Again, the HGC appeared to prioritise certain social and 
clinical value narratives and marginalise commercial ones.
The HGC did appear more rational and less myopic on some of the substantive 
issues. For example, they argued that family history should be looked at more 
critically in the context of insurance. They recognised that there was a degree of 
parity between the social implications of new genetic tests and more traditional 
clinical tests. Furthermore, the HGC stated that in future it would try to identify 
means of access to insurance for the genetically disadvantaged, consider various 
regulatory systems, investigate the role insurance might play in a reformed welfare 
state, and discuss how a private insurance system might best provide social goods. 
These are certainly fundamental issues that any policy process must recognise, but 
they appeared to have been neglected in the initial consultation and advisory
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framework. The HGC, as well as the other advisory/regulatory organisations, 
appeared to be neither equitable in the way it treated alternative value frameworks, 
nor effective in deliberating the broader nuances of the issue. The HGC’s 
moratorium recommendation, for example, was justified on the weak basis that 
procedural inadequacies had been identified in the system of self-regulation, the 
technology was still in its infancy so could be misinterpreted, and the public feared 
social and economic exclusion would be engendered by prevailing commercial 
values. It certainly appeared that the public concern issue was privileged In the 
decision-making framework, especially when one considers the following comment 
by Baroness Helena Kennedy, Chair of the Human Genetics Commission:
Our consultations have shown very real public concern on the issue of 
genetics and insurance. On the basis of the evidence we have received, we 
have profound misgivings about the industry's handling of this information and 
its ability to keep its own house in order. I hope that these proposals go some 
way to reassure the public. They will also give the Commission the opportunity 
to consult further and devise an enforceable system which can enjoy the 
confidence o f everyone.' (HGC, 2001c, my italics)
This is an extremely critical statement about the insurance industry's competence. 
Insurers are portrayed as having neither the ability nor motivation to protect the 
public from the unrelenting power of its commercial values and interests. 3 This 
statement, perhaps more than others, undermines the HGC's initial commitment to 
assess the broader issues of genetics and insurance rationally and equitably. The 
future effectiveness of the organisation may depend on its ability to engage with the 
underlying issues and stakeholder concerns far more impartially.
3 Recently (May 2002) the HGC published their final report Inside Information: Balancing Interests in 
the Use of Personal Genetic Data (HGC, 2002) In this document, the HGC reassert the 
recommendations they made previously, provide a detailed account of their decision-making process 
(including evidence received from interest groups), and establish their objectives for future research.
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2.2.4 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Fifth Report. 
Politicians' Differential Treatment of Stakeholder Evidence
A number of sociological insights into the process of evidence evaluation in 
formal political settings emerge from an analysis of the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee Fifth Report. This was a crucial document in 
the genetics and life assurance policy/regulatory framework, as it had a strong 
influence on Government decision-making. By assessing in some detail the 
committee process, we will be able to provide further answers to the fourth 
research question, particularly the issue of political institutions treatment of 
stakeholder accounts.
The principal aim of the Select Committee was to collate and interpret evidence 
from the various advisory committees, regulatory authorities, and various 
stakeholders. It would investigate the issue of genetics and insurance in some 
detail and provide further recommendations to government ministers. The process 
included two oral evidence sessions; one with Prof. Martin Bobrow (head of the 
department of medical genetics at Cambridge University) and another with 
representatives of the Cooperative Insurance Society, Norwich Union, and 
Prudential. The committee also received 37 written memoranda from a variety of 
organisations including insurance companies, patient-support groups, and genetic 
research institutes.
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Ideally, this inquiry should have served as an impartial mechanism for filtering the 
diverse concerns of stakeholders. It should then have constructed pragmatic 
recommendations based on an extensive and impartial analysis of all the relevant 
issues. However, a critical analysis of the witness examination transcripts, and the 
listed recommendations, will reveal that the virtue of impartiality was seriously 
compromised, and that the general approach to the underlying theoretical issues 
was both narrow and superficial. One can observe the politicisation of the genetics 
and insurance issue most acutely within the deliberative process of this Select 
Committee investigation. ‘Politics without reason’ may be an appropriate 
description of the nature of this decision-making process.
The most conspicuous feature of this Select Committee process, and the issue 
that our attention will be focused on, was the differential treatment dispensed to the 
various experts who appeared as witnesses at the evidence sessions. Most 
strikingly, the questioning of the medical geneticist appeared noticeably less 
confrontational and invective than the cross-examination of the insurance 
representatives. It appeared that the political members of the committee held 
preconceived ideas about the quality and legitimacy of the witness statements they 
were to hear. For example, the opening statements offered by Prof. Bobrow were 
generally accepted as fact, while those given by the insurance representatives 
were often met with incredulity.
Prof. Bobrow opened his account by stating his career history and arguing that 
significant scientific progress will be required before we can predict with any 
accuracy the complex effects of gene/environment interactions, and therefore the
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penetrance of specific genes in affected individuals. His career history clearly 
impressed the committee members who responded: That is very impressive, and 
thank you very much. It gets us off to a good start.' (House of Commons (HOC), 
2001, Minutes of Evidence, Question 2) After Bobrow challenged the widely held 
assumption that the ‘new genetics' will soon prove highly predictive, the following 
dialogue took place:
7. (Dr. Williams) Can I come in with just a brief one? You are speaking with 
great restraint and accuracy in what you tell us, but are there other clinical 
geneticists out there that believe that the blueprint will be more predictive than 
that, or in certain instances, like in Huntington's or some of the genetic defects, 
where maybe in five or ten year’s time . .. we will be able to say a good deal 
more, or are there some enthusiasts in the field that think there is more 
information here than you are telling us?
(Professor Bobrow) Of course, there is always a spectrum of opinion. I think, if 
we take the specific question you asked me, which is whether there are people 
who believe we will have tests that will predict time of onset and rate of 
progression of Huntington's disease, I do not know any such people, nor do I 
know of any scientific work that leads us to believe that we are seriously going 
to crack that problem. Every scientist believes that every problem will be 
solved, so I'm not going to say never, but there is nothing on the horizon, at this 
stage, in my view.
8. (Dr. Gibson) And you would not really think that the insurance companies 
can predict epistatic effects between genes, we are a long, long way from 
understanding that, we have never really understood the phenomenon, 
although it has been around for years, the interaction of genes and different 
chromosomes, for example? So they are nowhere near that, they are millions of 
years from it, would you say?
(Professor Bobrow) Millions of years is not the kind of thing that falls naturally 
from my lips; it is not easy to see it happening ... I do not think there can be any 
doubt that the horizon between now and the time one could have a validated, 
verified test that predicted the sort of thing we are discussing must be certainly 
decades away.
(Chairman) ... You did say, very early on, that, even if there is a gene that is 
likely to lead to some disease, you cannot be sure whether the person will get 
that disease in their childhood, in their middle life, or indeed not at all. To what 
extent then is it valid ... for insurance companies to use genetic information at 
all in setting premiums, if scientists have no idea at all when this gene is going
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to kick in with its trouble. How can insurance companies say that someone 
should have a loaded premium, just because they have particular gene?
(Professor Bobrow) Can I go back and clarify something, because I have 
clearly left somewhat of an overstatement in the air. Some genetic conditions 
clearly manifest in childhood, pretty well always, and If I gave the Impression 
that there was no idea of when things would start to have effects. That was not 
quite accurate. For those that start in adulthood, there is, in general, a relatively 
wide range of onset. The particular example that I was discussing of 
Huntington's ... can have onset very early and very late ... but, in general, it is 
a disease with onset about 40, plus or minus 15 years.
(Ibid., Questions 7 & 8)
This strand of dialogue illustrates the problem of moving uncritically from the 
clinical to the actuarial realm. Bobrow gives account of what he believes to be the 
current status of genetic testing. In doing so, he essentially marginalises the 
arguments of those who claim that genetic testing is highly predictable. He tries to 
demonstrate that genetic science is highly complex and that predicting factors such 
as age-of-onset and penetrance is not yet possible, even for single-gene disorders 
such as Huntington's. However, the interesting part of the dialogue occurs when 
the Committee members try to shift focus onto the insurance problem and ask 
Bobrow for his opinion on this. Revealed is an unsubtle attempt by the committee 
to coerce the witness into validating an anti-insurance argument on the foundation 
of clinical reality. The committee begin by trying to render Bobrow's ‘genetic 
complexity’ rhetoric more powerful and compelling. They do this by translating his 
rather balanced and diplomatic words into an argument that the insurance industry 
is 'millions of miles away' from gaining any utility out new kinds of genetic tests. 
The Committee appeared to be trying to steer the respondent into criticising the 
commercial use of genetic information, based on their interpretation of the scientific 
status of the issue. In his defence, Bobrow did claim that he may have been falsely 
interpreted as overstating the case. His initial claim that genetic testing cannot yet
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predict how a disease will manifest itself was later restated less strongly as an 
argument that genetic information may only give us an age-range of about 15 years 
for when the gene may express itself. The Committee’s assertion, which they 
appeared to want Bobrow to verify, that insurers have no use for genetic 
information because it has little predictive value, was now being undermined. 
However, this assertion was deeply flawed. The insurance industry does not need, 
nor desire, absolute certainty. A broad spectrum for age-of-onset can be factored 
into their calculations. Therefore, limited genetic information is still commercially 
useful, despite the Committee members' comments.
The argument that there is no justification for loading a premium on the basis of 
an applicant having a faulty gene, which is not fully understood and cannot with any 
accuracy be predicted to express itself on a specific date, demonstrated the 
actuarial ignorance of the Committee members. It was one thing to place absolute 
trust in the scientific/clinical expertise of a witness, but to shift the focus onto the 
complex issues of insurance and assume the respondent's competence extended 
to this area was, perhaps, disingenuous. It appears from the transcript evidence 
that the Committee members began as committed sceptics of insurance industry 
competence and probity. It appeared that they were merely trying to validate their 
prejudices with the veneer of a supposedly objective science. The transcript 
revealed the problems that can be engendered when one attempts to assess 
evidence from two very different knowledge domains.
It is important to emphasise that not all clinical geneticists support Prof. 
Bobrow’s account of the predictive potential of genetics. For example, Bobrow
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argues that insurers over-interpret the predictive potential of genetic tests in a way 
that is inconsistent with the scientific evidence. This view is not shared by other 
'experts', such as Prof. Sandy Raeburn, the ABI genetics advisor. Because the 
science is still in its infancy, there is still no established consensus, or indubitable 
evidence-based facts, on the predictive power and value of genetic testing. 
However, the Select Committee appeared quite willing to display a degree of 
deference to the opinions of Prof. Bobrow, and uncritically accept his account, 
despite the fact that he was quite willing to concede that there is a degree of 
professional disagreement amongst clinicians on the predictive capacity of the new 
genetic technologies.
Prof. Bobrow was also asked his opinion on the policy aspect of this issue. 
Bobrow expressed doubts about the viability of an outright legislative ban but 
wanted to see a stronger moratorium put in place. He expressed concern that the 
industry had been slow to respond to the issue and questioned the appropriateness 
of self-regulation. Interestingly, he also signalled a desire to extend the debate to 
the use of all genetic information, including family history. The following account 
was particularly interesting.
insurers at the moment do have access, without contest, to very strong 
genetic information by asking about family history; how that is interpreted in 
detail, I honestly do not know, but they do have access to that, every time you 
go for a life examination, you are asked about your family history. As I 
understand it, the reality for these diseases and others is that if you do not 
declare a family history of Huntington's, or whatever it is, you have not 
declared a germane item of information and your insurance will be null and 
void; if you do declare that family history, they have you, they know you are at 
a very high risk, and they do not actually need to do genetic tests to validate 
that. Therefore, if one is going to try to impose a real ban on the use of genetic 
information, as opposed to just tinkering with laboratory tests, I think one 
needs to grapple with the use of family histories ... So I see it as a bit of a 
sham, to be honest, because I think it does not address the real issue, which is
231
the information, it addresses the trivial issue, which is the test.' (Ibid., Question 
29)
This account represents an attempt to challenge the ‘business of discrimination' 
value narrative, by extending the arguments against the use of new kinds of 
genetic test information to family history. However, while the objection to insurers 
using genetic tests was based on a narrative of clinical validity, in this account the 
objection appears rooted in a social value of economic inclusion. Insurers' access 
to family history has never really been challenged on the grounds that it is an 
imperfect scientific/technical tool, but always on the basis of the wider social and 
economic consequences for the at-risk. The account also demonstrates, once 
again, an ignorance of the commercial realities of insurance. The statement about 
the consequences of revealing a family history of Huntington’s disease implies that 
insurance companies would deny somebody a policy on these grounds. However, 
as revealed in chapter 2, the insurance industry often underwrites applicants with 
such a family history. Sometimes they might offer a term policy instead of a whole 
life policy, or they may simply load the premium to take account of the increased 
risk.
The Committee asked Bobrow if he believed the fear of a genetic underclass was 
valid. He responded:
'I think there is an extremely serious risk of creating a group of people who see 
themselves as a genetic underclass, which may be almost as damaging, 
because they will avoid some forms of medical care, and so forth, or research 
participation, because of this concern.’ (Ibid’, question 31)
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The principal theme in this account is that a perception of social exclusion is as 
morally insidious as actual exclusion, particularly if it has a negative impact on 
clinical values. Again, as revealed in the interview accounts, the clinical and social 
value framework is conflated, while the commercial concerns are marginalised. The 
Committee then asked: But careless use, or poor use, of genetic information by 
insurance companies is going to exacerbate whatever the problem may be?' 
Bobrow responded: ‘I think it is a public issue, clearly, or you would not be having 
this hearing.’ (Ibid.) The Committee’s questions appeared value-laden. Even when 
Bobrow tried to remain circumspect, the Committee appeared to want him to 
provide evidence in support of the belief that there would be substantial and 
negative consequences if insurance companies were permitted access to the 
information. They accepted a great deal of the evidence presented by this one 
clinical representative, and encouraged him to speak on various issues that 
deviated from his specific area of expertise. They uncritically accepted both the 
clinical narrative he offered, as well as the complex social and commercial 
narratives that he was encouraged to express.
If we now contrast this evidence session with that of the insurance 
representatives, we can observe a very different process at work; one that was 
palpably more confrontational and lacked the same level of deference to expertise. 
When it came to questioning representatives of the insurance industry, the 
Committee members used the account given by Prof. Bobrow as a foundation for 
their cross-examination. After the Prudential witness, Keith Bedell-Pearce, talked 
about the Huntington's gene test, and stated that it was relatively accurate in 
determining the disease’s age-of-onset, the Committee chair Dr. Gibson replied:
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Bobrow went further when he gave evidence. I am sure you have read it. He 
does not have the same confidence that Sandy Raeburn has in being able to 
predict. He said that he is not sure if you have the gene that you can predict 
“when the disease will start, how rapidly it will progress and thus when death 
will occur." ... It is a mess, is it not? You cannot really predict and yet with 
these uncertainties you feel confident to talk about increasing or decreasing 
premiums. It is an uncertain science.' (House of Commons (HOC), 2001, 
Minutes of Evidence, Question 79)
In response to this accusation of applying scientifically spurious data, Bedell- 
Pearce exclaimed:
‘ ... I do not want to stand in the middle of an argument about the efficacy or 
otherwise of genetic testing between two academics. The evidence that the 
insurance industry advisor has provided us with and indeed the GAIC also has 
confirmed is that there is a degree of predictive certainty so far as the 
Huntington's chorea is concerned ... there is a considerable body of scientific 
evidence and practical experience of the emergence of Huntington's chorea to 
indicate that with certainty, where the nucleotide repetition is more than 39 
times, the disease will emerge.' (Ibid)
The science appeared now to be in question, and the principal antagonists in this 
exchange were simply countenancing the disparate accounts of two academic 
geneticists to support their particular case. One was an insurer hoping to use 
scientifically valid genetic information as an underwriting tool, and the other was a 
politically motivated Select Committee member trying to undermine the insurance 
industry's veracity in interpreting and utilising complex genetic data. The very style 
and conceptual framework of the questioning appeared far more invective and 
critical. The implicit assumption was that the testimony of the insurance 
representative could not be taken at face value.
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In question 81, the belligerent approach continued when the Committee asked 
Mr. Urmston, an insurer representing the Cooperative: 'Have not the insurance 
companies a better chance of predicting by looking back at what your great granny 
or your grandfather and your mother and father died from?' (Ibid, 81) Urmston 
replied:
'That was what I was trying to refute earlier [Urmston had argued that genetic 
tests provide a greater predictive power, even by discovering the absence of 
the gene in those individuals with a family history] If you remember the figures I 
quoted, I was trying to say we have gone back and said that, if we had used 
the family history methods, what we have been able to demonstrate ... is that 
the practices that we use [current genetic test results] are more accurate and 
are giving better information' (Ibid)
The committee retorted: How do you know that? You are being conned by the 
scientists.' (Ibid, question 82) Urmston came back by arguing:
With respect, if your father or mother have had this disease, there is a 50 per 
cent chance that you may have it. If we rate on the basis of that, ail the people 
who have parents with Huntington's chorea we will end up rating in line with 
that sort of probability. The genetic test means that at least half of them we will 
not rate at all. [Because they will be discovered to be free of the gene].' (Ibid)
Interestingly, when the respondent cites scientific evidence that supports the 
commercial use of genetic information, the clinical narrative then appears to be 
questioned by the Committee. Those clinicians who give a different account from 
Bobrow are represented as ‘conning the insurance industry'. It appears that only 
scientific evidence that validates a critical assessment of the insurance industry is 
shown respect and deference. In reply, the Committee member stated: 'I say you
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can only say they have the gene, period. You cannot say more than that.’ (Ibid, 
question 82) Clearly, the Committee failed to comprehend the basic concept that 
absence of a gene can have as much predictive power as discovery. This simple 
misunderstanding appeared to result in the insurance industry being castigated for 
what could only be imagined duplicity and incompetence.
Later in the inquiry, it was discovered that some insurers, such as Norwich 
Union, were using genetic tests on the ABI list that had not yet been approved by 
the GAIC, albeit with the promise that policies underwritten on the basis of those 
tests would be retrospectively reassessed if the GAIC subsequently refused to 
validate them. The view of many insurers was that this would prompt the GAIC to 
initiate the validation process immediately, and treat it with a greater sense of 
urgency. This practice of using genetic tests not yet validated by GAIC was not 
explicitly prohibited by the ABI. However, the Committee decided to characterise 
both the ABI, and the companies it represents, as acting: in a free market,
picking up tests that have channelled through this one academic from Nottingham. 
He may well believe strongly but nevertheless it is one person’s advice, not 
government body advice.’ (Ibid, question 110) This statement implicitly assumes 
that government advice, by its very nature, is somehow more reasonable and 
deserving of public legitimacy. This is a rather spurious authoritarian view of 
government knows best' that many may justifiably reject. There was also a degree 
of hypocrisy in accusing the insurance industry of relying on the evidence of one 
academic, when the Committee itself also appeared to be prioritising the account of 
a single clinician.
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The appropriateness of this practice was posed to Bedell-Pearce, and he 
rebuked the negative implication by asserting the view that Prof. Raeburn was an 
eminent geneticist who: has been retained for some time by the ABI not
because I believe the ABI went expert shopping, but simply because of his 
eminence and his ability to give a disinterested professional opinion.’ (Ibid) The 
Committee then argued again that the industry should follow government advice 
and proclaimed: you have jumped the gun and you have applied this
knowledge, funnelled through this academic, not funnelled through the arm of 
government.' (Ibid, question 113)
There is a degree of truth to the claim that insurers varied in how they interpreted 
the ABI code. Some applied it far more liberally than others. However, the ABI only 
ever proposed minimum standards. Just because a few individual companies 
decided to go beyond the minimum requirements does not justify characterising 
those who did not as duplicitous, incompetent, inconsistent, or a threat to public 
confidence, as the Committee both implicitly and explicitly suggested. It must be 
noted that concern was also expressed over Prof. Raeburn sitting as both the ABI 
advisor and a member of the GAIC body responsible for validating genetic test 
applications, which could be seen as a conflict of interest. This was certainly a 
legitimate concern that the Committee was correct to identify, but it was not 
necessarily a blatant or conscious deception.
Overall, the actions of the insurance industry did not seem to warrant the 
opprobrious level of criticism directed at them by the Select Committee members. 
Dr. Ian Gibson even accused Norwich Union of trying to set up a ‘genetic ghetto'.
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He claimed: '"self-regulation is clearly not working. These companies are 
attempting to identify a genetic underclass which can only lead to them profiting 
from individuals being discriminated against.’” (Quoted in The Times, Thursday 
February 8,h, 2001) The evidence does not support this kind of politically charged 
conspiracy theory, so the moral condemnation again appears largely unjustified.
The question that needs to be asked is why a supposedly impartial Select 
Committee differentially judged the veracity of stakeholder evidence. It is clear that 
there is a broad range of opinion on the issue of genetics and life assurance, and 
various stakeholders have perhaps complicated the issue by drawing on a variety 
of value narratives to defend particular sectional interests. However, the Select 
Committee report appeared to further politicise and ideologically polarise the 
relevant constituencies, rather than establish a consensus-based position after 
diligent deliberation of all the complex issues.
The Committee focused predominantly on procedural inadequacies of the ABI 
code of practice and the insurance industry's failure to promote public confidence. 
Broader theoretical issues such as the nature of discrimination, the definitional 
boundaries of genetic information, and the role of commercial insurance in 
contemporary society were not deliberated In any great detail. The social good 
aspect of insurance appeared to be a crucial omission. Furthermore, the limited 
number of witnesses that contributed to the evidence sessions suggests that this 
political inquiry was inadequate. Although supplementary memoranda were 
provided by a number of organisations, it was predominantly the witness testimony 
that informed the final recommendations.
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The Committee made a number of recommendations. They suggested that 
organisations such as the GAIC and HGC be given greater resources, after it was 
discovered that their current budget was woefully inadequate. On the issue of 
genetic test validation, the Committee felt that the scientific evidence was 
inadequate (they based this on Bobrow’s testimony) and recommended that the 
GAIC re-examine their decision to approve the Huntington’s test and demand the 
insurance industry provide peer-reviewed data to support their case for actuarial 
relevance. Although the call for peer-reviewed evidence may be valid, it seemed an 
extreme response to have the GAIC re-examine the validity of this test. It not only 
cast doubt on the integrity of the GAIC, but also illustrated the Committee's lack of 
knowledge about Huntington's chorea and its implications for life assurance 
provision. This genetic test can indeed benefit the applicant who has a family 
history of the disease but tests negative for the actual gene. Furthermore, 
individuals found to have the gene would have already had problems acquiring 
insurance based on family history, so they would not suffer any additional 
discrimination if insurers were permitted to use positive genetic tests.
The Committee also questioned the industry's competence to regulate itself. 
They recommended that an independent monitoring system be established. 
Furthermore, they proposed a voluntary moratorium for at least two years, while 
more research is conducted on the actuarial relevance of specific tests and their 
implications for access to insurance. The Committee stated: ‘If the insurers are 
unable, or unwilling, to regulate themselves and enforce this moratorium, we 
recommend that Government enforce its will by legislation.' (HOC, op cit.,
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Paragraph 71) The industry was therefore being coerced into accepting a new 
moratorium. The commercial sector would certainly find this more desirable than 
legislation, but again the severity of the Committee’s criticisms seemed 
incommensurate with the real shortcomings of the ABI’s policy position. Although 
the Idea of a moratorium may seem reasonable in principle, the process used to 
reach this decision appears deeply flawed.
The Select Committee report reveals a number of interesting sociological insights 
into the political nature of decision-making on controversial science and society 
issues. It is interesting to observe the various ways in which stakeholder evidence 
is differentially judged by politicians in order to give their particular value position a 
veneer of legitimacy. Once an issue enters the realm of representative political 
institutions, political expediency appears to become a central feature. Instead of 
reaching fair and equitable decisions, the process appears to simply polarise and 
antagonise political/ideological sensitivities further. This particular Committee report 
appeared to be more concerned with responding to perceived public fears of a 
genetic underclass, excluded from financial security, and an unrelenting science 
with the power to do much harm as well as good. Perhaps this was the principal 
reason why insurance industry accounts were treated with so much hostility, while 
evidence from the clinical community was so much revered.
2.2.5 The Government's Response
The Government responded to the various advisory committees in October 2001, 
and entered into conciliatory talks with the ABI. A new five-year moratorium was
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negotiated. In their response, the Government claimed to recognise both the 
'understandable' public fear of discrimination as well as the industry’s concern 
about adverse selection. The Government appeared to frame the issue superficially 
as a simple discordance between public and commercial values and interests. This 
is hardly surprising, as the advisory committees responsible for investigating the 
wider concerns in the area had already reduced the debate to the level of a simple 
dichotomous conflict. The Government recognised this to an extent, as they argued 
that the moratorium was unlikely to provide a lasting solution. (Department of 
Health, 2001a, 4)
The Government report did take into account the procedural shortcomings of 
industry self-regulation that were identified by the Select Committee. Their 
recognition of the need to independently monitor ABI compliance was perhaps a 
pragmatic response. Their decision to  raise the financial ceiling under which 
applicants need not divulge genetic information would also offer individuals the 
opportunity to purchase a substantial, and arguably adequate, amount of insurance 
cover without fear of being unfairly discriminated against. Of course, there are 
many other methods of discriminatory risk-assessment not prohibited by the 
moratorium. Despite recognising this point, by noting that the Secretary of State for 
Health would consult with the insurance industry and genetic-support groups on 
how to make access to insurance easier for those currently excluded because of 
their family history, the Government was still relatively unsuccessful in establishing 
any fixed boundaries to this expansive problem.
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What further complicated matters was that the Government, just like the various 
advisory committees, appeared to prioritise the public fear issue. It is important to 
remember that in 1998, after the publication of the HGAC report, the Government 
decided that self-regulation was sufficient and lauded the actions of the ABI. 
However, in 2001 the Government fundamentally changed its position and argued 
that self-regulation was not working. One might assume that it was the recognition 
that the public was becoming increasingly concerned about the issue that caused 
the Government to change its approach.4
This section has revealed a number of flaws in the formal policy/regulatory 
process around the issue of genetics and insurance. With regard to the fourth 
research question, the evidence suggests that the policy framework has served 
merely to simplify the underlying issues, and polarise stakeholder accounts, rather 
than reach rational and equitable solutions acceptable to all stakeholders. The 
process has appeared to prioritise certain substantive issues, and marginalise 
others, and has failed to equitably balance stakeholder Interests. The analysis has 
also revealed the power that perceived public opinion has had on this process. 
Every committee and regulatory body has made explicit reference to the need for 
public confidence to be inspired. Even committees focused on the clinical and 
scientific issues have enveloped their rhetoric with concerns for public interests and 
values. This issue of public opinion will be Investigated in more detail later. Now it
* The Secretary of State for Health Alan Milburn, in his speech given at the International Centre of Life 
in Newcastle in April 2001, had also highlighted the concerns of the public, and raised the dire 
prospect of a "genetic underclass" resulting from discriminatory practices. He stated Without 
appropriate regulation, lack of public confidence will remain a significant barrier to fully harnessing the 
health benefits genetics developments represent.' (Department of Health 2001b) The ABI responded 
by claiming it was willing to work closely with the government to ensure a fair resolution to the 
problem. (ABI. 2001c)
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is necessary to assess stakeholder accounts of the policy process, and assess 
whether the data corroborates the preceding interpretation.
3. STAKEHOLDER ACCOUNTS OF THE POLICY PROCESS
The previous chapter revealed the complex ways in which key stakeholders in 
the genetics and life assurance debate accounted for their concerns, and 
suggested candidate solutions, by drawing selectively from a broad narrative 
repertoire. This analysis contributed to answering part of the third research 
question. This section will complete the investigation of the third research question 
by assessing the extent to which stakeholders have differentially judged the 
efficacy and legitimacy of the policymaking and regulatory bodies. This section will 
also further reveal the flaws of the currency policy process.
Almost all of the stakeholders interviewed expressed concern about the veracity 
of the current decision-making and regulatory process. However, the transcripts 
also revealed considerable variation in both the strength and focus of stakeholder 
accounts. It became evident that some respondents were judging the process by 
reference to how it satisfied their own ideological goals and interests. For example, 
Julia Cream of the Alzheimer’s society responded as follows when asked her 
opinion on the general advisory committee system:
JC: I guess I've been encouraged more recently because I think the 
recommendations that everyone has been coming out with have been very 
similar ... we've been very critical about the GAIC since they were set up ... 
and have said publicly that we have little faith in that process.
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JM: You don't think that a validation system is necessary?
JC: We're not even getting into that. We don't have faith in the process that 
has been set up.
When asked whether she believed the various committees had sufficiently 
deliberated the broader underlying issues of the problem, and established 
pragmatic conceptual boundaries, Julia Cream was once again selective in which 
specific committees she had faith in. She stated:
in some ways, I’ve been really impressed by some of the work. I think the 
Select Committee did a good report really quickly ... I think the HGC is very 
interesting. I think the way they hold their meetings in public are fascinating 
and very brave, and you actually see them debating the issues and saying, I 
think, quite controversial things. It's very honest and very transparent ... GAIC 
has not been so good ... their meetings aren't in public, they've had one 
meeting where pressure groups were invited but I don't think adequately 
answered our questions, or been able to justify why they have made certain 
decisions ... There are quite a lot of bodies now where things get debated, like 
the UKFGI, which is very heavily dominated by insurance groups ... I think 
what surprises me is that all the committees say the same thing, have the 
same criticisms, and the Government doesn’t act. And to me it reflects just how 
powerful a lobby the ABI is. Because the public aren't in favour of what the ABI 
is doing
This interview took place before the implementation of the five-year moratorium. 
Nevertheless, Julia Cream reveals her incredulity towards the UKFGI and the ABI, 
because she perceives them to be producing proposals that the insurance industry 
finds palatable. She then translates this into the organisation being ‘dominated’ by 
the lobbying activities of the commercial sector. However, this criticism could also 
be applied to the HGC and the Select Committee, who have perhaps allowed 
certain stakeholders and the 'uninformed' public, who are generally critical of 
Industry practices, to influence their decision-making. It is also interesting that Julia 
Cream makes explicit reference to the public' and accuses the Government of 
failing to respond to their legitimate concerns about the regulatory process. The
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respondent assumes that the public hold strong and negative views about the ABI’s 
self-regulatory process, and that by failing to enact legislation, the Government is 
failing in its duty to represent the interests of the electorate. This strategy of 
deferring to a perceived ‘public mood' is one frequently employed by interest-based 
groups who believe the formal political process Is ignoring their interests. The bold 
statement that ‘the public aren’t in favour of what the ABI is doing’ remains 
unsubstantiated. However, by linking her political rhetoric to claims about what the 
public truly needs and wants, the respondent may be trying to acquire further 
legitimacy for her narrow interest-based objectives.
It is interesting to contrast Julia Cream’s account with that of Alistair Kent. As 
revealed in the previous chapter, Alistair Kent was far less critical of the insurance 
industry's position, and argued that the best way to protect the genetically at-risk 
was to sustain a competitive insurance market. In stating an opinion on the policy 
process, the focus of his attention was once again on the scientific uncertainty 
underlying the issue. He stated: I
I think one of the important things that has been missing from the debate is 
scientific reality. If you listen to the conversations, if you read the House of 
Commons report, yes it would be terrible if ... we did those things based on the 
assumptions you're making about the predictive power of genetic information, 
but everything we know about genetic information tells us that it ain’t likely to 
be so ... You know people have not in a sense stopped to define the size of 
the event that needs to happen in order for it to appear on the actuaries' radar 
... if you have a population risk of a certain thing happening of ... 1 in a 
thousand, at what point, you know what's the bandwidth for that normality. If 
you have an event that happens 1 in 750 as opposed to 1 in 1000 is that still 
within the normal bandwidth? ... There comes a point at which the likelihood of 
something happening becomes significant and what I think, the insurance 
industry, geneticists, actuaries, underwriters, need to do is sit down and say 
that's the size of the blip, we can see a blip of that size, anything smaller than 
that is white noise. ... On the one hand if you can define the size of the event 
that must happen for it to appear on the radar then you can look at the science 
and ask well actually what is genetic information going to tell us that is of that 
order of magnitude or greater? And what I am absolutely convinced of is that in
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the vast majority of cases the answer will be nothing. For a few cases it will be 
something. And for even fewer cases it will be something so big that we can't 
actually ignore it ... But the idea that we are going to end up with a large 
uninsurable underclass is media scare mongering.
In this account, the respondent reveals his, deeper, and perhaps more informed, 
understanding of the likely implications of genetics for life assurance provision than 
those interest groups that have chosen to defer uncritically to perceived public 
opinion. Alistair Kent tries to conceptualise the problem in terms of what is already 
known about the practical realities of the insurance industry and the power of 
genetic information. Of course, his desire to see the relevant professional bodies 
communicate and create a pragmatic definitional framework around the problem is 
perhaps too optimistic in light of the evidence provided.
In commenting on the House of Commons report, and the advisory committee 
system in general, Alistair Kent stated:
I think it’s very clear from the House of Commons report that there is a great 
danger of bandwaggoning here. That report is very clearly saying "something 
must be done and quickly” and the danger is that you take a knee-jerk reaction 
... So I think the danger is that you take this kind of bandwaggoning that 
something must be done so you do something. You say right we'll ban genetic 
information. So you say well actually are you talking about DNA testing? ... Is 
that positive test results and negative test results? Or just positive test results 
or just negative or whatever?
Again, the respondent expresses concern that in the absence of balanced, 
evidence-based decision-making, policies around genetic information and life 
assurance may begin to reflect the narrow and unsophisticated views of an 
uninformed public. When asked about the role he believed his organisation should 
play, Alistair Kent stated, rather interestingly:
246
The role that we have been trying to play Is to try and get people to focus on 
what the real issues are rather than what the public are led to believe the real 
issues are. If you simply go by what the public wants we'd be hanging sheep 
stealers ... we'd have the death penalty back tomorrow, but we don't because 
people with the power to change that feel that this is an inappropriate use of 
their power.
There is a clear perception within GIG that equitable policies can only be achieved 
through a process of informed decision-making. However, this statement is 
perhaps just as uncritical as those expressed by Julia Cream. Alistair Kent appears 
to believe that the process of revealing, deliberating, and resolving the real’ issues 
is relatively simple. He presents the ideal process as one requiring greater 
education, dialogue, and conciliation. However, this thesis has revealed how 
complex and multifaceted the problem of genetics and insurance is. The real’ 
issues may simply be those that particular constituencies have perceived to be the 
most important, and congruent with their social and political ideologies. It certainly 
appears to be the case that a number of competing, underlying narratives have 
structured the general debate. However, to claim that 'scientific reality’ will 
automatically reveal what the ‘real’ issues are, and allow us to resolve them, is 
perhaps too neat and simplistic. Although informed debate and a truly conciliatory 
process may be constructive, it should not be taken-for-granted. There are a 
number of issues that may challenge the efficacy of such a process, which will be 
discussed in the following chapter. Although GIG have tried to engage with the 
more subtle complexities of this issue, we should not be too uncritical of their 
position. Like all interest groups, they have tried to express a particular story, and 
drawn upon a broad narrative repertoire, in order to create a consistent and 
perhaps morally adequate account of their particular policy position.
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The clinicians were equally concerned about the nature of the policymaking 
process. However, both the anonymous genetic counsellors were uninformed 
about the nature of the policymaking framework and were at first tentative about 
stating any opinion on this matter. However, after having the policy and regulatory 
process explained to them, both expressed the desire that clinical/scientific 
perspectives be represented in the decision-making framework. Dr. Quarrel was 
one clinician who was relatively informed about both the underlying issues and the 
regulatory framework. His account was critical of the policy process and the 
insurance industry’s position within it. He stated:
... there have been various government, non-governmental and quasi- 
governmental organisations, looking at the issue and writing reports. I think 
that it would be better if the insurance industry could come forward with a set 
of proposals, to either the HGC or the GAIC, for primary legislation that would 
allow us to move forward, but they seem to be most reluctant on doing that. 
Ultimately if it gets to MP's then there's going to be a tremendous ground swell 
of opinion that we cannot have a genetic underclass, which is a bit of a 
pejorative term, but if they are not careful then primary legislation will be 
written, because it is going to be popular with the public.
This account reveals a thinly veiled contempt for the efficacy of various 
governmental and non-governmental committees. The respondent argues that the 
onus should be placed on the insurance industry to take a stance and establish a 
fair and equitable process for resolving the issue. The respondent appears to 
recognise the political implications of the process, when he predicts that primary 
legislation, which could undermine commercial freedom, may be inevitable if the 
insurance industry continues to procrastinate, and public opinion swings further 
against standard business norms.
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One problem with the advisory committee system is that it can become 
increasingly difficult to track the flow of decision-making and assess the suitability 
of candidate solutions. This point was illustrated by Sandy Raeburn when he talked 
about the problems the ABI and GAIC had in simply defining genetic information:
I can recall at least 2 meetings of the ABI genetics committee about 4 years 
ago when we were trying to define genetic tests ... in the end we came to the 
definition of a genetic test which is in the ABI code of practice. Of course, 
about a year or two later In the GAIC, we had at least one meeting where we 
debated the same thing. I think these committees have debated the issue and 
I’m aware that on both occasions there was a feeling by most members of both 
committees that we had to move on ... but I think ... we didn't actually resolve 
it just by getting a semi-agreed definition. We didn't resolve the issue in a way 
which the public would find reassuring or robust ...
Two committees deliberated the same issue but ended up with only a ‘semi-agreed’ 
definition. If it is so difficult for the committees to complete basic boundary work, it 
is likely to prove almost impossible for them to resolve the trickier social, political, 
and economic issues. Such committees are also likely to be as politically and 
ideologically charged as stakeholder groups, since they too constitute 
professionally dissonant members. Raeburn’s account perhaps suggests that the 
idea that the formal political process can easily resolve Interest-based conflict is 
naive.
The respondents most critical of the decision-making process tended to be the 
insurance representatives, which was revealed in their interview accounts. In 
commenting on the Select Committee report, Tony O’Leary stated:
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... I think there is a political agenda there where its, you know, if I was an MP 
I'm far better standing up here shouting "protect the poor and downtrodden”, 
than “protect the massive great capitalist insurance companies" ... so I think 
there's all those elements in there ... My personal view is that you go in front of 
a Select Committee and they have some preconceived ideas or views of the 
people they are seeing. So if they are seeing a Professor in Genetics, here's a 
good guy who's looking after the people ... and up there to tell the truth, and 
the whole truth, and even when the Professor in Genetics said “its not really 
my area of expertise but I th ink ...”, then that's a definite down there. Now when 
you get the big bad insurance company up there, just trying to wriggle out of 
what they haven't been doing, it gets a little more like an inquisition, you treat 
everything with suspicion ...
This account supports the findings from our investigation of the differential 
treatment of stakeholder evidence by the Select Committee. The respondent 
questions the legitimacy of juxtaposing the eminent clinician, who is portrayed as 
someone out only to protect the interests of the poor, with the untrustworthy 
insurer, who is portrayed as someone seeking to exclude the poor and vulnerable. 
The policy community, just like the clinicians and patient-support groups, appeared 
to draw predominantly from a social/clinical value narrative in order to advance a 
'politics of inclusion’ rhetoric. This narrative was then used to present the 
commercial sector as a threat to social and economic inclusion. This strategy is 
sociologically interesting. A politics of inclusion narrative appears to be used as a 
rhetorical weapon against commercial interests and values. It acquires legitimacy 
by claiming to engender trust within a community of citizens ostensibly motivated 
by egalitarian values. The irony is, of course, that life assurance never provided a 
means for the poor and vulnerable to protect their financial interests. It was, and 
still Is, primarily an institution that protects those wealthy enough to pay the 
premiums. Nevertheless, the politics of inclusion narrative was convenient in that it 
helped critics challenge the norms and values of big business and render their own
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position socially and morally adequate. Such a narrative has appeared to define the 
policy framework of the genetics and life assurance debate.
Although Tony O’Leary appeared uncomfortable with the overtly political nature 
of the policy process, Keith Bedell-Pearce was more circumspect when 
commenting on the work of the Select Committee. He argued that the 
parliamentary democratic process does have some advantages. However, he 
qualified this by stating:
Select committees are playing to a number of agendas, including local interest, 
lobby groups and the need to make a bit of a splash on whatever. This is well 
understood and part of the deal ... There are always political agendas because 
these are political people sitting on it and they’re going to pursue those political 
agendas.
The anonymous insurance underwriter countenanced this view when he stated 
that:
Unfortunately, I think the genetics debate is driven by one or two individuals 
who have particular views which we may never change. And I think we are 
losing out to that thought process. And I would like to know that these people 
fully understood the totality of the way the insurance industry works.
Again, these accounts raise questions over the suitability of the advisory committee 
process. Although the ABI has publicly supported the moratorium decision, the 
pervasive scepticism expressed by many insurance representatives should 
sensitise us to the possible flaws in the decision-making process. Bedell-Pearce's
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comment that political agendas are well understood and ‘part of the deal’ should 
not lead us to simply tolerate the political hubris of individuals who sit on 
governmental committees. If the system reveals itself to be manifestly prejudiced, 
then it is perhaps necessary to change it and not simply demand stakeholders 'play 
the game’ of politics.
The anonymous insurance representative raised another problem with the
decision-making framework. He claimed:
Ok I'm pretty well informed of the sort of total picture of the insurance industry 
and genetics, I was one of the 4 people drawing up the final code of practice. I 
asked them to do me a cascade chart from the government perspective of 
whose making the decisions, because I've lost track of It. And if I don't know 
hardly anybody's going to know. So I'm just waiting from the ABI to say right 
this comes from the Department of Health ... I'm losing track of whose making 
the decisions, who's reporting to who?
This statement raises a serious problem. With so many committees and policy forums 
each taking responsibility for different facets of the issue, it is difficult to keep track of 
where real progress is being made. Furthermore, it makes it far more unlikely that all 
the information will be deliberated fairly. There is perhaps a need for a more focused 
approach where fewer institutions could enjoy a wider remit and free themselves from 
the vagaries of the political arena. However, the anonymous underwriter also talked 
about the political motivations of certain insurance people. He stated:
I personally believe that there are some within the insurance industry who are 
taking the genetics debate, and seeing it as a marketing opportunity, I think it's 
important that the insurance industry maintains its solidarity here.
When he was asked to elaborate he replied:
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Its not what they do its what they say ... they’re always seen in the financial 
and national press, and read very carefully what they're saying because it 
doesn’t mean necessarily what they're going to do ... and you can always 
stand up and say pleasing words which everybody wants to hear ... but the 
proof comes in what they actually do.
This is certainly a disturbing comment, which if true could jeopardise the openness 
and transparency the industry has sought to promote and foster. It also illustrates 
that not all members of the insurance industry share the same agenda. Just like 
various other stakeholder groups, insurers do not constitute an homogeneous 
group. There are a number of individuals with vested interests In the outcome of 
the policy process. The stories they tell, and the strategies they employ, are 
complex and multifaceted. Although there may be certain similarities in the ways 
that representatives from particular profession constituencies account for their 
interests, within all stakeholder groups there is a broad spectrum of opinion that 
may represent individual rather than group interests.
This section appears to provide further support to the argument that the genetics 
and life assurance debate in the UK is driven more by political strategising than 
rational evidence-based deliberation. Just as the formal political process appeared 
to grant differential legitimacy to stakeholder accounts, here it has been shown that 
relevant stakeholders judge the equity and efficiency of the political process by 
reference to how it may serve their broader social, political, or ideological Interests. 
Some may even defer to perceived public attitudes when it is advantageous for 
them to do so. This section has contributed further to our understanding of the third 
research question. It has also provided evidence to corroborate earlier conclusions 
about the nature of the policy and regulatory process. This now concludes our
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investigation of the third and fourth research questions. It is now necessary to 
look more closely at the way a very particular kind of public opinion has influenced 
the strategies of various political groups and institutions, and perhaps further 
threatened fair and effective policymaking. This analysis will provide an answer to 
the fifth research question.
4. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA IN SHAPING THE POLICY 
PROCESS
Throughout this chapter, perceived public opinion' has revealed itself to have 
had a central role in the genetics and insurance controversy. One explanation for 
why governments now appear so sensitive to public attitudes may be the negative 
experiences they have had in the past when dealing with complex science and 
society issues. In the past, public fear and scepticism often emerged as a threat to 
government policy. The crisis of public confidence over the issue of BSE, for 
example, might be characterised as symptomatic of an institutionalised political 
arrogance that privileged those scientific accounts that were politically expedient, 
and subjugated the legitimate fears of a public who did not trust the information 
they were being fed. With controversy now enveloping genetics based 
technologies, the Government has recognised the need to be open and transparent 
in its decision-making, but has now privileged public opinion as the primum mobile 
of policy.
Every advisory committee and interest group has referenced data on public 
attitudes when formulating and disseminating their policy recommendations. 
However, most of the research on public attitudes has failed to distinguish the
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‘informed’ from the ‘uninformed’ public. This methodological oversight may have 
serious implications for policymaking. In order to provide some answers to the fifth 
research question, this section will investigate the role of public opinion and the 
media in shaping the policy framework around genetic information and life 
assurance.
4.1. The Problem of an Uninformed Public
Although there has been a great deal of research on public attitudes toward the 
new genetics’ in general, few have specifically investigated the genetics and 
insurance issue. This section will critically review a couple of these studies and 
reveal their methodological flaws. Various ‘public attitude’ surveys will be shown to 
have produced largely uncritical and superficial findings, which may undermine 
their utility for policymakers.
The largest quantitative survey of public attitudes toward genetic information was 
conducted by MORI in 2000. The research was based on 1,038 interviews with 
members of the People’s Panel, conducted between 6 October and 17 December 
2000. On the use of genetic information by insurance companies, the survey 
discovered that: ‘... two thirds are aware that human genetic information can be 
used for setting insurance premium levels, but only eight per cent back its use for 
this purpose.' (MORI, 2000b) Greater awareness was evident in those respondents 
with ‘high genetic knowledge’, who also tended to be more sceptical of the 
commercial use of such information. However, the criterion used to determine 
those with high genetic knowledge' was rather simplistic. It was based solely on the
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ability of respondents to recognise three diseases as having an hereditary origin. 
Furthermore, one must question the underlying rationale of distinguishing 
respondents on the basis of their knowledge or ignorance of the science of 
genetics. A high knowledge of genetic science does not necessarily make one 
more proficient in assessing social policy issues around the use of genetic 
information. It would have been more appropriate, perhaps, to stratify respondents 
on the basis of their knowledge or ignorance of the more nuanced social and 
philosophical issues that underpin the issue; knowledge that may be more useful 
for assessing the validity of competing knowledge claims.
The primary finding of the MORI report was that the majority of respondents 
(78%) considered it inappropriate for insurance companies to use genetic test 
information for setting premium levels. 57% disagreed strongly with the statement 
that insurance companies should be permitted access, while 62% believed that 
although there was no technical reason why insurance companies could not use 
the information for this purpose, they ought to be prevented from doing so on. The 
survey also discovered that in terms of third-party access to genetic databases, 
insurance companies were least trusted to be responsible users. Four in five 
respondents stated that insurers should be prevented from accessing such 
information. The 1999 British Social Attitudes Survey found that 75% of the public 
did not believe insurance companies should be able to rate policy applicants based 
on genetic test information, which is consistent with the more current MORI data. 
There appears to have been no improvement in public confidence. Opinions were 
also found to vary considerably with age. 25% of those aged over 65 thought 
insurance companies should have access but only 5% of those under the age of 25
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considered access appropriate. Those with low levels of genetic knowledge were 
also more likely to support commercial use of genetic information. This data 
corroborates other studies, referred to in the following chapter, which reveal that 
publics that are more knowledgeable tend to be more critical of the social 
applications of science and technology.
One interesting finding of this research was that respondents thought it more 
appropriate for insurance companies to access genetic information for health- 
related insurance products than products such as travel and home insurance. For 
life assurance, 30% of respondents thought it appropriate for companies to use 
genetic information. The results for other products were; home contents (6%), 
travel (18%) and pensions (19%). 35% of respondents thought health insurers 
should be permitted access. These are interesting results. On the one hand, they 
appear to reveal respondents' awareness that the commercial need for accurate 
predictive data is more acute for health-related insurance products. However, it 
also demonstrates, rather surprisingly, that the public does not believe that there is 
a greater moral imperative to provide health-related products to everybody 
regardless of their risk status. Much is made by various interest groups of the 
public’s desire to promote a 'politics of inclusion' and provide health-related 
insurance products to all. However, this data suggests that people are not as 
critical of life assurance providers as they are of travel and motor insurance 
providers.
Overall, the findings of the MORI poll were fairly mixed. There was certainly 
evidence to suggest the public are cynical of the insurance industry in general. 
However, many of the findings were not particularly surprising. We know that in
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general insurance companies do not enjoy a great deal of public support or 
confidence. Most people asked to comment on the insurance industry tend to draw 
upon anecdotal evidence of insurance companies acting duplicitously. 
Furthermore, individuals’ personal experiences of the seemingly arbitrary and 
unregulated practices of car and travel insurance providers might shape their frame 
of reference when responding to these very specific issues. Again, it is interesting 
that there were very different responses when respondents were asked to 
comment on the use of genetic information for specific insurance products. 
Although a majority believed that insurance companies should not have access to 
the genetic test data, this majority was greatly reduced when the question specified 
particular insurance products. Yet, many interest groups continue to claim that a 
significant majority of the public do not condone the use of genetic information by 
commercial organisations. Such groups do not appear to have looked at the data 
critically.
The MORI survey also distinguished 'knowledgeable' and ignorant’ respondents 
rather too simplistically. Therefore, there was no accurate data on how public 
beliefs are modified. There is a need to understand the ways in which people 
modify their beliefs once they become ‘informed’ of the underlying theoretical 
complexities of the issue. When there is both an ignorance of the scientific basis of 
genetics, and an intuitive distrust of the private insurance sector, it is no surprise 
that most people randomly surveyed express a desire to prohibit insurance 
providers accessing their genetic medical records. Such quantitative data can 
provide us with little more than a superficial veneer of what the public thinks about 
these issues.
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The 101 public responses to Section 1 of the HGC Whose Hands on Your Genes 
document produce the same kinds of results as the MORI survey, because once 
again there was little attempt to tap into the views of the 'informed public’. In this 
study, it was discovered that 59% of respondents did not believe insurance 
companies should be permitted to use the results of an individual's genetic test to 
calculate their premium.5 (HGC, 2001 d, HGC01/P9, Annex A) 49% of respondents 
thought that genetic information needed to be protected in a different way to other 
forms of medical information. The respondents believed that genetic information 
raises new social and ethical problems, ought to be singled out for special 
legislative attention, and that genetic privacy should to be protected in the context 
of insurance contracts. This particular survey should be treated with even more 
caution than the MORI research, because the number of responses to the HGC 
consultation document was so low. Furthermore, there is no way of knowing what 
background knowledge the respondents were drawing upon when expressing their 
opinions. Also, the question asked by the HGC was simply whether insurance 
companies should have access or not. There was no opportunity for the public to 
respond to the issue within a contextual framework, where specific commercial or 
social circumstances might challenge their opinions and lead to a re-evaluation of 
initial beliefs. For example, if one responds that no company should be permitted 
to factor in genetic test information when underwriting policies, the question arises
5 Voss, 2000 reported to the HGC on public attitudes towards the use of genetic information through a 
literature review on work conducted over the previous 10 years on the issue. She discovered only five 
reports, which generally revealed a strong public scepticism of the insurance industry's use of genetic 
information. She referred to Radar s, 1999 work, which found that there was stronger opposition only 
to employer s use of genetic information. (Voss, 2000)
See also Singer et at, 1998 who reviewed trends in public attitudes to genetic testing, therapy, and 
engineering, based on Gallup questions, Roper Centre for Public Opinion Research, and polls in the 
Public Opinion Quarterly between 1937 and 1998. Although their focus was on the United States, the 
results were analogous to similar studies conducted in the UK. There has been a general upward 
trend of public scepticism regarding privacy, and increased public perceptions of adverse risk. (Singer 
et al, 1998, 635-637)
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as to whether this would apply both to positive tests and negative tests. These two 
very different contexts require clarification. Such narrowly focused and superficial 
surveys may prove dangerous if they are used uncritically to buttress particular 
social goals or political ideals.
Public surveys might prove useful for discovering how general public attitudes 
perhaps vary by age, class, and gender. The Office of Science and Technology 
(OST), with the aid of the Wellcome Trust, conducted this kind of survey on public 
attitudes to science in 2000. They categorised respondents as ‘confident believers’, 
‘technophiles’, 'supporters’, ‘concerned’, ‘not sure’ or ‘not for me’, based on the 
kinds of answers given to a series of questions on controversial science issues. 
(Office of Science and Technology & Wellcome Trust, 2000) Each category tended 
to be monopolised by certain social groups. This was not a survey on a single 
issue, which often requires respondents to be given some background knowledge if 
it is to be useful. However, studies may contribute towards our understanding of the 
disparities that exist between different social groups' engagement with science. 
This could provide a basis for future qualitative research on more specific 
concerns. Nevertheless, such surveys should not, on their own, be granted a 
legitimacy they do not deserve, and certainly should not be considered a suitable 
basis from which to shape formal policy.
4.2. The Role of the Media
The media have had a central role in shaping public attitudes towards both 
genetic science and the specific issue of genetics and insurance. The tendency of
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the media to over-hype genetic science may have been crucial to the way negative 
public beliefs and attitudes have been formed. It is evident that the media has been 
keen to accentuate the determinacy of genes. The potential interest of the 
commercial sector in using such genetic information serves only to increase the 
rhetorical power of their headlines. For example, a story appearing in the Financial 
Times in February 1997 was headlined ‘Losers in the lottery of life’. The article 
contemplated the ‘brave new world' of genetic testing and expressed fears that:
‘ ... affordable life and medical insurance could eventually become the 
preserve of a select, healthy minority with people who are too ill, too old or 
simply have the wrong genetic make-up being charged prohibitively expensive 
premiums -o r  even refused cover all together.’ (The Financial Times, 22 
February 1997, page 3)
Despite adding the caveat that we are still in the realm of speculation, the article 
still attempted to portray a potentially dystopian future in which insurance 
companies perniciously discriminate against at-risk policy applicants who then form 
a ‘genetic underclass’. Another article on 7 November 1998 was headlined: ‘A 
premium issue: The cost of life insurance could one day depend on your genetic 
code.’ (The Financial Times, 7 November 1998, p 9) Yet another from August 1999 
read: ‘Your life in their hands -  like it or not: do you fancy the idea of insurance 
companies probing your genes for potential diseases before providing you with 
cover?’ (The Financial Times, 14 August 1999, p 1) More recently, an article in the 
Guardian Newspaper, Cancer Gene Tests ‘will destroy private health’, reported the 
views of Sir Paul Nurse, a Nobel prize winning scientist and head of the charity 
Cancer Research UK. He claimed that advances in genetic testing would 
eventually collapse the private insurance market altogether, and that in the next
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few decades socially-based insurance systems would have to come to replace all 
forms of private provision. ( Guardian Unlimited, August 5th, 2002)
It must be recognised that the media, just like all other social institutions, is not 
composed of homogenous actors with shared goals and ideologies. The media is a 
complex and heterogeneous medium for knowledge dissemination, with varying 
degrees of quality and objectivity. However, although there is a great deal of 
constructive and responsible reporting, the liberal use of extremely emotive 
language, even in the broadsheet media, and a tendency to grant greater 
legitimacy to those who are radically opposed to insurance companies using 
genetic information, may have only a negative impact on both public attitudes and 
the political system that chooses to react to them. Many of the interview 
respondents had serious reservations about the role of the media, particularly the 
insurance representatives. Graham Austin replied to the question on media 
influence by exclaiming:
It’s a good media story. I mean to run the story that X, Y, Z, has got a family 
history of this, has got BRCA 1 [Breast cancer gene] and was turned down for 
life assurance makes a great story. Whereas someone with a positive 
Huntington's test gets life assurance. Where is the story in that.
Clinicians tended to point to the negative impact media reporting on genetics may 
have on peoples' expectations of what current genetics services can offer them. 
Some also pointed out that their patients are more likely to raise the concern over 
insurance when there is a particular flurry of media attention around it. Patient-
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support groups claimed to have experienced the same problem. Julia Cream 
expressed ambivalent views about the media. She stated:
It's often in our favour, so while it might not always be correct or may be 
sensationalist it's usually helped get our message across and keep it alive. But 
the downside of that is that when there is a mixed message, so when they talk 
about Alzheimer's rather than identify it as familial early onset Alzheimer's, its 
our staff on the helpline that have to deal with all the extremely anxious 
members of the public'
Just as she was selective in which advisory committees she chose to place her 
faith in, Julia Cream again makes no apology for supporting media coverage that 
gets the Alzheimer's Society message across, even if the stories are inaccurate or 
sensationalist. This statement illustrates the way stakeholder and interest groups 
may, through their support of particular media sources, obfuscate truth in order to 
have a broader set of social, political, and ideological goals realised. Alistair Kent 
of GIG was more critical of the media. He claimed that their frequent démonisation 
of the insurance industry does nothing to enhance the quality of debate. He stated:
Oh this is a great story. Everybody thinks that the insurance companies are out 
to screw them ... It's a great story and I certainly wouldn't claim that the 
insurance companies are philanthropists, but ... Individuals within the 
companies are ... like you and me ... they're sort of mere mortals and fallible, 
but you know most of them are not ... overtly getting up in the morning thinking 
"how many claims can I reject today, what excuses can I find to screw the 
customers?" They are trying to do a decent job against the standards that are 
set for them. Again, it's about our own expectations.
Again, we must consider the differential treatment of evidence. Earlier, it was 
revealed that political institutions had granted differential levels of legitimacy to 
particular stakeholder accounts. Here, stakeholders appear to be differentially 
treating the quality of media reporting by reference to how well it represents and
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supports their particular interests. For some, the media exists as a necessary evil 
to be tolerated if it largely supports their political cause. However, if we do not have 
balanced reporting by the media, then members of the public are always going to 
have a skewed perception of the broader nuances of any controversial policy issue. 
If one subsequently situates 'uninformed' public opinion at the centre of 
policymaking, one is de facto basing important policy decisions on the reports 
circulated by a sensationalist media. This is both undemocratic and may lead to 
iniquitous policymaking based on the lowest common denominator.
This section has illustrated the problematic nature of public opinion, and its 
influence on the strategies of policymakers and interest groups. Members of the 
policy community constantly refer to the public mood, or the public attitude, 
claiming that their decisions must be based on what the public needs and desires. 
However, this section has demonstrated that few have drawn a line of demarcation 
between the informed and uninformed public. Even fewer have considered the role 
of the media in arousing public fear and scepticism. One might ask if the social 
position of media representatives affects their coverage of the genetics and 
insurance issue. Personal insurance products are important to self-employed 
people such as journalists, so they have a stake in the outcome of this issue. The 
genetics and life assurance problem is certainly one that has been given a great 
deal of attention within both the policy community and the media. Why a problem 
that currently affects such a small section of society, and is unlikely to be significant 
in the near future, garners so much focus and attention certainly requires further 
analysis.
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At the beginning of this section, it was argued that the Government is now far 
more attentive to the perceived concerns of the public, partly because of the social 
and political crisis that enveloped the BSE controversy. However, one must 
question how far, and for how long, the Government will be willing to prioritise what 
it perceives to be the ‘public mood’. At the moment, the Government has nothing to 
lose by imposing moratoriums and reprimanding the industry for its commercial 
excesses. The reality is that in the short-term, the commercial sector will not suffer 
adversely from a moratorium. The Government’s decision poses little threat to their 
traditional interests and freedoms. Furthermore, the moratorium ensures that the 
Government need not begin contemplating subsidisation of the genetically 
disadvantaged through public taxation. The question becomes: if at some point in 
the future a real threat to commercial insurance emerges, will the Government shift 
their position and begin to represent the sectional interests of the corporate sector? 
Appeasing public attitudes is all well and good if there are no economic burdens to 
deal with.
The Government's recent crisis over MMR vaccination serves to illustrate the 
point that political institutions are quite willing to turn against the public if it is 
politically advantageous. The Government’s policy position on MMR can be 
contrasted with their policy approach to genetics and insurance. In the former case, 
Government endorsed ‘experts’ shaped the policy framework. However, in the 
latter case, it has been largely the 'uninformed public’ who have driven policy. 
Nevertheless, a politicised decision-making framework has been the guiding 
principle in both cases. Representative institutions often fall into one of two 
extremes. Either they attempt to represent the ambiguous and highly problematic 
'Public', or alternatively represent particular sectional interests: usually powerful
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commercial lobby groups. Both responses denigrate the power of reasoned 
argument and equitable decision-making.
In considering the fifth research question, the evidence suggests that perceived 
public opinion has had a palpable influence on the strategies of key stakeholders 
and the evolution of the policy process. The media has also been shown to have 
aroused public fear and scepticism. However, it has also been demonstrated that 
representative institutions, and stakeholder groups, have failed to recognise the 
crucial distinction between an informed and uninformed public. The consequence 
has been that the decision-making framework has proved inadequate as a means 
of establishing some rational, evidence-based boundaries to this complex and 
expansive social and technological problem. When one draws too heavily on a 
perception of what the public thinks, wants, or needs, then policy is likely to be 
based on the lowest common denominator of decision-making. It is likely to reflect 
the narrow prejudices of an ambiguously defined public. Stakeholders may then 
strategically use this ambiguity in order to envelop their ideological beliefs with a 
veneer of legitimacy. In the following chapter, the problems that can arise when 
one seeks to uncritically represent the public will be investigated further. The final 
section of this chapter will look critically at the moratorium decision, in the context 
of the insights gained through the preceding analysis of the policy process, and 
assess its suitability as the best means to reach equitable decisions on this issue.
5. REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT MORATORIUM
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Because of the highly political nature of the genetics and life assurance debate in 
the UK, and the apparent failure of the policymaking organisations to initiate a 
broadly based, informed, and impartial consensus-building approach, many people
have argued for a more comprehensive strategy.
5.1. Towards More Effective Debate
Harper (1997a) believes that there has been a serious lack of constructive 
dialogue between the insurance industry and clinical geneticists on the scientific 
and social aspects of the genetics and life assurance problem. In 1993, Harper 
argued that many genetics professionals had already foreseen the potential 
implications, but they had been largely ignored by the insurance industry. (Harper, 
1993) One of the crucial observations to emerge from the analysis of the policy 
process was the extent to which the issue had been defined by the mobilisation of 
a variety of distinct 'experts', from a number of disparate professional fields, who 
had failed to communicate with each other effectively. Harper had stressed in 1993 
the vital importance of extensive discussion between a variety of stakeholders. He 
wrote: 'To allow an issue of such practical and ethical importance to drift into 
unconsidered and piecemeal applications is unacceptable.’ (Harper, 1993, 227) 
Konotey-Ahula (1993), in response to Harper, argued that no one group should be 
permitted to dominate such a dialogical process. Although Harper has generally 
been critical of the insurance industry’s interest in new kinds of genetic information, 
his appeal for broader deliberation was noble and constructive. Other scientists, 
such as Dykes (1996), concurred with Harper’s call for rational dialogue. He wrote: 
‘Open and informed debate including scientific, medical, commercial, lay, ethical
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and legislative representation is urgently required to ensure that safeguards agreed 
to be necessary are put in place.’ (Dykes, 1996, 694) The most salient word in this 
quote is 'informed'. One cannot deny that the formal decision-making process has 
been 'open' and ‘transparent’, particularly since it has involved groups usually 
excluded from the decision-making process, but the evidence suggests that it has 
not been ‘informed’.
Kaufert (2000) accentuates the politicised nature of the debate when she argues 
that:
‘ ...the debate over insurance is interesting, not for the accuracy of the different 
predictions, but as a source of insight into the claims being made by different 
groups as they manoeuvre for a stronger position or struggle to defend their 
existing interests. It is also interesting because it is contentious and its conflicts 
best reveal the differences in perspective between key actors.' (Kaufert, 2000, 
827)
The analysis of stakeholder accounts and their representation in the policy 
framework, provided in this and previous chapters, supports Kaufert’s view that 
what is interesting in this debate is the ways in which various actors have sought to 
use the political process instrumentally in order to ensure their interests and values 
are both recognised and prioritised. Every stakeholder hopes that their definitional 
framework, moral position, and ideal means of resolution will be the one that wins 
through in the political process. This may be one reason why stakeholders appear 
to use rhetoric strategically, draw on a broad narrative repertoire, and shift between 
definitional frameworks in particular contexts. Kaufert is quite right to promote 
greater research into the political manoeuvring of certain interest groups, and the 
competing knowledge claims they articulate. When one is developing policy on
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contentious science issues that have relatively unknown social consequences, 
political and ideological intransigence is more likely to impede constructive 
progress and undermine strategies for resolution. Kaufert herself describes the 
debate as a:
‘literary construct, put together by lawyers, ethicists and journalists, based on 
their knowledge of how the existing insurance system works, and coupled with 
a series of assumptions about the new genetics ... there are too many 
unknowns, too little data and too few cases from which to generalize.’ (Ibid, 
827)
It is partly a consequence of the lack of reliable evidence, and thus the diminishing 
explanatory power of any single perspective, that ideologically-based political 
rhetoric tends to dominate proceedings. Commercial practicalities and professional 
rules of thumb may have directed the conjectures of 'experts', but when the debate 
entered the political realm, it appeared that a precautionary principle based on fear 
of an unknown future’ existed as the guiding rationale. Although it is ultimately 
society as a whole that must set the ethical boundaries of genetic technology and 
its social applications, not just the appointed 'experts’, (Kinderlerer et al, 1998), it is 
important to promote rational, evidence-based deliberation for evaluating 
competing knowledge claims.
5.2. Moratoriums, Regulation, and International Perspectives.
It is interesting to note that the UK has been one of the few countries in the world 
to take the regulatory path, through the establishment of a series of moratoriums. 
Most countries have enacted legislation to prohibit insurers' use of specific genetic
269
test information. However, the initial policy of industry self-regulation in the UK 
lacked the confidence of both the public and various interest groups. Baldwin and 
Cave (1999) claim that such self-regulatory mechanisms often attract criticism 
because they are perceived to be unfair to those affected by the regulatory 
decisions. (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, 132) The authors write: Past experience 
suggests that self-regulators have a sporadic, unstructured, and patchy record of 
consulting those with interests in the workings of their systems.' (Ibid) This was 
somewhat true of the ABI system of self-regulation where, despite gaining 
feedback through a citizens’ jury, the code of practice was established without 
significant consultation with both the wider genetics community and those 
vulnerable groups who may in the future be affected by the decisions.
The current regulatory framework, which contains greater checks and balances 
on industry practice, still falls short of any formal proscriptive legislation. Many 
believe that the legislative response of other countries should be applied to the UK. 
However, one must be careful in using cross-national comparisons as a basis for 
policymaking. The social framework within which various kinds of insurance 
products exist has significant implications for the kind of policy likely to prove 
appropriate and effective in the long-term. Firstly, many countries have been 
concerned solely with health insurance, particularly the United States. There is a 
much stronger argument for legislative redress in this area, since healthcare has a 
greater claim to being considered a primary social good than life assurance. 
Nevertheless, even in the United States, legislation has not been all encompassing. 
Federal protection of privacy only extends to those who acquire their cover through 
group insurance plans. Little protection is given to those who purchase individual
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policies. Most European countries have also focused on healthcare, particularly 
those whose systems are managed by the private sector. Of those that have 
looked specifically at life assurance, the majority have implemented simplistic 
legislation prohibiting the use of genetic information in underwriting.6
It might have been pragmatic for the UK to avoid legislation and establish a 
flexible regulatory approach. However, the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests we should question the ability of the moratorium to promote a dialogical 
process acceptable to all key stakeholders. However many committees are set up, 
and however many public consultation exercises are established, if stakeholders do 
not feel confident that their own interests will be assessed rationally and fairly, then 
the process itself can enjoy little legitimacy. Outcomes do not enjoy legitimacy 
simply because they satisfy the majority view. The process itself must be seen to 
be fair and acceptable, in principle, to all. Even if the decision made through a 
conciliatory and equitable process leads ultimately to a less ideal outcome than one 
achieved through political bargaining, it may still enjoy greater legitimacy in 
principle. If one proceeds indefinitely with a politically entrenched process in which 
some views are given greater priority than others, simply because it is politically 
expedient to do so, eventually a decision will be made that unjustifiably subjugates 
the rights and interests of a particular group. So far, there has been little attempt to 
reach consensus on some of the substantive issues underlying the debate. Since 
the implementation of the five-year moratorium, many of the official regulatory and
6 See Reilly, 1997 and Chin-Hul Lai and Kleiner, 1999 for a comprehensive analysis of Slate and 
Federal legislation on genetic information and insurance. Frankel, 1999 also provides an excellent 
analysis of the political interests in the US shaping congressional decision-making. He points to the 
coalitions that have been established, under the banner of genetic privacy rights, which have had a 
significant impact on the way Government has framed the agenda Rather like in the UK, it has mainly 
been those people against insurer's access to genetic test information whose voice has resonated 
loudest in the political process.
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policy bodies have produced very little in the way of new strategies for resolution. 
One exception has been the HGC and GAIC. Recently (24 September 2003) they 
set up a joint public meeting to discuss genetics, insurance, and fairness. Three 
substantive issues discussed were insurance products and the relevance of 
genetics, the use of family history by insurers and geneticists, and individual 
protection against risk. (HGC, 2003, page 1) The rationale for the meeting was to 
allow various stakeholders to discuss some of the broader issues pertinent to the 
problem. These kinds of meetings are certainly important, and likely to provide a 
means of reaching consensus, but their role has, historically, been relatively 
marginal. There have been far too few meetings like this over the past few years.
Cook (1999) argues that ethics and morality must be used to aid society in 
coming to terms with the genetics and insurance issue. He points to the danger of 
allowing geneticists and insurers to make decisions alone. Cook believes that 
legislation can be avoided if professional bodies can maintain general good 
practice and enjoy the support and confidence of the public. He writes: The retreat 
to legislation is a confession of failure in terms of our ability to relate to each other 
and to order our medical and insurance practices.' (Cook, 1999, 162) A decision­
making structure that recognises political and ideological dissonance, but does not 
allow this to define a particular policy outcome, may provide the only means of 
avoiding the worst consequences of rash and emotive policymaking, and might 
truly enjoy both public and commercial confidence.
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6. CONCLUSION
This chapter, and the one preceding it, has provided a comprehensive 
sociological analysis of stakeholder accounts of the genetics and insurance 
problem, and their representation in the formal policy and regulatory process. The 
first section of this chapter assessed in detail the work of the various advisory 
committees and regulatory processes that have been responsible for shaping 
policy over the last few years on the issue of genetics and insurance. This section 
was guided by the fourth research question. The formal policy process, it was 
argued, emerged in response to growing fears and concerns that a genetic 
underclass might emerge if insurers have unrestrained access to new kinds of 
medical information. This process was supposed to provide a balanced 
assessment of the likely social, commercial, and ethical implications, and offer the 
Government pragmatic, evidence-based policy recommendations. However, an 
analysis of how this process emerged and evolved, and a critical examination of 
the advisory committee system and those interest groups that have contributed to 
it, revealed inherent flaws that could undermine equitable policymaking. The 
various committees appeared too narrowly focused and often neglected the deeper 
social, ethical, and commercial complexities of the problem. They, like the relevant 
stakeholders, tended to operationalise particular narrative frameworks and 
marginalise or prioritise certain substantive issues. They also differentially judged 
the legitimacy of stakeholder evidence based on what was for them politically 
expedient. The frequent use of emotive language such as 'discrimination', 'social 
exclusion’, and ‘genetic underclass', without recognition that such concepts are
273
highly ambiguous and contested, served to underlie the extent to which the debate 
had become politically-charged and ideological.
The third section focused on stakeholder accounts of the policy process. This 
contributed further to answering the third research question. Even though most 
stakeholders could accept, in principle, the current moratorium, the lack of faith in 
the political process itself revealed the underlying flaws in using this kind of system 
for arbitrating competing interests. The fact that the various stakeholders had very 
different reasons for accepting the moratorium, differentially judged the nature of 
the political process and the legitimacy of those committees constituting it, and 
appeared divided as to what the eventual outcome of the compromise ought to be, 
demonstrated further the political conflicts that will likely persist throughout and 
beyond the moratorium.
The fourth section further revealed the politicisation of the genetics and 
insurance debate, through a critical analysis of the impact public opinion, and 
media representations, has had on the strategies of stakeholders and the 
policymaking/regulatory process. Perceived public opinion appeared to be driving 
not only the political response to the issue, but also the strategies of key 
stakeholders as they gave account of their beliefs. The media was also shown to 
have aroused public fear and scepticism with their emotive anti-insurance industry 
rhetoric. The frequent reference to 'the public’, within policy documents and 
expressed by interview respondents, was shown to be based on an inaccurate 
perceived understanding of who the public are and what they really believe. The 
various polls and surveys carried out to reveal the true public mood were also
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critiqued for failing to distinguish between an informed and uninformed public. 
Because survey data is often used strategically by various organisations and 
interest groups to legitimise their beliefs, and may directly influence the policy 
framework, the distinction becomes even more crucial. The failure to look more 
critically at public attitudes resulted in a policy process that responded to the 
perceptions of an uninformed and ambiguously defined public who, unsurprisingly, 
had little interest in commercial norms and values. This section provided interesting 
answers to the fifth research question.
The final section concluded the chapter by reflecting on the status of the current 
moratorium. It was argued that the debate may need to be broadened so that the 
deeper and more nuanced roots of the problem can be deliberated in a fair and 
equitable manner. The continued conflict between the basic interests and values of 
stakeholders has done little to help the policymaking process. If anything, it has 
rendered it evermore complex and capricious. The question is whether an 
alternative, citizen-centred process of decision-making might provide a better 
means of resolving this conflict. The final chapter will asses the suitability of the 
citizens' jury approach and provide answers to the final research question.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapters critically assessed a number of complex issues 
surrounding the use of genetic information by life assurance companies, and 
revealed a number of flaws in the policymaking and regulatory process. They
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offered a critical sociological analysis of the substantive theoretical issues 
underlying the debate, and began to highlight the diverse ways in which Key 
stakeholders can manipulate the social, political, and ethical boundaries of the 
problem by marginalising or prioritising particular value narratives. The purpose 
of this chapter will be to assess, in light of the issues so far discussed, the 
suitability of the citizens’ jury as an alternative policymaking model. This chapter 
will provide answers to the sixth research question. The substantive theoretical 
issues underlying the citizens’ jury method, as well as its practical exigencies, 
will be critically evaluated.
The opening section will look at the role of representative democratic 
institutions and reveal their inherent flaws. In practice, such institutions have a 
tendency to represent either what they perceive to be the ideological beliefs of 
the majority or the sectional interests of a minority. This section will discuss the 
political ideals of the early intellectuals who helped create the liberal tradition of 
representative government. However, it will situate their defence of liberal 
democracy within an historical context; one where the majority had no political 
voice and procedurally representative institutions emerged as the only 
conceivable alternative to minority privilege. This historical ’ideal’ still resonates 
with contemporary democrats who often fail to recognise the limited quality, 
legitimacy, and fairness of the actual decision-making that takes place within 
representative institutions.
The next section will present the deliberative turn in political theory as 
foreshadowing contemporary experiments in citizen-centred decision-making. 
The case for basing policy decisions on the deliberative reasoning of citizens 
will be juxtaposed to the weaker proceduralist/constitutionalist conception of
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representative democratic institutions. This section will lay the foundation for a 
critical assessment of the citizens' jury.
Section 3 will move beyond the abstract theories of deliberative democrats 
and provide a critical sociological analysis of the citizens’ jury model in action. 
Although the benefits such a model might bring to democratic decision-making 
will be presented, various theoretical and practical problems associated with 
such a radical system will also be raised. Most contemporary experiments with 
the citizens' jury method will be criticised for having operationalised ill- 
conceived notions such as the 'common good’, uncritically defended an ideal of 
representation, and failed to give participants any real decision-making power. 
Difficulties around the issue of facilitation and democratic legitimacy, as well as 
the more complex problem of how citizens’ juries can supersede weak 
proceduralist representative institutions when they are bound by similar 
procedural rules, will also be addressed. Such problems may require the model 
being presented simply as an 'ideal’ regulatory mechanism for resolving the 
genetics and insurance dilemma.
In the final section, further internal and external contingencies of the citizens' 
jury model will be contemplated. The issue of the public understanding of 
science and expertise is one particularly crucial issue, because the way in 
which we conceptualise the relationship between lay and expert opinion may 
have fundamental implications for the efficacy of any jury system.
By the end of this chapter, the citizens' jury model will have been critically 
assessed. The advantages and disadvantages of the approach will have been 
presented so that we can offer some answers to the final research question.
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2. INTERESTS, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POVERTY OF REPRESENTATIVE 
DEMOCRACY
Evolution of the idealised form of representative government that now 
dominates most Western societies was a slow and arduous process. It was 
dependent on the experiences of individuals who found themselves situated in a 
succession of tumultuous and ideologically unstable historical periods, which 
began to mould their conception of the constitutional boundaries of 'good 
government'. The Enlightenment, in particular, played a significant role in 
reconfiguring peoples’ perception of their place in traditional social hierarchies. 
The emergence of liberalism, as a political movement based on the inviolable 
rights of individuals, both shaped and represented these changing constructions 
of the political order, and served to challenge the minority power and privilege 
that dominated the antecedent social and political landscape.
Once liberalism became the dominant ideology, representative government 
emerged as the archetypal democratic model for uniting both the liberties and 
obligations of citizens within a new framework of political equality. The early 
proponents of representative democracy focused predominantly on the design 
and formal implementation of procedural rules to guarantee all interests would 
be recognised within the social and political institutions of a government by and 
for the people. However, although the intentions of these early democrats were 
laudable, and perhaps imperative in the context of the great inequalities of their 
time, it would be inappropriate to take for granted the democratic procedures 
they considered so essential for effective government. In particular, one may 
need to question the premise that formal representation within the central 
political institutions, coupled with regular casting of votes within a party political 
system, by its very nature enhances the quality and legitimacy of decision­
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making. However, the widespread acceptance of the contemporary 
representative democratic model, held by many to be the emblem of a free and 
open society, has perhaps undermined critical analyses of the quality of 
deliberation that takes place within its institutions.
2.1. Proceduralism  W ithin Representative Institu tions as a Means of 
Protection Against Tyranny
John Stuart Mill’s famous essay Considerations on Representative 
Government, offers one of the most salient defences of the representative 
system of government and the procedural rules necessary for sustaining it. 
However, despite being an advocate of the representative structures of 
government, Mill also recognised that political institutions are the conscious 
creation of human subjects. Therefore, the mere existence of the system does 
not by itself determine the quality of decision-making. Mill posited an Important 
qualitative distinction between the machinery of government and those citizens 
who actively engage with it. Even if the quality of the formal political machinery 
is high, this can prove impotent as an equitable and legitimate vehicle for social 
and political change if participants lack certain fundamental qualities or virtues. 
Mill wrote:
’ ... if the checking functionaries are as corrupt or negligent as those whom 
they ought to check, and if the public, the mainspring of the whole checking 
machinery, are too ignorant, too passive, or too careless and inattentive, to 
do their part, little benefit will be derived from the best administrative 
apparatus.' (Mill, 1998, 228)
Mill wanted to promote the ideal of an active and educated citizenry, as he 
believed that those who wield political power should be drawn from the most
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intelligent and virtuous members of the community. However, he also longed for 
the representation of all interests, not just those of a minority or majority. Mill 
was as much concerned by the possibility of 'tyranny by the majority’ as he was 
of an ‘elected dictatorship'. He w rote:'... no class, not even the most numerous, 
shall be able to reduce all but itself to political insignificance, and direct the 
course of legislation and administration by its exclusive class interest.’ (Ibid, 
326) Tocqueville, in his classic text Democracy in America, also feared that 
American democracy, despite its laudable attempt to harness a spirit of liberty' 
that resonates naturally within free, fair, and democratic institutions, might fall 
into the trap of acquiescing to the whims of a majority. He wrote: ‘If it be 
admitted that a man possessing absolute power may misuse that power by 
wronging his adversaries, why should not a majority be liable to the same 
reproach?’ (Tocqueville, 1994, Vol 1, 259) In his book, The Road to Serfdom, 
Hayek (1944) also argued that it would be a mistake to assume that as long as 
the majority will is the primary source of power then that power is non-arbitrary. 
He wrote:
There is no justification for the belief that so long as power is conferred by 
democratic procedure, it cannot be arbitrary; the contrast suggested by this 
statement is altogether false: it is not the source but the limitation of power 
which prevents it from being arbitrary. Democratic control m ay prevent 
power from becoming arbitrary, but it does not do so by its mere existence.' 
(Hayek, 1944, 74)
The concerns and anxieties expressed by these early democrats are just as 
important today. However, despite recognising the possible aberrations of 
representative government, most early intellectuals believed that solutions lay 
within the framework of the representative system itself. They believed that 
tyranny by majorities or minorities could be tempered by simply reconstituting 
the rules and procedures of the political system. The intractable problem of how
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best to balance the competing interests and ideologies of particular individuals 
and groups was not considered one germane to the system of representation 
itself, but merely to the way in which it was constituted and utilised by the 
people.
Today, the constitutionalist/proceduralist system of representative 
government is revered as the best and most practical model for contemporary 
liberal societies. Many believe that the virtue of a representative institution lies 
in its ability to aggregate individual preferences and prescribe inexorable rules 
and procedures for guaranteeing their expression. However, by idolising a 
particular form of representative government, they often ignore its inherent flaws 
as an equitable system of decision-making.
2.2. Ideology, Interests, and P o litic isation: The Poverty o f Representative 
Institu tions
Decision-making flaws within representative Institutions have a number of 
root causes. These fall broadly under the categories of ideology, interests, and 
politicisation. Once representative democracy establishes itself as the dominant 
model of a nation’s political order, every decision tends to be defined as a 
political action guided by political interests and expediency. In party political 
systems, individual rights, interests, and reasons for embracing certain political 
and social beliefs become subsumed under an imagined group ideology, which 
the respective political parties then attempt to represent, manipulate, or even 
create. This is perhaps inevitable, as no political Institution or party can 
effectively represent the totality of diverse interests circulating within society. 
Therefore, they must aggregate the preferences of atomised individuals under
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the rubric of a single coherent political philosophy. Touraine (1998) grasped this 
point most clearly when he wrote:
'If interests are multiple and diverse and if, ultimately, all voters have a 
series of particular demands ... it is impossible to define a policy that 
represents the interests of the majority or of a number of important and 
active minorities. If representa tive  is to exist, the demands that emanate 
from very different individuals and sectors of social life m ust be 
aggregated.’ (Touraine, 1998, 51)
However, in trying to aggregate individual preferences, representative 
democracies tend to operationalise a 'universalist' approach to policymaking. 
When confronted with a particularly complex policy problem, such as the issue 
of genetics and insurance, representative institutions conceptualise solutions by 
reference to how they may satisfy the demands of various group interests. The 
inherent quality of the arguments becomes subordinate to an appreciation of 
both the real and imagined power of 'stakeholders’ and the 'public'. The 
previous chapter revealed how the Government sought to placate an imagined 
public opinion when developing its policy on the genetics and insurance issue. 
They could have simply appeased the minority interests of the commercial 
sector, or those individual consumers who wished to profit from their 'healthy' 
genetic constitution, but this would still have been a political and ideologically 
based solution; one that would have simply prioritised either the rights of an 
open market or the right of individuals to acquire ‘social justice'. Representative 
institutions often fail to equitably balance competing interests because they are 
driven by a political expediency that becomes practical only by viewing society 
as a number of stable ideological groups or interests that must be either 
appeased or antagonised.
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What problématisés this kind of decision-making process further is that it fails 
to recognise interests as fluid and unstable Individual preferences, which may 
only emerge through a process of active dialogue. Through deliberation, 
individuals may modify their beliefs and come to realise that their underlying 
interests are different to how they imagined them to be prior to discursive 
engagement with fellow citizens. However, in pluralistic societies dominated by 
representative institutions, the scope for citizen participation in deliberative 
forums has become severely limited. Therefore, interests are aggregated and 
artificially fixed under totalising group ideologies. The political representatives 
then merely play the game of politics in order to increase their power and 
influence. Politics becomes, as Weber aptly described, a vocation whereby: ‘He 
who is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving other 
aims, ideal or egoistic, or as “power for power's sake," that is, in order to enjoy 
the prestige-feeling that power gives.’ (Weber, 1946, 78)
For Weber, this competitive and elitist form of parliamentary government was 
inevitable in modern bureaucratic societies. As someone intuitively distrustful of 
the masses and their emotionality’, and a vociferous critic of direct participation, 
he welcomed the emergence of the intellectual career politician as a 
constructive development in modern bureaucratic governance. He believed that 
the electorate should enjoy the minimalist role of periodically removing 
incompetent leaders. Schumpeter (1943) expressed a similar view with his 
theory of competitive leadership’. He argued:
’ ... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals [politicians] acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.' 
(Schumpeter, 1943, 269)
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Weber’s analysis of bureaucratic governance, and Schumpeter's writings on 
competitive leadership, aptly describe a contemporary political landscape, in 
which the power and influence of the citizen has become seriously corroded. 
However, while Weber and Schumpeter believed the attenuation of power 
invested in the citizen to be a panacea for democratic poverty in pluralistic 
societies, an argument could be made for weakening the stronghold of political 
elites in order to reinvigorate democratic citizenship.
It is not just the political parties and institutions that must politicise every 
policy issue, and think in terms of universal ideological categories, within the 
modern structures of representative government. Individual citizens, if they 
desire any form of real political power, must themselves subsume their 
individual preferences under the banner of a universal group Identity. The 
political system is then used instrumentally to promote the supposedly shared 
ideology of the group. Interest groups become mere lobbyists who attempt to 
force government to accept their own conceptualisation and interpretation of the 
’social good’. Touraine asks:
How can democracy be preserved if African Americans, Native Americans, 
and women define themselves primarily In terms of their being and see 
institutions merely as instruments promoting the interests of an elite or, 
alternatively, their own interests?’ (Touraine, op cit., 65)
Again, the preceding analysis of the genetics and insurance debate revealed 
the ways in which stakeholders ultimately use the political system to protect 
sectional interests. It is a consequence of stakeholders having to use 
representative institutions instrumentally, that individuals must imagine 
themselves as part of a broader political interest. Otherwise, they lose any
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effective voice and have no guarantee that their disparate interests or desires 
will be satisfied.1
The argument put forward in this section has been that representative 
institutions provide an inadequate mechanism for resolving complex 
disagreements in policy areas requiring reasoned and impartial deliberation. 
Because those who defend the existing representative institutions have focused 
almost exclusively and uncritically on the procedural rules that guarantee all 
views and interests may be freely expressed, there has been little critical 
analysis of the actual forms of deliberation fostered within the representative 
structures themselves. The present system falls under the category of what 
Held (1996) refers to as protective democracy’. This position is predicated on 
the idea that, '... given the pursuit of self-interest and individually motivated 
choices in human affairs, the only way to prevent domination by others is 
through the creation of accountable Institutions.’ (Held, 1996, 75) In contrast, 
there is ‘developmental democracy', which: '... avers that political participation 
is a desirable end in itself and is a (if not the) central mechanism for the 
development of an active, informed and involved citizenry.’ (Ibid, 75) For 
developmental democrats, the casting of a single vote every few years does not 
provide a sufficiently strong basis for informed political participation.
It is clear that the ideal of democracy may often lie discordant with its lived 
and practical reality. A far stronger conception of democracy may be essential if
' Sometimes groups seek to have their interests legally protected on the basis that their cultural 
identity is under threat. This often breaks with the equality principle of liberalism in not extending 
the new rights to those external to the culture. The political theory of "multiculturallsm" tends to be 
supportive of such practices, and often tries to demonstrate that equality is not really being 
compromised when we allow specific cultures to retain all their identity-dependent practices and 
traditions. See Barry, 2001 for a comprehensive egalitarian liberalist critique of this strand of the 
multiculturalism agenda.
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we wish to realign the ‘ideal’ and the 'real' of democratic citizenship. The 
deliberative turn in democratic theory tried to move us in this direction.
3. THE DELIBERATIVE TURN IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY
3.1 ‘Thin ' and ‘S trong’ Democracy
The deliberative turn in democratic thought began to highlight the poor quality 
of deliberation fostered within representative democracies and tried to create a 
more active role for citizens. The existing system was labelled ‘thin’ democracy, 
because citizens had such a limited role. In the 1980s, Barber (1984) provided a 
communitarian critique of ’thin’ liberal democracy. He advocated an alternative 
‘strong’ democratic model based on direct citizen participation. Barber argued 
that although the narrow proceduralism of thin democratic models was capable 
of protecting the individual from unjustifiable assault on his or her private 
interests and property, it could not promulgate a broader conception of civic 
virtue and participation. (Barber, 1984, 4) He wrote:
’ ... thin democratic politics is at best a politics of static interest, never a 
politics of transformation; a politics of bargaining and exchange, never a 
politics of invention and creation; and a politics that conceives of women 
and men at their worst (in order to protect them from themselves), never at 
their potential best (to help them become better than they are). (Ibid, 24,25)
With ‘strong’ democracy, Barber imagined the possibility of a community of 
citizens galvanised by civic purpose, rather than homogenous and stable 
ideological interests, who unite in search of a common purpose through 
participatory institutions. (Ibid, 117) Barber considered his conception to be not
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only consonant with, but also dependent upon, the politics of conflict, the 
sociology of pluralism, and the separation of the public and private sphere. 
Furthermore, the sheer scale of modern bureaucratic and pluralistic societies 
did not, according to Barber, reduce the scope and efficacy of participatory 
politics. Therefore, the new model was: wedded neither to antiquarian 
republicanism nor to face-to-face parochialism.’ (Ibid, 117) Barber defined 
‘strong democracy' formally as:
‘Politics in the participatory mode where conflict is resolved in the absence 
of an independent ground through a participatory process of ongoing, 
proximate self-legislation and the creation of a political community capable 
of transforming dependent, private individuals into free citizens and partial 
and private interests into public goods. ' (Barber, op cit, 132)
Barber believed that his participatory model challenged ‘the politics of elites and 
masses that masquerades as democracy in the West.' (Ibid, 117)
Barber’s work influenced a number of deliberative democrats throughout the 
1990s. Their debates require some analysis, because they may be crucial to 
any fair assessment of the suitability of the citizens’ jury.
3.2 The Nature of Deliberative Democracy
Bohman (1996) provided one of the most expansive accounts of the nature 
and scope of public deliberation. Influenced by the work of Habermas, Bohman 
believed that the ‘dialogical approach’ to decision-making offered the best 
alternative to thin representative democracy. He argued that within a truly 
deliberative process, citizens justify their decisions through appeals to common 
interests. They are encouraged to base their arguments on reasons that all 
participants could accept in principle. There is therefore something in the nature
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of deliberation, when organised effectively, which produces 'reasonable 
decisions' that are epistemically superior to those not ‘publicly tested'. 
Deliberative democracy appears to both improve the quality of the reasons for 
decision-making and simultaneously promote egalitarian principles. (Bohman, 
1996, pp 5,6)
Although procedures are a necessary element of any institutionalised form of 
decision-making, proceduralism itself cannot, according to Bohman, explain 
why deliberative participants find various arguments convincing. Proceduralism 
may tell us how to guarantee equality, but it does n o t:'... specify when a reason 
is publicly convincing.' (Ibid, 32) Bohman claims that only in a deliberative 
system can we achieve this publicity requirement. Although representative 
systems can satisfy two other requirements of any truly authentic democracy, 
that is non-tyranny and political equality; it rarely satisfies the third precondition.
Fishkin (1991) also supported these three essential conditions of democracy, 
but argued that most political models are forced to trade-off political equality 
and public deliberation. He argued that democrats such as J.S. Mill sacrificed 
political equality in order to achieve non-tyranny and some form of publicity, 
while most modern democratic theorists have tended to sacrifice deliberation. 
Fishkin writes: 'We seem to face a forced choice between equal but relatively 
incompetent masses and politically unequal but relatively more competent 
elites.’ (Fishkin, 1991, 1,2) However, both Fishkin and Bohman believed that 
only through the deliberative model could all three requirements be met.
Deliberative democrats argue that rationality is an emergent property brought 
into existence only through co-operation and active dialogue amongst self­
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reflexive participants. They recognise that minimal procedural constraints must 
be imposed on deliberation in order to mitigate the effects of selfishness, the 
tyranny of vested interests, and the problems associated with the size of 
deliberative groups. However, it is the primacy of dialogue that most clearly 
differentiates adherents of this approach from their constitutionalist detractors.
This tendency to construe rationality as an emergent property, realised only 
through active dialogue, is firmly rooted in the Habermasian idea of 
'communicative action' and 'discourse ethics’ . In communicative action:
‘ ... actors are prepared to harmonize their plans of action through internal 
means, committing themselves to pursuing their goals only on the condition 
of an agreement -  one that already exists or one to be negotiated -  about 
definitions of the situation and prospective outcomes.' (Habermas, 1992, 
134)
Habermas argued that only through active dialogue could universal norms 
emerge. His discourse ethics, guided by the principle of communicative action, 
challenged the contractualist liberalism advocated by Rawls in his seminal text 
A Theory of Justice. Rawls believed in the primacy of justice and exhibited 
rational deliberation as an ideal means for formulating its aims and objectives. 
In deliberation, the appeal would be made to public reasons, which in a recent 
article Rawls claims are characteristic of a democratic people and represent the 
reasons of citizens and thus the ‘public good’. (Rawls, 1997, 93) However, in A 
Theory o f Justice, Rawls constructed a hypothetical ‘original position’ in which 
deliberative participants are under a ‘veil of ignorance' regarding their social 
position and individual desires and needs. The conception of 'justice as 
fairness’ that he subsequently claimed any rational person in the hypothetical
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position would choose for society,2 rendered actual physical dialogue 
superfluous. Because the 'right' was considered independent of and prior to the 
‘good’, and the original position was constructed in such a way that unanimity 
were possible, Rawls could subsequently argue that: ‘the deliberations of any 
one person are typical of all.' (Rawls, 1999, 232) For Rawls, any solitary 
individual could imagine him or herself placed in the hypothetical original 
position and reason their way toward the rights that justice requires. However, 
Habermas argued that if agreement In moral argument was to be reached:
'... it is not enough for the individual to reflect on whether he can assent to 
a norm. It is not even enough for the individual to reflect in this way and 
then to  register his vote. W hat is needed is a "real'' process of 
argumentation in which the individuals concerned cooperate.' (Habermas, 
op cit, 67)
The deliberative process favoured by most supporters of citizen participation is 
rooted in the Habermasian, as opposed to the Rawlsian, formulation.
3.3. The Process of Deliberation: A Range of Approaches
2 See Sandel, 1998 for a general critique of Rawlsian liberalism and the primacy of justice it is 
based upon. Sandel argues that Rawls' attempt to detach the Kantian approach from its 
transcendental idealism falls because deontology with a Humean face (The Rawlsian approach 
which claims the self need not be transcendental) 'either fails as deontology or recreates in the 
original position the disembodied subject it resolves to avoid. Justice cannot be primary in the 
deontological sense, because we cannot coherently regard ourselves as the kind of beings the 
deontological ethic -  whether Kantian or Rawlsian -  requires us to be.’ (Sandel, 1998, 14)
See also Gray, 1995 for a lucid account of the flaws in certain theoretical strands of political 
liberalism, in particular those that retain ' . . . a  deep attachment to liberal institutions in which their 
authority is not conditional on their contribution to the well being of those they serve.' (Gray, 1995, 
88) Gray proposes a post liberal/pluralist view that is willing to discard liberal practices if well­
being is subsequently improved. The task of post-liberal theory is to promote peaceful co­
existence amongst different cultural groups without appealing to universal standards. (Ibid, 96) In 
his most recent work, Two Faces of Liberalism, Gray argues against the liberal search for rational 
consensus on the best way of life, and endorses liberalism's alternative philosophy, which avers 
liberal toleration as the search for peaceful co-existence amongst contradictory values and 
conceptions of the good life, and employs a notion of modus Vivendi that recognises certain liberal 
principles may not be suitable for all groups and societies. (Gray, 2000)
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When we come to consider the potential advantages of deliberative politics, a 
number of diverse issues arise. How we conceptualise deliberation as a 
discrete concept will ultimately determine the practical utility of those citizen 
centred decision-making structures that have sought to cultivate the deliberative 
virtues.
Pellizoni elucidates the strengths of the deliberative model by reference to 
three inherent virtues. Firstly, there is a 'civic virtue' in that discussion has an 
educative effect on the citizens who participate. Secondly, there is a 
'governance virtue'. Decisions made after open discussion are more likely to be 
perceived by participants as legitimate. Thirdly, there is a 'cognitive virtue'. 
Pellizoni writes:
‘ If opinions and preferences are not fixed, open dialogue may give rise to 
new or more articulated points of view ... And since It is impossible to say a 
p rio ri which are the most valid arguments, there are no grounds for 
restricting participation to a minority.’ (Pellizoni, 2001,66,67)
For Pellizoni, the deliberative virtues are all connected. However, many 
theoretical approaches concentrate too much on one virtue and ignore the 
others. Pellizoni is particularly critical of the Habermasian approach for 
prioritising the cognitive virtue of deliberation and imposing a 'unity of reason’ 
framework on the deliberative process. This provides a weak foundation 
because, as Pellizoni writes:
The force of the best argument seemingly dwindles as the dialogue 
becomes more problematic, as the conflict grows fiercer. Reason 
seemingly shatters into fragments impossible to reassemble, and 
communication seems entangled in the web of strategy, technocracy or 
rhetoric. In these situations the force of the best argument is only a myth.’ 
(Ibid, 72)
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Nevertheless, Pellizoni believes the ideal of deliberation can be rescued from 
the unity of reason if it is not compelled to rest on the internal force of 
argumentation. Instead, one must embrace the ‘plurality of reason', and 
organise deliberation on the cooperative values that naturally emerge from it. 
(Ibid, 82)
Gutman and Thompson (1996) argued that the concept of ‘reciprocity’ offers 
the best guiding principle for the deliberative process. Reciprocity is a form of 
mutuality whereby:
'Citizens try to offer reasons that other similarly motivated citizens can 
accept even though they recognize that they share only some of the other's 
values. When our deliberations about moral disagreements in politics are 
guided by reciprocity, citizens recognize and respect one another as moral 
agents, not merely as abstract objects of others’ moral reasoning.’ 
(Gutman and Thompson, 1996, 14)
By conceptualising deliberation in a reciprocal sense, Gutman and Thompson 
argue: '... we do not face the stark choice that is often posed in contemporary 
political theory. We do not have to choose between modeling democracy on 
procedural principles or founding it on comprehensive conceptions of the good.’ 
(Ibid, 92) Appeals to a 'common good' may have a pathological impact on the 
quality of deliberation. The ‘common good' argument is a particular flaw in both 
contractualist liberal and communitarian approaches to democracy, because it 
assumes the existence of an a priori and independent 'social good' that any 
rational being ought to accept and be guided towards realising. Rousseau 
referred to this as the general will’. He wrote:
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'So long as a number of men gathered together consider themselves as a 
single body, they have a single will also, which is directed to th e ir common 
conservation and to the general welfare ... the common good is so obvious 
everywhere, and all that Is required to perceive it is good sense.' 
(Rousseau, 1994, 134)
The totalitarian/tyrannical interpretation of this passage may apply equally to 
those theorists who believe such inexorable laws ought to guide deliberative 
participants. However, they provide no explanation of what such universal 
maxims constitute, how in practice they may be realised, or what impact they 
may have on the quality of outcomes.
Deliberation guided by the ideal of mutual reciprocity and not constrained by 
appeals to a 'common good’, builds a foundation for a citizen centred model of 
decision-making. What lies at the heart of the deliberative process is the 
collective nature of decision-making. Dryzek (2000) uses the term discursive 
democracy’ in order to accentuate this point. The point is that this new form of 
political democracy provides, according to its supporters, the  best means of 
achieving rational, fair, and democratically legitimate decisions.
The theories of deliberative democracy presented in this section emerged as 
a direct response to what was considered a deliberative and democratic deficit 
within contemporary representative political institutions. In a sense, these ideas 
laid the groundwork for subsequent experiments in citizen-centred 
policymaking. However, many of the recent converts to this method have 
applied the new decision-making models without appreciating the theoretical 
complexity of the deliberative approach. If citizens’ juries are to supplant the
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existing policymaking frameworks, it is important to recognise both their 
advantages and disadvantages.
4. THE CITIZENS' JURY AND POLICYMAKING: DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY IN ACTION
As was illustrated in previous chapters, the emotive issue of genetics and 
insurance has been one of immense complexity, in which conflicting scientific, 
social, and political Interests have vied for recognition and representation in the 
formal policy process. However, the lack of informed, balanced, and reasoned 
deliberation of the issue appeared to undermine the possibility of an equitable 
solution being found. The question is whether a well-structured and critically 
adept citizen-centred decision-making process might improve the quality of 
policymaking, and render deliberative theory more than simply an abstract ideal.
4.1. The Basic Structure o f the Citizens’ Jury: A Critique o f the ABI Jury
Advocates of the citizens’ jury have constructed a standard formulaic model 
for its implementation. A citizens’ jury usually consists of 12-16 representatives 
of the lay public who are asked to deliberate a contentious policy Issue and offer 
guidelines and recommendations for action. Usually a specific commissioning 
body, which is seeking public attitudes to, or justification for, a range of possible 
policy alternatives, requests an independent organisation to organise and 
manage the process. This independent body consults extensively with the 
commissioning organisation before framing the overall aims and objectives of 
the jury. The independent body also takes responsibility for selecting the
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witnesses and facilitator, collating relevant materials, and assigning roles to the 
participants. The actual jury usually sits for up to 4 days, but the entire process 
may last many months. The pre-jury ‘boundary work' does not often involve 
citizens.
The citizens’ jury has two fundamental processes at its core. One process is 
witness testimony', in which pre-selected 'experts’ deliver presentations, hand 
out reading materials, and subject themselves to cross-examination by jurors. 
A second process involves deliberation amongst the individual jurors, which is 
managed by a professional facilitator. Here, the jurors are required to discuss 
the witness testimony and collectively formulate fair and equitable solutions to 
the policy problem posed to them. The facilitator's role is to ensure that 
deliberation is managed effectively (i.e. jurors do not digress too far from their 
predefined objectives), and that the deliberative virtues of equality, non-tyranny, 
and reasonable/non-selfish discussion are sustained. In certain cases, the 
facilitator writes the final report on behalf of the jurors.
Many argue that this method provides the best (in terms of rational, fair, and 
democratic decision-making) approach to policymaking on issues defined by a 
number of complex and ideologically dissonant agendas. By reducing the power 
of political elites, and delegating greater responsibility to the lay citizen, it is 
argued that decision-making can become freed from the whims of political 
expediency, and lead to more focused, rational, and equitable policy. However, 
the uncritical application of the citizens’ jury, in this minimalist procedural sense, 
may defile both the underlying ethos of the model and the supposedly sublime 
deliberative virtues at its core. If such a system is to be applied to the issue of
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genetics and insurance, both the strengths and weaknesses of the model must 
be recognised.
The citizens’ jury commissioned by the ABI in 1997, to gain public feedback 
on the first draft of its code of practice, illustrates how easily deliberative ideals 
can be compromised during practical experimentation in participatory politics. 
The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) took responsibility for running 
the ABI Jury. (IPPR, 1997) After consulting with the ABI on the key questions 
they wanted addressed, and the general objectives they hoped the process 
would achieve, the IPPR spent three months constructing an agenda for a four- 
day jury. The agenda setting process consisted of advisory meetings, focus 
groups, and consultation with stakeholders. Draft agendas were formulated and 
sent to various interest groups for feedback.
It could be argued that because the general aims and objectives of the jury 
were framed by the ABI, who had a stake in the outcome of the process, the 
democratic legitimacy of the jury was compromised from its inception. 
Furthermore, because the IPPR selected the witnesses and drafted the agenda, 
without any significant input from those who would eventually be subject to its 
theoretical and practical constraints, the power of the jurors to effect any real 
change was always going to be limited. Stewart et al (1994) argue that the 
organisation of citizens’ juries by independent bodies raises the same concerns 
about accountability as those juries managed by official organisations with 
vested interests. The fact that in this case the IPPR took responsibility for 
writing the final report, as well as disseminating the outcomes of jury 
deliberations, should alert us to the diverse ethical dilemmas engendered by all 
citizen-centred decision-making processes. However, although Stewart et al
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defend the idea of a citizens’ jury in principle, they do present it simply as a 
complement to the existing representative systems rather than an autonomous 
and independent process. They foresee the role of citizens as one limited to 
exploring issues and making recommendations.
Ortwin et al’s (1993) ‘three-step’ model of participatory politics implicitly 
supports this minimalist conception. In the first step, concerns are identified 
and evaluative criteria established through consultation with stakeholders. In the 
second step, independent ‘experts’ establish a framework for identifying and 
measuring the impact of various decision options. In the final stage, randomly 
selected citizens aggregate and weigh the pre-defined options given to them 
and make ’informed’ decisions. This model involves citizens in the most limited 
sense. Although the ideal of an informed citizenry who make value judgements 
in a non-selfish, informed, and politically-neutral way is still encouraged in the 
final stage of the process, the citizens' power and influence is limited because 
they have no role in establishing the evaluative criteria. This was also the case 
in the ABI citizens’ jury. The jurors were not making binding decisions that the 
ABI had pre-committed to implement, and the ABI promised only to consider the 
jurors’ recommendations and provide reasons for either accepting or rejecting 
them. In this sense, the jury was little better than a focus group; existing simply 
as one of a variety of methods to reveal public attitudes. Pickard (1998), in her 
critique of two juries run by a health authority, argues that without legislative 
authority the citizens' jury can in the end prove disempowering. (Pickard, 1998, 
243)
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With any model of public participation, the question of why the public ought to 
be involved requires a response. The way in which we conceptualise the role of 
the public, and the quality of the outcomes we expect from their deliberations, is 
dependent on the general structure of the model and the framing of its 
objectives. As Lenaghan (1999) writes in relation to public involvement in health 
care decisions:
'... when ordinary people are given the time and opportunity, they can 
participate meaningfully in decisions about the allocation of finite resources 
for health care. However, this is not a given, but depends on the nature of 
the question that is put to the jury, the development of the agenda and the 
kind of information which they have access to.' (Lenaghan, 1999, 53, my 
Italics)
In the case of the ABI jury, one could argue that meaningful participation was 
compromised precisely because the kind of information offered for juror 
deliberation, and the procedural methods used to frame the agenda, were 
democratic and comprehensive in the weakest possible sense. For example, 
the diversity of witness testimony was limited, and the jury had no option to 
request additional testimony if they believed this would enhance the quality of 
their decision-making. The hypothetical case studies that were deployed as a 
heuristic device to aid the jurors in their deliberations were also provided by the 
ABI. This perhaps ought to have been questioned on impartiality grounds. The 
ABI jury did deliberate the Issue of whether insurance companies should be 
permitted access to genetic information, extensively discussed the code of 
practice, and considered important general questions such as who should have 
ultimate responsibility for the insurance needs of citizens. However, the final 
recommendations emerged from a crude method of aggregative voting on 
specific issues within the code of practice. In the end, the jury supported the 
ABI's general approach. The ABI (1997a) responded enthusiastically to the
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recommendations, and considered what jurors perceived to be lacking in the 
code. These were relatively minor procedural details. One must ask how the 
ABI would have responded had the jurors been far more critical of their 
approach and demanded a fundamental shift in policy.
The ABI case study demonstrates that if citizens’ juries are to become 
effective decision-making bodies, a number of procedural problems need to be 
resolved. One could argue that the role of citizens ought to extend beyond the 
deliberative process itself and include the actual framing of the agenda. Those 
with a stake in the outcome of the process should also have a far more limited 
role in any organisational design. Many of the problems associated with 
practical implementations of the citizens' jury are often a consequence of the 
process being non-institutionalised. Because juries are commissioned by 
specific organisations, who bear the financial burdens (around £16,000-£24,000 
for a 4-day Jury), these organisations are likely to demand a certain level of 
control over the outcome. They can do this by ensuring that the process is 
organised in such a way that their pre-defined ideal position is more likely to find 
representation in the outcome. They then simply reap the reward of having their 
position enjoy a simulacrum of democratic legitimacy by having involved the 
public. Even Ortwin et al recognise this when they claim that stakeholders may 
challenge the legitimacy of the process if they begin to perceive themselves as 
having little real power. (Ortwin et al, op cit., 201) Irwin (2001), makes the 
important point that: ’Viewed critically, this ‘pre-framing’ of the agenda ... 
restricts the possibilities for public responses to operate within their own terms 
of reference and frameworks.’ (Irwin, 2001,9)
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Slaton (2001) notes that while participatory models are useful at a time when 
the public has an intuitive distrust of government, people will not settle for such 
models if they do not lead to both an increased voice for the people and a real 
commitment that their decisions will be represented in formal policy. (Slaton, 
2001,360) Similarly, Fuller (2001) argues, in relation to consensus conferences 
on the disposal of industrial waste, that public confidence is unlikely to be 
inspired if: the public is not involved in constructing the knowledge base It
needs for considering the disposal options.’ (Fuller, 2001,22) Citizens must be 
central to all parts of the jury process. It may not be possible for the specific 
citizens sitting on the final jury to perform the preliminary 'boundary' work, but it 
should be members of the lay public all the same.
So far, this section has outlined some necessary procedural conditions 
relating to the general framework of the citizens’ jury, and its pre-jury planning, 
through a critique of a particular citizens’ jury in action. However, the efficacy of 
the deliberative process ultimately stands or falls on the quality of the 
deliberation manifested within this basic structure. It is now necessary to look 
more closely at the role of jurors, witnesses, and facilitators. This will allow us to 
critically evaluate the potential of the process for resolving something like the 
genetics and insurance problem.
4.2. C itizen’s Juries and Deliberative Rationality
The citizens’ jury rests on the idea that ordinary members of the public can 
bring to the surface new perspectives on social and scientific issues and make 
a positive contribution to policymaking. Stewart et al point out that, ‘theirs 
[citizens] are not the judgements of vested interests, but of ordinary citizens with
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no particular axe to grind. They bring too experience and understanding which 
is not otherwise available to government "experts".’ (Stewart et al, op cit, 7)
The notion that citizens can improve the quality of decision-making because 
they are non-political, attached ideologically to no particular solution, and 
guided only by their duty as a citizen to seek 'reasonable' and ‘fair’ decisions, 
resonates deeply with advocates of the citizens’ jury model, but it should not be 
regarded as a given. One cannot simply place citizens in the jury system, 
provide them with a series of ‘expert’ testimonies and the time and space for 
deliberation, and then simply assume that the decisions made will conform to 
an ideal of deliberative reasoning. One must look critically at the construction 
and management of the actual deliberative process.
4.2.1. Selection of Jurors and Witnesses, and the Roles they are Ascribed
The potency of the citizens' jury rests in part on the methods used to select 
jurors and witnesses. Most supporters of the citizens' jury model argue that 
jurors ought to constitute a representative’ sample. The central idea is that the 
model can only be democratically legitimate if participants in some way 
represent the various communities and interests that may be directly or 
indirectly affected by the particular policy decision. However, by prioritising 
representation in the citizens’ jury, one may simply be recreating the problem of 
politicisation and ideological intransigence inherent to representative 
institutions. Fuller (2002b) makes the important point that:
There is nothing intrinsically valuable about having citizens' juries 
constituted in certain proportions of the population. A “cross section of the 
public” is valuable only insofar as it results in a framework that adequately 
distinguishes between the personal interests of the jurors and the diverse 
interests of the larger society, with the understanding that the full range of
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those interests can never be represented by a single jury.’ (Fuller, 2002b, 
215)
Smith and Wales (2000) argue that ‘incluslvity’ may be a more useful term in 
conceptualising the ideal make-up of the jury, because it avoids any essentialist 
connotation. (Smith and Wales, 2000, 56) If jurors are selected on the condition 
that they represent some essential social category, identity, or political position, 
then equitable decision-making may become impossible. Smith and Wales 
argue that: 'This emphasis on representation may undermine the democratic 
ideal of the inclusive jury.’ (Ibid, 56)
The primary principle when selecting jurors is that the process is as inclusive 
as possible. The greatest variety of social actors should be afforded the 
opportunity to participate, but only on the basis that this may have a salutary 
impact on decision-making. However, it may sometimes be necessary to 
exclude certain individuals from the deliberative process. For example, 
individuals who are unwilling to be constrained by the procedural rules of the 
jury or who manifestly refuse to be receptive to alternative arguments, perhaps 
ought to be prohibited from participating. Similarly, individuals w ith a clear stake 
in the outcome of the issue being deliberated should not be considered as a lay 
member of the jury.
The goal of true Inclusivity will likely be an elusive ideal never fully realised. 
Evidence from studies of legal juries illustrates that many people do not wish to 
participate, and those who do often find the process deeply unfulfilling. Some 
individuals therefore allow their personal prejudices, or antipathy towards the 
general legal process, to affect the quality of their deliberations. Page (1998) 
makes the important observation that social class differences in perceptions of
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citizen participation may also affect the desire to participate. His research on the 
People’s Panel discovered that:
many working class people remain suspicious of anything at all to do 
with "government" (any government) -  or research activities that demand 
more than answering a questionnaire ... we found that mentioning the 
potential to be invited to a focus group or a citizens’ jury was actually 
disturbing and alarming to a few people.’ (Page, 1998, 6)
Because most advocates of the citizens' jury method believe passionately in 
the idea of representation, most have had to contemplate the controversial idea 
of compelling citizens to participate. However, to compel a recalcitrant citizen to 
engage at any substantial level with complex social policy issues, and 
deliberate effectively with fellow citizens, would defile the very virtues presented 
by deliberative democrats. Participants must essentially wanfto participate. This 
does of course raise the problem of how such a process achieves legitimacy if it 
is not at all representative. This crucial issue will be dealt with in more detail 
later.
Witness selection differs from juror selection in that a representative process 
must be incorporated. The witnesses that testify in citizens’ juries are expected 
to represent the totality of interests and perspectives germane to the policy 
issue being deliberated. This is the only way to ensure that no particular 
scientific, social, or political frame of reference is excluded from the deliberative 
process. Because the witnesses are not expected to deliberate, reach 
agreement, and ultimately resolve the specific policy dilemma, the fact that their 
views may be partial does not challenge the deliberative ideal.
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Although the witnesses are expected to deliver formal testimony, and may 
dispense to the jurors various written materials, the essential requirement is that 
the jurors are afforded an opportunity to engage the witnesses in active 
dialogue. Many experiments with the citizens' jury model have neglected this 
important aspect, usually because time constraints have rendered extensive 
two-way discussion impractical. However, in its ideal formulation, the citizens’ 
jury cannot compromise on these matters. If there is no opportunity for the 
jurors to engage with witness testimony, there is little chance that the process 
will prove much more ameliorating than the existing policymaking processes.
This section has presented the basic framework of the citizens’ jury, but 
challenged the emphasis many advocates have placed on representativeness. 
Now it is necessary to focus on the deliberative process itself, because this is 
where adherents of citizen-participation claim their model improves most on 
existing ones.
4.2.2 Facilitators and the Management of the Deliberative Process
The primary role of the facilitator is to organise and manage the participants 
as they deliberate the evidence presented by witnesses. Before considering 
this aspect of the citizens’ jury in detail, it is important to elucidate the general 
principles that must guide this process. Proponents of the citizens’ jury often 
talk about such things as the ‘social’ or 'public' good, social justice', 'welfare 
maximisation’, disinterested reasoning’, and ‘community interests’, as the 
primary guiding principles for citizen deliberation. However, few have unpacked 
these deeply problematic philosophical and political concepts and considered 
what impact they may have on the quality of deliberation. One consequence of
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adopting universal guiding principles is that a number of problems and 
contradictions begin to emerge. Price (2000) highlights a contradiction in the 
idea of a disinterested juror who is expected to simultaneously be interested in 
his/her own community. He writes:
A citizen is impartial, lacking a vested interest, or neutral, and yet also a 
taxpayer and member of the community, committed to family, friends, his 
or her city, or even the NHS. Citizens are at once disinterested and 
committed. They contemplate broader interests and yet are motivated by 
relatively narrow ones. They take the longer view and yet may also have to 
be educated into it.' (Price, 2000, 274)
The imposition of a particular framework of social justice on the deliberative 
process compounds these kinds of problems. Price is particularly critical of the 
'welfare-maximising' criterion often favoured by deliberative theorists. He 
argues that in everyday practice, the individual beliefs people hold, and the way 
they express them, are often incompatible with such immutable ideals. Instead, 
individuals generally consider issues in personal terms. By forcing jurors to 
deliberate within the constraints of a particular pre-defined framework of social 
justice, one actively suppresses alternative frames of reference and political 
rhetoric. (Ibid, 274) For example, if one were to accept a Rawlsian framework of 
justice for guiding deliberation on the insurance and genetics problem, then one 
would have to direct the jurors to consider a solution that maximised the 
benefits for the most disadvantaged, such as those likely to be denied 
insurance. On the other hand, if one accepted a libertarian inspired entitlement 
framework, such as that proposed by Nozick (1974), then any solution must 
support the right of individuals to benefit from their 'good' genetic constitution 
and enter into fair contractual relations with an insurer. Although jurors should 
be encouraged to base their deliberations on fair, rational, and publicly 
defensible reasons, no prior concept of what the social good constitutes can be
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imposed upon them. Although the most obvious solution may well be one that 
conforms to a welfare maximising or entitlement conception of justice, this 
cannot be determined a priori. It is something that should be recognised as 
emerging spontaneously as an individual's reasons are publicly tested.
Parker (2000) supports this view by arguing that we should support an idea of 
public reason and justification that embraces personal autonomy as a guiding 
principle for decision-making, especially on ethical issues surrounding genetics. 
He advocates a process that:
'... offers the possibility of a resolution of some of these questions [around 
genetics] without itself depending upon an extensive set of deeply shared 
values, or the imposition of individualistic or communitarian principles. 
While it does not itself depend upon a non-existent consensus, it offers the 
possibility of a developing, emerging consensus in a context of diversity.’ 
(Parker, 2000, 165)
The main point deliberative democrats wish to accentuate is that all the good 
that comes from deliberation emerges from individuals’ capacity to understand 
complex information and collectively make value judgements. If rationality' is an 
emergent property, any prior conceptual constraints to the deliberative process 
must be minimal. This idea has implications for the suitability of citizens’ juries 
for the genetics and life assurance issue. In chapter 2, it was argued that certain 
forms of insurance might be defined as ‘primary social goods’. However, one 
cannot begin the deliberative process by accepting this definition as given. It is 
up to the jurors, after contemplating the issue in some detail, to decide whether 
a particular insurance product can reasonably be defined as such a good' and if 
commercial constraints can justifiably be imposed in the name of 'justice'.
307
Most of the flaws that threaten practical experiments with the citizens' jury 
model, stem from problems in the management of deliberative participants. 
Most evaluations of citizens’ juries point to the educative aspects of the general 
process, highlight the fact that jurors tend to reach enlightened decisions, and 
maintain that the transparency of the method improves the quality of decisions. 
This was the case in Pellizoni and Ungaro’s (2001) analysis of three Italian case 
studies of participatory decision-making. Most participants stated that the 
defence of values, fostered in the participatory model, was more important than 
defending material interests. The authors write: ‘Participation is seen as a 
citizenship right to co-operate, rather than as the possibility to protect one's own 
interests.' (Pellizoni & Ungaro, 2001, 278) Similarly, Mclver (1998), in her 
evaluation of six pilot citizens' juries in health authority settings, found that most 
achieved their intended objectives in terms of enabling jurors to become 
informed, deliberate effectively, and make recommendations. However, 
research into the social psychological nature of deliberation serve to illustrate 
how the virtues of deliberation might ultimately depend on effective juror 
management.
The role of the facilitator is to ensure that all deliberative participants have an 
equal opportunity to speak and that any dominant personalities are prevented 
from ‘taking over’ discussions. These problems frequently arise in citizens’ 
juries and are well documented. Barnes’ (1999) evaluation of two citizens’ juries 
revealed a number of problems. In the first jury conducted in Belfast on the 
issue of health service changes: ‘It was evident both to facilitators and to the 
jurors themselves that there were some people who were playing very little part 
in the plenary discussion.’ (Barnes, 1999, 26) Similarly, in a second jury 
conducted in Swansea, which discussed policy issues relevant to an aging 
population, Barnes observed that when deliberation occurred it was often
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chaotic, with participants 'talking over' one another. Furthermore, jurors often 
drew on personal experiences but were non-specific when they did so, and they 
made little use of the witness evidence and other information sources they had 
access to. (Ibid, 37) It is imperative that the facilitator establishes and sustains a 
coherent internal dynamic within the deliberative process, makes sure that 
nobody is excluded, and ensures that all participants fulfil the important role 
given to them. A report on a jury commissioned by the Welsh Institute for Health 
and Social Care (1997) pointed out, in relation to facilitation, that:
The moderator's role was to bring together a group of people from diverse 
backgrounds, build their confidence, manage proceedings and facilitate 
both large and small group discussions in such a way that everyone felt 
that they had a say throughout the entire process. Essentially his job was 
to ensure that the Jury addressed the question and performed their task of 
making recommendations effectively.' (WIHSC, 1997, Part 2)
This provides an excellent description of how the facilitator’s role ideally ought 
to be conceptualised in any citizens’ jury. However, the quality of deliberation 
will depend ultimately on how good the facilitator is at managing the emotional 
dynamics of group behaviour.
Thompson and Hoggett (2001) provide an account of those emotional 
dynamics that may undermine citizens’ juries. However, rather than seek to 
expunge emotion from the process, the authors attempt to illustrate how its 
power can be harnessed for the good. They write:
'... since emotions are always a necessary and inevitable aspect of the life 
of all groups (Including those that appear cool, calm and collected), the 
restrictions of deliberation to reasonable dialogue is simply not an option. 
The point is that wishing the emotions were not there will not make them 
go away.' (Thompson & Hoggett, 2001,353)
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The crucial point is that to expect a lay citizen to enter the deliberative forum 
stripped entirely of their emotional, ideological, and individual beliefs is 
dangerously naive. Emotions are a constitutive part of what it is to be a socially 
embedded human, so to pretend that individuals can simply switch off the 
subjective, partial, and irrational facets of their psychology is to underestimate 
the inevitable power that emotional rhetoric will bring to bear on any ostensibly 
reasonable discussion. The role of the facilitator should not be to artificially 
create the rational, de-situated citizen who will discover, through deliberation 
with other equally rational social agents, some pre-determined ‘common good'. 
Rather, his/her role should be to effectively manage the inevitable emotional 
dynamics of collective decision-making and guide it towards the realisation of 
‘rational’ and 'fair' outcomes, which are themselves recognised as emergent 
properties.
Thompson and Hoggett refer to research on the social psychology of group 
behaviour, particularly Wilfred Bion’s groundbreaking work on Group Relations 
Theory, in order to discover a practical means of harnessing emotion within 
deliberative forums such as citizens’ juries. The authors begin by noting the 
ways in which a particular emotional culture within the deliberating group can 
result in inequality of opportunities for discussion. They write: "... if a group is 
under the sway of a particular basic assumption, it will listen to certain speakers 
and certain acts of communication much more readily than it will to others.' 
(Ibid, 356) As an example, they cite the possibility of a ‘dependent culture' that 
pays greater attention to those displaying calm authority and little doubt, and 
scant attention to those who challenge the dominant authority by questioning 
the intellectual foundations of its legitimacy. Thompson and Hoggett therefore
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warn against selecting jurors who show too much deference to authority or seek 
to reduce the opportunity of other participants to have their views expressed. 
These patterns of inequality: may shift from moment to moment as the
emotional culture of the group ebbs and flows.’ (Ibid, 356) Certain dependent 
emotional forces, the authors argue, may destroy the group itself. They write:
‘Group Relations theory describes cases in which a group finds or creates 
some sort of holy text, and then uses this text to discipline itself. In the 
most extreme case, if a dependent culture grips the group with sufficient 
force, then slavish obedience may be preferred to democratic debate ... In 
the case of citizens' juries, then, we should watch out for cases in which 
jurors are too attentive to the suggestions of the commissioning body ... or 
in which they heed too closely the words of its moderator or facilitator, or its 
expert witnesses.' (Ibid, 356,357)
The authors then outline various ways in which emotion may aid the process 
of deliberation. They begin by arguing that the closer a citizens’ jury comes to 
resemble a work-group, the better it is equipped "... to contain and then to 
harness the affective power of the basic assumptions.’ (Ibid, 357) Drawing on 
Bion's work, they postulate four necessary features of the deliberative group. 
Firstly, there must be a clear goal and purpose. The remit given to the jury is 
crucial here. If it is too vague or broad, no effective decision-making will be 
possible. However, if it is too narrow, aggregative voting may be a necessary 
outcome. An argument for permitting jurors to establish the agenda for 
deliberation may be fundamental here. For issues as complex and conflict- 
based as genetics and insurance, the efficacy of the approach may be 
contingent upon clearly defined and consensually accepted objectives.
311
Secondly, there must be no rigidly defined sub-groups. This may necessitate 
a maximum limit to the number of jurors. Group Relations theory demonstrates 
that above a certain number, internal factions may emerge and develop their 
own internal dynamic. This implies that splitting the jury into smaller groups or 
plenary sessions may prove unwise. However, the authors reject this argument 
by claiming such a practice is justified on the contrary finding that only small 
groups can immunise themselves against the emergence of factions. They 
write: ‘... the subdivision of juries is justified since only these subunits will not 
themselves have internal psychological divisions.’ (Ibid, 358) However, the 
facilitator should rotate the groups so that all participants can enjoy face-to-face 
interaction.
Thirdly, all contributions by participants must be equally valued. The authors 
write: There Is a certain cheery optimism in the literature of citizens' juries 
which holds that social barriers against participation are dissolved simply in the 
course of a jury’s deliberations.’ (Ibid, 359) However, the authors argue that 
practical ground rules for conduct might need to be established, and they 
suggest the jurors produce their own codes of conduct. Furthermore, the small 
group system may help make sure that all views are equally valued.
Finally, participants must have clear and accepted roles. (Ibid, 357) The 
authors cite two conceptions of the facilitation role. This first is a hands-off 
approach. Here, the facilitator minimises his/her involvement in order to 
empower the jurors. This often proves counterproductive because it allows 
strongly opinionated participants to then hijack deliberations and dominate 
proceedings. Przeworski (1998) criticises deliberative democracy on the 
grounds that 'ideological domination’ by certain participants is inevitable, as
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strong minds’ will strive to transform the beliefs of others. Stokes (1998) also 
talks about the general social phenomenon of preference inducement’, which 
may act on any social or political group. Deliberative forums, she argues, are 
particularly susceptible to the inducement of artificial or pseudo preferences by 
both fellow participants and broader societal norms and expectations. The point 
is that the facilitator has a crucial role in trying to minimise such pathologies of 
deliberation. A second ‘hands-on’ approach grants the facilitator a far more pro­
active role in maintaining order and reducing inequality. However, this may 
produce a dependent emotional culture. Thompson and Hoggett argue that one 
possible solution to the problem of defining and organising these two 
contradictory roles may be to appoint two facilitators, each with their own 
distinct responsibilities. The authors write:
The first is a "jury facilitator” whose role is to organise the task of 
deliberation, and the second is a “process facilitator” who acts as a “jurors' 
friend ”. While the former is in charge of time keeping, note taking, ensuring 
the jury sticks to the agenda and so on, the latter's role is to support the 
ordinary jurors in whatever way necessary -  for example, encouraging then 
to speak in their own voices, to express contrary thoughts, to be creative 
and so on.' (Ibid, 361)
In this section, the possible advantages of using a citizens' jury to help 
resolve the genetics and insurance dilemma have been presented. The process 
was juxtaposed to existing systems of representative decision-making, which 
were shown in previous chapters to have proved inadequate as an equitable 
means of balancing competing interests on this controversial issue. However, 
contemporary experiments in citizen participation have been shown to be 
deeply flawed, so an ’ideal’ model has been suggested. This model substitutes 
the goal of 'inclusiveness' for the goal of ‘representation’ and seeks to give far
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greater power and control to citizens. However, there are still a number of 
persistent problems with the method. In particular, difficulties concerning 
democratic legitimacy, the process of facilitation, and the procedural constraints 
imposed on jurors, might threaten the practical realisation of such an idealistic 
model. If we are to assess the suitability of the method, these difficulties require 
a response.
4.3. Flaws of the Citizens’ Jury Process
Despite the apparent attractiveness of a revised citizens' jury method of 
decision-making, a number of challenges still face the model. This section will 
reveal the arguments against the suitability of the model and assess whether or 
not they are pathological.
4 .3 .1  The problem of proceduralism
The first problem with the account given above concerns the internal 
contradiction between the objection to representative democracy because of its 
proceduralism, and the specification of certain procedural preconditions for 
effective deliberation in the citizens’ jury. The opening section of this chapter 
argued that representative institutions essentially fail because their elaboration 
of strict procedural rules to ensure the representation of all interests diverts 
attention from the quality of deliberation. However, even in the citizens' jury, it 
became necessary to establish certain procedures and rules to ensure good 
management of deliberating citizens. Johnson (1998) argues that advocates of 
deliberation, if they truly seek to foster democratic legitimacy and fairness, must 
apply the same critical standards to their own approach that they do to the
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aggregate and social choice models. The imposition of certain rules of 
behaviour in the forum, and limitations on the range of views permitted, are 
considered by Johnson to be one area where deliberative democrats show 
themselves to be as constraining and superfluously proscriptive as their 
opponents. (Johnson, op cit, 164)
However, one could argue that opposition to representative institutions is 
based not so much on the mere existence of proceduralism within their formal 
constitutions, but on the basis that such institutions appear to take-for-granted 
that proceduralism on its own may guarantee fair representation and good 
quality outcomes. Although the citizens’ jury still requires the adherence to 
certain rules and regulations, there is an additional commitment to the quality of 
deliberation, which may render the model more suitable as a means of 
achieving rational and equitable decisions.
Another way to avoid the apparent contradiction may be to consider the work 
of sociologist, J.M. Atkinson (1982). His paper on formality in institutional life 
sought to reveal the impact proceduralism may have on the way actions are 
identified as being ‘formal’ or ‘informal’. The evidence suggested that a taken- 
for-granted model of conversational interaction is often used by lay and 
professional analysts to assess the formality or informality of particular social 
settings. Atkinson argued that such procedures result ‘...in evaluative 
interpretations which fail to address the question of how such interactions may 
be operating to produce orderliness in the settings where they are found.' 
(Atkinson, 1982, 86) Atkinson developed this theme in relation to the way 
recurrent features of multi-party interaction, such as those found in citizens' 
juries, may provide solutions to the practical problem of creating and sustaining
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the attentiveness of participants. The central idea was that certain non- 
conversational rules (which help render the action formal rather than informal) 
may in fact be vital for the practical accomplishment of the setting's goals.
Atkinson rallied against those who believed it might be advantageous to 
render formal settings less formal. He wrote:
‘ ... the distinction between formality’ and 'informality' is used evaluatively, 
with formality' a source of nervousness and something to be avoided, and 
‘informality’ being equated with a ‘relaxed atmosphere' in which there need 
be few inhibitions about speaking.' (Ibid, 95)
Analysts have identified settings as formal or informal by reference to 
interactions noticeably different from those found in the production of other 
conversational encounters. As group size increases, the provisions for 
maintaining orderliness and participant's attentiveness are eroded to the extent 
that modifications to conversational practice may become relevant. Non- 
conversational procedures may therefore be necessary to ensure that order is 
maintained in multi-party settings. Atkinson writes:
Attempts to make courts [or any multi-party setting] 'more informal' ... may 
call for the abolition of a whole range of evidential and procedural rules 
dealing with what might be talked about and who might speak when -  in 
spite of the fact that it is not clear how the orderly conduct of proceedings 
within finite time limits could be assured in the absence of at least some 
non-conversational procedures.' (ibid, 114)
In summary, both conversational and non-conversational procedures are a 
crucial element of any multi-party setting, because they ensure order is 
maintained and local objectives are accomplished. Procedures in the citizens’ 
jury exist primarily to enhance the quality of communication between
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participants. This is very different from the elaborate constitutional procedures 
that determine the formal structure and practices of representative institutions. 
So, although there may appear to be a contradiction in rejecting proceduralism 
as it applies to representative democracies, but an acceptance of it as it applies 
to deliberative institutions, once the subtle differences of what these procedures 
constitute are recognised, the contradiction appears less problematic. 
Atkinson's work provides an entry point for more subtle and nuanced 
considerations of proceduralism in multi-party settings. Such considerations 
may support the need for specified conversational and non-conversational rules 
within citizens’ juries. Although such procedures may render the jury a more 
formal social setting, they may be essential if the jury is to locally accomplish its 
goals. Furthermore, such procedures appear qualitatively different from those 
used to constrain representative institutions, so the apparent contradiction need 
not prove pathological.
4 .3 .2 .  Difficulties Around Facilitation
It has been argued that the advantages citizens' juries might bring to 
policymaking on the genetics and insurance issue are dependent on effective 
management and facilitation of the deliberative process. A number of crucial 
issues regarding facilitation were raised and an ideal formulation of the 
deliberative process was presented. However, it is necessary to look more 
critically at facilitation, through empirical work in cognate fields, in order to fully 
assess the suitability of the citizens’ jury model. Might evidence from other 
social settings dependent on facilitation render the ideal model of the citizens’ 
jury impractical?
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Evidence from studies on mediation and counselling, as well as sociological 
work on group decision-making, reveals a number of difficulties with facilitation. 
The problem of group psychology has already been discussed through the work 
of Thompson and Hoggett. They tried to reveal the ways advocates of the 
citizens’ jury could use social psychology to enhance the process. However, 
further investigation is required, because the facilitation process within citizens’ 
juries is so susceptible to pathological social and psychological effects.
Greatbatch & Dingwall’s (1999) work on divorce mediation highlights a 
common problem with the process of facilitation. Their research revealed the 
various ways in which participants in mediation sessions can, consciously or 
subconsciously, marginalise or prioritise certain issues to such an extent that 
the social dynamic of the encounter is fundamentally changed. The authors 
looked specifically at the marginalisation of domestic violence in divorce 
mediation encounters. They discovered that although mediators rarely 
questioned the validity of clients’ accounts of domestic violence, they often 
sidelined them ’... by proposing that they lay beyond the scope of the sessions 
and/or by shifting to different topics.’ (Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1999, 177) The 
authors suggest two possible reasons why the counsellors might have 
marginalised the issue. Firstly, the mediators may not have considered the 
mediation session to be the most suitable venue for exploring domestic 
violence. Secondly, particular characteristics of the clients may have led the 
mediators to conclude that the issue was not particularly serious.
However, closer inspection of the transcripts revealed that the process of 
marginalisation did not always begin with mediator intervention. Instead,
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it began with the disputants' allegations which were produced in ways 
which could be heard either to minimise the severity and impact of the 
violence or to raise the possibility that they were not serious' accusations.
Thus the allegations were open to interpretations which could justify and 
perhaps lead to their marginalization by the mediators.' (Ibid, 177)
The authors cite a number of examples where the issue of violence was 
marginalised through the social interaction of participants. They describe 
marginalisation as a general social phenomenon, which often arises only 
because the disputants formulate their accusations in such a way to permit 
marginalisation. The authors write: ‘All the mediators subsequently undertake 
marginalizing actions, which include remaining silent, asking questions on 
different topics, treating the reported incidents as non-serious, and/or ruling the 
issue out of bounds.’ (Ibid, 185)
This evidence has significant implications for the facilitation process of the 
citizens' jury. The marginalisation of certain issues, arising from the actions of 
either facilitators or participants, appears to be inevitable in any social setting 
defined by dynamic interactions. This has been a long recognised problem in 
genetic counselling sessions. Third-party mediators often find it incredibly 
difficult to ensure choices made by clients are both informed and made freely. 
Even if counsellors are noble in their intent, and try to remain impartial, 
conversational cues and implicit, rather than explicit, suggestions can affect the 
nature of decision-making. In the past, genetic counselling came under strong 
criticism as counsellors appeared to coerce clients into making particular 
reproductive decisions. Attempts have been made to render the process less 
judgemental, but problems do persist. Despite the medical profession's claim to 
stand morally neutral when consulting with patients, the reality often belies this. 
Steinberg’s (1997) research on the practice of IVF (In Vitro Fertilization) 
treatment found that some medical practices: ‘... reflect, reproduce, and
319
perhaps most importantly, (re)normalise eugenic sensibilities.' (Steinberg, 1997, 
76) In particular, she argues that IVF often normalises the heterosexual family, 
which is judged to be the only ‘normal’ family. Patient selection often reflects 
these eugenic sensibilities. Geneticists and counsellors may not even be aware 
that their value judgements are impacting on choice. In fact, Mahowald (1998) 
argues that non-directive counselling may not necessarily be a good thing. 
Some people welcome directness as they often crave professional advice and 
wish everything to be 'out in the open'.
A facilitator managing a citizens' jury is placed in a similar position to genetic 
counsellors and other kinds of mediators. They are expected to be impartial, 
and merely facilitate juror deliberations, yet the evidence suggests that this may 
ultimately be impossible. It may not even be desirable. They may, as the social 
dynamic evolves, contribute to the marginalisation, or indeed prioritisation, of 
particular issues, and therefore play an undue role in the outcome of the 
proceedings. This process of marginalisation may not even be conscious. It 
might simply be a 'normal' response to the rhetorical form of participant 
accounts. Furthermore, some jurors may expect cues from the ‘expert’, and 
positively embrace their contribution. This idea was touched upon when 
discussing the social psychology of deliberating groups. These issues are 
extremely difficult to resolve, and as such may necessitate the citizens' jury 
being regarded more as a regulatory ideal. There are some practical means by 
which the negative effects of facilitation may be reduced, but a deeper 
understanding of group psychology is still required.
At this point, it would be useful to consider the work of Simmel. Simmel was a 
conflict sociologist who was interested in the impact of group size on the nature 
of group interaction. His work is pertinent to these issues of facilitation. Simmel
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recognised the problems that can emerge when one moves from a dyad' to a 
'triad' form of interaction. The dyad is a relatively straightforward social 
encounter, in that that each participant can present him/herself in such a way 
that their identity is preserved. Furthermore, each can end the encounter by 
simply withdrawing from it. However, in a triad there is a significant change in 
the form of interaction. Strategies emerge that may engender competition, 
alliances, and mediation. The consequence may be the emergence of a group 
structure independent of the individuals constituted within it. Individuals in the 
triad will more likely feel compelled to sublimate aspects of their individuality in 
order to participate. Simmel believed that the move from a two-person to three- 
person group was the single most important marginal change in group size; far 
more significant than moving from say fifty people to a thousand.
The problem of group psychology was discussed earlier. Simmel 
demonstrates how difficult the task of effectively managing the process may 
ultimately prove. One can never really know if the consequences of third-party 
involvement in the social encounter will be positive or negative. The third person 
could be a source of mediation and promote group unity. However, there is 
always the chance that he/she will be a source of conflict. The point is that 
facilitation in citizens' juries is subject to the same complex problems as 
mediation or counselling in other social settings. As we move from dyadic to 
triadic relationships, interaction is likely to become far less stable. However, it 
may also become far more effective. Because there are both positive and 
negative consequences associated with the facilitator's role, effective 
management of the process is crucial. The problem lies in understanding the 
true nature of group decision-making, and establishing a pragmatic role for the
32 1
facilitator. Until more work in this area has been completed, the facilitation 
process can be presented only as a regulatory ideal or aspiration.
4.3.3. Difficulties Around Juror Deliberation
In the previous section, the advantages of deliberation were presented. It was 
argued that deliberative models might widen the scope for rational and de- 
politlclsed engagement with contentious issues. However, again there may be 
problems with this optimistic view. Evidence from jury deliberations suggest that 
the ideal of equal citizens reaching fair and enlightened decisions is often a 
naive ideal.
Sommer et al (2001) cite two experiments that examined group decision­
making in legal juries and found that pre-established decision criteria often led 
to outcomes that violated distributive justice. The first experiment revealed that 
noncompliant jurors in a civil trial were biased when they awarded damages for 
negligence when the decision-criteria explicitly prohibited an award. They were 
more likely to absolve the plaintiff of negligence, if negligence on his or her part 
precluded an award for damages. The second experiment replicated the first at 
a group level and ‘... revealed that juries also biased their attributions of 
negligence to justify reducing damages when the decision-criteria required an 
excessive award.’ (Horowitz et al, 2001, 309) Jurors tended to absolve the 
defendant of negligence when such negligence required a high award for 
damages. This evidence suggests that juries may often fail to comply with the 
law. There is always a possibility that juries may recruit information to reach a 
desired rather than an objective result. Noncompliant jurors justified their 
decisions by recruiting and discussing information that supported their
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decisions, but often ignored information that was contradictory (or favoured the 
opposing party).
Another study, by Winship (2000), discovered that jurors often sideline the 
evidence and draw on their own personal or group narratives. Group verdicts 
are often the product of ‘...preferences, expectations, inferences and stories 
that individual jurors brought to the deliberations.’ (Winship, 2000, 552) There is 
always a risk that juries might act in a populist manner; basing decisions on 
what they think the majority desires rather than what is ‘right’ and 'equitable'. In 
this sense, their actions might be analogous to political representatives who 
always consider a broader ‘public mood’. One must ask if this problem is likely 
to reveal itself In the citizens’ jury. If so, the role of the facilitator, and the 
formulation of procedural rules, may become crucial. There is always a risk that 
jurors will act In a populist manner, or produce agreement, but on the wrong 
policies. The evidence from experiments with legal juries shows how 
participants may even ignore the procedural framework and reach decisions 
that undermine it. There is no way of knowing a priori how a particular ju ry will 
deliberate. They are liable to suffer the same problems faced by all decision­
making bodies. However, as long as this is recognised, it may be possible to 
reduce the negative impact of individual non-compliance.
There are a number of problems with the deliberative aspect of citizens’ 
juries. It is an open question as to whether basic ideological agreement is 
required before deliberation can begin, or if successful deliberation itself 
diminishes ideological divisions at a later date. Participants must certainly 
agree, prior to deliberation, to adhere to certain rules of deliberation. However, 
they do not have to be in ideological agreement on the specific issue being
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deliberated. As was stated earlier, emotional commitment to a belief or attitude 
is something that ought to be part of the deliberative process. Through 
discursive discussion, participants are expected to subject their beliefs to critical 
public scrutiny. The hope is that good decisions/reasons will emerge collectively 
from this process. This may be an abstract ideal, but it could still bring many 
advantages to the policy process.
It is perhaps right to criticise the cheery optimism of many deliberative 
democrats, who often fail to recognise the limitations of their approach, but it 
would be wrong to reject the model outright because it may never fully live up to 
its lofty ideals. Citizens are not ideological robots who will be truly objective, 
rational, and de-situated. But neither should we assume they are totally 
irrational, emotional, and permanently driven by their social situatedness. There 
is likely to be a middle ground that the citizens’ jury can attempt to tap into. 
Whether it succeeds will depend on the organisation and management of the 
jury, and the extent to which it recognises the limitations of group decision­
making.
4 .3 .4  Citizens' Juries and Democratic Legitimacy
One final difficulty with the method presented concerns the extent to which 
citizens' juries achieve democratic legitimacy if they are non-representative. 
Earlier, it was argued that the goal of the model should be to promote 
inclusiveness rather than representation. This indeed leads to the fundamental 
problem of how one ensures that decisions are based on merit rather than the 
ability of committed participants to negotiate amongst themselves. Even the
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apathetic must be assured that decisions that may affect them are based on 
good evidence.
One could argue that this is not a problem exclusive to the citizens’ jury. 
Representative institutions are constantly criticised for not being truly 
representative, and the apathetic constantly challenge the legitimacy of 
policymaking. The difference with the citizens’ jury model is that it explicitly 
recognises the democratic deficit inherent to many liberal, representative 
institutions. Rather than strive for the same elusive goal of true representation, it 
promotes the alternative, and perhaps more realistic, goal of inclusivity. If it is 
successful in reaching that goal, it is likely that members of the jury will 
constitute a good cross-section of the general population; perhaps greater than 
is found in many representative institutions. However, this cannot be taken for 
granted as it is far from a trivial point. It is perhaps the greatest barrier to the 
institutionalisation of the method. More empirical work is required to investigate 
the extent to which decisions by citizens’ juries adequately take account of the 
diverse interests and groups within society, and base decisions on the best 
available evidence. It is difficult to state exactly what a fair evaluation would 
constitute. How do we study the citizens’ jury? It would most likely require in- 
depth analyses of juror deliberations and an assessment of how they interact 
when discussing witness testimony. A criteria for assessing the extent to which 
final verdicts correspond to the ideals of rational, equitable, and non-partisan 
decision-making would also need to be established. This may prove difficult, but 
it is not impossible.
This section has raised a number of difficulties associated with the citizens’ 
jury method. Evidence from cognate fields has demonstrated that it is perhaps 
best to regard the citizens' jury at this point as a regulatory ideal, rather than an
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established practical method for improving decision-making. However, it is likely 
that the problems identified with the process will not prove pathological. It is 
possible to resolve some of the issues, or at least mitigate their impact, by 
refining the way in which the process is organised and managed. Furthermore, 
many of the problems are not ones exclusive to the deliberative model, so there 
is a strong chance that the method may be suitable for use on the genetics and 
insurance problem. Such an issue may in fact be a good candidate for 
experimentation with the citizens’ jury method.
Before concluding this chapter, one more issue needs to be looked at if we 
are to fully assess the viability of the citizens' jury. This is public understanding 
of science and expertise, which has crucial implications for the witness 
testimony aspect of the citizens' jury.
5. THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE AS CENTRAL TO CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION AND THE DEMOCRATISATION OF DECISION-MAKING
The suitability of the citizens’ jury is in part dependent on recognition of lay 
citizens' competence to understand, disseminate, and perhaps challenge 
received scientific and expert opinion. Recent work in the public understanding 
of science literature may support the case for the citizens' jury.
5.1. The ‘Public’ and the ir A ttitudes to Science
Before considering the literature on the public understanding of science, it is 
important to unpack the very term ‘Public’. It is necessary to appreciate that the 
juxtaposition of 'public' and 'expert', is an artificial construct. For example, the
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identity of 'experts' in a particular scientific discipline is not defined exclusively 
by their specific expertise, technical competence, and beliefs within that body of 
knowledge. At the same time, such individuals are non-experts in those fields 
they have acquired no formal training in. However, Sclove (1995) argues that, 
‘Although experts are also citizens ... their views are structured by their expert 
status.’ (Sclove, 1995, 52) When we talk about the public attitude to, or 
knowledge of, a specific scientific field of enquiry, we are referring to a set of 
assumptions, beliefs, and interests that exclude a particular institutionalised 
form of scientific expertise. This may seem a trivial point, but it is important to 
recognise that 'the public’ is an artificial construct used to polarise the 
differential interests and understandings of 'experts’ and non-experts’.
Various studies have revealed differences in attitude and understanding of 
science between experts' and ’non-experts', and ‘informed’ and ’uninformed’ 
publics . Evans and Durant (1995) discovered that greater knowledge 
correlates strongly to positive attitudes towards useful’ science, but negative 
attitudes towards morally contentious and ‘non-useful’ areas of research. 
(Evans & Durant, 1995, 70)3 Furthermore, low scientific knowledge was 
discovered to have a strong correlation to more inconsistent and less 
discriminating attitudes to specific areas of research. The ‘informed’ public 
therefore appear less susceptible to context manipulation or preference 
inducement, particularly through such things as the wording of survey questions 
and general framing of science issues. The authors argue that because the 
more informed are generally more discriminating in their attitudes, and less 
likely to support areas of controversial science, policymakers and scientists
3 Mitchie et al. 1995 in their comparison of public and professional attitudes towards genetics, 
also discovered the public to be generally more sceptical than geneticists, ethicists, and 
obstetricians, but the differences were not as acute as many tend to imagine.
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should not presume that a more informed public will inevitably embrace new 
science and technology. (Ibid, 70)
Social scientists have also revealed differences between lay and expert 
understandings of genetics. Parsons and Atkinson (1992), studied the 
construction of risk by female patients carrying the gene for Duchenne Muscular 
Dystrophy. They discovered that many women translate the mathematical figure 
of risk into a descriptive category and use this as a basis for determining 
reproductive behaviour. (Parsons & Atkinson, 1992, 441) The authors provide 
the following example: Mrs Powell and her two daughters all had carrier risks 
that were medically defined as less than 2 per cent. They had not translated 
them Into certain carrier status but certain exemption. They said very clearly 
that none of them was a carrier.’ (Ibid, 441) The authors claim that through the 
process of translation from ordinal to categorical measurements, a great deal of 
important information can be lost.
Many patients often display a poor understanding of basic Mendelian 
genetics. Richards (1996a) has documented the personal narratives of various 
individuals at-risk of genetic-based diseases. One patient stated:, 'I felt that I 
would get breast cancer as my body was similar to my mother’s in many ways.' 
(cited in Richards, 1996a, 28) Lay members of the public may often associate 
physical similarities with shared genetic fates. This data suggests a need for 
greater public education on basic genetics. Richards (1996b) argues that: ‘ ... 
the starting point for genetic education should be existing lay knowledge and 
the social processes that support this.’ (Richards, 1996b, 226) Pritchard (1993) 
suggests that the point of entry for genetics education ought to be the doctor- 
patient interface. Here, the non-expert patient could be treated less as a
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passive recipient of information and become an equal and informed participant 
in the assessment of their risk. (Pritchard, 1993, 10)
These kinds of studies illuminate striking disparities in knowledge between 
experts and the public. Such research may be crucial to the efficacy of public- 
centred decision-making processes. However, it may be inappropriate to frame 
the issue in terms of the public’s 'knowledge-deficit' or “'ignorance' of science. 
Although a certain level of education may be essential, there is far more to 
science policymaking than simply this. Although lay citizens may often engage 
with science differently than the 'experts’, their alternative explanatory 
framework might be recognised as a legitimate input into the normative policy 
process.
5.2. Beyond a ‘Knowledge Deficit’ Model
Until recently, the problem of public ambivalence towards science policy, and 
concerns that citizens were not positively engaging with technological progress, 
was regarded as a consequence of deficiencies in scientific literacy. This 
became known as the 'knowledge deficit’ model, which was rooted in an 
Enlightenment view of scientific knowledge. Because, 'science' was considered 
a coherent and rational search for indubitable truth, based on universally 
applicable methods, engagement with science policy was seen to require a 
degree of technical competency. Many policymakers considered the increasing 
communication gap between science and the public to be an inevitable 
consequence of specialisation. They lobbied for improved public education on 
the fundamental principles of science in the hope that this would make it easier 
to proselytise sceptical publics into the scientific faith. A recent MORI (2000a) 
investigation revealed that many scientists consider 'knowledge deficit' to be the
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greatest hurdle for a more 'informed' public understanding of science. More 
significantly, many scientists expressed the belief that they should retain 
primary responsibility for communicating the ethical and social implications of 
their work. (MORI, 2000a, 3)
Most scientists endeavour to protect their existing monopoly over scientific 
'expertise' by erecting what Kerr et al (1997) refer to as ‘discursive boundaries’. 
In their interviews with genetics professionals, the authors discovered that most 
respondents believed in an independent and objective science, established 
boundaries to demarcate 'good' and bad’ science, and used a rhetoric of 
neutrality in order to protect themselves from blame for the social 
consequences of their work. (Kerr et al, 1997, 291) They also expressed a 
desire to educate the 'ignorant' public. (Ibid, 291) Similarly, Ettore (1999) has 
portrayed genetics experts as storytellers’ and 'producers of genetic ideology' 
who:
‘ ... construct complex genetic narratives accessible for popular 
consumption ... This is an important, if not the most important, part of 
"genetics work” , establishing their scientific and cultural authority by the 
stories scientists tell, the metaphors they use ... and the global range of 
their influence.' (Ettore, 1999, 40)
Bensaude-Vincent (2001) argues that although the phenomenon of a 
knowledge and communication gap is not new, the emphasis on an ignorant 
public only really began in the mid-twentieth century. She argues that the 
advent of cold war physics, and the domination of the military-industrial 
complex, marginalised the role of public opinion. Before science became 
'industrialised' and 'institutionalised', there was no suggestion that the public 
could not be active contributors to scientific progress. The eighteenth century
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was very much defined by the popular science of amateurs, who conducted 
their experiments in public and appeared to embrace the contributions of lay 
citizens.
In the context of contemporary public engagement with science policy, it 
might be necessary to try and recapture the Enlightenment view of public 
opinion and reconceptualise the positivist view of science. The end of the cold 
war, and the current domination of the biological sciences (which do not fit so 
easily within a monolithic positivist view of science and expertise), may provide 
the necessary access point for re-configuring the historically subservient 
relationship between scientists and the public.
The old ‘knowledge deficit’ model appears to be untenable in the context of 
the biological sciences. The fragmentary nature of the biological sciences has 
created a multiplicity of experts with knowledge and technical proficiency within 
increasingly narrow sub-disciplines. The policy debate on genetics and 
insurance illustrates how difficult it is to find a single ’expert’ with access to the 
whole picture'. Instead, there is a diverse range of knowledge domains 
(encompassing clinicians, molecular biologists, actuaries, insurers, social policy 
experts, interest group representatives, and economists) that are relatively 
independent from each other, and bring to the policy process only a partial 
perspective.
Zimmerman (1999) cites ‘... the lack of complete information, even in the 
hands o f experts, with respect to the ultimate success or predictability of many 
of the new applications of science' (Zimmerman, 1999, 229, my italics) as 
contributing to public controversy and ambivalence. In fact, in the case of
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genetic information and insurance, the 'Knowledge deficit’ model was used 
predominantly by insurers to label their critics ‘ignorant’ of insurance as a 
specific form of expertise. The clinical and scientific community have at least 
tried to engage with non-scientists without simply replicating the positivist view 
of science4. However, because insurers never contributed to the public 
understanding of science debates, they have remained largely wedded to the 
'knowledge deficit' mindset.
Nevertheless, some have argued that we should not allow increased public 
involvement to denigrate the legitimacy of scientific expertise. Miller (2001) 
argues that even without the deficit model there will always be a knowledge 
deficit. He writes: “We do not want a public understanding of science political 
correctness in which the very idea that scientists are more knowledgeable than 
ordinary citizens is taboo.’ (Miller, 2001, 118) Although Miller welcomes public 
involvement, he argues that citizens must be able to recognise scientific 
controversy without rejecting science itself. Stern (1991) argues that citizens 
should be taught the meaning of scientific disagreement. If this educative 
process avoids portraying science as pure and incontrovertible, citizens might 
become less confused when confronted with the inevitable conflicts that define 
contemporary science. (Stern, 1991,112)
This literature suggests that the scientists who appear as witnesses in 
citizens’ juries might still have an educative role to play. As Garland (1999) 
rightly points out: ‘Society needs geneticists to describe factually what is known 
about genetics and what can be done.’ (Garland, 1999, 250) The crucial point,
4 Geneticists, more than most scientific experts', often speak of the need for more active dialogue 
with the public on the applications of genetic technology. This is certainly a positive development 
but should be observed with a critical eye. It may well be that geneticists simply wish to use public 
forums to defend their scientific practices and convince an increasingly sceptical public, rather 
than partake in an equal and politically neutral exchange of ideas.
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however, is that the transference of knowledge and information from expert to 
non-expert should not be based on an assumption of knowledge-deficit. 
Instead, the critical skills, experiences, and 'expertise' of the citizens should be 
recognised as a legitimate input to the process. Knowledge of esoteric science 
is not necessarily essential for developing science policy. As Fuller (1997) 
argues:,'... most of what non-scientists need to know in order to make informed 
public judgements about science fall under the rubric of history, philosophy, and 
sociology of science, rather than the technical content of scientific subjects.’ 
(Fuller, 1997, 10)
Although it is necessary to recognise that citizens may competently judge the 
validity of competing knowledge claims, equally important are the socially 
embedded lay perceptions of science that professionals are often either 
ignorant of, or denigrate as irrational. Black (1998) argues that such lay 
perceptions: ‘are not arbitrary or irrational but based on identifiable criteria, 
exhibit a systematic pattern, and are institutionally embedded. It is the 
acceptance of this proposition which has to underlie any system of regulation 
which seeks to facilitate full integration.’ (Black, 1998, 63) Similarly, Condit 
(1999b) writes: The public is not ignorant and irrational, but portrayed so only 
because elites such as social critics and scientists perceive that the public 
disagrees with their own views.' (Condit, 1999, 177) Her research discovered 
that the public were not always passive recipients of genetic knowledge. They 
often read scientific and media accounts critically and intelligently.
However, the suggestion that citizens are competent enough to engage 
critically with science appears to contradict other evidence presented in this 
thesis. In chapter 2, data revealed that patients often reject medical advice or 
interpret risk in a way that contradicts received wisdom. Earlier in this chapter,
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social science research revealed the apparent ignorance of many patients at- 
risk of certain genetic disorders. If we want to reject the ‘knowledge-deficit’ 
model, these apparent contradictions require a response. One way to get 
around the contradictory evidence might be to argue that the apparent internal 
irrationality of individuals who reject medical advice that directly affects them 
may not necessarily indicate a more general phenomenon of scientific 
ignorance. It may not preclude the possibility that such individuals could 
rationally judge phenomena relating to other people. For example, smokers 
often reject medical advice and may even try to rationalise smoking in a way 
that runs counter to received medical wisdom. However, we should not assume 
they are inherently ignorant of the dangers of smoking and unable to make 
rational decisions on general smoking policy. The fact that many in the medical 
profession smoke indicates that an internal cognitive distinction should be made 
between assessments of individual and group risk. This argument may find 
support from ‘attribution theory’ in social psychology. Attribution theory states 
that people explain their own behaviour differently to how they explain the 
behaviour of others. For example, an individual who is successful may claim 
their success is a result of personal effort. However, when others are 
successful, they may attribute it to luck of the draw. Similarly, an individual who 
fails may attribute his/her failure to unforeseen external social circumstances. 
However, when others fail, they may attribute it to some behavioural defect in 
that individual's personal constitution.
The general point is that people tend to regard advice and principles as 
applying to ‘people in general', but are willing to treat themselves as the 
exception. There is even a degree of rationality to this. Because most medical 
advice is based on statistics, so exceptions are indeed to be expected in the 
normal pattern of events, those who do not take the advice, or operationalise an
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alternative rational framework, may simply be taking a calculated risk based on 
what they believe to be more in-depth knowledge of their own personal 
circumstances. Therefore, the documented 'irrationality' or ‘ignorance’ may not 
undermine the argument that lay citizens can, in principle, come to judge the 
validity of competing knowledge claims and make important science policy 
decisions.
5.3. A New Relationship Between Scientists and the Public
Macintyre (1995) argues that the social context of the new genetics is crucial 
for policy decisions. She argues that 'sound policy’ requires both a good public 
understanding of science and a scientific understanding of the public. She 
writes:
'... it is crucial that laboratory and clinical scientists, doctors, health-service 
administrators, and regulatory authorities are knowledgeable about those 
aspects of our culture and social institutions which are likely to influence 
the introduction of, and response to, the new genetics.' (Macintyre, 1995, 
228)
The knowledge deficit model assumed that a continual one-way flow of 
information from scientists to the public was the only solution to public 
scepticism. The idea was that the public could be convinced to accept the 
legitimacy of any particular technological development if only they were 
'informed' of the science. However, with genetics, it is increasingly difficult to 
separate the science from its social embeddedness. Durant et al (1996) argue 
that:
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'The main consequence of embedding public understanding of the new 
genetics within a contextual rather than a deficit model of the public 
understanding of science is that it points to the need for a far more subtle 
and textured characterisation of the interrelation between speakers, media 
and audiences.' (Durant et al, 1996, 246)
Durant et al point out that DNA has become constitutive of a public discourse 
in which constant shifts in meaning, particularly the transformation from a 
conceptualisation as mere genetic material to a socially connotative part of 
mass culture, must be taken account of if a true public understanding of the new 
genetics is to be framed effectively. Such understandings are never:
... passive reflections of professional, scientific understandings: rather, 
they are active constructs, the products of multiply-mediated historical and 
cultural ... Influences, which may be expected to diverge significantly from 
those professional understandings of science with which they coexist.’ 
(Ibid, 236)
It appears to be imperative that scientists turn to the public and begin to draw 
upon their own unique insights as lay citizens. Locke (2001) believes that an 
SSK approach, which challenges the universalistic claims of Enlightenment 
science, offers the most promising avenue for understanding public 
ambivalence towards rationalised expertise. (Locke, 2001, 4) Eden (1996) also 
seeks to extend the notion of expertise in order to undermine the priority often 
granted to institutionalised scientific rationality. For Eden, true démocratisation 
requires that counter-experts be granted the same legitimacy as mainstream 
experts. (Eden, 1996, 199) Irwin’s (1995) case studies of lay citizens who used 
'local knowledge’ of the environmental impacts of technology to challenge the 
scientific orthodoxy, demonstrate how démocratisation might work. Irwin argued 
that citizen-centred’ science policy could reverse the flow of power in decision­
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making by recognising the public's unique knowledge generating capacities. 
Kerr et al (1998) extended this idea to the genetics debate by arguing that:
‘Expertise is ... not solely the province of professionals, but lay people have 
valuable knowledge and understanding of the social world which equips them to 
discuss the new genetics in a sophisticated and reflexive manner ... technical 
details are but a small part of this “stock of knowledge" and are far from 
fundamental to lay people s sociological intellect and imagination.' (Kerr et al, 
1998, 52)
Bucchi’s (1996) analysis of the communication of scientific discourse 
recognises the reverse flow of information and understanding from the public to 
the scientists. He criticises the 'the canonical account' of public understanding, 
analogous to the deficit model, which assumes that that the public appears only 
at the end of a unilinear cognitive chain. The public only has a role after the 
science has been produced and validated by ‘experts’. (Bucchi, 1996, 376) 
Bucchi writes: ‘As a unidirectional linear communication transfer from one 
sender (the scientific community) to a completely passive receiver (the broad, 
uninformed public), the process should in no way affect the nature and content 
of original information.’ (Ibid, 377)
Bucchi argues that a modification of the ‘continuity model’, which emerged 
from the sociology of science, might reveal the ways in which scientists turn to 
the public during 'marginal crisis situations'. When the science is new and 
contentious, scientists often need public support. Bucchi writes: '... public 
support is particularly necessary when what is at stake is not just the 
negotiation (however massive) of the boundaries but rather their constitution.' 
(Ibid, 382)
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Bucchi claims that crude continuity models try to overcome the canonical view 
of science communication by bounding themselves to a rigid sociology of 
science perspective. They focus their attention on the scientists and take-for- 
granted the public realm. He argues that:
‘ ... communication of science at the popular level may influence core 
scientific practice in many more different and subtle ways than simple 
support and reinforcement ... it can foster the inclusion or exclusion of 
actors or theories from the specialist's discourse, and it can make room for 
new interpretations or confer a different status on existing models by 
linking them to other public issues and themes.' (Ibid, 386)
This idea becomes increasingly pertinent when we consider the witness 
testimony aspect of citizens’ juries. It recognises that deference to the authority 
of 'experts’ may be counterproductive, and that scientists can learn as much 
from the public as the public learns from them.
5.4 Citizen Ju ro rs  Cross-Examining ‘Expert’ W itnesses
The public understanding of science literature has implications for the 
suitability of the citizens’ jury. If the model is to be effective in establishing policy 
on the issue of genetics and insurance, the ‘experts’ who appear as witnesses 
must not assume a ‘knowledge deficit’ model. It is crucial that the dialogue flow 
both ways and jurors be allowed to challenge the testimony. Evidence from 
consensus conferences demonstrates how this can work in practice. A recent 
report on a GM crops conference in Japan revealed that citizens were quite 
willing and able to challenge ‘expert opinion’. The report states:
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lay citizens not only can sufficiently uptake complicated technical issues 
but also can make significant contributions to the development of scientific 
and technological discourse by raising some vital questions from  their own 
standpoints as consumers, parents, students, or agricultural producers.’ 
(Hirakawa, 2001, Para 2.4)
Both jurors and witnesses must be encouraged to regard the process as open 
and mutually beneficial. Experts should be encouraged to reject the 'deficit 
model’ as they present their opinions, and jurors must not prejudge the 
legitimacy of expert testimony. The former is perhaps the most difficult goal to 
accomplice. Evidence suggests that experts, generally try to protect their 
cognitive authority on matters of science and expertise. They also appear 
bounded by an institutional framework that runs counter to democratic 
openness. The citizens’ jury might offer the best opportunity to redress this 
problem. The process can only be effective if experts are not afraid to express 
their opinions. Fuller (2000b) argues that the political theory of science required 
for an open society, and thus for an effective model of scientific decision­
making, is republicanism. He writes:
The open society is possible only in a republican regime, where, unlike 
liberal or communitarian regimes, a clear distinction is drawn between 
staking an idea and staking a life ... This distinction underwrites the 
fundamental principle of the open society: the right to be wrong.' (Fuller, 
2000b, 5)
If expert witnesses are unable to present their views without fear of having their 
careers or reputation damaged, then the knowledge available to jurors for 
deliberation will be inadequate, and may undermine fair, informed, and effective 
decision-making.
Because the genetics and insurance debate has been so controversial, the 
potential for closed-mindedness and ideological obstinacy is high. However, if
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the various witnesses are given assurance that their testimonies will be 
deliberated rationally and equitably, there is no reason why they should 
consider the citizens' jury less legitimate as a decision-making body than the 
current system. However, we are still in the early stages of recognising the 
importance of the public in scientific policymaking. The knowledge-deficit model 
continues to persist in many professional circles. A number of anomalies could 
undermine the realisation of a true citizen-centred science. In particular, many 
still criticise citizen participation methods. Such challenges require a response.
5.5. Critic ism  o f Citizen P artic ipation as Based on a Lack o f Faith in 
Increased Démocratisation o f  Policymaking
The genetics and insurance problem has offered a perfect case study for 
assessing the suitability of the citizens’ jury model. The final question that 
remains is whether criticism of citizen participation is based on a simple lack of 
faith in the further démocratisation of policymaking.
Critics of citizen-centred decision-making often reveal their lack of faith in the 
competency of the public to understand technical details and reach informed 
decisions. Keith Bedell-Pearce reflected this view in his interview. He stated:
As undemocratic as it may seem I'd much rather rely on committees or 
forums of informed, objective individuals. Citizen's juries ... can be swayed 
by advocacy and it's not jus t the advocacy of people in front of you, but all 
of the stuff they pick up from  television programmes through to Watchdog 
or Panorama or whatever. People take a large amount of baggage in with 
them ... I'm not sure that a randomly drawn jury would come to an 
appropriate solution taking on board all the interests involved.
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This general scepticism was shared by most of the interview respondents, but 
insurers and geneticists were most likely to talk in terms of 'knowledge deficit’. 
In commenting on the ABI citizens’ jury, the anonymous insurance underwriter 
explained:
there were people with all respect, who had absolutely no knowledge at 
all ... the majority of the time was taken trying to explain to them the 
difference in policies. We were talking about life and disability insurance 
but they wanted to talk about problems they had with travel insurance.’
Both these comments illustrate that peoples' attitude towards the citizens’ jury 
may be shaped by their knowledge of particular examples. Flawed 
experimentation with citizens’ juries may be worse than none at all, if they give 
people a false impression of the model’s suitability.
Critics may also account for their lack of faith in the process by arguing that 
the method is only suitable for relatively homogenous societies with shared 
belief systems and underlying cultural assumptions. The fact that citizen’s juries 
and consensus conferences tend to have been used most in the Scandinavian 
countries and Japan, appears to support the critics' argument. The efficacy of 
the model may depend on the social and political constitutions of the societies 
in which they are used. This point was revealed in Nelkin’s (1977) comparative 
analysis of technological decision-making and participation in Sweden, The 
Netherlands, and Austria. Citizen participation was affected by the countries' 
very different assumptions about who should participate, which was often 
dependent on how they traditionally dealt with opposition and conflict. 
Sweden's homogeneity and historical tendency to foster participation of citizens 
lay at one extreme, while the historical religious and regional conflicts of the 
Netherlands lay at another. (Nelkin, 1977, 92) These national differences
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affected the quality of citizen participation, and even its basic aims and 
objectives. However, these observations do not necessarily imply that the 
model cannot be transported internationally. Einsiedel et al (2001), drawing on 
case studies of consensus conferences in Denmark, Canada, and Australia, 
argue that:
'Our case study suggests that the consensus conference model is one that 
“travels well" and is easily adapted to contexts outside Europe. All three 
countries are, of course, similar as post-industrial liberal democracies with 
common Western cultural foundations. Having said this, it appears our 
observation still holds when one considers that the model has also been 
applied in Japan and South Korea.’ (Einsiedel, 2001,94)
Although national contexts may influence the quality of citizen models of 
participation, they do not negate its efficacy a priori. Any deviations from the 
ideal of deliberative reasoning may be resolved within any national context. The 
fact that the model seems to work well in a variety of countries serves to 
illustrate its potential malleability. Furthermore, one must be careful not to 
prejudge the effectiveness of participants based upon national historic traditions 
of behaviour. For instance, Japan has an historical tendency towards deference 
to authority, but in the consensus conferences used there, Japanese citizens 
appeared more than willing to challenge received scientific wisdom.
These criticisms of the citizens' jury method may appear at first to provide 
prima facie evidence that the model is simply inappropriate beyond a limited 
public consultation role. However, the basis of such criticisms appears to rest 
on an intuitive lack of faith in the reasoning capacities of citizens a scepticism of 
increased démocratisation more generally, and a belief that the model is 
inappropriate for pluralistic societies. However, such criticisms do not
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necessarily have to prove terminal; rather they may simply require us to make 
procedural changes to the constitution of the method and deploy greater social 
and political resources to encourage and accelerate its practical realisation.
6. CONCLUSION
This chapter sought to assess the suitability of the citizens’ jury model for 
determining policy on the genetics and insurance problem. The assessment 
began by juxtaposing the deliberative model with a weaker 
proceduralist/constitutionalist one. The latter was revealed to be inadequate as 
a rational mechanism for balancing competing interests through evidence- 
based evaluation. The citizens’ jury, as it has been constructed by adherents of 
deliberative democracy, was then presented. However, such experiments in 
participatory politics were criticised for their obsession with representation, and 
their failure to grant citizens any real power. An alternative model was then 
presented; one which promoted the goal of inclusivity and placed citizens at the 
centre of all parts of the policymaking process. Various procedural issues were 
then raised, and the role of facilitators, citizens, and witnesses were 
documented. However, a number of persistent flaws in the process were also 
revealed, and attempts were made to evaluate their likely impact on the 
practical implementation of the model. In the final section, the issue of the public 
understanding of science and expertise was illustrated. It was argued that a far 
stronger recognition of the competence of lay actors to judge the validity of 
competing knowledge claims was required before citizens' juries could be 
contemplated as a legitimate and practical policymaking process.
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Overall, one has to admit that the citizens’ jury method has both advantages 
and disadvantages. It certainly appears to be a method well suited to an issue 
such as genetics and insurance, which engenders controversy and 
ideological/professional dissonance. The current policy mechanisms were 
shown in previous chapters to have foregone rational, evidence-based solutions 
in favour of political expediency; the result being a continuing moratorium in 
which little lasting progress has been made. The citizens’ jury may well be one 
way of exploring the issue in greater depth and establishing policies that treat 
stakeholder accounts more equitably. However, persistent flaws in the model 
cannot be neglected.
There are a number of difficulties around such things as facilitation, group 
behaviour, and democratic legitimacy. One major problem is that the model has 
no formal recognition because it is not institutionalised. However, if it were 
institutionalised, various other problems might arise. For example, if citizens’ 
juries were granted legislative power, then one would have to consider the 
impact of the UK’s harmonisation with other EU and international treaties on its 
practicality and legitimacy. Should unelected citizens determine not only policy 
in the UK, but also other countries? This problem, as well as a number of others 
documented in this chapter, has no simple solution. Therefore, the citizens’ jury 
may have to be presented as a regulatory ideal rather than a practical method 
ready for formal implementation.
It is likely that the method will bring many advantages to the policymaking 
framework, and perhaps lead to more enlightened decision-making on the issue 
at hand. However, far more empirical work will be required, and some 
compromise on the model’s ideal constitution may be necessary, if it is to be
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used as a pragmatic method of decision-making. Perhaps the current 
moratorium on the genetics and insurance issue would be an ideal time to start 
experimenting with the citizens’ jury. At the very least, it may be an appropriate 
time to start thinking about how citizens’ juries might be studied and provide a 
more extensive evaluation. Citizens’ juries are becoming evermore popular in 
various countries around the world. There is therefore increasing amounts of 
data being generated, which might enable us to assess the suitability of the 
model more effectively. The answer to the sixth research question, however, is 
still left relatively open. The model does have many advantages over the 
present system and might improve decision-making on the genetics and 
insurance issue. However, further research is required so that the flaws may be 
ironed out.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis has provided the first extensive sociological analysis of the genetic 
information and life assurance debate in the UK. It has used both original data 
derived from interviews with key stakeholders, as well as secondary data from 
policy documents, reports, and debates, in order to provide a response to a 
number of crucial research questions around this increasingly controversial 
social issue. The genetics and insurance debate in the UK is a perfect case 
study for exploring the variety of ways in which social, political, commercial, and 
scientific values can envelop contemporary policy problems and play a critical 
role in shaping the policy framework. This concluding chapter will rehearse the 
research questions, and assess the extent to which the thesis has succeeded in 
providing an adequate response to them. The chapter will conclude by listing 
some of the limitations of the research and highlighting a number of issues that 
may require further investigation and analysis.
2. SUMMARY AND FURTHER ANALYSIS
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2.1. The im plications of Genetic Inform ation fo r Life Assurance Provision
The first research question asked what would be the most likely social, 
commercial, legal, and ethical implications if life assurance companies were 
permitted to use new genetic tests as an underwriting tool. It also asked if the 
rhetoric of key stakeholders serves to advance or problematise our 
understanding of the theoretical complexities underlying the issue. A second 
related research question asked if key stakeholders operationalise particular 
definitional frameworks around genetic information in order to legitimise 
particular social, political, or professional values. Chapter 2 attempted to 
provide a response to these first two critical research questions.
Chapter 2 began by providing an historical analysis of insurance, risk, and the 
impact of probabilistic reasoning on capitalist society. This revealed two 
important issues relevant to the stated research questions. Firstly, it 
demonstrated that the emergence of insurance from the probabilistic revolution 
concretised a number of commercial principles that have continued relatively 
unchanged to this day. Historically, the insurance industry has been compelled 
to deal with the introduction of novel technologies. Secondly, the historic role of 
insurance within society appeared to challenge the generalised 'risk society’ 
theory of Beck and Giddens. The historical data revealed that insurance has 
always existed primarily as an institution to protect the middle classes from 
financial risk. Because both Beck and Giddens fail to recognise such distributive 
issues around risk, their theories were shown to be inadequate for enabling us 
to understand the complexity of the genetics and insurance problem. Although 
the ‘risk society’ theory may have served an important function by sensitising 
social scientists to the importance of risk as a social phenomenon, its practical
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utility for understanding genetics and insurance was shown to be minimal. 
However, the work of Foucault and Weber did allow for a deeper understanding 
of the differential impacts the probabilistic revolution had on both society, and 
the various social groups constituted within it. The revelation of the historical 
class-bias in insurance provision also proved crucial to our understanding of the 
differential implications of genetic information for access to insurance. The fear 
that insurance companies’ use of genetic information might engender 
widespread social and economic exclusion appears groundless when one 
recognises that the 'poor and vulnerable' have historically been excluded from 
the insurance market.
The second section of chapter 2 began to look at the underlying commercial 
principles of the modern life assurance business. These principles were 
contrasted with those of social insurance systems. It was revealed that the 
'business of discrimination' narrative that underlies the commercial provision of 
insurance products was based on the historical principals of equity’ and the 
'freedom to underwrite’. A lengthy analysis of the standard norms of commercial 
insurance, and its putative social role, revealed a critical issue regarding the 
distribution of social goods through private insurance. If an insurance product is 
considered a non-primary social good’, as opposed to a primary social good', 
then the principle of equity, and the associated process of discriminatory risk- 
assessment, is largely justified. The ethical boundaries of commercial insurance 
were presented as being dependent on the type of social good being 
distributed. If society defines a good as ‘non-primary', then commercial 
providers have a right to use actuarial underwriting to rate applicants and place 
them in an appropriate 'risk pool'. However, if a good becomes recognised as 
something everybody should have a 'right' to access, then the restriction of
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commercial freedom, or the substitution of a social insurance system for a 
private one, could be justified.
This analysis also discussed the important issue of ‘fair' and ‘unfair’ 
discrimination; emotive terms that are often misused by both stakeholders and 
scholars. Fair discrimination is the natural consequence of commercial risk- 
classification. If such classification is based on sound actuarial evidence, many 
claim it is by definition fair. Unfair discrimination, in contrast, may occur if 
insurers rate applicants on imperfect data or allow normative judgements to 
pollute the actuarial decision-making process. The underlying logic is that if 
insurers simply abide by their own long-established principles, there will be no 
unfair discrimination. However, one might wish to argue that discrimination is 
unfair if an individual is denied access to an insurance product defined as a 
primary social good, even if the insurer uses standard actuarial methods. Again, 
it appears that the type of social good being provided is crucial to our 
understanding of what is fair or unfair. What is clear, however, is that both 
concepts are highly complex, and when misused by stakeholders, 
policymakers, or academics, may lead to unjustified demands being placed on 
the commercial sector.
However, insurers were also shown to have problematised this issue of 
fairness. Chapter 2 uncovered the complex rhetorical strategies used by 
representatives of the insurance industry to morally justify their commercial 
practices. The interview transcripts revealed the extent to which respondents 
envelop their ‘business of discrimination' narrative within a social value narrative 
framework. They appeared to shift between commercial, social, and clinical 
values, in order to provide a morally adequate account of commercial freedom. 
Although they were perhaps justified in defending their business interests, by
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presenting themselves as philanthropic distributors of social goods they may 
have problematised our understanding of the issues’ ethical boundaries.
By presenting the commercial role of insurance and its underlying principles, 
and offering a critical analysis of such problematic concepts as fair and unfair 
discrimination, equity, and social exclusion, a solid foundation was built from 
which to explore the Implications of genetic information for life assurance 
provision. The principal conclusion drawn was that genetic information is 
unlikely to have a significant impact on the provision of life assurance. The fear 
of widespread social and economic exclusion (a social implication) was rejected 
because of three revealed facts.
Firstly, the poor and excluded have never really had access to life assurance. 
Therefore, they would unlikely constitute a new ‘genetic underclass' if insurers 
were permitted to use genetic information as an underwriting tool. Secondly, the 
flexibility of a commercial market, coupled with the ability of insurers to create 
novel products for at-risk individuals, would likely mitigate any significant social 
impacts. Finally, genetic information can often rule people into insurance as well 
as out of it. For example, if somebody with a family history of Huntington’s 
disease takes a genetic test and it proves negative, they could acquire a 
standard life assurance policy when previously they would have been rejected. 
This chapter also discovered that the commercial implications were likely to be 
relatively minor. It was more likely that genetic information would simply lead to 
a refinement of existing underwriting practices. Although commercial fears of 
adverse selection were found to have some validity, they were not necessarily 
significant in the case of life assurance provision. Because the provision of life 
assurance requires minimal actuarial underwriting, the introduction of new kinds 
of genetic test information is unlikely to be of much use to a commercial
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underwriter. With regard to potential ethical implications, it was again revealed 
that few new ethical dilemmas or perplexities arise. Furthermore, all potential 
social, commercial, and ethical implications might be rendered innocuous by the 
fact that the insurance industry has demonstrated its creative capacity to create 
novel products for at-risk applicants. The growth in the annuities market was 
signalled as one particularly crucial area; important to any considerations of the 
genetics and life assurance issue.
The emergence of new kinds of genetic information may simply have 
sensitised people to the commercial practices of insurers, and their historical 
use of actuarial data. In this sense, society might want to reconsider the role of 
private insurance and third-party use of clinical information more generally. The 
final section of chapter 2 raised a number of legal/clinical issues around the 
ownership and control of genetic information, as well as the trust relationship’ 
between doctors and patients. It was argued that the use of genetic information 
by insurers does raise some important issues regarding ownership and consent, 
and may fundamentally affect the traditional relationship between clinicians and 
patients. However, the increasing tendency for people to conceptually isolate 
certain kinds of genetic information was also shown to be unjustified. The 
conclusion was drawn that the debate should now be centred on third-party 
access to all medical data, not just the genetic variety.
Once we recognise that new kinds of genetic information will have little impact 
on the existing system of life assurance provision, the question then becomes 
why genetic information has been singled out for special attention. Might 
stakeholders have played a crucial role in rendering genetic information 
special? The second research question sought to investigate the extent to 
which key stakeholders operationalise particular definitional frameworks around
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genetic information to perhaps justify broader social, political, or professional 
agendas. Chapter 2 provided a response to this question. The interview 
accounts revealed that clinicians, patient-support group representatives, and 
insurers alternate particular definitional frameworks, in very specific contexts, in 
order to render their broader social, political, or professional values most 
coherent and logical. They may draw upon either a ‘restricted' or an ‘expanded’ 
definition in order to legitimate a normative belief about how the information 
ought to be used. At times, respondents’ accounts appeared to imply that 
genetic information is no different to family history data or various other kinds of 
medical information (the argument of ‘substantial equivalence’); while at other 
times, respondents seemed to want to treat certain kinds of genetic information 
as special (the argument of non-equivalence). Often, the creation of a particular 
definitional framework appeared to be used to either legitimate or challenge the 
commercial value of the ‘freedom to underwrite'.
However, the interview accounts also revealed that stakeholders representing 
a particular professional constituency do not always have shared opinions and 
values. Julia Cream and Alistair Kent, for example, disagreed on the issue of 
whether or not insurers should be able to access genetic information. They 
therefore used very different rhetorical strategies when constructing a 
definitional framework around genetic information. However, it was certainly the 
case that all respondents used a shifting definitional framework when 
expressing their accounts. This may be one reason why the genetics and 
insurance debate has become so controversial. Both stakeholders and 
academics may have problematised the issue by displaying an inconsistent 
approach to the very definitional boundaries of the debate. By drawing on a 
complex repertoire of social, commercial, and ethical values, insurance industry 
representatives, in particular, revealed themselves at times to be both
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inconsistent and contradictory. For example, they claimed they would not 
request people to take a genetic test as a prerequisite for obtaining insurance 
cover, but then tried to defend the practice of requesting that certain individuals 
take an HIV antibody test. Other stakeholder accounts also appeared to 
engender certain inconsistencies and contradictions, partly because of their 
need to provide a morally adequate account of their beliefs by drawing on a 
broad narrative repertoire.
Overall, chapter 2 demonstrated that genetic information will unlikely have a 
significant impact on the existing provision of life assurance in the UK, although 
the controversy may have served an important purpose in sensitising people to 
the role and function of private insurance in society. The controversy may have 
emerged because of the iconic status genetics seems to enjoy in modern times. 
At the beginning of chapter 2, reference was made to the issue of eugenics. It 
was suggested that the past abuse of biological science for ideological means, 
might have sensitised people to the potential social implications of new genetic 
information. The fact that HIV testing did not raise the same level of concern as 
new kinds of genetic testing, serves to illustrate the special nature often 
ascribed to genetics-based information.
Although it was argued that genetics would have little impact on the life 
assurance industry, it could have an impact on other forms of insurance such as 
health and long-term care cover. Such products might be considered 'primary 
social goods'. Therefore, if society becomes increasingly dependent on private 
forms of insurance to meet these needs, the use of genetic information to rate 
policyholders may prove to be unjustified. A crucial point of this chapter was the 
need to consider the implications genetic information may have for the 
privatisation of welfare. Risk-assessment is morally justified only if the good
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being distributed through a mutuality-based system of insurance is considered a 
non-primary social good.
2.2. Stakeholder Accounts of the ir Concerns about Genetic Inform ation  
and Life Assurance.
The third research question asked: what are the specific concerns of 
stakeholders regarding genetics and insurance, and do their accounts draw on 
a broad set of social, clinical, and commercial values? Chapter 3 focused on 
this research question and provided an extensive sociological analysis of 
stakeholders' interview accounts. Policy documents circulated by relevant 
professional interest groups were also analysed to substantiate the interview 
data.
Both the interview transcripts, and data from relevant professional 
organisations, revealed that stakeholders draw on a broad and complex 
narrative repertoire when giving account of their concerns on this issue. They 
appeared to draw selectively from a social, commercial, clinical, or ethical 
narrative value framework, and marginalise or prioritise certain substantive 
issues, in order to provide a morally adequate account of their beliefs.
Clinicians were found to draw predominantly from both a clinical and social 
value narrative framework, often conflating the two, in order to legitimise their 
belief that commercial freedom may need to be curtailed. Through their 
interview talk, they appeared to marginalise commercial concerns and prioritise 
clinical and social ones. Sometimes, they would appear to recognise the 
concerns of the insurance industry, but would then present a professionally
354
situated account and give ultimate priority to the needs of their patients. Their 
strategy was to argue that restrictions on the commercial ‘right to underwrite’ 
might be justified, because it might prevent social and economic exclusion, 
which would then ensure that all members of society benefit from the genomics 
revolution. Clinicians’ primary concern was that fear of social exclusion might 
prevent people taking genetic tests. Therefore, in order to protect the clinical 
value of testing, clinicians often drew on a ‘politics of inclusion’ narrative.
Patient-support groups also appeared to marginalise commercial values by 
wrapping their rhetoric in a social value narrative framework. Julia Cream, from 
the Alzheimer’s Society, was most critical of insurance industry practices and 
often drew on various configurations of social, commercial, and clinical values in 
order to undermine the ‘business of discrimination' narrative. Insurance industry 
representatives used similar strategies. They frequently prioritised a commercial 
value narrative, but often enveloped this within a social or clinical value 
framework. Through their interview talk, they would shift the conceptual 
boundaries of clinical, social, and commercial values to both marginalise the 
significance of an anti-commercial rhetoric, and trivialise public fears about 
social and economic exclusion. Evidence from policy documents distributed by 
various professional bodies appeared to support the interview data analysis. 
Patient-support groups would often criticise insurance industry practices, 
because they exclude vulnerable groups, while clinical organisations would 
challenge the business of discrimination narrative, because subsequent fears of 
discrimination may reduce patients' willingness to undergo genetic testing.
However, this chapter also revealed a deeper complexity to the stakeholder 
accounts. One hypothesis of this research was that there would be acute
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differences of opinion between insurers, clinicians, and patient-support groups. 
However, this chapter revealed that such broad professional constituencies 
were not homogeneous. Not all members of clinical or patient-support groups 
believed that incumbent forms of legislation were necessary to protect 
individuals from the discriminatory practices of insurers. The contrasts in the 
accounts of Alistair Kent and Julia Cream, and Sandy Raeburn and other 
clinicians, were striking in this regard. Kent and Raeburn accepted commercial 
insurers as important distributors of social goods, whereas Cream perceived 
them as a threat to social and economic inclusion. Therefore, one could 
observe the use of very different rhetorical strategies in their respective 
accounts. It appeared that membership of a particular professional constituency 
was not the principal determining factor of how beliefs are formed. Rather, it 
appeared that individuals’ beliefs, and the rhetorical strategies they used to 
account for these beliefs, was determined more by their level of knowledge of 
the issues' underlying complexity, and the extent to which they had engaged 
constructively with other stakeholders. Nevertheless, some common strategies 
were revealed. For example, although Kent and Cream appeared to be in 
ideological disagreement as to how the issue should be legislated, both 
expressed an explicit commitment to the needs of the at-risk. Subsequently, 
both prioritised a social/clinical value framework when accounting for their 
beliefs. Similarly, Raeburn prioritised clinical values, just like his professional 
colleagues, when he sought to defend existing commercial practices.
In terms of the third research question, we can say that despite some 
anomalies in the accounts, key stakeholders do have a relatively fixed idea of 
how they would like to see the issue resolved. They then appear to use rhetoric 
strategically in order to render their position the most logical, coherent, and 
morally adequate. The kinds of value frameworks prioritised, and those
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marginalised, appear partly determined by the professional situatedness of the 
respondents. One consequence of these strategies is that the protagonists 
appear more professionally and ideologically dissonant. The complex, and 
sometimes inconsistent, use of a variety of value frameworks serves only to 
polarise accounts and add another layer of complexity to the issue. The 
professional dissonance that emerges may serve only to antagonise public 
debates on this issue. If narrowly defined interests and values constantly 
impinge on the policy process, and if stakeholders problematise matters by 
operationalising complex narrative strategies when accounting for their 
concerns, it may become far more difficult to engender informed and equitable 
debate.
2.3. Genetic Inform ation, Life Assurance, and the Policy Process
Following from the assessment of stakeholder accounts, the thesis moved on 
to investigate the policy framework around genetic information and life 
assurance. Chapter 4 sought to provide answers to the fourth research 
question, which asked whether the advisory/regulatory system had produced an 
equitable process that could rationally judge competing narratives, or if political 
decision-makers had granted differential legitimacy to stakeholder evidence. It 
also tried to investigate the extent to which perceived public opinion had 
negatively influenced the strategies of key stakeholders and politicians. This 
would provide an answer to the fifth research question.
Through an extensive sociological analysis of the formal policy process 
around the genetics and life assurance debate, a number of important insights 
began to emerge. The Impetus for a formal political process appeared to
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emerge from growing public fears that the use of genetic information by life 
insurers might lead to widespread social and economic exclusion. The complex 
political rhetoric of key stakeholders, identified in chapter 3, may have played a 
crucial role in shaping the policy and regulatory framework. A critical analysis of 
the advisory committee system, and its inconsistent treatment of interest group 
accounts, revealed the inadequacies of such a deeply entrenched political 
process.
The various committees appeared too narrowly focused and appeared to 
neglect some of the more subtle and complex nuances of the problem. Just like 
the various stakeholders, committee representatives appeared to prioritise or 
marginalise certain substantive issues, draw selectively from a broad narrative 
repertoire, and differentially judge evidence based on what they considered 
politically expedient. The frequent and uncritical use of emotive concepts such 
as ‘discrimination’, ‘social and economic exclusion’, and 'commercial values’, by 
various representatives of committees and advisory groups, appeared to 
underlie the extent to which the process was very much political in nature. A 
lengthy analysis of the House of Commons Select Committee report revealed 
an explicit attempt by politicians to undermine the validity of insurance industry 
accounts by prioritising clinical evidence. Within this report, insurers appeared 
to be portrayed as untrustworthy and motivated only by profit, while clinicians 
appeared to be portrayed as part of a noble profession concerned only with 
enabling society to benefit from the genomics revolution. The clinician's 
evidence was taken largely at face value, but the insurers were forced to defend 
their commercial practices and values. Analysis of the ABI's policy approach 
provided further evidence that the insurance industry are often compelled to 
marginalise their own concerns, and implicitly support a ‘politics of inclusion' 
narrative, in order to demonstrate that they are socially responsible.
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Although a variety of advisory committees were established to investigate the 
broader social, scientific, and ethical implications of genetics for life assurance 
provision, it appeared that most had taken a narrow and relatively 
unsophisticated approach to the problem. Genetic information had been 
narrowly defined, no attempt was made to distinguish insurance products and 
their unique implications, and the 'politics of inclusion' narrative was uncritically 
represented. It seemed that most of the institutions had pre-framed the issue as 
one of a need to 'protect consumers' and the ‘genetically at-risk' from unfair 
discriminatory practices. Again, the analysis of the A B I’s policy approach 
appeared to reflect the political strategising that was required if interest groups 
were to have their views recognised by representative political institutions.
Interview accounts of the policy process revealed a degree of disenchantment 
with the political nature of decision-making on this issue. Although most 
stakeholders accepted the moratorium decision in principle, their lack of faith in 
the process itself was palpable. Insurers believed that the process failed to 
recognise their interests and concerns as legitimate. Clinicians pointed to the 
lack of scientific evidence in the debate. Members of patient-support groups 
also appeared to be selective in which specific committees they approved of. 
Julia Cream, for example, rejected the ABI’s system o f self-regulation but 
praised both the work of the HGC and the House of Commons, because she 
perceived these institutions to be generally supportive of her ideological beliefs.
The question then became: why has this policy process become so 
ideologically and politically dissonant, and why have the representative 
institutions not taken a rational, evidence-based approach to the issue? The
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impact of 'public opinion' and the ‘media’ appeared crucial in this regard. Public 
opinion revealed itself as a central feature in the accounts of stakeholders, the 
media, and members of advisory committees. Even the ABI frequently referred 
to' the public’, and expressed the need to earn their confidence. However, there 
appeared to be little discussion on what the public constituted and what their 
'real' concerns were. Various surveys were criticised for their failure to 
distinguish the 'informed' from the 'uninformed' public, and media accounts 
were criticised for their sensationalism of the issue. It appeared that a potential, 
yet largely undefined, problem had emerged as genetic science had 
progressed. Media representations had then aroused public fears by portraying 
dystopian visions of our pre-determined genetic future. A policy framework was 
then established, but committee representatives, politicians, and stakeholder 
groups then appeared to react uncritically to a perceived view of an incredulous 
public concerned about a potentially large genetic underclass emerging in 
society. Representative institutions were then forced to use political expediency 
as a guide for action, and stakeholders were compelled to respond to the public 
fear issue by demonstrating that their values were consonant with a broader set 
of social values.
The evidence presented in this chapter appeared to support the contention 
that the political process was less rational, focused, and equitable than it would 
have been if pragmatic policymaking acceptable to all stakeholders were the 
primary goal. One might ask what made this issue so different from other 
controversial science/society issues such as ADHD, Gulf War syndrome, BSE, 
or MMR vaccination. All are, in a sense, complex and controversial 
science/society issues that have engendered political conflict, public concern, 
and professional dissonance. Perhaps it is because the term genetics' has 
become such a powerful iconic symbol, and arouses such strong feelings in
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people, that the significance of genetic data for insurance became so inflated 
and conflictual.
The evidence from chapter 4 seemed to provide us with a solid foundation for 
responding to the fourth and fifth research questions. The regulatory/advisory 
system might be judged successful in the sense that no single stakeholder 
group had their values or interests completely undermined by formal legislation. 
However, a number of flaws inherent to this representative system of decision­
making were revealed. The intrusion of 'uninformed' public opinion appears to 
underlie the extent to which the process deviated from rational and equitable 
decision-making. The moratorium decision may have been constructive in the 
sense that It avoided irreversible legislation, but this does not detract from the 
fact that the process provided an inadequate response to this complex issue. 
Since there has been little progress, since the establishment of the moratorium, 
in resolving the underlying conflict over social, commercial, and clinical values, 
there is reason to believe that the controversy will continue. For this reason, it 
was necessary to contemplate an alternative form of decision-making.
2.4. Evaluating the Citizens' Jury Approach to Policymaking.
The final research question asked whether the citizens' jury method was a 
suitable procedure that might improve policy on the genetics and insurance 
issue. Chapter 5 provided an evaluation of the citizens’ jury by illustrating the 
flaws of representative institutions, describing the deliberative turn in democratic 
theory, and raising arguments for and against the use of citizens juries.
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Representative institutions were accused of failing to balance competing 
interests equitably, because they are guided by a political expediency that is 
only practicable by construing society in terms of a number of relatively stable 
and homogenous ideological groups who make demands on government. The 
narrow and uncritical proceduralism of representative bodies, and their 
obsession with representation, was shown to problematise fair and rational 
decision-making on complex science/society issues such as genetics and 
insurance. The deliberative turn in democratic theory, which focuses explicitly 
on the quality of deliberation in modern democracies, was then shown to offer a 
potentially better alternative to the weak democratic systems that currently 
prevail. The citizens’ jury model was then critically evaluated.
The limited number of experiments with citizens’ juries were criticised for 
failing to give jurors any real decision-making power, and insisting that jurors 
constitute a representative sample of the population. They were also criticised 
for failing to take account of the underlying complexity of deliberative theory. An 
ideal’ model of the citizens’ jury was then described and explained. It was 
argued that the citizens’ jury model could provide a suitable means through 
which to establish rational, fair, and pragmatic policies acceptable to all 
stakeholders in the genetics and insurance debate, if certain criteria were met. 
Firstly, jurors would have to be given real decision-making power, or at least be 
assured that their decisions would be taken seriously into account. Secondly, 
the process would have to be guided by the principal of '¡nclusivity' rather than 
‘representation’. Finally, intelligent and pragmatic procedures would need to be 
established to guide jurors, facilitators, and witnesses, and ensure they fulfil 
their roles adequately. Issues such as the public understanding of science were 
shown to be crucial to the success of citizens’ juries. It was argued that, in 
theory, citizens could make intelligent decisions that were not directly influenced
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by ideology, interests, and political bargaining. The genetics and insurance 
problem provides a perfect case study for exploring the suitability of such a 
model, because it is an issue that illuminates so much the inadequacy of 
policymaking
However, a number of crucial issues that may challenge the suitability of the 
model were also presented. Firstly, the chapter highlighted the contradiction in 
trying to criticise representative institutions for their narrow proceduralism, but 
then elaborating a number of rules and procedures necessary for effective 
citizens’ juries. However, by referring to Atkinson’s seminal paper on formality in 
institutional life, it was argued that there might be a qualitative difference 
between the procedures used by representative institutions and those required 
in the citizens’ jury. In particular, certain conversational and non-conversational 
procedural rules were shown to be vital for effective deliberation. Such rules 
often determine whether a social setting is formal or informal, and may be a 
necessary feature of any formal decision-making body. However, to avoid the 
contradiction, it was argued that the procedures constitutive of representative 
institutions are different, and perhaps more problematic, than those required for 
citizens' juries, because they are narrowly defined and apply mainly to structural 
aspects of a democracy rather than conversational/deliberative ones. This 
crucial distinction might render the apparent contradiction innocuous. However, 
the fact that it may still prove difficult to ensure deliberation is fair, rational, and 
based only on ‘good reasons’ may require the model being presented for the 
time being as a regulatory ideal.
Secondly, a number of problems regarding facilitation were revealed. 
Evidence from studies in genetic counselling and mediation revealed that third
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parties involved in formal interactions might, through their presence, marginalise 
or prioritise certain issues, or unduly influence the process of deliberation. 
Reference was made to the inherent problems of group behaviour, revealed by 
sociologists such as Simmel, and social psychologists such as Thompson and 
Hoggett. Such work signalled a number of problems with the organisational 
aspects of deliberation. In particular, It might continue to prove difficult to ensure 
that 'dominant personalities', or emergent group cultures’, do not destroy a 
preferred internal dynamic of group deliberation. This evidence suggested that 
certain rules and procedures might be necessary as a managerial tool. 
However, pathologies of deliberation do not necessarily have to be terminal. 
Problems of group decision-making occur in a variety of institutional settings. 
The fact that the citizens’ jury model explicitly recognises such problems, and 
tries to resolve them, may render the method suitable as a decision-making 
process.
A final problem revealed was the lack of representation in the ‘ideal’ citizens’ 
jury model. How can the process be democratically legitimate if it is not 
representative in some sense? Again, one could argue that this is not a problem 
exclusive to the citizens’ jury. Representative institutions are almost never 
entirely representative, and are constantly criticised for not responding to the 
needs of the apathetic. The citizens’ jury model accepts this problem, and 
argues that the goal of true representation will always remain elusive. 
Therefore, it replaces representation with inclusivity as its primary goal. This 
does not mean that the interests of the apathetic are automatically excluded, or 
that decision-making will be based simply on the bargaining abilities of 
committed citizens. If Inclusivity is a realisable goal, it is likely that the juries will 
constitute a broad range of opinion and include a number of individuals from a 
variety of socio-economic groups. Of course, we cannot simply assume this.
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Further research is necessary to assess if the citizens’ jury can truly live up to 
its ideal.
To answer the final research question, we can say that the citizens’ jury 
could, in principle, prove a legitimate alternative to the existing system of 
decision-making. Although the evaluation did raise a number of persistent 
problems and inconsistencies with the model, there is no compelling reason 
why they cannot in time be resolved. However, more work still needs to be done 
before we can fully evaluate the model. We may need to look more closely at 
the democratic legitimacy of the model, and assess how effective deliberation 
and facilitation can be in real case studies. A number of questions remain to be 
answered. How do we ensure juries do not act in a populist manner? Might 
jurors produce agreement but on the wrong policies? Does successful 
deliberation diminish ideological division at a later date? Might the UK’s 
harmonisation with EU and international treaties affect the legitimacy of 
unelected citizens’ juries? All these are important questions that require further 
analysis. Of course, one would need to establish evaluation criteria. Nobody 
has yet described adequately how a jury might be studied. Perhaps there is a 
need for the academic community to begin assessing more rigorously the 
suitability of alternative methods of decision-making. Most citizens' juries have 
been commissioned and managed by policy groups and think-tanks. Few 
sociologists have tried to study the intricacies of the method. The ESRC might 
be an appropriate body through which to lobby for more research in this area. 
However, there is no reason to believe that the model will prove an unsuitable 
mechanism through which to arbitrate conflicts over the genetics and insurance 
issue. The fact that citizen participation has proved relatively successful in a 
number of different countries, illustrates the malleability of the method.
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Overall, this thesis has provided a number of answers to the important 
research questions it set out to assess. It has provided an extensive 
sociological analysis of a continuing controversy that is yet to be fully resolved, 
and furthered sociological research on the new genetics. The evidence largely 
supported the preliminary assumptions and hypotheses, although others were 
challenged by the data. However, there were limitations to the research, and 
there still are further issues that need to be investigated. To conclude the thesis, 
these will now be detailed.
3. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER 
INVESTIGATION
The qualitative approach used to investigate the stated research questions 
could not provide an exhaustive assessment of the issue. The research could 
certainly have benefited from greater quantitative input. Although quantitative 
studies have been cited in order to substantiate some of the primary arguments, 
further research on how beliefs on this issue may be determined by such things 
as class, gender, age, and professional situatedness, could be useful. 
Furthermore, more focused quantitatively based narrative/discourse analysis of 
the various policy documents circulated by interest groups, as well as media 
accounts of the issue, might also improve on the research findings presented. In 
addition, further qualitative work on stakeholder beliefs might prove useful. This 
research focused only on three types of stakeholder groups. Interviews with 
politicians, members of regulatory authorities, and perhaps members of the 
public might have generated some more useful data. Practical considerations 
dictated that a more narrow and focused qualitative analysis was the most
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appropriate methodological strategy. However, alternative methods must still be 
recognised as equally valid and potentially useful.
In terms of the broader issues associated with the genetics and insurance 
controversy, the following list details some of the issues neglected in this 
research, but perhaps in need of further investigation by sociologists.
• International comparisons on the issue of genetics and insurance 
(this research focused only on the UK genetics and life assurance 
debate).
•  Further analysis on how genetic information may affect access to 
different insurance products. Also worth investigation is the 
implications of genetic testing for employment (this research focused 
only on life assurance.)
•  Further research on the social impact of genetic databases.
•  Continued research on progress made during the current 
moratorium. This research looked only at the debate up until the 
negotiation of the moratorium. Documents released since this date, 
as well as policy debates, may require analysis.
•  A great deal more sociological work on the suitability of citizens’ 
juries. This research presented some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach, but further work will be required to 
validate the model.
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